A SHAPE-SHIFTING CREATURE DISSECTED: POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF JEAN MONNET IN EUROPEAN STUDIES

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue that contemporary political and intellectual conflicts over the right course for European integration are reflected in the historiography of Jean Monnet, the so-called founding father of the European Union (EU). Multiple and mutually antithetical representations of Monnet are explored across the central themes of the contemporary European debate: nationalism, sovereignty, political methodology, and economic ideology. I investigate how the different faces of Monnet are constructed and used to legitimate contradictory scholarly standpoints regarding these central themes. Along the way, I attempt to decipher the puzzle of Monnet’s elevation to the status of a theoretical pioneer in EU Studies. Finally, I also explore how different roles assigned to Monnet in the various narratives of the EU’s origins contribute to the construction of European identity.

Key words: European identity, Jean Monnet, the founding fathers of the EU, politics of history, EU historiography.

INTRODUCTION

There has been a growing emphasis on the need to link the debate on a collective European identity to the complex structure of social relations underlying the European political community (Eder, 2009). Instead of focusing on official EU symbols such as flags and buildings, and measuring the public’s identification with these symbols, identity formation should be grasped in terms of organically emerging narratives that mediate European social conflicts and agendas. According to Eder (2009, p. 435), “collective identities are constructed through stories.” Therefore, the emerging network of competing European narratives is the actual empiric of European identity research. Following this research agenda, I explore multiple scholars’ Jean Monnet narratives and interpret the functions of these narratives in advocating European identity agendas.

Now, the field of EU studies has treated Monnet much as Marxists regard Marx, as psychoanalysts repute Freud, and as sociologists look to Durkheim. In Foucault’s (1984) terms, what makes such founders of discursivity unique is that practitioners perennially return to them in their developments of the discourse begotten by the founder. Indeed, calls to return to Monnet’s so-called first principles and method have been nothing but commonplace in theoretical and political conversations about European integration. The parallel, however,
is uneasy, for Monnet—unlike Marx, Freud or Durkheim—was no grand theorist. The first
president of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High Authority, Monnet left
little in terms of written word—let alone theoretical discourse—for posterity and future
interpretation. More than that, “he would have been astonished to hear one talk of his political
philosophy, and of his method’s general principle” (Fontaine, 1991, p. 17). Jean Monnet was
a cognac salesman, an international troubleshooter, and a skillful political entrepreneur with
no university education and plenty of scorn for book learning and theoretical scholarship.
How did a figure like this become a partner in integration theory building, a partner willingly
appropriated by federalists, functionalists, and intergovernmentalists alike? And what do
such appropriations of a long-dead hero mean in terms of advancing different agendas for
European historiography, European integration theory, and European integration itself? This
is the theme of this paper.

Following Eder, what is of interest here is not the official Monnet symbolism, but
the narratives that have emerged amid political and intellectual conflicts over European
integration. Official EU attempts to construct, popularize, and exploit the heroic narrative
of Europe’s founding fathers have been unmasked, dissected, and classified alongside other
symbols manufactured as part of EU’s identity politics (Shore, 2000; Kaiser, 2011; Peterson
neo-functionalist autopilot mode and became active in the politics of memory, a heroic image
of Monnet has posited him as the “lynchpin of [the] European symbolic universe” (Kølvraa,
2012b, p. 83). The official story of Monnet’s heroic struggle to achieve a united, prosperous,
and peaceful Europe is meant to generate feelings of community and belonging. In day-to-day
EU political rhetoric, Monnet is regularly “called on to admonish those whose ideas about the
direction of Europe were not in tune with the father’s vision,” as interpreted by the European
Commission (Kølvraa, 2012b, p. 79). Students of European identity have unmasked an official
political myth in the making.

As of yet, however, there was no attempt to determine whether the field of EU studies
itself is also complicit in engaging in similar politics of history when it comes to representing
“Mr. Europe.” As George Stocking (1965) once put it in his critique of utilitarian uses of history
in scholarly discourses, “when there is no single framework which unites all the workers in a
field, but rather competing points of view or competing schools, historiography simply extends
the arena of their competition.” Hence, I argue that the political mythology surrounding Jean
Monnet has become a historiographical battleground for different scholarly camps competing
in the contemporary European debate. Mutually antithetical representations of Monnet are
constructed to legitimize different positions in the contemporary debate, and to propose
different identities for Europe.

Just as the Marxism of the intellectual milieu was a far richer and more diverse discourse
than the official Marxism of the Soviet Union, it is also appropriate to explore Monnetism
as it developed in the intellectual milieu, rather than in the Eurospeak of EU officials alone.
“There have always been multiple Marxes,” Terrell Carver (1998, p. 234) writes, “and each
one is a product of a reading strategy.” I make a similar case about Monnet, and explore the
strategies behind various representations of Monnet in European Integration (EI) theory and
historiography, as well as popular-academic literature on the EU. Those strategies and the resulting portrayals of Monnet are then linked to authors’ general theses regarding key issues of the European debate.

It has to be stressed, however, that the set of authors, whose portrayals of Monnet are analyzed in this paper, is not meant to cover all the influential conceptions. Some major authors like Moravcsik are absent from this analysis, and some lesser-known theses are included. Furthermore, no privileged treatment is offered to the reputed giants of EI theory or historiography, whose works are analyzed on the same terms as works in the tradition of popular-academic genre. For, as I will argue, both genres can be equally prone to the politics of founders. The set of scholars was selectively constructed to include examples of all of the positions relevant to the contemporary European debate and its key dividing lines.

