SMALL NEW MEMBER STATES IN THE EU FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARD ‘SMALL STATE SMART STRATEGY’?

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the small new member states at the EU ‘frontline’ in their efforts to upload their geographic preferences in the EU foreign policy. It starts by reviewing the preferences of Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. Next, it compares how they pursued these preferences in the EU. Third, it indicates their uploading success. Finally, it notes that these countries, despite their ‘double disadvantages’, moved closer toward ‘small state smart strategy’, including compromise-seeking behaviour, persuasive deliberation, lobbying, and using coalitions. While their uploading success has been mixed, their preference projection in the EU foreign policy has been visible.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the foreign policy experiences of the small new member states at the EU ‘frontline’ – Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. It looks how they seek to project their geographic preferences in the Union’s “special relationship with neighbouring countries” (Art 8 (1) TEU). Thereby it sheds light on the uploading process of the Europeanization of member states. In this way, it addresses the task put forward by Rouben Wong and Christopher Hill (2011) who in their comprehensive study on the Europeanization of foreign policy covered a large group of member states, yet could not provide “detailed data on a number of later entrants” and thus highlighted the need to know what are the roles played by ‘frontline states’ (2011: 212).

Why to focus on small new member states at the EU ‘frontline’? These countries represent interesting cases in the EU policy making. On the one hand, their “smallness” is even more reinforced by their structural disadvantages, suggesting them to be only ‘policy takers’. On the other hand, their geographical location at the EU “frontline” – at its external border – indicates specific interests towards their immediate neighbourhood. This means that they cannot simply free-ride in developing the EU ‘special relationship with neighbours’, but have to put great efforts to influence the EU policy closest to their preferences.

1 Bőrzel (2002: 205) identified that the EU ‘latecomers’ face a ‘double disadvantage’ in the EU as they lack sufficient staff power, money, and expertise to shape the EU policies.
2 Grøn and Wivel (2011: 523) suggest that ‘small state smart strategy’ involves a state as (1) a lobbyist, (2) a self-interested mediator, and (3) a norm entrepreneur.
A typical picture of the EU is that big member states exert much more influence than small ones (Moravcsik 1998). This means that small states are not left much choice other than to follow the ‘rules of the game’ of large states. However, it would be difficult to understand the EU relationships with its Eastern neighbours, including Russia, the Western Balkans, Turkey, or the Mediterranean without taking into account small states’ contributions. Such initiatives as the Northern Dimension (1997) and the Eastern Partnership (2009) illustrate the possibilities of small states.

Studies on small states show that they can successfully influence the EU by using immaterial power assets, such as cooperative behaviour, through persuasive advocacy, by building coalitions, by using their EU Presidency effectively, and through strengthening the domestic uploading capacity (see, e.g., Wivel 2005; Tallberg 2008, 2010; Björkdahl 2008; Bunse 2009; Jakobsen 2009; Panke 2010, 2012; Nasra 2011). According to Grøn and Wivel (2011: 523), smart state ideal behaviour is the state as lobbyist, self-interested mediator, and norm entrepreneur. The above studies, however, focus on old, small member states. The new small members, which wield much less resources and experience in the EU, have not been investigated sufficiently.

This article seeks to explore the efforts of the ‘smallest of small’ in the EU foreign policy making – Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. In doing so, it draws on the Europeanization concept, namely its uploading dimension. In this way member states, instead of being passive recipients of the EU demands, are treated as pro-active contributors in the common policy. Europeanization is applied here to identify a state’s influence in terms of process through the uploading strategies and the content-relevant outcome. Uploading shares many similarities with the rational choice approach (Wong 2006: 137). Here, uploading is embedded in the rational choice institutionalism approach as it provides the appropriate means for explaining actor influence. Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors act strategically to attain their preferences, yet it underlines the importance of the EU institutional environment that constrains states’ uploading efforts.

The article starts by reviewing six countries’ intensely held (geographic) preferences; second, it compares their uploading strategies in the EU, and third, it indicates their success of influence. Finally, it notes that ‘time matters’: under almost a decade of membership they have moved closer in using ‘small state smart strategy’, while their preferences have generally remained the same.

1. GEOGRAPHIC PREFERENCES IN THE EU FOREIGN POLICY

Why geographic proximity is crucial for national preferences in the EU? Geographical position can be understood as a “proxy variable for the imperatives induced by interdependence and [...] increase in opportunities for cross-border trade and capital movements that should determine national preferences” (Moravcsik 1998: 26; Schimmelfennig 2003: 166). Thus geographic proximity is closely linked with a state’s economic welfare and security – the so-called ‘first-order’ core national interests (Mearsheimer 2001: 46). As Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia are bordering with the EU neighbours of strategic importance, their geographical position suggests specific preferences in developing the EU’s relationship with respective neighbours.

Geographic proximity is even more pronounced in the case of small, new member states’ foreign policies. Small states traditionally have a narrow foreign policy scope, primarily focused on their nearest geographical surrounding. Due to geographical and historical proximity they have explicit interests only in their immediate neighbourhood. This also applies to Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. Most of these countries’ neighbourhood preoccupations had been their core foreign policy concerns already prior to the EU accession, and after joining they sought to upload them to the EU level. In this way, Cyprus was eager to use the EU framework to remove the on-going Turkish occupation from the north of its territory, Slovenia – to enhance stability in the Western Balkans, and the Baltic States – to reconcile their relations with Russia. In addition, the EU membership allowed them to widen the scope of their geographic interest. Thus, Malta started to focus on a broader Mediterranean region, and the Baltic States – on support to the Eastern neighbourhood, seeking to bring the former Soviet republics closer to the EU.

