ASPECTS OF SELF-PRESENTATION IN THE SPEECHES OF ISOCRATES

Tomas Veteikis
Lecturer of the Department of Classical Philology,
Vilnius University

Abstract
This article, based on the paper presented at the ISHR 2013 Conference (July 24–27, 2013, Chicago), reconsiders the rhetorical image of Isocrates, preserved in his literary works and especially in three of the most prominent speeches, Panegyricus, Antidosis, and Panathenaicus, discusses certain controversies and difficulties of determining his public character and his attitude towards the audience and, basing on both empirically gathered data (references found in Isocrates’ writings) and on the theoretical basement provided by the consideration of the classical rhetoric tradition and the modern communication science approach, reviews the main aspects of the speaker’s self-presentational tactics as seen in his self-reflexive statements (found in the mentioned speeches), the examination of which could lead to a better comprehension of the otherwise obscure picture of this influential Athenian rhetorician.

Preliminary remarks on problems and tasks
In his discourses aimed at public reading, Isocrates created a certain picture of his literary or rhetorical “self”. Such concept is only fractionally mentioned in ancient rhetorical treatises (among others in Aristotelian theory of ἔθος of speaker, audience and occasion)¹, but it is perhaps inherent in the long tradition of character-composition (ἦθοςτοια) implicitly present both in oral speech-making practice and early written forensic discourses. The concept of the orator’s activity, consisting of the displaying his own character and commending his

¹ E.g., in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 3.7 = 1408a10–b20 concerning the appropriateness (πρέπον) of style. This discussion includes observations about the manner the orator presents himself to the audience, which we could summarize as ἀρμονία ἐν λόγῳ, πάθει, ἔθει, καὶ εὐκαρπίᾳ. James Fredal in his article on Demosthenes’ technique of character presentation (“The Language of Delivery and the Presentation of Character: Rhetorical Action in Demosthenes’ against Meidias”, Rhetoric Review, 20, No. 3/4 (Autumn), 2001, pp. 251–267) convincingly showed that by the 4th century BC the Greek oratory had been employing in speeches three strategies as described in Aristotelian theory of ἔθος (by referring to this article I, nevertheless, change the references to the Aristotle’s text and include a parallel standard numbering of Immanuel Bekker’s edition; for this purpose, I used the German edition by Adolphus Roemer, Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. […] Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914): construction of speaker’s own ἔθος (Rhet. 2.1.4–6 = 1377b29–1378a16), adaptation of his speech to the ἔθος of the audience (Rhet. 2.12.1–17.6 = 1388b30-1391b7) and construction of a more specific ἔθος appropriate to the occasion (Rhet. 3.7.6–10 = 1408a25–b20).
good qualities (not just merely exhibiting his rhetorical skills), was associated with the realm of words and expressions denoting demonstration and exhibition (e.g. ἐπίδειξις, δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος, ἐμφανιζεῖν, ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύειν, φαίνεσθαι or ἀποφαίνειν ἑαυτὸν). Nowadays, the same concept is an attractive topic for interdisciplinary research within communication studies (matching the subjects of rhetoric, literary theory, ethics, and psychology). In the course of these studies, various new concepts and terms dealing with the speaker–audience interaction and various constituents of rhetorical communication (such as rhetorical image, self-presentation, impression management, strategies of intimidation, ingratiation or self-handicapping) have been coined or acquired new connotations. Despite a somewhat loose relation among these concepts and the traditional terminology of classical rhetoric, certain attempts to match them up have already been made. At least in the case of the research on Isocrates, we find the term ‘self-presentation’ frequently employed. Since, however, it is neither firmly established nor strictly defined, but, on the contrary, other synonyms (such as

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2 Beside the already mentioned Aristotelian theory which contains the concept expressed in the words „τὸ ποιὸν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα“ (Arist. Rhet. 2.1.3 = 1377b26–27; 2.1.4 = 1377b29; cf. 1366a10), the significant example could be drawn from the instruction present in the 4th-century BC manual of rhetoric by Anaximenes, Rhetorica ad Alexandra (14.8. = 1431b10–14), containing the majority of these key words (marked here in bold): „Ἡ μὲν οὖν δόξα τοῦ λέγοντός ἐστι τὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανίζειν κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων. δει δὲ ἐμπειρῶν ἀποφαίνειν σεαυτῶν περὶ ὧν ἢ λέγεις, καὶ ἐπιδεικνύειν, ὡς συμφέρει σοι τάληθη λέγειν περὶ τούτων, τὸν δ’ ἀντιλέγοντα μάλιστα διακόνειν μηδεμίαν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντα τὸν ἐναντίον περὶ ὧν ἀποφαίνεται [τὴν τε δόξαν ὁμοίως].” The source of the quotation is Anaximenes Ars Rhetorica Quae Vulgo Fertur Aristotelis Ad Alexandria, ed. Manfred Fuhrmann, Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1966. All the highlights of the words occurring in this and other passages of this article are mine.

3 Impression management is a term associated with sociology and social psychology, meaning a goal-directed process in which people, by controlling information in social interaction, attempt to affect the perceptions of other people about a person, object or event (cf. Barry R. Schlenker, Impression Management: The Self-concept, Social Identity, and Interpersonal Relations, Monterey (California): Brooks/Cole, 1980, p. x; Manfred Piwinger, Helmut Ebert, “Impression Management: Wie aus Niemand Jemand wird”, Bentele, Guenther et al. (Ed.), Kommunikationsmanagement: Strategien, Wissen, Lösungen, hrsg. Günter Bentele, Manfred Piwinger, Gregor Schönborn, Neuwied/Krefeld: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 2001, pp. 1–2). It is usually used synonymously with the term “self-presentation” in which a person tries to protect self-image and/or influence the perception of it (Sandy J. Wayne, Robert C. Liden, “Effects of Impression Management on Performance Ratings: A Longitudinal Study”, The Academy of Management Journal, 38, No. 1 (Feb.), 1995, p. 232). The notion of impression management also refers to practices in professional communication and public relations where the term is used to describe the process of formation of a public image of any organization or company. In the theory of impression management, various strategical aspects have been distinguished, usually acquiring a dyadic structure, e. g., defensive strategy (such as avoidance of threatening situations or means of self-handicapping) and the assertive one (verbal idealization of the self, the use of status symbols, and others) (cf. Piwinger, Ebert, op. cit., p. 26).

4 In this respect, Joachim Knape’s study Modern Rhetoric in Culture, Arts, and Media (transl. by Alan L. Fortuna), Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2013 is worth a mention, especially the essay No. 3: “The Modern Concepts of Image and Ethos as Found in Aristotle” pp. 51–68, dealing with the ‘rhetorical image’ of the orator and his ‘expectations’.

self-characterization, self-display, self-portraiture, self-portrayal, self-description, or self-depiction) are easily used, the same terminological flexibility is preferable for me in this paper.