The operational meaning of the European debate is derived from David Marquand’s (2011) scheme of the great ambiguities of European integration, developed in his book, *The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe*. The ambiguities are Marquand’s explanandum for all the major contemporary problems of the European project: the financial crisis and subsequent euro crisis, the mismatch between monetary union and fiscal disunion, the disconnect dividing the peoples of Europe from the European elites, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in French and Dutch referendums (and of the Lisbon treaty in Ireland), the declining turnout in European Parliament elections, the looming specter of renascent nationalism and Eurosceptic populism, a lack of unity in European foreign policy, and migration related cultural turmoil among other issues. Marquand argues that these issues have been determined by a number of ambiguities that have accompanied the European project from its very inception. For my purposes I will proceed with the ambiguity of nationalism (first part), the ambiguity of sovereignty (second part), the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of economic ideology (third part).

While chronicling representations of Monnet along these dimensions, I draw insights from the critical historiography of the social sciences to account for the uses and techniques of the politics of founders and origin myths in EU scholarship. The paper may also be characterized as an outline for Monnet’s metabiography. Shapin (2006) describes metabiography as a study of authors and the locations from which they approach a shared biographee. Metabiography explains why heroes of science and politics have many different lives after death, and enlightens the interests that the present has with the image of the dead hero. However, if most metabiographies are diachronical and look at how biographical representations change over time according to the prevailing zeitgeist, I approach Monnet’s image-makers synchronically and look at the present arena of political competition as a source of representational conflicts. Linking the scholarly to the political, I conclude the paper by discussing the relevance of Monnet’s scholarly representations to European identity formation processes.

1. JEAN MONNET: POST-NATIONALIST, EURO-NATIONALIST, OR NATIONALIST?
According to Marquand (2011, p. 52), ever since the 1950’s birth of what Marquand termed the neo-Carolingian empire, the relationship between national identities and European identities has remained ambiguous. Although “the assumptions underpinning the European project were resolutely non-ethnic and implicitly anti-ethnic,” this could never be made explicit, for
ambiguity was a prerequisite for moving forward with the largest support possible (2011, pp. 52-55). Despite the advantages associated with the new model of sober, enlightened, consensual, and post-national rule, a problem emerged: there was a lack of affection for Community institutions. The new model reshaped the European habits of the intellect and of the wallet, but, unlike nationalism, failed to impact the habits of the heart. And when problems associated with multiculturalism, immigration, and ethnic nationalism came to the fore in new member states, Europe witnessed a problem that was more serious than disinterest—the “specter of resnascent nationalism,” (2011, p. 49) with a strong anti-European flavour. Marquand argues that the problem is intrinsic to the European project, for there was no clear vision on the part of the founding fathers on how Europeanism would displace ethnocultural nationalisms. Fudge was a choice of convenience, and the price is being paid now.

What does the ambiguity of ethnicity, as described by Marquand, have to do with Jean Monnet? And is there a historical consensus on where Monnet stood on the issue? Marquand associates Monnet with an anti-ethnic position and places him at the centre of the emergent Euro-nationalist vision. In the post-war period the prevailing teleological understanding of modernity dictated that smaller units necessarily give way to larger, more efficient ones. Just as the Westphalian nation-state had subsumed smaller units, so there was every reason to expect “a wider European entity to subsume the Westphalians states that made it up” (2011, p. 53). A new identity formation would then follow suit. According to Marquand, this was Monnet’s vision: national identities would continue to exist only as residuals of an earlier state of history only to be gradually displaced by Europeanism.

While Monnet’s awareness of the dangers of nationalism is well documented, Marquand’s representation of Monnet as a Euro-nationalist visionary is not without alternatives. Marquand’s representation is directly contradicted by Holland’s (1996, p. 98) evaluation of Monnet’s vision: “He [Monnet] was opposed to the substitution of nationalism at the state-level by a new nationalism at the European level.”

In Holland’s interpretation, the key for Monnet was to destroy the “spirit of domination” associated with nationalism rather than to embrace that very same spirit on a new political level. Whether or not Monnet was on a mission to create a new “European individual” is an issue that divided even his closest associates. Fontaine (1991) explains that Monnet respected the continent’s cultural diversity and saw in the quest for a European identity a great risk of a new nationalism with the same deadly tendencies of the old one. According to Fontaine, neither a European state, nor a new European individual was part of Monnet’s underlying agenda.

In the same collection of articles, however, one finds Robert Marjolin (1991) branding Monnet as an almost utopian visionary of a European superstate, which would one day attract the emotional loyalties of its citizens at the expense of the constituent member states. Marjolin, a French economist who played a key role in the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), finds his associate’s neo-functionalist creed was proven wrong by history, for the spillovers have not resulted in a “United States of Europe” or a European identity and it is doubtful whether the European people “have a genuine aspiration, however confused, towards European unity” (1991, p. 174).
1.1 Patriot, or Schemer Against the Nation-state?

Disagreements over where Monnet stood on the issues of identity and nationalism (as well as utopianism and pragmatism) can be creatively exploited to advance broader scholarly and political agendas. Such exploitations can be illustrated by contrasting the roles in which Monnet is cast in Christopher Booker and Richard North’s (2005) *The Great Deception*, and Alan Milward’s (2000) *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*.