Geographic position has been underscored by the national foreign policy makers: “The most important condition for being taken seriously in the EU is vital national interests. Everyone knows that Lithuania will say something on Russia, Belarus or the Eastern neighbourhood. Geographic proximity is the main determinant explaining a state’s position in the EU” (Interview, 09.07.2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Lithuania). Also, “Latvia’s national interests are undoubtedly related to its direct neighbourhood, in particular the domestic economic interests in the context of overcoming the economic crisis” (Interview 18.01.2013, MFA of Latvia).

Geographic proximity for the Baltic States primarily means Russia, involving the ‘first-order’ core national interests of security and economic welfare. In terms of security, their historical experience plays a crucial role. These tiny states, having been colonized by Russia, understandably are concerned about their territorial security (Kasekamp 2013: 100). Worrying on Russia’s attempts to restore influence in the former Soviet space is their continuous concern (Baun and Marek 2013: 210). Security in one way or another appears in the EU–Russia agenda, which turns into the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian intensely held preferences in the EU policy vis-à-vis Russia.

On the other hand, geographical proximity with an energy-rich country such as Russia is closely linked with the Baltic States’ domestic economic interests and interdependence. While energy issues are high on their foreign policy agendas in the EU, divergent domestic interests seem to complicate formulating strong and coherent national positions for the Brussels needs. In Estonia, energy security became an increasing priority in foreign policy after the 2007 Bronze Solder incident when the Gazprom shut down the natural gas pipeline (Galbreath et al. 2008). Also in Lithuania, energy security is one of the main foreign policy issues in the EU. Despite its high priority, interdependence with Russia resulted in the lack of coherence in
developing national policy (Vilpišauskas 2013: 130). Similarly, in Latvia, the tendency has been to mix political responsibility with business interests (Kaljurand et al. 2012: 39). Increasing ‘gaspromization’ and specific business and related political interests led to changing patterns in relations with Russia. Both factors – security concerns and economic interests – contributed to formulating the national preferences (Sprūds 2009: 113–115).

Geographic proximity with Russia is closely linked with the Baltic States’ preferences in their shared Eastern neighbourhood. The Baltic governments’ natural interest is to make difference in their neighbouring region (Sleivyte 2010: 151). The European Neighbourhood Policy helped them to redefine relations with Russia, as well as find their own place within the EU (Jakniūnaitė; 2009: 118; Kesa, 2011). While joining the EU officially made the Baltic States part of the Western community, due to their historical experiences of being part of the Soviet Union they constantly felt a need to reconfirm their Europeanism (Jakniūnaitė 2009: 119). Hence, their assistance to the Eastern neighbours helped them to identify themselves as more European. Furthermore, through active engagement in the Eastern neighbourhood they sought to change the geopolitical influences in the region by diminishing the Russian and strengthening the European influence (Kesa 2011: 87–88).

Immediately after joining the EU, all three countries announced the Eastern neighbourhood as one of their top priority in the EU. Lithuania has been most ambitious. For several years after joining, it positioned itself as an active “leader of the region” that resembled the Grand Lithuanian Duchy territory (Vilpišauskas 2013: 136). It visualized its role on the basis of historical memory rather than on economic interdependencies (ibid.). Also, Estonia and Latvia declared the Eastern neighbourhood as their foreign policy priority, however, without such regional ambitions. Estonian foreign minister Paet in every foreign policy statement to the Riigikogu highlighted the Eastern neighbours, continuously declaring that “the Eastern partnership has long been and remains a priority (MFA, Estonia, 21.02.2013). Similarly, Latvia’s official position put forward the priority to devote particular attention to the Eastern neighbours (MFA, Latvia, 2006) and to turn from reform importer to exporter. Given the experience and know-how from its own transition, the government opted for neighbourhood policy (Ozoliņa 2012: 146).

In the course of time, the Baltics’ solidarity statements with the Eastern Partnership countries have transformed, and their initial ambitious statements of being ‘advocates of European aspirations’ of the Eastern partners Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have been replaced by a more pragmatic small-step approach. Two factors have contributed here – the enlargement fatigue in the EU and the reform fatigue in the Eastern partner countries. However, the Baltic States’ strategic goals have remained unchanged despite shifts in their tactical approaches. Not surprisingly, one of the main priorities of Lithuania’s EU Presidency in 2013 is the Eastern neighbourhood, showing the continuity of the country’s foreign policy. The foreign minister Linkevičius, with a view to the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit, has announced that he “sees Eastern Promise for EU Presidency” (Radio Free Europe 14.06.2013.), in this way expressing Lithuania’s willingness to keep the Eastern Partnership high on the EU agenda.
One common Baltics’ concern in the Eastern neighbourhood has been Belarus. Its authoritarian regime in combination with Russia’s growing influence in the country is related to the security concerns. On the other hand, the direct border with Belarus in the case of Latvia and Lithuania suggests their specific interests due to economic interdependence. For years, Belarus has been their substantial economic partner. Transit of Belarus goods is one of the main budget-income of both countries. This explains why the Baltic States, in particular Latvia, were highly sceptical about the EU economic sanctions on Belarus, especially given its severe economic crisis in 2008. For this reason, foreign minister Rinkēvičs warned that the EU sanctions “must not affect the economies of EU member states” (The Baltic Course 2012). Similarly, Lithuania’s foreign policy preferences since its economic crisis shifted to reflect closer its actual economic interdependencies with the Eastern neighbours (Vilpišauskas 2013).