In his works, written during his teaching career in Athens and his old years (ca. 392–338), Isocrates quite often speaks of himself (or his rhetorical self) and expresses his personal views on the rhetorical education, claims his originality and difference from other rhetoricians and philosophers. On the other hand, in some places (most notably in Phil. 81, Epist. 8.7, and Panath. 9–10) he is unscrupulous to mention his weakness of voice and timidity to speak publicly (usually interpreted as stage fright). This controversial rhetorical image of creative and yet self-stigmatized (leptophonic and glossophobic) speech-writer, thanks to Roman and Byzantine biographers, has been preserved to our days. I am not going to consider how much this literary portrait (or rhetorical picture) of the rhetorician differs from the real person (such a distinction is hardly possible in the current state of our knowledge of the life of “real” Isocrates), but it is interesting to look deeper into the impression that the orator (or the literary representative of his person) creates of himself in his texts. Due to the abundance of material and time constraints, I will confine myself only with three discourses, namely, Panegyricus, Antidosis and Panathenaicus, linked together by common political, rhetorical and pedagogical topics, Athenocentric Panhellenism, complexity of an imaginary audience, the speaker’s patriotic, independent (self-distancing), and self-reflexive (containing commemoration of individual qualities) posture.

The aim of this article, then, is to start elucidating multiple aspects of Isocratean self-display in these three speeches as certain conscious devices (with the possible effect parallel to that of the captatio benevolentiae technique, developed later by Roman rhetoricians) and to share some

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6 Cf. Too, op. cit., p. 79, 86 (“self-characterisation is analogous ... to the sort of ‘self-fashioning’ ... occurring in Renaissance authors”) et alibi.


8 Cf. Too, op. cit., p. 75.


12 Isocrates depicts himself (or presents his rhetorical self) in most of his epideictic and political discourses, but this is not the case with the six extant forensic speeches; nevertheless, the activity of writing court speeches was probably a good practice on how to defend his own position and paint his own character and reputation with bright colors (on the basis of the examples of his clients’ ethopoeia).

13 Or “microphonic” (cf. the term mikrophōnia used by Y. L. Too, op. cit., p. 78 and 85)

14 On which see the discussion in Too, op. cit., chapter 3.

15 The conceptualization of this technique, consisting of a number of rules and recommendations for the speaker to follow in the course of the whole speech and especially in its initial part (Gr. προοίμιον, φροίμιον, Lat. exordium) in order to manage the disposition of
observations concerning their possible impact on the audience and the author himself.

There is not much direct research on Isocrates’ self-presentation, save for a few paragraphs from Yun Lee Too books\textsuperscript{16}, and a certain number of hints in other works are taken into consideration (e.g., T. Poulakos, D. Depew, N. Livingstone, E. Haskins)\textsuperscript{17}. The present work is largely based on the empirical analysis of Isocrates’ texts, the results of which (i.e. the characteristics of Isocrates’ self-display in a concise form) are attached to this article among the added materials.

Meanwhile, what follows further on is a review of the aspects of Isocrates’ self-presentation according to the newly-created scheme (the principles of which will be also indicated below), and it starts from a brief survey of the rhetorician’s public character and his attitude towards the audience. Three sections devoted to this issue roughly correspond to the three important questions (derived from the first reassessment of all the data gathered during my study of the texts of Panegyricus, Antidosis, and Panathenaicus), namely, 1) the difficulty of establishing the synthetic identity of Isocrates’ (Isocratean speaker’s) rhetorical personality due to the precautions to be made in view of the occasion-conditioned variations of the general setting of each speech and the writer’s/speaker’s position reliant on particularity time; 2) the contrastingness of the speaker’s self-reflexion ranging from low to high self-esteem; 3) the consideration of the occasion-conditioned interplay between the speaker and his audience.

**Isocrates’ public character**

(ēthos of the speaker)

All three speeches chosen for the discussion, written in different periods, mark certain changes of Isocrates’ public character\textsuperscript{18} and reputation. The general outline of the external factors which should be considered when creating the synthethic picture of the orator for ourselves could be formulated in the following short but composite description: The speaker/writer of Panegyricus, Antidosis and Panathenaicus

- is in his 50ies, 80ies and 90ies, respectively
- represents different stages of his teaching carrier and reputation
- addresses the multifold Athenian audience at different times and occasions
- provides his listeners/readers with a different level of self-esteem.


\textsuperscript{17} For the titles of their works, look in the above footnotes.

\textsuperscript{18} This term here could be interchangeably used with the terms like “Isocrates’ literary self-portrait” or “Isocrates’ rhetorical self”, but has a slight shift of meaning to the realm of publicity (vs. privacy) implied by the titles of the speeches discussed.
Panegyricus, written by the 56-year-old man, is like an advertisement of a teacher’s and politician’s views promoting his distinctive rhetorical style and thematic preferences (ἔνδοξα, i.e. “things held in esteem”, “deeds of high repute”, “honorable things” rather than παράδοξα, “incredible things”, “things contrary to expectation” or ἀδοξα, “disreputable topics”) 19. In Terry Papillon’s words, it “stands as the best example of his ideas of political leadership and his role as a teacher of such leadership. But it also stands as the most prominent example of the Isocratean smooth style” 20. Antidosis, written by the 82-year-old rhetorician, captures the moment soon after Isocrates’ school’s heyday, when the need to defend his views against the common prejudice and slanders by contemporary professionals emerged. This work restates and conceptualizes the main standpoints of Isocrates views on education and Athenocentric politics. Panathenaicus composed by a nonagenarian (97 years) reflects the further step in the decline of Isocrates’ reputation and the end of the political domination of Athens 21. If we apply the Aristotelian scheme of the three-fold age division (νεότης-ἀκμή-γῆρας) of a character (Arist. Rhet. 2.12-14 = 1388b30-1390b12) to the author of these works, then Panegyricus could be associated with a mature man in the peak of his wisdom, while Antidosis and Panathenaicus with an old man with certain declining abilities. This must have influenced the speaker’s self-presentational tactics to a certain extent, and this factor should not be ignored when dealing with the rest of the aspects of Isocrates’ rhetorical personality to which I now proceed.

First-sight picture of orator’s image: between pride and humility

For a systematic picture of Isocrates’ character, one should look in his most autobiographic-like works, Antidosis and Panathenaicus, and see him depicting himself as a lover of peaceful life and values of Periclean Athens. In regard of limits of time and space, the detailed characteristics of his rhetorical image will be postponed to some other occasion, while in the present one I will deal only with one important feature. Speeches of Isocrates express a certain duality of the orator’s image: the reader is informed both about his distrust in his own performative qualities, on the one hand, and a not unnoticeable commendation of the speaker’s (narrator’s) mental abilities, on the other. The bold self-confidence of the speaker of Panegyricus and his expression of hope for a positive assessment by a group of intelli-

19 Cf. Isocrates’ direct attack against various writers on strange and absurd topics in Hel. 1: ἀποθέουσαν ἄτοπον καὶ παράδοξον ποιημένοιν and his preference for the “noblest kind of oratory” which deals with the greatest affairs in Panegyricus 4: προκρίνας τοιτοις καλλίστως εἶναι τῶν λόγων, εἶτε περὶ μεγίστων τυχάνοντος ὑπότεσιν. On the difference between the concepts of ἐνδόξα and παράδοξα cf. Anaximenes Rhet. Alex. 11, 1–2 = 1430b1–8. This argument could be corroborated with the indirect evidence produced in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where, specifically in the passage devoted to one of 28 topoi, the topos of authoritative opinions (though not identified as ἐνδόξα), three references to Isocratean works as significant illustrations of this device are made (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1398b28–1399a6).