*The Great Deception*, a book written in the popular-academic tradition by two renowned British Eurosceptic intellectuals, casts Monnet as the main villain who uses obscurity, stealth, and corruption to put his schemes into action. In their integration narrative, Monnet aims, from the start, to form a supranational government and a “United States of Europe” by employing clever deceits to set in train the integration processes while concealing its true purpose. Monnet’s character is built by a creative use of Monnet’s biographical controversies—the authors hint at Monnet’s alleged illegal activity when he served as a cognac salesman in Canada for his father’s company—and the existing image of Monnet as an anti-nationalist visionary of a supranational Europe. For instance, the authors portray Monnet to have been theorizing—along with Arthur Salter and as early as early as 1930s—on schemes to “erode nationalism” by splitting Europe’s nation-states into regions. The whole Eurosceptic narrative is centred around the image of Monnet as a deceitful visionary of a supranational Europe deprived of national allegiances.

As regards Arthur Salter, he was a British civil engineer, whom Monnet collaborated with at the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council during World War I and at the League of Nations afterwards. It is noteworthy that while Salter barely figures in most accounts of the ECSC’s origins, the authors of *The Great Deception* place him centre stage in their EU origin story. According to Booker and North, the contemporary EU is the fruition of a supranational idea conceived by Monnet and Salter during the Great War, which they developed during the interwar period. A couple of observations are in order. First, it may well be speculated that Salter’s inclusion in the EU pantheon could be an attempt on the part of the authors to make the European story friendlier for British audiences. Second, such an attempt builds on Monnet’s reputation as a networker par excellence. Monnet is traditionally perceived as a kind of human hub of high-level international relationships and political influences (Chirapa-Pascanut, 2014) and this image can be exploited by authors for their own agendas by singling out one particular thread of Monnet’s web of influences. This historiographical technique is not uncommon in the historiography of Monnet, as I will illustrate later in this paper.

Returning to the ambiguity of nationalism, Milward’s (2000) classic historical account serves as another testing ground for the flexibility of Monnet’s historical image. It is clear that Monnet’s representation as both a key player and a supra-, anti-, or Euro-nationalist would not work well with Milward’s general thesis, in which he argues that self-interested nation states have been both the primary movers and the primary beneficiaries of European integration, and that the integration process has actually strengthened the *national* allegiances of European peoples. This was surely part of the rationale behind Milward’s attack on the founding fathers historiography, which focuses the post-war narrative on the heroic roles of Monnet, Spaak, Spinelli, Adenauer, Schuman, and de Gasperi, and champions “the
miraculous doings of these European saints” (2000, p. 318). This line of historical research was criticized: first, for assigning a role too important for a handful of individuals; and, second, for misinterpreting them as “harbingers of a new order in which the nation no longer had a place” (2000, p. 318). Milward’s rebellion against historiographical hero worship in general, and the Monnet myth in particular, is well documented (Kølvraa, 2010). In fact, most contemporary attempts to reappraise the role of individuals—like Monnet—in the European integration process begin with a line of defence against Milward’s “historical realism” (Burgess, 2000; Loth, 2008; Knudsen and Gram-Skjoldager, 2010).

However, the second part of Milward’s historiographical strategy for dealing with the EU’s so-called founding fathers has been largely ignored. I argue that Milward is drawn to the very myth he is trying to debunk and that he labours to reshape that myth in the image of his general thesis. What emerges is Jean Monnet, the French patriot, whose primary mission was to rebuild the economy of post-war France. Milward takes pains to stress Monnet’s role in preparing France’s Plan of Modernization and Equipment (the Monnet Plan) while at the helm of France’s Planning Commissariat immediately after World War II. In this line of interpretation, working with the French nation-state’s post-war resurgence as his top priority, Monnet starts pondering Western European integration as late as April 1948, and only when information flowing from his American connections convinced him that the ECSC would provide “access to German resources and German markets for French reconstruction” (2000, p. 336). The European Schuman Plan is reinterpreted as a mere instrument of France’s Monnet Plan.

Instead of rejecting the centrality of Monnet altogether, Milward reshapes the historical picture of the illustrious Frenchman into a fitting historical icon for his own thesis. Just as European integration is construed as an instrument of the nation state, Monnet is reinterpreted as a prominent French statesman who summons the ECSC to further France’s national interests. Marquand’s interpretation of the founding fathers as anti-nationalist builders of the Euro-national order is turned on its head. In Milward’s take on integration history, Monnet, Spaak, Schuman, Adenauer, and De Gasperi are celebrated as enlightened nationalists: “Far from renouncing the nation-state as the foundation of a better European order, they achieved prominence and success because they were among those who developed an accurate perception of the positive role it would play in the post-war order and who also recognized or stumbled upon the need for those limited surrenders of national sovereignty through which the nation-state and western Europe were jointly strengthened” (2000, p. 319). Whatever else it may be, this conception of enlightened nationalism is a transposition of Milward’s own theory into what is presented as the original idea behind post-war integration efforts. Such historiographical manoeuvres amount to the construction of a presentist origin myth, whereby authors aim to legitimize their “present views by showing that a great thinker ‘discovered’ these, our truths a hundred years ago, that our questions are ‘perennial ones’” (Samelson, 1974, p. 223).