Similarly, Slovenia’s key foreign policy interests are focused on its geographical vicinity. In the EU, Slovenia’s national interests have been most explicitly and strongly defined in the Western Balkans (Bunič and Šabič, 2013). While after gaining independence Slovenia was eager to distance from the Balkans by becoming a full-fledged member of international development aid, a natural choice was pursuit of its immediate security interests (Kajnč 2010:193). After joining the EU, it expressed willingness “to act as a bridge” between the EU and the region (ibid. 204). Its official policy documents continuously stress the Western Balkans as a priority area (Foreign policy, MFA Slovenia, 2013). For Slovenia, the Balkans mean not only security concerns but also strong economic interests. The Western Balkans is Slovenia’s second largest trade market. Evidently, “Slovenia’s huge business interests in the neighbouring region determine its foreign policy preferences in the EU. It has an enormous interest to get the EU membership for the Western Balkan countries to provide a certain legal framework and predictability, and to stop the Balkan countries conflicting and making wars among each other” (Interview 12.07.2013, EEAS). Hence, the Slovenian preferences in the EU are determined by security and economic interests, i.e. ‘first-order’ concerns. These interests are building blocks for Slovenian uploading efforts in the EU.

In a similar way, Cyprus’ foreign policy preferences in the EU are explicitly linked to its geographic proximity and Turkey. The so-called ‘Cyprus problem’ undoubtedly belongs to the ‘first-order’ core security interests. This has been Cyprus’ intensely held preference since it signed the Accession Treaty with the EU in 1972. The EU membership does not appear to have changed Cyprus’ views on Turkey (Baun and Marek 2013: 212), and it adhered to its initial position. Cyprus has continuously insisted on the EU making pressure on Turkey to contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem (Sepos 2008: 125). All Cyprus national preferences in the EU have been in one way or another related to the need of removing the on-going Turkish occupation of the north of its territory (Stavridis and Kassimieris 2013: 144).

Also, Malta’s foreign policy seeks to use its geopolitical relevance to maximize its influence (Pace, 2013: 160). Its special focus is stability in the Mediterranean region (ibid.:162). Malta does not have direct security threats in its close vicinity. However, in terms of security as the ‘first-order’ concern, it is confronted by non-military threats such as irregular migration from
the Central Mediterranean. Hence, Malta’s key priority is to ease the burden on its densely populated inhabitants and its resources (Fiott 2010: 112). Given the relevance of this issue for the national security, the migration issue has become Malta’s highly salient issue in the EU, including in foreign policy. In its national positions it refers to its unique geographical position (ibid.).

In sum, the six small new member states at the EU ‘frontline’ demonstrate that geographical proximity matters for the intensity of their preferences in the EU foreign policy. Hence, one may expect that they would put great efforts to influence the EU policy closer to their preferred outcomes. In the following, it is looked more closely to uploading strategies they have used in attaining their goals. Have they moved closer in using ‘small state smart strategy’?

2. UPLOADING STRATEGIES

As underscored by the representative of the European External Action Service (EEAS), “small member states can ‘show their teeth’ only when they have vital national interests” (Interview 12.07.2013, EEAS). Evidently, upon accession, small new member states knew very well their vital interests, i.e the EU policy towards their immediate neighbourhood. The question is how they sought to upload their national preferences, given divergent member states’ interests.

A key for an effective uploading is the knowledge of how to interact in the EU decision-making system. After joining, the new member states were challenged with the EU complex nature, which was a “steep learning curve, and a new game altogether compared to accession process” (Galbreath et al., 2008:54). Developing national positions and defending them in the EU required a significant epistemic input (ibid.). As for the smallest members, it was also difficult due to the lack of resources and expertise.

The evidence shows that, despite initial failures, the six small new member states gradually improved their ways of uploading. In other words, they moved closer towards a small-state smart strategy. Already since joining there has been an awareness of their ideal behaviour. As stressed by the Slovenian foreign minister Rupel in 2006, Slovenia may exert its influence by “being original, smart, more flexible, by being faster than others, focusing on areas where it had advantages”; it should have adaptability, a spirit of empathy and cooperation and ‘honest brokers’ (Bunič and Šabič 2013:89). However, in practice it was not an easy task.