21 It stands in striking opposition to contemporary anti-Macedonian aspirations pronounced by Demosthenes.
gent listeners, reiterated in later discourses with a constant reminder of his services to Athenian public, gives the impression of a boastful stance, while his elsewhere declared self-image of a disabled speaker (unable to perform speeches orally) has a sign of a low self-esteem.

However, rhetorical art manages to veil this dual image. The delicate and inventive manner, in which orator praises himself, has attracted Aristotle’s approbation (Rhet. 3.17.16 = 1418b23–27): Aristotle commends Isocrates’ technique (such as present in his Ad Philippum and Antidosis) of indirect self-praise in words of another person; indirect portrayal of the self would allow the speaker to escape public’s envy or reproaches for a long speech (μακρολογία) and thus to preserve his good image. On the other hand, the aspects of low self-esteem, present in all three speeches in different proportion, do not go further than the recognition of human weaknesses and mistakes, thus do not reach the level of self-hatred (μισαυτία) or self-loathing, the concept not unknown in the time of Aristotle. Bearing in mind that specific hints at Isocrates’ natural infirmities are not mentioned in Panegyricus and occur merely in texts written in his old age (the earliest of which dates back to 368 BC), in particular in private texts (chronologically: Epist. 1, 9; 8, 7; Phil. 81; Panath. 9–10), we can infer that the apparent shifting between pride and humility is not so much a matter of instability of character, but rather of changing tactics of one’s literary self-presentation and impression management. This insight urges caution in dealing with Isocratean rhetorical image and his speaker’s attitude towards the audience (regarding them as a certain part of fundamental strategy aimed at influencing hearers and improving his own reputation).

**Attitude towards audience (ēthos of the audience and audience segregation)**

The non-ephemeral performative situation of Panegyricus, Antidosis and Panathenæicus 23 – the nation’s celebratory meeting 24 or court hearing public case, γραφή 25 – itself suggests that implied and intended readers were not only the orator’s like-minded. Isocrates explicitly shows the mixed nature of his audience comprising individuals with different expectations and perception of the speaker, thus demanding an appropriate prudence of the latter, managing emotions and arguments. Accordingly, the speaker vividly exhibits his own presence: commends himself or makes excuses, expresses doubts or preferences to the audience, but is cautious in regard of ingratiating; he rather teaches his hearers (and readers) 26 and promotes

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22 Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 1166b13–17: „ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ’ ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν; ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δισχερῶν, καὶ τοιοῦτον ἔτερα ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδὲν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς“. Cf. also commentary on Nicomachean Ethics by 12th-century Byzantine philosopher Michael of Ephesus where the term “μισαυτία” is introduced, not attested in Aristotle’s own writings: Michael Eph., In ethica Nicomachea ix-x commentaria, 502: „οὐκόν αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν ἢ φιλαυτία, ἄλλα μάλλον ἢ μισαυτία“.

23 For more information about each of these discourses, see the Appendix below.

24 Which is the setting of πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι – Panegyricus and Panathenæicus.

25 Antidosis belonged to the public cases and not to the private ones (δίκαι).

26 On the contrast between giving advice and trying to please the audience see the insightful comment by N. Livingstone on Busiris (§3) (op. cit., pp. 101–102).
the ideal of good will, κοινή εὔνοια (most explicitly stated in Antid. 22–23)\textsuperscript{27}. In all three speeches he mentions the presence of people who dislike him and mainly implies the dyadic structure of the audience (the elitist group of serious intelligent hearers in opposition to the inimical part), as is shown below (in the concluding scheme of this section). Dual division is found in Panegyricus 11–14 where Isocrates distances himself from the impatient narrow-minded public ignorant of the differences between the court speeches and political discourses, but expresses his trust only in attentive and educated hearers\textsuperscript{28}, and in Panathenaicus where he speaks of the majority (οἱ πολλοί) estimating him “in a confused and altogether irrational manner”\textsuperscript{29} (ταραχωδός καὶ παντάπασιν ἁλογίστως) – praising (ἐπαινοῦντες) his discourses, but hating him personally (φθονοῦσι) (Panath. 15). In Panathenaicus, he separates admirers of the serious and the frivolous speeches: the former are interested in civic values and realities, and the latter prefer political quarrels and paradoxical encomia (Panath. 135–137). The audience of Antidosis is most elaborately depicted. Beside the fictional court members and accuser, the speaker enumerates the recipients of his discourses who ruined his reputation – slanderers and victims of their misinformation (πολὺ διεψευσμένους), inimical sophists and envious intelligent people (4–5)\textsuperscript{30}, as well as those who never provide any sign of favor (Antid. 153–154)\textsuperscript{31} and “who are unable to create or say anything of value” (τινες τῶν εὐρέων μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ’ εἰπεῖν ἄξιον λόγου δυναμένων), but are good in criticizing and prejudicing the works of others (Antid. 62); on the other hand, he associates himself only with the decent (ἐπιεικεῖς) and wise listeners (Antid. 149, 170)\textsuperscript{32}.

Thus, the summary picture of the audience in the three discussed speeches could be outlined in the following way:

Two-fold division of the audience (present in all three speeches):

- the majority (οἱ πολλοί, τὸ πλήθος)


\textsuperscript{28} NB: in the end of the speech (Paneg. 188) he makes another division of the audience into those who are able to act and those who claim for ability to speak well and urge the latter to follow his example of serious speech.

\textsuperscript{29} The quotation is taken from G. Norlin’s translation. For this and other English quotations of Isocrates’ works, the edition of the series of Loeb Classical Library, Isocrates in Three volumes (Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd, 1961–1964, containing translations by George Norlin and Larue van Hook), is the preferable choice in this paper.

\textsuperscript{30} “Misperceptions about the rhetorician’s character and his work contributed to a false public opinion of him (ψευδή παρί μου δόξην) and caused him to lose the historical liturgy trial” (Too, A Commentary on Isocrates’ Antidosis, 2008, p. 93)

\textsuperscript{31} Cf. Antid. 168, where Isocrates singles out two categories of citizens: τοὺς εἰθισμένους ἅπασι χαλεπαίνειν (“those who are churlish toward everyone”) and τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πολλοί.”