In this chapter, we have illustrated the high level of flexibility characteristic of Monnet’s historical representations. Living memories of Monnet, “as he really was,” diverge and those divergences fuel new memories with clear political motives. Why do authors find it worthwhile to create a special role for Monnet in their European narratives? To answer this
question, other European ambiguities around which Monnet’s representations rotate need to be discussed. By looking at Milward, I have already set foot in Marquand’s second ambiguity—the ambiguity of sovereignty. And it is to this problem that I now turn.

2. FEDERALISM, FUNCTIONALISM, INTERGOVERNMENTALISM: MONNET AS A THEORETICAL PIONEER

Marquand’s second great ambiguity is held responsible for the “impenetrable obscurity” of the European project, which has alienated a bemused European public. It is the ambiguity of sovereignty, which manifests itself in the competition between federalism, neo-functionalism, and intergovernmentalism as organizing principles of European integration. With federalists and confederalists pushing the Union into different directions for most of the project’s history, sovereignty is divided between Brussels and national capitals; but the formula for this division is increasingly obscure and not even the most informed observers can agree on the true extent to which supranationalism has transcended national sovereignties.

European integration theory was tasked with settling such confusions. The fate of competing theories, however, was closely linked to integration processes and political demands—the divisions of politics were reflected in the divisions of theory. As Wallace (1990, p. 61) explains, “theories of political integration . . . developed alongside political strategies of integration, feeding on one another as they grew.” This theory-praxis nexus—characteristic of EI theory even more so than of social science in general—may offer a suggestion as to why a central role in the formulation of EI theories has been attributed to Monnet, a figure of a decidedly pragmatic predisposition, who took to heart his father’s advice against book-learning and “disliked political and economic theory” (Fransen, 2001, p. 5). A comprehensive overview of the EI theoretical universe and Monnet’s place in it is beyond the scope of this paper. But a number of examples will illustrate Monnet’s peculiar role in the discourse under consideration. I will then employ an explanatory scheme, developed in the historiography of sociology, to account for this peculiarity.

2.1 “The EU’s most original and important thinker”

What is meant when Monnet is proclaimed a “precursor to neofunctionalist theory” (Niemann, 2006, p. 12)? Although statements relating Monnet to the origins of theoretical schools of EI are not uncommon, there has been no attempt to scrutinize this relationship, except for passing remarks. For instance, Gillingham suggested that while Monnetism has declined as an important philosophy of action, the “myth nonetheless survived in scholarship and would continue to provide a context for integration studies and essential vocabulary for the subject” (Gillingham, 2003, p. 72).

To illustrate this point, I go back to a paper by Holland (1996). Writing in the aftermath of the creation of the Single Market, Holland encouraged reappraising Monnet’s heritage as a way to understand this new stage of integration, as well as to evaluate the theories dealing with the new situation in Europe. The paper appraises Monnet’s role in establishing the ECSC, his “guiding influence” on the Treaty of Rome, and his continued impact on European integration via his Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Holland characterizes
Monnet as a pragmatist and a political opportunist who “was never restricted by the purity of theory” (1996, p. 106) and would, in his inspired quest for a peaceful supranational Europe, be sufficiently flexible on general principles in order “to appeal to a broad political spectrum from cautious intergovernmentalists to unabashed federalists” (1996, p. 98). What follows this hagiographical summary of Monnet’s achievements, however, is a surprising and unsubstantiated description of Monnet as “unquestionably the EUs most original and important thinker” (1996, p. 101).

From here Holland moves on with an evaluation of contemporary EI theories and their conformance with the ideas of that pioneer “thinker”. Holland has it that the functionalism of Mitrany and the neo-functionalism of Haas have failed the test of history and the most accurate account of integration processes leading up to the Single European Act (SEA) and the Single Market has been offered by the intergovernmentalist theory of Keohane and Hoffmann. According to Holland, this theory correctly emphasizes the primacy of politics, and the role of intergovernmental bargaining as a key prerequisite of a spillover effect. In an unconventional interpretation, Holland then questions the consensus affirming the conformance between Monnetism and the two brands of functionalism. Mitrany, unlike Monnet, incorrectly emphasized popular acclamation as a prerequisite for the development of Community institutions, whereas Haas, unlike Monnet, ignored the political context of the spillover processes. Instead, Holland pairs Monnetism with the winner, concluding that Monnet, just like Keohane and Hoffmann, “recognized the primacy of intergovernmental bargains” (1996, p. 105). In other words, Holland discards Monnet’s conventional representation as a (neo-)functionalist, and aims to reinterpret him as a forerunner of contemporary intergovernmentalist thought. Such a move reinforces the legitimacy “of a present point of view by claiming for it a putative founder” (Stocking, 1965) and—vice versa, it reconstitutes the lasting relevance of the pioneer figure.