At the outset, the new member states faced substantial difficulties. The lack of experience and knowledge of how to play the ‘Brussels game’ led to mistakes that limited their influence. One such example is Lithuania’s initial aggressive approach (together with Poland) in pushing its positions, which met resistance among the EU partners and criticism from the High Representative (HR) for CFSP Solana for being too radical (Vilpišauskas 2013: 136). Due to its sweeping tactics it was even named a “new cold warrior”. The worst case seems to be the 2008 Lithuanian uploading efforts in the new EU–Russia Agreement. Lithuania linked the opening of the negotiations on this agreement with additional demands to Russia, including energy supplies and frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. Despite its enormous efforts,
even the like-minded states’ did not support Lithuania, and it remained in full isolation. Apparently, its ‘troublemaker’ image led to domestic criticism that the selected approach is counterproductive and there is a need for compromise. Consequently, after 2008–2009 elections, the Lithuanian political elite shifted to a more constructive approach (ibid.).

Another example is Slovenia’s long-lasting blockage of Croatia’s accession negotiations due to its bilateral sea border dispute with Croatia. Despite the EU pressure, Slovenia continued its hard bargaining methods by linking Croatia’s accession negotiations with this bilateral problem. However, with its EU Presidency approaching, it felt urgency to solve this issue. By signing the Arbitration Agreement with Croatia in 2009 it put the problem at the technical level. The further positive sign that confirms Slovenia’s more constructive approach was its ratification of the Croatian EU Accession Treaty in April 2013, thereby setting aside another bilateral dispute with Croatia on the Nova Lublanska Bank.

Most pronounced seem to be Cyprus’ uploading efforts of its bilateral problem with Turkey. Already as a candidate country it constantly put forward its demands, and as a member state it used its potential fully. For instance, after Turkey signed the Ankara Protocol in 2005, extending its Customs Union to all new member states except Cyprus, it requested the EU condemnation, which resulted in the EU counter-declaration (Sepos 2008: 125). Cyprus also insisted on the total suspension of Turkey’s accession negotiations, which led to the postponement of Turkey’s negotiations on eight chapters. While “everyone in Brussels knows the Cyprus interest and position”, its hard bargaining style and veto threats in a long term tend to be unproductive as “it obstructed all the decision-making process and irritated the partners” (Interview 28.06.2013, EEAS). Problems with this approach have been realized among the Cypriot political elites. One such example was disagreement between the Cypriot Commissioner Kyprianou and President Papadopoulos in 2007, when the Commissioner criticized Papadopoulos for using blackmailing and confrontational approach on the Cyprus problem, specifically on the Turkey’s accession negotiations (ibid.:133). Positive tendencies were observable during the Cyprus EU Presidency in 2012 when Nicosia took a restrained and neutral approach.

As one can see, small new member states have learned the “pointlessness of being small and being isolated, especially in the EU foreign policy making, which rests on consensus” (Edwards 2006: 146). In the following, it will be discussed how they actually sought to improve their uploading strategies.

Cooperative and compromise-seeking behaviour

A key for an effective uploading is learning how to interact in the complex system of the EU decision-making, including improving compromise skills. The small state smart strategy involves presenting initiatives as the EU common interest, in this way avoiding conflicts with the existing EU policy initiatives (Grøn and Wivel 2011). In contrast to hard bargaining – conflicting and aggressive tactics, cooperative bargaining is characterized as a cooperative attitude, brainstorming, rich information sharing and participants openly disclosing what
they want (Naurin 2010: 37), friendly tactics, signalling flexibility, praising the other side, and seeking for compromise (Dür and Mateo 2010: 683). The importance of the cooperative interest-mediation style was confirmed by one Lithuanian foreign policy maker: “Lithuania’s blocking of the EU–Russia Agreement was wrong. As a result, it was isolated. Especially, under consensus, it may have a detrimental effect. Of course, one can use veto from time to time, but blocking in general is very painful. Everyone was fed up with Lithuania” (Interview 09.07.2013, MFA of Lithuania).

In most cases, small new member states have learned the importance of a constructive interest-mediation style. One such example is Lithuania who learned a lesson on the need for compromise. After the 2008 elections, the Lithuanian foreign policy changed its foreign policy rhetoric from trouble-maker to more a pragmatic and cooperative approach, while the policy priorities remained the same (Vilpišauskas 2013). This pragmatic approach has been maintained during Lithuania’s EU Presidency in 2013, e.g., with the Lithuanian government strictly following the Brussels official line.

Another example is Estonia. Despite bilateral problems with Russia, it sought to escape the image as a ‘one-issue’ state by purposefully taking a restrained approach and downplaying them as ‘technical’ problems (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008:176). The EU solidarity expression with Estonia in the Bronze Solder crisis in 2007 stimulated it to be even more cooperative and consensus-oriented in formulating the EU common policy vis-à-vis Russia. For this reason, Estonia did not support the Polish and Lithuanian blocking of the negotiation mandate for the New EU–Russia Agreement (Kasekamp 2013).

Similarly, Latvia in its uploading efforts, in case of the EU economic sanctions on Belarus in spring 2012, sought to be cooperative and consensus-oriented, despite its strong domestic concerns caused by economic interdependence with Belarus. In the words of foreign minister Rinkēvičs, the EU Council decision in March 2012 on the sanctions on Belarus was not an easy one for Latvia; however, it supported the compromise as it is “extremely important for the EU to have a common and unanimous foreign policy” (MFA, Latvia, 23.03.2013).