\textsuperscript{32} Stanley Wilcox in his article “Criticisms of Isocrates and His φιλοσοφία” (Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 74, 1943, pp. 113–133) identifies two groups of listeners and readers ill-disposed against him in Antidosis – “those who are deceived and prone to believe the worst about him (4, 26, 28, 154); secondly, those who know the truth but envy him, feel as the sophists do about him, and rejoice to see the public deceived (4, 6, 142, 149, 153, 154)” (Wilcox, op. cit., p. 123).
• serious (fair and intelligent) listeners (ἐπιεικεῖς, νοῦν ἔχοντες)
Manifold division of the audience (implicit in Antidosis):
• implied by occasion
  – members of court (δικασταί) [never addressed in formal way]
  – accuser (κατήγορος)
• implied from the context
  – intolerant citizens got used to criticizing others (Antid. 62, 149, 168)
  – slanderers (συκοφάνται) and victims of their misinformation (Antid. 4)
  – envious private citizens (ἰδιῶται) and sophists (Antid. 4)
  – serious listeners (οἱ λογίζεσθαι δυνάμενοι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες, cf. Antid. 149, ἐπιεικεῖς, Antid. 170)
  – Isocrates’ disciples (οἱ πλησιάσαντες, cf. Antid. 44).
Such picture of a multiple and chiefly hostile audience naturally creates an impression of the unstable reputation and psychological condition of the speaker (attempt to transcend the psychological barrier); on the other hand, such speaker’s posture may be seen as a deliberate act, as anticipatory vindication of the written discourse from criticisms (like granting immunity), or a certain maneuver of captatio benevolentiae when claiming his specific identity (self-fashioning, to use a modern term): he strives to appear steady and de-

Principles of the classification of Isocrates’ self-presentation

Principles of the division of the aspects of Isocrates’ self-presentation in this paper are based on the presumed connection between the speaker’s activities in regard to the external targets (audience and the subject matter of the speech) and internal targets (his own personality, thoughts, beliefs). Rhetor’s activities are delineated in the treatises of Isocrates’ younger contemporaries (Aristotle and Anaximenes), more specifically in their division of the rhetorical material.

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (1.3.2 = 1358a36–1358b8) enumerates three types of rhetorical discourses according to three types of audience; audience is the addressee of orator’s speech and the main constituent of the triad: orator (messenger, addresser) – the subject of the speech (message) – recipient of the speech (addressee). Listeners are either ordinary spectators or judges who deal with the past, or else judges who deal with the things to come. The example of the judges who focus on the future and imminent actions is found among the members of the assembly (ἐκκλησία), of those who focus on the past events – among the dicsasts, and the ordinary listeners/spectators are those who pay attention only to the evaluation of the skills (δύναμις) of the orator. From here, the ascription of a person’s behaviour” (Sasan Zarghooni, “A Study of Self-Presentation in Light of Facebook”, [Oslo:] Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo, 2007, p. 9 (on-line access: http://zarghooni.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/zarghooni-2007-selfpresentation_on_facebook.pdf).
the types of the audience to the particular types of rhetorical discourses follows: the listeners of the political-deliberative speeches are competent in judging the upcoming realities, the listeners of court speeches – in judging the facts of the past, and the listeners of epideictic speeches are ordinary spectators of the present qualities. In regard to the orator’s attitude towards the audience, Aristotle assigns a pair of opposite tasks to each type of the speech. The primary task (and certain stylistic “orientation”) of the speaker delivering the deliberative speech is either to exhort or to dissuade (Rhet. 1.3.3. = 1358b8–10), the court speaker’s task is either to accuse or to defend (1358b10–12), and the task of the deliverer of the epideictic speech is either to praise or to blame (1358b12–13).

Anaximenes (or Ps.-Aristotle), representative of the older sophistical rhetoric, enumerates three types (γένη) of political discourses and seven forms (εἴδη) as the aspects of those three types (προτρεπτικόν, ἀποτρεπτικόν, ἐγκωμιαστικόν, κατηγορικόν, ἀπολογικόν, ἐξεταστικόν) (Rhet. Alex. 1.1. = 1421b7–12).

Six Aristotelian forms (εἴδη) were virtually preserved (with certain modifications) in the subsequent Greek technical rhetoric, as, for example, the division by Byzantine sophist Troilus shows (see also the table in the end of this article). The 7th form, present in the Anaximenean division (ἐξεταστικόν εἴδος)³⁶, has no attribution to any specific type of speeches, but it features a universal applicability³⁷ and perhaps means the predecisional phase of deliberation. It might have a certain relation to the philosophical context and especially to the Socratic conception of the human soul as a conscious self and, consequently, of human life to be lived (and actions to be performed) in constant accordance to the awareness of the one’s human condition contrasted to the bestial and negligent living (e.g., the famous dictum in Plato’s Apology of Socrates 38a5: „οὐ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτός ἀνθρώπῳ“).

³⁴ The six-partite system is provided by Diogenes Laërtius (3.93–94): „Τῆς ῥητορείας εἴδη ἕστιν εξ  ἐξ ἐν τοῖς ἤτοι ῥητορείας ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἐγκώμιον, τὸ δὲ ψόγος, τὸ δὲ προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή, τὸ δὲ κατηγορία, τὸ δὲ ἀπολογία“.

³⁵ Troilus Soph., Prolegomena in Hermogenis arte rhetoricalic (Rhetores Graeci, vol. 6, ed. C. Walz), Stuttgart: Cotta, 1834, Repr. 1968. Troilus made one specific addition in the section of deliberative speeches: he inserted two parallel concepts – συμβολή and παραίνεσις, which, in my opinion, slightly differ from the concepts of exhortation and dissuasion; this insertion remains obscure in this context. Cf.: „διαιρεῖται δὲ τὸ δικανικὸν εἰς δύο, εἰς κατηγορίαν καὶ ἀπολογίαν, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν εἰς δύο, εἰς προτροπὴν καὶ ἀποτροπὴν, εἰς ὄμον, συμβουλὴν καὶ παραίνεσιν, τὸ δὲ πανηγυρικὸν εἰς ἑγκώμιον καὶ ψόγον“ (53). His division of rhetorical activities is paralleled with analogous triadic subdivisions of time, place, public persona, purpose, and soul, cf. Troilus 53–54: „χαρακτηρίζονται δὲ τὰ τρία εἴδη ταῦτα ἀπὸ τριῶν τινον· ἀπὸ τόπου, ἀπὸ προσώπου καὶ ἀπὸ τέλους· τόπος γάρ τοῦ δικανικοῦ τὸ δικαστήριον· τέλος δὲ τοῦ δίκαιου· τέλος δὲ τοῦ συμβουλευτηρίου· τέλος δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τοῦ δὲ πανηγυρικοῦ τόπος τὸ θέατρον, πρόσωπον ὁ πανηγυριστής, ἢτοι ὁ ἀκροατής, τέλος δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ· τοῦ δὲ εἰσιν εἴδη τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐπειδὴ τρία εἰσὶν εἴδη τῆς ψυχῆς, θυμικὸν, λογικὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, καὶ τὸ μὲν θυμικὸ ἀναλογεῖ τοῦ δικανικοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸ τοῦ πανηγυρικοῦ, τὸ δὲ λογικὸ τοῦ συμβουλευτικοῦ“. ³⁶ Cf. Isocrates’ words in Antidosis (141): „Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀπήνεγκε τὴν γραφὴν, ἐσκόπουν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡσπερ ἄν ὑμῶν ἐκατός, καὶ τὸν τε βιον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τὸς πρᾶξεις ἐξήταζον καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διέτριβον, ἃρ’ ἐς ὁμονύμου ἐπαινεσθαί με προσηκείν“.