In a more recent biographical study, Ugland (2011, p. 30) uncritically reiterates Holland’s reference to Monnet as the “EU’s most original and important thinker,” but he ascribes a different, albeit equally central, role to his biographee. Contrary to Holland, Ugland does attempt to explain how a political actor with a pronounced dislike for theory can be considered a theoretical equal to proper EI theorists. Referring to Sheldon Wolin’s ideas on the relationship between traveling and theory, Ugland focuses on Monnet’s business trip across Canada as a young cognac merchant. Drawing a parallel between Monnet’s travels and Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous journey, Ugland speculates that through observation and comparison, Monnet transformed his acquaintance with Canadian federalism into his own theory of European supranational unity. Using the economic nature of Canada’s Constitutional Act of 1867 as an inspirational model, Monnet pioneers the theory of federalist functionalism, or so goes Ugland’s argument. Monnet is credited for providing “the analytical link between what was often considered to be opposing doctrines: functionalism and federalism” (2011, p. 31). Only by focusing on economic cooperation, incrementalism, and functional links, can Europe arrive at political federation in the long run (instead of promoting an immediate shift of political power to the European level). Similarly to Holland, Ugland (2011, p. 31) also argues that Monnet’s theoretical innovation was later built upon and substantiated by authors in the field of EI theory, such as Navari (1996).
2.2 From Practitioner to Theorist: A Historiographical Transformation

The above are just two illustrations of a specific trend of using Monnet as a point of departure for different theories on integration mechanisms.\(^1\) “In view of traditional integration theories,” Wessels (2015, p. 50) concludes, “Monnet might at the same time be characterized as a neo-functionalist, a federalist and an intergovernmentalist.” In the critical historiography of the social sciences, such interpretative flexibility is conceptualized as a feature of presentist historiography, wherein the alleged approval of an iconic founder is creatively mobilized to traditionalize and legitimize a present theory or disciplinary agenda (Baehr, 2002). Competing schools of thought aim to lionize the founder, and what emerge are multiple Freuds, Durkheims and Marxes, set against each other in the context of present-day disciplinary battles. While the susceptibility of the social sciences to mythologize and politicize their origins is no longer a new or controversial point, European integration theory also offers a different conundrum, namely the elevation of Monnet, a practical man, rather than a scholarly one, to the status of theoretical pioneer.

Despite frequent references to Monnet’s first principles, general theory, analytical links, and method, these references rarely go beyond quoting Monnet on the primacy of institution building, political gradualism, the dangers of the national veto, and the centrality of economics and sectoral integration. This is not to question Monnet’s inventiveness as a political actor, but to stress that any talk of Monnet’s theory is necessarily far-fetched. In other words, Europe’s first honorary citizen was no discursive founder in the sense of the term defined by Baehr (2002). Discursive founders are authors who have developed a stock of presuppositional ideas formative of a disciplinary tradition. Nor was Monnet an institutional founder in the sense of creating the field’s first academic institutions (e.g., Durkheim as the founder of the *Année sociologique* in 1896).

Discursive founders and institutional founders were the two founder types developed by Baehr to account for the symbolic and legitimizing uses of the founder concept in social science discourses. But neither of these two types can explain Monnet’s iconic position in European integration theory discourse. Baehr’s typology, however, has since been expanded to account for an altogether different use of that very same founder concept. For example, sociologist Michael Burawoy has argued, in advocating for a socially engaged public sociology, that British social reformer Robert Owen (1771-1858) was the actual begetter of sociology. Just like Monnet, Owen was a man of affairs with no academic education, and with little to offer in terms of groundbreaking theory. Rather, the success of Owen’s socially enlightened management schemes at the New Lanark cotton mills earned Owen Burawoy’s nomination. Hence, the so-called father of socialism was transformed into the father of sociology, for

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\(^1\) This is not to argue that the trend is universal or pervasive in the theoretical field under consideration. The argument in this second part of the paper is meant as an extreme case of the paper’s thesis. It is far easier to show how EU historiography produces images of Monnet that correspond with the historian’s general argument about the driving forces of integration processes, for Monnet and his times are actually a historian’s subject matter. It is an altogether different task to show that the politics of founders plays a legitimizing role in EI theory as well. Representations of Monnet as a pioneer of EI theories by no means constitute a general trend. What is argued is that the politics of disciplinary founders can be utilized, and often is, as a strategy to legitimize viewpoints in EI theory.
Owen’s practical engagements fit with Burawoy’s agenda for a practically engaged social science. The concept of a public founder has thus been added to Baehr’s typology to account for the historiographical technique, wherein an iconic public figure is transformed into a forerunner of a scholarly enterprise (Pūras, 2014).

A pioneer in European integration practice has been likewise transformed into a forerunner of European integration theory. Extending the parallel, it might be argued that the elevation of public founders is characteristic to scholarly discourses that are relatively more intertwined with social or political practices, and it is often argued that most EU scholars “are not detached observers, but convinced supporters of European integration” (Majone, 2009, pp. 2-3), and that EI theory legitimates and informs EU politics (Wallace, 1990). This special relationship explains Monnet’s iconic status in the discourses of both the European Commission and EU studies. The difference between these two dimensions, however, is the possibility of conflict—which creates multiple Monnets in the competitive field of EU scholarship. Yet the absence of the possibility of conflict permits only one sterile image of Monnet in the official discourse of the EU.

3. MONNET BETWEEN TECHNOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL EUROPE AND NEOLIBERAL EUROPE

According to Eder (2009), European collective identity is “multiple” because it is shaped by competing historical narratives that represent the unsettled spaces of European social relationships and conflicts. Building on Eder’s idea, I have been using Marquand’s great ambiguities as the arena of competition, which structures politically motivated memories of Monnet. Aside from issues of ethnicity and sovereignty, Marquand also emphasized the ambiguities of political method and political ideology. The British philosopher has it that Monnet and the other founding fathers were inspired by Saint-Simon’s vision to establish a European polity that would be technocratic in method and “social” in content. The growing pressure for public accountability and the rise of neoliberalism, however, compromised this original vision, and the EU is presently stuck in an ambiguous state between technocracy and democracy, and between a “Social Europe” and neoliberalism. Marquand argues that the inability to resolve these ambiguities resulted in growing popular dissatisfaction with the EU, as well as in flawed economic policies, such as a schizophrenic state of affairs in which a monetary union is not reinforced by a fiscal union.