Malta is another example of the cooperative interest mediation style. As a small state in the centre of the Mediterranean surrounded by much more powerful neighbours, it has learned to compromise and seek the peaceful resolutions of conflicts. This led it to entrench neutrality, which primarily aims to keep Malta out of conflicts (Pace 2013: 160). Overall, Malta’s uploading strategies in case of its strong domestic concern with the immigration problem indicate the compromise-seeking interest-mediation style in the EU.

Building a good reputation

A member state’s success to influence the EU foreign policy is related to its good reputation as a partner that demonstrates interest not only for its own national preferences, but also for the Union as a whole (Kavakas 2001). Reputation is important, according to one EEAS representative: “If in 2004–2005 the EU partners looked to the new member states with suspicion, then now mistrust has disappeared. We have the Latvian and Lithuanian diplomats
working as the Heads of EU delegations in Belarus and in Russia. Gradually, the old members understood that the ‘newcomers’ have different interests but anyway they can be trusted” (Interview 12.07.2013, EEAS, Brussels).

The Baltic States’ support of the Eastern neighbours can be associated with gaining a higher reputation in the EU. Hence, Latvia represented the Austrian EU Presidency in Belarus in 2006, seeking to carve out a niche as a mediator and expert in the EU relationship with its neighbours. To ensure the credibility of their political statements, the Baltic States started to practically assist the Eastern partnership countries, especially the front-runners Georgia and Moldova. For example, the Eastern Partnership Centre in Tallinn was established in 2011 for training officials from the partner countries (Kasekamp 2013: 106). Slovenia allocated its major part of the development aid projects to the Western Balkan nations to help them to meet the EU technical requirements. However, due to the economic crisis, it became more complicated; for instance, Latvia for several years had to suspend its bilateral development aid for this reason.

Another common concern of the small new member states was diminishing their trouble-maker reputation. Here, the Baltic States were concerned with getting rid of the ‘one-issue’ states in the EU policy vis-à-vis Russia. For this reason, Estonia purposefully tried to keep a good reputation. Despite bilateral problems with Russia, to escape the perception of being ‘Russo-phobic’, Estonia sought to present itself as a ‘good European’ trying to be as constructive as possible and going along with the EU mainstream in almost all dossiers (Kasekamp 2013:109). Similarly, Latvia was keen to avoid being branded as a ‘one-issue’ state and ‘trouble maker’ in EU policy towards Russia. Thereby its purposeful behaviour was to take a ‘restrained approach’ and be constructive in the EU decision-making on Russia. Both Estonia and Latvia rather approached the EU institutions as mediators in resolving bilateral problems and downplayed as ‘technical’ problems (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2008: 176).

Similarly, Slovenia, although accused of using its EU Presidency to gain advantage in the bilateral dispute with Croatia, generally showed a restrain in this respect in order to build its reputation as a honest broker (Kajnč 2011: 205).

**Persuasive advocating**

During their formal interventions in the EU Council negotiations, member states can make their policy positions known to others. According to the scholars, small states tend to rely on soft bargaining tactics by strategically using argumentation and signalling flexibility to compromise, praising the other side (Dür and Mateo 2010: 562) through providing well-reasoned positions, rational justifications, convincing reasoning, and value-claiming (Lethonen 2008: 219).

Among the six small new member states, there has been awareness that “impact of a small country is based on the strength of its arguments” (Pabriks 2006 quoted by Jakniūnaitė 2009: 118). In supporting their position as the Eastern neighbour advocates, the Baltic States started to transmit the message that they have transformed into the modern European states and started to follow the EU discourse of common values of democracy and human rights.
In general, the new member states made a difference in the Council debates on the Eastern neighbourhood, and their views were widely acknowledged (Raik and Gromadzki 2006: 21). While at the outset their statements were too vague and general, gradually they improved their argumentation skills by a more convincing reasoning, technical justifications, and better presenting their individual assistance for the sake of common benefit.

The importance of persuasive advocating was highlighted by the national representative in the EU Council COREPER ambassadors’ format: “In the foreign policy issues, not only big member states, but also small states with good argumentation can reach their preferred outcome. Here, one needs to start with general value-oriented statements and then flesh out narrower, national concerns. One always needs to start with the commitment to the common values and then to open the debate by expressing specific points” (Interview 13.02.2013, Permanent Representation of Latvia in EU). The fact that small new member states became more persuasive has been confirmed by the old members’ experts. For instance, Latvia on the visa facilitation issues with Russia “has been very vocal in the EU, supported its position by technical arguments, and consulted partners and shared information prior to the meetings” (Interview 20.06.2013, MFA of Sweden).

The Baltic States have always been especially outspoken on Belarus. At the outset, they strongly criticized the authoritarian regime in Minsk, thereby reflecting their more idealistic foreign policy due to shared totalitarian experience (Raik and Gromadzki. 2006: 21). Later on, they also voiced their strong opinions on Belarus, but in this case they reflected their domestic economic interests and cross-border trade. When in spring 2012 the EU decided to impose economic sanctions on Belarus, the new restrictions were only limited thanks to a consistent opposition by Latvia whose economy is closely linked to Belarus, and by Slovenia (Publication 28.03.2012). Latvia succeeded to upload its domestic concerns by persuasive deliberation based on technical justifications on the negative impact on its economy.