³⁷ Anaximenes Rhet. Alex. 37: „Τὸ δ᾽ ἐξεταστικόν εἴδος αὐτὸ μὲν καθ᾽ ἐστιν οὐ πολλάκις συνίσταται, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις εἰσῆδει μέγεθος καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τὰς ἀντιλογίας χρήσιμον ἐστιν“.
All these seven forms constitute the basis of my hypothetical (and tentative so far) classification of the speaker’s self-presentation aspects, which – in view of the terminological and cognitive difficulties of grasping the meaning of exact concepts and their functions – has to be supported by a number of substantial arguments. I have only two arguments at the moment; both are related to Isocrates’ practice. On the one hand, he was well aware of the different topics and arguments proper to a particular situation and was practicing both pure and mixed types of speeches. For example, he criticized sophists for mixing arguments of jocular and serious discourses as well as the techniques of encomium and forensic speeches, so in response to Gorgias he wrote a model encomium of Helen, while in his composition Busiris, directed against Polycrates of Athens, he included both encomium and apology as separate parts of the whole. He also made distinction between topics of praise and accusation (Busiris 4–6), between accusation and admonition (Panegyricus 130), but he used praise and advice alternately (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1.9.36 = 1368a1–8). On the other hand, in a number of paraenetic works (such as To Demonicus or To Nico-
cles) we find Isocrates anticipating the idea of ‘golden rule’,[39] namely, instructing a young man to take care of his own character basing on empathic attitude towards others (treat others the same way you wish to be treated by others). This implies that the study of the soul and character was part of his teaching[41].

Basing on these considerations, it is possible to presume that the speaker who presents himself to listeners or readers as a target of the speech can engage in the same actions directed to himself as to the other targets of his speech.[42] In other words, he can apply all these seven forms to self-description.

Having examined Isocrates’ discourses by raising the question of how the speaker depicts himself in the places where he directly refers to himself, I attempted to group the cases of self-presentation according to these seven aspects (self-praise, self-blame, self-defence, self-accusation, self-incitement, self-dissuasion, and self-advice), but some methodological difficulties, such as how to distinguish between pure accusation and dispraise, or how to decouple the self-incitement from the rhetorical expression of hopes, doubts, promises, have prevented me from accomplishing this task to a comprehensive systematic end (statistical data are not prepared to a publishable standard, either).[43] Therefore,

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[38] See esp. Helen, § 7–14.
[39] For the discussion concerning the identification and illustration of this device, see my paper “References to Isocrates in Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric”, Literatūra 53 (3), 2011, p. 12 and 29.
[40] Cf. Ad Dem. 14; Nic. 61; Ad Nic. 24, 38; Paneg 81. In G. Norlin’s words, “Isocrates anticipates the golden rule” (Isocrates in Three Volumes..., vol. 2, p. 11, n. c. (comm. in Ad Dem. 14).
[42] This idea could be supported by the considerations expressed by Ekaterina V. Haskins (Logos and power in Isocrates and Aristotle, pp. 106–107) concerning the “speaker’s mimēsis of the audience” which is more congruent to Isocratean, rather than Aristotelian conception of rhetorical education.
[43] These data could only be mentioned in a rough (as a sort of working hypothesis to be revised later) here without pretense at completeness: I found eight instances of self-praise or self-commendation, five of self-defence, three of self-criticism (self-accusation or self-blame) and one of self-deliberation/ self-counseling.
I have simplified my task in the meanwhile by choosing only four aspects to address here: self-praise and self-defence remain as they are, while self-accusation and self-blame are merged into one unit of self-blame, and the aspects of self-incitement, self-dissuasion and self-guidance constitute the field of the ‘self-advice’ or ‘self-deliberation’ concept.

This system of self-presentational aspects is certainly by no means comprehensive, and the question of its relevance is open to discussion and revision (e.g., with more emphasis on the modern models of the classification of rhetorical material, such as those by James L. Kinneavy’s *A Theory of Discourse* 1971, or Walter Beale’s *Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric* 1987).

**A concise survey of the aspects of self-presentation**

All the three speeches can be characterized by a great variety of self-display tactics, but certain general patterns can already be revealed. Here, a general sketch of these tactics follows, and for a more detailed synthesis one can consult the corresponding section among the appended materials (section B).

Considering the field of self-praise, straightforward boasting is very rarely found in the discourses selected for this discussion, unless a few more direct expressions are extracted from the context (example 1.1 in the section C of the bulk of the references appended to this article). The Isocratean self-praise is primarily (and for the most part) indirect, although, despite its latent manner, sometimes it has a force of a rather bold boast, as, for instance, a detailed analysis of the opening of *Panegyricus* can show. The speaker of this discourse implies himself to be among “those who had toiled in private for the public good and trained their own minds so as to be able to help also their fellow-men” (τοῖς ... ὑπὲρ τὸν κοινὸν ἱδία πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ὡμίο παρασκεύασασιν ὡστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐφελέξιν δύνασθαι); he implies to be that “single man who attained wisdom” (ἔνός ὁ' ἀνδρός εὗρο μνήματος) able to give benefit to those who are willing to share his insight (κοινωνεῖν τῆς ἐκείνου διανοίας). He is well disposed towards common custom, despite the latter being unfavourable to him (or his ἀρετή), and seeks not a material reward for his activity but a good fame or approbation for his speech (τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γενησομένην); he claims his competence (οὐκ ἀγνοῶν) in knowing the context of the subject he is going to deal with and claims his superiority (ἐλπίζων ... διοίσειν) over other men who claimed for wisdom before him (πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιησαμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν); finally, he praises his own insight in choosing the best kind of discourses (προκρίνας τούτοις καλλίστους ἐῖναι τῶν λόγων) and points directly to *Panegyricus* as one of them. Hence, we have a picture of a man praising himself for being the wisest among Hellenes and able to perform excellent speech (cf. the 1st example in the table of subsection 1.2 of the section C).
Self-defence in the examined speeches can be analysed according to one of the modern frameworks of apologia, stemming from the Robert Abelson’s theory of belief-dilemma resolution[44]. If we choose the influential framework of Ware and Linkugel (1973)[45], it is not hard to find that all the four self-defence tactics described in their paper (denial, bolstering, differentiation, transcendence) are present in _Antidosis_ (as examples in the whole subsection 2 of the section C in the Appendix show). Thus, for instance, when Isocrates says “no citizen has ever been harmed either by my ‘cleverness’ or by my writings” (Antid. 33), his tactics reminds a direct denial (“I didn’t do it”), although not without a shade of indirectness (the shift is made from the conscious act of a person to his works and the effects of his actions). When the speaker of _Antidosis_ expresses his acceptance of penalty in case it is proved that his disciples became base people (Antid. 99), he uses the strategy of bolstering, or mitigation of the negative effects and strengthening the positive image of himself. When in Antid. 40 he explicitly states: “So, from what my accuser has himself said, it is easy for you to conclude that I have nothing to do with litigation”, he explicitly distances himself from the charge of gaining profit from teaching litigation, and this is an example of the tactics of differentiation. Finally, when Isocrates defends his reputation and explains his competence as the adviser of Timotheus and tries to minimize the ill fame of the latter by the reference to the general idea of the infirmity of human nature (Antid. 130), the tactics of transcendence or a broader contextualization could be recognized[46].