The connection between these two themes of the European Integration problematique is also apparent in the historiography of Monnet, hence the decision to discuss these two ambiguities together. What follows is a look at a number of representations of Monnet constructed by scholars to reinforce their arguments regarding European democracy and European technocracy, and neoliberal Europe and social Europe.

Now, although Monnet’s political style is typically described in technocratic and elitist terms, this reputation can be put to different political uses. In this regard, the most unfavourable representation of Monnet is found in Majone’s (2009) historical account. Majone’s influential history of European integration is meant as a call for more public accountability, democracy, and flexibility of governance in the EU, and is against elitist federalist visions that have little
support among European populations. In this context, the image of Monnet is constructed as Majone’s straw man who can be easily knocked down as a simplified miniature of everything the author does not appreciate about twenty-first century EU politics: elitism, unaccountability, stealth, technocracy, and a lack of political vision.

Majone describes Monnet as both an actual and a symbolic leader of crypto-federalists, a political group that set in motion a process of integration by stealth, wherein federalist political integration proceeds “under the guise of economic integration,” (Majone, 2009, p. 72) without telling the European people what is actually going on. Monnet sets in place an operational code, which renders democracy irrelevant and grants key decisions to European elites. Majone (2009, p. 75) labels it “the strategy of fait accompli – the accomplished fact which makes opposition and public debate useless.”

What is especially unusual about Majone’s narrative is that he describes Monnet’s technocracy and institutionalism as self-serving goals, rather than as a means to achieve a political goal. In a symbolic attack, Majone claims that Monnet was not a neo-functionalist. For all their elitism and disregard for democracy, “the neo-functionalists a la Ernst Haas . . . were interested in ‘final goals’; according to them, the integration process must move towards the establishment of a central political authority” (2009, pp. 74-75). Monnet, in Majone’s (2009, p. 73) verdict, is arrogantly disinterested in ultimate ends: “What mattered was the movement, the process—especially the creation of European institutions.” In what is a clear example of the politics of history, Majone uses Monnet to issue a political warning by extending the bleak present and “what is to become the future as far as possible into the past, thereby constructing an image of continuity, consistency and determinacy” (Lepenies & Weingart, 1983: xvii).

Majone’s distinction between crypto-federalism and neo-functionalism, based on Monnet’s alleged disregard for the actual political destination of European integration, is an unconventional proposition. Holland (1996), for example, emphasizes that Monnet’s elitist strategy was tied up with a vigorous advocacy for a “democratic Community,” as an end, if not as a method. Ugland (2011) made the same point when presenting Monnet’s theoretical innovation of linking functionalist means to federalist ends. Similarly, Su (2009, p. 35) invokes the Pleven Plan and Monnet’s advocacy of the European Defence Community (EDC) to argue a case diametrically opposite to that of Majone: “Though Monnet preferred to begin integration in the economic field, he seized any opportunity to leap on political unification without waiting for the mature development of economic integration as Haas proposed.”

Burgess (2000) invokes Monnet’s memoirs to show his dedication to both the democratic handling of the supranational institutions and, at an unspecified date in the future, “to a federation validated by the people’s vote.” Monnet is presented as a federalist democrat in principle, but a cautious functionalist in practice, who believed that a democratic federation could only emerge organically, “by forging specific functional links between states in a way that did not directly challenge national sovereignty” (2000, p. 200). In another defence of Monnet’s democratic credentials, Duchene (1994) chronicles his nurturing of the all-party and transnational Action Committee for the United States of Europe, his wooing of trade union leaders, and his efforts to the secure the success of “European” resolutions in national parliaments.
3.1 Monnet between Left and Right

What was described above is a defence of Monnet’s democratic credentials based on a distinction between Monnet’s method (functionalism, economic integration, and technocracy) and Monnet’s underlying vision (federalism, political integration, and democracy). However, the philosophy of *community building through economic means* can also be attacked as a source of the contemporary EU crisis with Monnet as the original troublemaker.

Drawing a line of ideological paternity between Saint-Simon, Monnet, Delors, and modern-day neoliberalism, Swedberg (2014) faulted what he termed economism for both the EU’s economic hardships and for its democratic deficit problem. Swedberg presents Saint-Simon as a forgotten pioneer of Europe’s integration paradigm, namely, of the idea “that unification and integration of Europe should primarily be created through economic means.” The paradigm re-emerged with Monnet, who is described here as a Saint-Simonian. Just like his utopian-socialist compatriot, Monnet hits upon the idea of industrial integration as a key to long-term European unity, peace, and prosperity. For Swedberg, this idea forms the essence of the Monnet method, which not only gave birth to the Schuman Declaration and the European Coal and Steel Community, but has also become the underlying philosophy of subsequent European integration. Economism—a theory that holds political integration can be achieved primarily through economic means—has allegedly provided the underlying rationale for all the key moments of European integration, from the Rome Treaty and the Common Market, to the Single European Act and the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Swedberg wonders whether the economist’s *modus operandi* is to blame for both democratic deficit issues and the EU’s economic vows during the recent financial and currency crises. For one thing, the indirect way of constructing a community “does not easily square with the idea of democracy” (Swedberg, 2014). More crucially, when economics and politics become inseparable, political leaders use their mandates to effect economic decisions, the implications of which are beyond their scope of understanding: “Saint-Simon, Monnet, and Delors had all been much more interested in the political goal of unifying Europe than in the actual economic consequences of the reforms that they had advocated, in order to reach this goal” (Swedberg, 2014).