Also, Slovenia supported its positions on the importance to bring the Western Balkan nations closer to the EU with a well-elaborated and persuasive advocating. Slovenia used its EU Presidency to promote the Western Balkan dossier in many ways. It voiced strong opinions in support of accelerating the enlargement process with regard to its neighbours within various forums, including the Foreign Affairs Council, even when the issue was not on the agenda (Kajjnč 2011: 93). While Slovenia pretty much relied on distributive bargaining, “blocking Croatia’s accession to the EU, it also used convincing and well-elaborated arguments” (Interview 28.06.2013, EEAS).

Cyprus strategically tried to upload the Cyprus problem by using various deliberation modes, including distributive bargaining. For instance, before the European Council in 2004 when the EU discussed the target date for launching membership negotiations with Turkey, Cyprus threatened to veto this unless Turkey changed its position on the Cyprus issue (Sepos 2008: 124). Also, it sought to make use of issue-linkages. Thus, in order to prevent Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan from the recognition of the Northern Cyprus, it sought to influence their Association Agreements with the EU (ibid.). For the same reason, Cyprus objected the
recognition of Kosovo independence expressing fears that it would be a precedent for the Northern Cyprus (ibid.). Overall, Cyprus has been very vocal in different EU policy-making formats in raising its core national interest.

Malta, to upload its highly salient immigration issue to the EU level, took substantial persuasion efforts. In order to ease the burden on its densely populated inhabitants and budgetary strain, Malta pursued a tough line, insisting that it could not agree with its unique geographical position not to be taken into account (Fiott 2010: 112). It argued that the Dublin II Regulation (2003), forcing immigrants to reside in the member state they first arrive in, was against Malta’s interests. Such position created a conflicting situation in the EU. Also, Malta objected the 2008 French EU Presidency’s proposed Migration and Asylum Pact in the JHA (ibid.: 113) and consistently insisted on the need for the common EU asylum policy. In 2010, Malta even suspended its participation in the Frontex missions since the rules of engagement inquired that migrants rescued had to be taken to the country hosting mission (ibid.). Disagreements with Italy erupted on the responsibility for migrants rescued at the sea (Pace 2013: 172). As a result, it succeeded in a way that in December 2008 the European Council agreed on the Dublin II Regulation by allowing Malta to transfer immigrants to other member states and allocated 112 million EUR within the External Borders Fund (Fiott 2010: 113).

Lobbying the EU institutions

According to Grøn and Wivel (2011: 523), the ideal type of a small state smart strategy for maximizing its influence in the EU is acting as a lobbyist. Lobbying is a ‘unilateral action’ where the formal institutional rules are absent (Scharp 1997: 47). State lobbying is an ‘informal strategy to impact policy outcomes through contacting key decision-making actors’ (Panke 2012: 145). The scholarship about lobbying has focused mainly on how non-governmental actors influence the governments, and only a few studies have analysed states as lobbyists, yet states may often use lobbying strategies (ibid.: 129). States may lobby key institutional actors, which are in charge of agenda-setting or chair. In the case of EU foreign policy, it involves lobbying such key institutional actors as the High Representative for the CFSP, the EEAS, the European Commission as well as the EU Presidency. It has been shown that the higher the intensity of preference, the more actively a state uses the lobbying strategy (Panke 2010). Lobbying is particularly important for small states. As Schmidt-Felzmann (2008: 173) puts it, while the Commission consults with large member states on their preferences in developing common policies towards third countries, like Russia, small member states, on the contrary, have to pro-actively lobby the Commission and member states.

The evidence shows that the six small new member states have sought to use the lobbying strategies. Already after joining the EU, the Baltic politicians in their support to the Eastern neighbours “did some important lobbying efforts” to include the South Caucasus countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Kesa 2011: 93). As a small country, Estonia has not attempted to “directly push its positions in the EU agenda” (Ehin 2012: 108). Even in the Bronze Solder crisis it tried to solve problem through contacts with EU institutions. Malta
in pursuit to its highly salient immigration issue in the Dublin II Regulation put continuous “lobbying efforts in the European Commission, the Justice and Home Affairs Council, the Foreign Affairs Council, and the European Parliament” (Fiott 2010).

Under the EU Lisbon Treaty, the EU institutions have an increasing importance in the foreign policy making. The High Representative and the EEAS have the leadership and the agenda-setting role, and it drafts policy proposals. Given the broad functions the EEAS has, it challenges the dominating position of member states (Tallberg et al. 2011: 40). However, small member states traditionally benefit from permanent EU institutions which mediate individual member states’ interests. Thus, the Commission has been perceived as an institution that small states rely on when seeking influence in the EU (Grøn and Wivel 2011: 526). A well-settled permanent EU foreign policy institution seems to be particularly useful in the case of small new member states. Their limited resources do not allow them to efficiently make lobbying efforts with every rotating Presidency. Instead, developing stable long-term relationships with the EEAS staff suits their needs better. Since the EEAS is drafting the policy proposals, the small new member states can seek to influence the decision-making already in its formulation stage through contacting the EEAS and providing their specific concerns. The evidence shows that small new member states, if their preferences are well-defined, can successfully inject their policy ideas through these new institutions.