An even greater subtlety might be attained in this discussion of the self-defensive postures and tactics, if a more in-depth analysis is made, but the limitations of the materials gathered for the current moment prevent me from discussing the other models of apologia (such as Halford Ryan’s[47], Sharon Downey’s[48], William Benoit’s[49], etc.). Meanwhile, when limiting myself to the Ware and Linkugel’s scheme, it seems very probable that the aspect of bolstering (or self-enhancement) is a predominant one (see examples under subsection 2.2 of the section C in the Appendix below) and it has a very tight connection to self-praise (commending himself as positive and good person). This interlacement (or “symbiosis”) of self-praise and self-defence is also present in _Panathenaicus_ where new slanderers against Isocrates (concerning his haughty character and hyper-critical attitude towards admirers of poet-  

45 Bonnie L. Ware, Wil A. Linkugel, “They spoke in defense of themselves: On the generic criticism of apologia”, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59 (Issue 3), 1973, 273–283. This framework has a number of successive theoretical revisions and more elaborated modifications, of which one of the most recent is that of Edwin L. Battistella in his book *Sorry About That: The Language of Public Apology*, Oxford [et al.]: Oxford University Press, 2014.  
46 More examples of self-defensive tactics possibly (but by no way definitely and undoubtedly) congruent with the tetradic scheme are presented in the Appendix below. 
ry) are to be resolved\textsuperscript{50}. Self-blame is not clearly expressed and in most cases could be possibly confined to the tactics aimed at neutralization of self-praise (see example 3 of the section C in the Appendix). Other postures or stances of the orator (such as self-encouragement, self-correction, expressing doubts, hopes or providing himself and others with advice (should we categorize them as protreptic, apotreptic, aporetical, elpistic, paraenetic?) are present in all the speeches examined, too, as example No. 4 in the section C of the Appendix of this article shows. While in some cases their teaching-oriented function reduces self-praise (serving as if moderation of the expression of self-love), in other cases it creates the impression of the speaker’s boastful or self-defensive stance being more evident.

**Conclusions**

To summarize, it may be said that autobiographical references are an important source for the investigation of Isocrates’ rhetorical identity. This identity, as seen in his three major compositions (Panegyricus, Antidosis, Panathenaicus), features a certain instability of character, but we cannot take this image for granted. In my opinion, the apparent shifting between extremes (such as high and low self-esteem, or division of the audience in to two opposite sides according to its perception of Isocrates’ reputation) is not so much the result of actual psychological condition of the author but rather a deliberate and purposeful act of self-depiction. In the process of self-display, the postures and tactics that the speaker of Panegyricus, Antidosis or Panathenaicus exhibits have something in common with the rhetorical εἴδη that are prescribed in handbooks of technical rhetoric, albeit neither systematically nor explicitly stated there. Basing on this intuition, we may distinguish among the variety of modes Isocrates’ speaker addresses himself and, perhaps, later make certain characteristics of Isocrates’ works in terms of the self-presentational tactics. The current hypothetical features of Panegyricus, Antidosis, Panathenaicus could be summarized in the following sequence:

- **Panegyricus** (390–380 BC) exhibits the image of a self-confident political orator who hopes to establish a better reputation using the tactics of crafty self-praise;
- **Antidosis** (354–353 BC) exhibits the image of a moderately self-confident rhetorician defending his reputation against slanders, using combined tactics of verbal self-defense and self-praise;
- **Panathenaicus** (342–339 BC) exhibits the image of a moderately self-confident rhetorician defending his reputation against new slanders, using mixed tactics of self-praise, self-defense, and self-criticism.

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. especially his report about “three or four of the sophists of no repute” at Panath. 18–19, who during their discussion on the poetry of Homer and Hesiod slandered Isocrates of treating with contempt all discussions of poetry and even all the learning and teaching of others.
SAVĖS PATEIKIMO (SAVIVAIZDOS) ASPEKTAI ISOKRATO KALBOSE

Tomas Veteikis

Santrauka


51 Lietuviškas Isokrato kūrinių pavadavimus linkstame rašyti, pagrindu imami lotyniškų pavadavimų šaknis, o tais atvejais, kai graikiškas pavadinimas turi bendresnės reikšmės ir aiškų lotyniškų atitikmenį, tada parenkame lietuvišką žodį (pvz. Kata sōφiastōn / Contra sophistas – Prieš sofistus, Περὶ σοφίστων / De pace – Apie taiką ir tt.). Dalis terminų dar nevienistotėje, tad juos pravartu žymėti dvejopai (taip, kaip ir darome, pavadinimai kūrinį, lotyniškai įvardijama žodžiais Antidosis ir De permutatione).
A. Brief characteristics of *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis*, and *Panathenaicus*

*Panegyricus* was written 390–380 BC, at the times of tension between the leading Hellenic states (Athens and Sparta) and Persia, which since King’s Peace (387 BC) had been controlling Asian Greeks. The key idea of *Panegyricus* is the conciliation of claims by Sparta and Athens on the leadership among the Greeks with special attention to historical merits of Athens (by putting emphasis on equality of Athens, even superiority over the then-leading Sparta) and the necessity of organising a Pan-Hellenic expedition to Persia; the two-fold idea is represented in epideictic (23–132) and deliberative sections (133–186) respectively. The speaker of this discourse emphasizes both the thematic and stylistic novelty of his work and urges other orators to follow his example (*Paneg*. 188).