According to Swedberg, the design flaws of the EMU are a case in point. In this line of interpretation, figures as diverse as Saint-Simon, Monnet, Thatcher, and Merkel are placed under the same umbrella of an economist integration paradigm that has clear free-market ideology overtones. By claiming, “Monnet’s ideas also influenced the Rome treaty,” Swedberg emphasizes the free-market connotations of the term *freedom* as used in the Rome treaty and subsequent Community and Union documents (The free movement of persons, services, goods, and capital are described as freedoms that relate to the needs of the market rather than human needs). To sum up, not only is the so-called Monnet method presented as a threat to democracy and a source of unsound economics, but the Frenchman’s heritage is also pushed to the direction of the economic right.

Although some authors concur that “individualism, entrepreneurship, market-oriented economy, and an emphasis upon competition” were crucial components in Monnet’s design for Europe (Su, 2009, p. 41), Monnet is at least as often placed in the economic centre and
the economic left. The centrist interpretation usually underscores Paul Reuter’s influence on Monnet. Reuter, a French law professor, was Monnet’s right-hand man during the conception of the ECSC’s founding treaties. Both Guisan (2013) and Isoni (2010) stress the connection between Reuter and Monnet to add a specific ideological element to their EU origin story. Isoni presents Reuter as an intellectual descendent of the Non-conformistes movement of interwar France, which sought “a ‘third way’ other than socialism or capitalism, individualism or collectivism,” and drew inspiration from the tradition of “Saint-Simon and Comte-style technocracy which, unlike the American version, considered the support of adequate public institutions as essential” (2010, p. 274).

Searching for a planist third way, Reuter saw the trusts as a symbol of the gigantic and depersonalized economy, which he looked to counter with a philosophy of humanisme communautaire. Isoni seems to suggest that Monnet put Reuter’s vision into action when he convinced Robert Schuman to commence European integration in the sectors of coal and steel, “the sectors in which the tendency to create monopolies and cartels had been most manifest” (2010, p. 276), whereas the ECSC High Authority embodied Reuter’s third-way principles of planism and enlightened technocracy. Similarly, Guisan focuses on the name chosen for the first supranational organization, Community, a term she notes, “came to Monnet through Paul Reuter.” Reuter’s conception of Community was meant as an alternative to socialism, liberalism, and capitalism—an alternative that was “impossible in a national framework” and that called for a European federation run by “an elite body of civil servants” (2013, p. 65).

If Swedberg positions Monnet in the economic right, and Isoni and Guisan place Monnet in the economic centre, Murray (1996, p. 164) looks for direct socialist influences on the origins of European integration and describes Monnet as a leader in the socialist camp: “Monnet for example was a socialist voter and very keen on involving trade unions and socialist parties in the Action Committee for the United States of Europe and he adopted a dirigiste approach to state control of the economy.”

The image of Monnet as a left-leaning interventionist is also fundamental to John Gillingham’s (2003) influential narrative. Distinguishing between successful “negative integration” (free-markets) and unsuccessful “positive integration” (super-state building), Gillingham describes Hayek and Monnet as symbolic leaders of the two European paradigms. In an attempt to challenge a “familiar story told by disciples faithful to the memory of Monnet” (2003, p. 73), Gillingham takes pains to show how Monnet and his planist method of sectoral integration were deliberately ignored during the Messina Conference of 1955. Unlike Swedberg, Gillingham divorces Monnetism from the free-market thinking behind the Rome Treaty, thereby demoting “Monnet and like-minded federalists . . . from visionary founding fathers to welfare-state planners responsible for the subsequent deadlock of 1966” (McKay, 2005, p. 634). This deadlock was broken only by the rise of Thatcherism and neoliberalism, which reaffirmed the Hayekian logic of integration “with the avalanche of progress ushered in by the Single European Act of 1986” (Gillingham, 2003, p. 81). In what is Gillingham’s political argument for European integration based on free-markets, Monnet is represented as a false hero, the original sinner whose followers continue to obstruct the European markets with quasi-socialist measures of super-state building.
All the narratives under review here have an underlying idea of “good integration,” and that idea is typically articulated through Monnet. Many recipes for success have Monnet as the key ingredient, but this special ingredient can be purchased in so many shapes and colours that a Monnet used by one cook bears little resemblance to the Monnet used by another. Who was Jean Monnet? Aside from testifying to his historical status as a key actor, these narratives hardly answer this question—for most of the answers are carefully designed to empower the author’s general thesis about what is good or bad for the EU. Throughout this paper, I have illustrated that this is usually the case with Monnet in scholarly narratives. Monnet is not a complex historical question to be answered, but a simple historical answer to difficult questions.

CONCLUSION

Fontaine (1991, p. 1), the ghostwriter of Monnet’s memoirs, was wrong when he wrote that the memory of Monnet “is already becoming fixed.” Following Schwartz (1985), one could argue that the destiny of a fixed legacy could never befall a founding figure like Monnet, for in a democratic society, a great individual is always transformed, post-mortem, into a representative individual. Aiming at a sociology of the American politics of heroes, Cooley (cited in Schwartz, 1985) wrote that the question to pose to a dead hero should not be a historical, “What are you?” but should be a pragmatic, “How far can I use you as a symbol in the development of my instinctive tendency?” In this paper, I have shown Monnet to be Europe’s representative individual, a symbol used to develop opposing political tendencies.