The importance, even the strong need, of lobbying efforts in the EU institutions was particularly highlighted by the EEAS representatives: “If a state has strong domestic interests, it is extremely important that it starts lobbying at all the levels of EU decision-making at the earliest possible stage. In the EU, everyone has to be aware that a country has particular interest. It should put consistent lobbying efforts” (Interview 28.06.2013, EEAS). The same interlocutor indicated the differences in lobbying activities, even among the Baltic States: “Lithuania in the EU circles is much more taken into account. The EU partners see that Lithuania has not only empty ambitions but concrete interests. Lithuania is quite professional in lobbying in the EU institutions. Also Estonia is rather successful” (ibid.).

Coalition-building

Besides lobbying, of crucial importance for a small state in successful uploading is the use of coalitions. As stressed by the EEAS representative, “smaller states have much less possibilities to influence the EU decisions. They try to see where the negotiations goes and then to build the like-minded groupings.” (Interview 12.07.2013, EEAS).

The new member states in Brussels quickly understood that “diplomacy there is about networking and ‘horse-trading’” (Galbreath et al. 2008: 55) and that they may influence the EU policy making through using coalitions. Even when decisions are taken by unanimity, member states seek to find allies in order to avoid reputation repercussions (Rüse 2011: 49). For instance, the Baltic–Nordic foreign ministers informally meet before each Foreign Affairs Council (ibid.: 216). Besides regional coalitions, they actively use the issue-specific coalitions. In this way, new member states have succeeded to keep the Eastern neighbourhood at the
EU agenda. In the energy policy, the Baltic common approach has been highly important. As argued by minister Paet, the Baltic cooperation is vital due to their isolation from the EU (Galbreath et al. 2008: 48).

Slovenia, in seeking support of enlargement in the Western Balkans, used coalitions; e.g., Slovenian and Italian ministers sent regular joint letters to the Commissioner for Enlargement since 2009 (Kajnč 2011: 93). Also, during the EU discussions on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Slovenia put all its diplomatic efforts to avoid stalemate over Serbia and to keep the issue high on the EU agenda. It actively engaged in the coalition-building activities by seeking support among the Visegrad countries and Austria, Italy, France and other member states. It used all its diplomatic creativity to keep open the dialogue with Serbia (ibid.: 205).

Cyprus put a pressure on Turkey by using the coalition primarily with Greece, its strong ally (Sepos 2008: 124). Both of them closely coordinated their positions towards Turkey and influenced the content of Turkey’s accession negotiations, the European Council conclusions, and the Commission’s Progress Reports on Turkey. For instance, Cyprus insisted that the December 2006 European Council Conclusions demand Turkey to implement the Ankara Protocol, including the recognition of Cyprus (ibid.). It also asked to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey. As a result of Cyprus efforts, it gained support from Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and France, and thus the EU compromise led to the suspension of Turkey’s membership negotiations (ibid.).

Also Malta achieved benefits from the EU negotiations by using like-minded coalitions. Thus, the Dublin II Regulation satisfied Malta’s interests. It was the result of coalition-building activities when the so-called Quadro Group consisting of Malta, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus prepared a ‘road map’ on illegal immigration (Fiott 2010).

**Strengthening the domestic uploading capacity**

For uploading the national preferences, a state needs, first, adequate capacities, otherwise “even the most enlightened preferences will fail to make a practical difference” (Scharpf, 1997: 51). The capacity-building indirectly helps states to effectively participate in the EU negotiations (Panke 2011: 20). In other words, a state needs to do homework in preparing well-elaborated and high-quality national positions.

The domestic capacity depends on the budget allocations, sufficient staff, and an effective coordination system among responsible institutions. Initially, the small new member states faced enormous difficulties in the EU policy-making due to the lack of experience and resources. Thus, in the first years after independence Slovenia’s foreign office had only a rudimentary organizational structure, and the need to comply with the EU accession criteria substantially challenged its administrative capacity (Kajnč 2011: 194). Also, the Baltic States had to establish institutions from scratch, including the Foreign Ministry (Kasekamp 2013: 100). Thereby even participation in the EU meeting was a challenge due to limited human resources (ibid.: 107). Furthermore, the limited capacities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been related with intellectual ‘brain-drain’ (Galbreath et al. 2008: 56).
Apart from the administrative capacity, a precondition for successful uploading is the domestic political strength. As argued by Vilpišauskas (2013: 140), a key issue behind the uploading success and failures of Lithuania has been the consistency and coherence of domestic policies over time. If there is a strong consensus among political elites on particular policy issues, then Europeanization is more likely (ibid.: 139). Also, T. Rostoks (2009: 58) argued that in pursuit of its preferences Latvia should strengthen its intellectual capacity and the quality of its arguments. Its national positions should be justified, and this is possible only if the Latvian expertise increases. Otherwise, nobody in the EU would treat it seriously (ibid.).

3. SUCCESS OF INFLUENCE

The EU decision-making success is usually defined as the degree to which member states achieve their goals (Bailer, 2004: 100). The empirical evidence shows that there is a striking difference between old and new small member states in their negotiation success salient policy issues (Panke (2010: 111–113). The least successful group contains the small new member states Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Latvia (ibid.). In general, the small new member states’ uploading success has been characterized as ‘mixed’.