*Antidosis*, the longest work of Isocrates, written 354–353 BC, after an actual event, when 82-year-old Isocrates (being represented by his adopted son Aphareus) lost the case against Megacleides on property exchange and performed the court-appointed obligation (*Antid*. 5)53. While taking the name from the actual suit and sharing features of the judicial defence speech, *Antidosis* in fact transcends boundaries of apology and swings into autobiography with elements of epideictic discourse and philosophical essay on the essence of rhetorical education. Apologetic framework consists of numerous fictional elements: public prosecution on fictional charges (corrupting the young, receiving money for teaching to win the cases awry, cf. *Antid*. 15, 30, 56) brought by a fictional accuser (Lysimachus), fictional penalty (death), and fictional trial before a court. The speech abounds in parallels with Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*, but Isocrates’ apology “is ... more discursive” not only in comparison with the Socrates’ speech, but also with the actual on-going judicial apologies54. In this particular speech Isocrates has the opportunity to present himself in most detailed characterization. According to Y. L. Too, “[i]n Greek antiquity, the dicanic speech was a privileged space for the depiction of one’s civic “self” (Too, *Commentary.*, p. 8). But it is the “self-conscious innovative structure” of *Antidosis* that “allows the rhetorician the opportunity to identify and answer a wide range of accusers. Better yet, it allowed Isocrates to present himself in the role of (potential) martyr for the cause of philosophical rhetoric”55.

*Panathenaicus* is the latest piece by Isocrates written 342–339 BC56 when tension lingered in the air in Athens because of the domination of Philip of Macedon in northern Greece and activi-
ties in Thracian Chersonesus. The discourse features unusual composition: although it was conceived as encomium to Athens, in fact it breaks down into three parts. The main theme (35–198) seems to be framed by additional narratives, such as apology to Isocrates’ profession (7–34) and critique of the written work (199–270). The discourse actually has a two-fold purpose: to justify himself before the new dignity-hurting criticism and perpetuate written memory of the past Pan-Hellenism of Athens. The work, which was written by the 97-year-old elderly man, unveils “grasp of a trembling hand”, “evidence of handicaps under which it was elaborated”.

B. A concise survey of the aspects of Isocrates’ self-presentation
(with an emphasis on self-praise, self-defence, self-blame and self-advice)

In his Panegyricus Isocrates praises himself for the novelty of his speeches (Paneg. 12), for the quality acceptable to the group of intelligent listeners (12; 74), for his competence, ability to present a serious subject properly (14), for his ability to express thoughts in multiple ways (64–65) and implicitly assigns himself to the intelligent (εὖ φρονοῦντες) citizens useful for the state who are considered among the best in their profession (1–3, 9–10). He apologizes for the issues of speech content (familiar topic, the need to select the main arguments), devotes special attention to the anti-Spartan criticism episode: harsh words are justified by the argument of purpose – he attempted not to defame, but to advice and discourage them from bad behaviour (129–130). Arguments of expediency associated with benefit prevail. Self-blame is rare. Beside the blunt criticism of Spartans, he subtly rebukes himself for insolence in face of careful listeners (Paneg. 12) and for miscounting the importance of the subject matter and the arguments of his speech (187). Self-incitement or self-advice appears in the beginning (17, 19) and in the middle (98) of the speech to remind himself the tasks of the speech.

In Antidosis the main focus is on self-defense with special emphasis on account of the defendant’s life. Isocrates defends himself against the fictional charges raised against him as a professional teacher (such as corrupting the young, teaching to win a case contrary to justice, unfair acquisition of income from speechwriting and teaching, attracting students of controversial reputation) and answers to common prejudice (κοινὴ διαβολή) concerning his profession, rhetorical paideia (167–214, 243–269, 291–292). The arguments of his self-justification are basically of two kinds: quotations from his speeches (52–83) that serve as ‘witnesses’ (or documentary evidence) and his own words about his life, writings, profession, personal contacts; self-defensive description is seen in extemporal remarks, too: the limited quality of his performance, oddities

57 Demosthenes, the most prominent orator at that time, delivered in 341 BC his famous 3rd and 4th Philippics.
58 Isocrates in Three Volumes..., vol. 2, p. 369.
59 Cf. also Paneg. 82–83, where he says that „no one, either of the poets or of the sophists, has ever been able to (mēdena pōpote dunēthēnai) speak in a manner worthy of” the achievements of ancient Athenian good and noble men; and he commiserates with those composers and orators asserting that “there exist no fitting words” (οὐκ εἰσὶν ἁρμόττοντες λόγοι) to describe their excellent virtues.
60 Cf. Paneg. 122: “ἄξιον ... μέμψασθαι ... Λικέδαμινοις”
61 Cf. Antid. 7: “εἰκὼν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμοὶ βεβιωμένων”. Yun Lee Too (A Commentary on Isocrates’ Antidosis, 2008, p. 8) rightly suggests that this work is similar to those forensic speeches, whose speakers give accounts of their life (τοῦ βίου λόγος), e.g., speeches 16 (For Mantitheos) and 24 from the Corpus Lysiacum.
of arguments and style are justified by the reference to old age (59; 176), the peculiarity of occasion (1), belonging to common phenomenon (311), or the exclusivity of his own opinion (272). In Antidosis he praises himself with the aim to reveal his own fairness/equity (ἐπιείκεια) and confirm the probability of his innocence, so here self-defense and self-praise are organically related. He commends himself as a good citizen, beneficial to his country, as a teacher and orator/writer, commends the benefits of his teaching and good qualities of his discourses. Perhaps the highest degree of self-praise is attained in dramatized illustrations of his teaching activities, where he teaches young Timotheos about the power of goodwill of common people and their beloved leaders (132–137) and gets himself instruction from one of his associates (τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων) (141–149). Such episodes serve also as certain instigation to speak up and a prove of his idea of quietism (cf. 150–151)63. On the other hand, he does not shrink from reproaching himself. In Antidosis, he criticizes himself for natural infirmities (176), lack of logical strength (178, 215), feeble reputation (272, 297–298), oversights left in the speech (179, 243, 310, 320). Part of the criticism is expressed through the ethopoetic image of his opponent (26)64 or reference to the charge (30–31). Unlike Panegyricus, speaker of Antidosis frequently ponders his arguments: is in doubt about self-characterization, speech strategies, effectiveness of arguments, expresses hopes, sets himself a task, gives promises, encourages himself or deters from inappropriate action: the episode of getting advice from anonymous friend urging him to abstain from self-praise (141–143) and self-refrain from criticism of opponents in order to escape reaching to the level of detractors (259) are among the most illustrative ones.