I looked for order, strategy, and a sense of purpose in what could otherwise appear to be a distorted chaos of irreconcilable narratives. Marquand has constructed a scheme of present locations from which different camps wage wars against each other over the political imagination and the organizing principles of the European project. In this paper, I explored the historical dimension of these wars, wherein the image of the EU’s iconic figure is transformed into a symbol of the political standpoint of each location. The result of these historiographical extensions of the present arena is a multiplicity of Monnet’s images along four controversies of the European debate, which are also the borderlines of the European identity project: nationalism, sovereignty, political method, and economic ideology.

Monnet, the enemy of nationalism and the builder of a new European order, is juxtaposed against Monnet, the guardian of France’s national interests (nationalism). Monnet, the pioneer of (neo)functionalism, is juxtaposed against Monnet, the intergovernmentalist (sovereignty). Monnet, the treacherous technocrat and the enemy of democracy, is juxtaposed against Monnet, the prudent builder of structures for a future European democracy (political method). Monnet, the free-marketeer, is juxtaposed against Monnet, the Saint-Simonian super-state planner (economic ideology). These are all powerful images that can be productively employed in advancing different identity narratives for the EU.

According to the author’s level of support or opposition for the current state of affairs in the European Union, these images are then invoked to portray Monnet as either a hero or a villain. Along the way, I also touched upon a number of historiographical techniques that allow authors to tell their origin stories in a persuasive fashion, such as by exploiting
Monnet’s reputation as a networker and singling out one decisive influencer (e.g. Adam Salter and Paul Reuter), or by reconceptualizing Monnet as a theoretical pioneer to provide symbolic legitimacy to contemporary theoretical views.

Should it come as a surprise that the tendency to mythologize the EU’s origins and founders is as strong in some EU scholarship as it is in the official political discourse of the EU? Critical historiography of the social sciences has shown that it is not uncommon for scholars to substitute methodological rigor with mythological storytelling when the subject matter they are dealing with has to do with symbols that are constitutive elements of their own disciplinary identity and collective memory (Baehr, 2002). My aim was to illustrate this point in the case of EU scholarship and to understand why Monnet is often approached not so much as part of scholars’ analyses, but rather as a flag for their general theses.

To be sure, it is possible that the wide disparity between Monnet’s modern images may have been aided by the very style of Monnet’s politics. For example, according to Duchene (1994), it was strategically important for Monnet to put both liberal and interventionist elements into his institutional schemes (such as the Schuman Plan) to “circumvent rehearsed responses” from the Left and the Right. Similarly, Holland (1996) describes how Monnet, for the sake of coalition building, would use different rhetoric to woo intergovernmentalists than he employed to win over unabashed federalists. Autonomous from party politics, Monnet could have been as ideologically flexible as he saw necessary, and this flexibility may have produced the conflicting sets of quotations and life facts that are fuelling the selective narratives of our own time.

What was essential, however, was to show the magnitude of intellectual investments that went into producing these representations. Gillingham suggested that the Monnet myth provides the underlying context and vocabulary for integration studies. His idea has been endorsed and elaborated in this paper. It is well worth pondering, however, whether these investments have only to do with academic politics. Should the connection be made here with the political project of advancing European identity that uses Monnet, the popular hero, as a “lynchpin of [the] European symbolic universe” (Kolvraa, 2012b)?

Explaining why the EU can never hope to attract mass European loyalties and foster the European demos by competing with nation-states at the level of history and collective memory, Smith (1992) argues, “there is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen in the battle, no European shrine of kings or saints.” Peterson and Hellström (2003), Kaiser (2011) and Kølvraa (2010, 2012a, 2012b) have shown that the EU is actually in the process of building such a shrine for its founding fathers (the House of European History being merely the latest and the most literal example). Furthermore, the European politics of heroes is publicly supported by media powerhouses like the BBC, which aired a romanticized radio play on Monnet in 2011, and by influential public intellectuals like Umberto Eco (2013), who deems Monnet a suitable candidate for the role of European Asterix, a hero capable of seducing the European masses. In other words, an attempt to establish Monnet as one of the few emotionally charged and popularly attractive symbols of the EU clearly exists.

Throughout this paper I presumed that the intellectual locations, from which authors are approaching Monnet, correspond to the political locations from which different factions wage
European political battles. Perhaps, then, the scholarly images of Monnet should also be seen as ready-made tools for wider political rhetoric, tools that can be utilized by different political factions to support, modify, or challenge the official version of EU’s origin story. If the Monnet myth is to capture the European imagination, the content of that mythology will remain a site of fierce political contention. In this war of origin narratives the academy may play a role of an arsenal where storytelling weapons are forged.

Wilfried Loth (2008), editor of the *Journal of European Integration History*, encouraged historians to further research the roles of the EU’s founding fathers and other key historical personalities of European integration. According to Loth, the outstanding significance of these personalities lies in the fact that their political actions have embodied, in different and changing measures, the driving forces of European integration. There is always a risk, however, that, in their lives after death, great political actors may end up embodying the interests of present political forces, rather than the forces of history.

REFERENCES