For instance, Cyprus’ record in its key preference issue has been described as mixed because “there has been only rhetorical support for Cyprus” (Stavridis and Kassimeris 2013: 154–155). At the same time, Cyprus successfully uploaded its concerns on the division of the island: its legitimacy was strengthened because Turkish-Cypriots are absent in the representative government (ibid.). In case of the Baltic States, their uploading efforts met various degrees of success. With regard to their key geographical preference, Russia and reconciling relations with it, there have been up-and-down developments. Russia continues to use the Russian minority in the Baltic States to damage their reputations (Kasekamp 2013: 104) and to undermine them as peripheral players in the EU (Sleivyte 2010: 6). On the other hand, such examples as the 2007 EU solidarity statement with Estonia in its Bronze Solder incident when the EU demonstrated solidarity in the face of Russian pressure on new member states (Kasekamp, 2013) speak in favour of a successful uploading. Overall, Estonia’s restrained approach and ‘small states’ smart strategy’ in the EU–Russia agenda has delivered certain positive results. As recognized by foreign minister Paet in 2013 in Riigikogu, Estonia’s relations with Russia are ‘developing and busy’ (MFA, Estonia, 21.02.2013), including the long-awaited progress in the border agreement. Also, the Latvian case shows that, thanks to the EU context, relations with Russia are evolving in a more pragmatic tone (Ozoliņa 2012: 146).

In the EU policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood, the Baltic States’ uploading efforts have been partly successful. They had to give up their initial advocating for the ‘European perspective’ for the Eastern Partnership countries and shift to a small-step approach. However, given the complexity of developments in the Eastern neighbourhood, the very fact that the Eastern Partnership was kept on the EU agenda can be perceived as a success story. Thanks to the like-minded states’ efforts, the Partnership has been running ‘step-by-step’.

As can be seen, the small new member states have been more successful by using the
existing EU policy initiatives rather than seeking to act as agenda-setters. Their best chance to influence the EU decision-making has been through seeking to modify the existing EU policy initiatives. For instance, when the Baltic States, together with Poland, sought to be the agenda-setters during the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, they did not succeed. When the Baltic and Polish leaders went to Georgia to call for EU response while Russian tanks were advancing toward Tbilisi, they failed to be a “wake-up-call” for old member states, which interpreted this step as an encouragement of recklessness (Kasekamp 2013). On the contrary, by using the existing EU initiatives they could be more successful. In this way the like-minded coalition succeeded to keep the Eastern neighbourhood at the EU agenda (Galbreath et al. 2008: 55). Also, Malta’s success in uploading its immigration concerns is related to the EU policy modification. The 2008 European Council which agreed on the Dublin II Regulation satisfied Malta’s demands. This proves that small states “may not be able to set agendas, but they are able to modify them” (Fiott 2010: 117). The uploading of Malta’s foreign policies is visible. While the issue of immigration highlighted Malta’s ability to modify rather than define the EU policy, the country is still able to extend its preferences at the EU (ibid.).

One exception when a small new member state may gain influence through agenda-setting is the rotating EU Presidency. In this way, Slovenia succeeded to elevate the Western Balkan dossier. It managed to present its own interests as being of vital importance to the EU as a whole (Kajnč 2010: 92). Despite the enlargement fatigue, a success may have been the preservation of the enlargement agenda in the EU; however, Slovenia in the Western Balkans has done more than that and “its record shows concrete, measurable results” (ibid.: 92). At the same time, Slovenia sought to use its Presidency as a leverage for influencing its bilateral dispute with Croatia. Due to this problem and the complexity of the region’s stabilization, Slovenia’s policy record is mixed (ibid.: 204). Similarly, Lithuania, thanks to its active lobbying efforts and persuasive advocating, succeeded to be the agenda-setter for the priories of its EU Presidency in 2013: the Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013 takes place in Vilnius.

CONCLUSIONS
This study has explored the foreign policy experiences of small new member states in the EU. It shows how they sought to upload their salient policy issues in the EU foreign policy. The results indicate that all the six countries used various uploading strategies. Overall, they have gradually moved from unsophisticated strategies, e.g., blocking the common EU decisions, towards smarter strategies by applying persuasive advocating, cooperative behaviour and showing flexibility to compromise. Evidently, while their national preferences on the whole remained the same, they have advanced their interest-mediation style.

Their uploading efforts in the EU foreign policy met the varying degrees of success and can be characterized as ‘mixed’. Apart from their smallness and short membership experience, the following factors hindered their uploading success: first, the limited domestic uploading capacity, including the lack of political consensus and continuity, as well as weak coordination procedures did not allow them to use efficiently a small-state smart strategy; second, the
EU institutional environment with divergent member states’ interests, in particular the large ones’, constrained their preference projection; third, the complexity of developments in their neighbourhood did not facilitate their ‘advocacy’ efforts.

However, the small new member states’ preference projection in the EU foreign policy has been visible. While their experience highlighted their success in modifying rather than defining the EU foreign policy, they still have the ability to exert their national interests. They have sufficient voice, especially given their smallness, to influence the Union’s “special relationship with neighbouring countries” (Art 8 (1) TEU). By uploading their national preferences to the EU level, the small new member states have focused their efforts on Europeanizing their foreign policies.

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