In Panathenaicus Isocrates mostly praises his strengths as a teacher and writer, identifies himself as “leader of speeches” (λόγων ἡγεμόνα) on Panhellenic matters (13), considers himself to be more serious than other orators, despite the assessment of the multitude, and superior because of financial independence (12–15). He praises his spiritual qualities, especially wisdom, insight, common sense, fairness, justice (9; 21; 62–65), stability of moral principles (87–88), altruism and usefulness for the other teachers (16–17); once he mentions his ‘the greatest gifts’ of fortune – health, living resources, good reputation (7–8). An interesting impression is created by an indirect boast while comparing himself to Agamemnon in connection to failure to receive the deserved glory for his activities useful to the whole world (74–75); the reason of this failure is ἀτυχία, named at the beginning of the speech, which brought him lies, slander and envy (8–9, 21). The final part of the speech, a sort of “addendum” on the writer’s doubts concerning the publication of the work and consultation with students, serves as new opportunity to praise himself indirectly: in fictional pupil’s words he praises his own wisdom (248), his freshly written speech which is useful even for the Spartans (253–254), his talent (φύσιν) that used to be shining brightly, lifestyle (τὴν τοῦ βίου τάξιν), industry (φιλοπονίαν), veracity of his philosophy (τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς φιλοσοφίας) in particular, and current happiness (εὐδαιμονία); he predicts himself a great glory and immortal memory that is left behind heroes (ὤδαμονία; τῆς τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένως... τὸν καλὸν ἔργων μνήμην ἐμποιούσης) as well as fame among other writers like that of Homer among other poets (Panath. 260–263).

63 “The rhetorician presents himself as a ‘quiet Athenian’, the sort of individual, usually of privileged means, who withdraws from the verbal jostling and meddling of the democratic city, in this case to turn his attention to teaching and the composition of political speeches” (Too, A Commentary on Isocrates’ Antidosis, 2008, p. 10)

64 His accuser, Lysimachus, according to Isocrates description, expects to win the case easily, seeing the rest of the citizens’ gullibility and Isocrates’ own inexperience to litigate.
The cases of the speaker’s apology in *Panathenaicus* are two-fold: he justifies himself either for the manner of speaking, style and composition or for his views on education (25–32), moral priorities (relation between benefit and justice, 86–87) and on the reliability of the sources for historical facts (authoritative writings and stories are more reliable than eyewitnessed things) (149–150). Arguments worth to be mentioned are as follow: fear of tarnishing his own reputation and presenting himself foolish or boastful to the listeners (if he ignorantly dismisses the digression, if having remarked positively about Agamemnon, he gives no example of his deeds, if he fails to give an adequate response to slanders), referring to the occasion which requires to emphasize different things, sacrificing formal rules for content’s sake, expressing educational views in the form of confession, referring to the tradition and authorities (concerning the bold depiction of events unseen with his own eyes). It is in *Panathenaicus* that Isocrates criticizes himself and identifies errors more than elsewhere. Two groups of reproaches can be distinguished: he criticizes his physical and spiritual weaknesses (weak voice, timidity, sadness, confusion, arrogance, aggression, indelicacy, negligence) or recognizes shortcomings of style, composition, structural proportions of his work (55, 74–75, 88–89). *Panathenaicus* also contains a lot of aspects of deliberation – doubts about the strategy of speech exposition (22, 88, 175–176), explicit refraining from the discussion about poets (33), self-exhortations (6, 7, 36–38) and tips for himself (24, 34, 152).

C. Selected examples of self-presentation in Isocrates *Panegyricus, Antidosis, Panathenaicus*

1. Examples of direct and indirect self-praise

1.1. Examples of straightforward self-praise (very rare, unless a few more direct expressions are extracted from the context)

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<tr>
<th>Antid. 84:</th>
<th>(self-praise through a comparison with other teachers of eristies and ethics)</th>
<th>Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόν ἐπὶ τήν σωφροσύνην καὶ τήν δικαιοσύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπειν ἡμεῖς οὐ πάντως τῶν ἑαυτῶν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ τήν ἀρετὴν καὶ τήν φρόνησιν τῆν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἁγγευμένην, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτων ἀντιλεγομένην, ἐγὼ δ’ ἐπὶ τήν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην: [85] κάκεινος μὲν ἀπόχρη τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τινά τῇ δόξῃ τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνηθῶσιν εἰς τήν αὐτῶν ὁμιλίαν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδένα πώποτε φανήσομαι παρακάλέσας ἐπαρκείας ἐπ’ ἐμαυτόν, τήν δὲ πόλιν ὥλην πειρᾶμαι πείθειν τοιούτως πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ δ’ αὐτοί τ’ εὐδαίμονήσουσιν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἐλλήνας τῶν παρόντων κακὸν ἀπαλλάξουσιν.</th>
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<td>Panath. 9</td>
<td>(having enumerated the advantages and disadvantages of his nature and fortune, Isocrates inserts self-praise concerning one particularity of his nature – his ability to discern the truth and to express it in words better than others who make clames for their knowledge of it)</td>
<td>[...] τήν δὲ φύσιν εἰδότας πρὸς μὲν τὰς πράξεις ἀγριοτότηταν ὑστάναι καὶ μελακοτέραν τοῦ δεόντος, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λόγους ὡστε τελείαν ὡστε πανταχῇ χρησίμην, ἄλλα δοξάσας μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου τῆς ἄλλης τῶν μάλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων, εἰπεῖν δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἐν συλλόγῳ πολλῶν ἄνθρωπων ὡς ἐποίησε εἰπεῖν ἀπολελειμμένην.</td>
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1.2. Examples of indirect self-praise (predominant self-praise aspect in all three discourses)

Paneg. 1–4: (cunningly concealed self-praise in a long period sentence)

Commentary. The speaker of the Panegyricus implies himself to be among “those who had toiled in private for the public good and trained their own minds so as to be able to help also their fellow-men” (τοῖς ... ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἱδίᾳ πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς ὑπὸ παρασκευάσασιν ὡστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὀφελεῖν δύνασθαι), he implies to be that “single man who attained wisdom” (ἐνες δ' ἀνδρός εὐ φρονήσαντος) able to give benefit to those who are willing to share his insight (κοινοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου διανοίας). He is well disposed towards common custom, although not favourable to him (his aretē), and seeks not material reward for his activity – good fame or approbation for his speech (τὴν δόξαν τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπέδειξεν). He claims this competence (οὐκ ἄγνοον) in knowing the context of the subject he is going to deal with and claims his superiority (ἐλπίζειν ...) over other men who claimed for wisdom before him (πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιησαμένων εἰναι σοφισταῖ). Finally, he praises his own insight in choosing the best kind of discourses (προκρίνας τούτους καλλίστους εἶναι τῶν λόγων) and points directly to Panegyricus as one of them. Hence, we have a picture of a man praising himself for being the wisest among Hellenes and able to perform an excellent speech.

Paneg. 13–14 (self-praise covered by a provocative proposition (proklēsis) to accept the punishment (derision) in case of his failure to demonstrate his superiority in oratory):
Antid. 151–152: (self-praise through the description of his peaceful way of life, beneficial to other citizens, with the concluding claim for public recognition)

Ταῦτα γὰρ συνεταξάμην οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον οὐδὲ διὰ ὑπερηφανίαν οὐδὲ καταφρονῶν τῶν μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐμοῦ ζώντων, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν, μάλιστα δ’ ὅρθον τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ παρ’ ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας, ἐστι姿势 τὸν βίον ἴσως νομίσας εἶναι τοῦτον ἤ τὸν τῶν πολλὰ πραττόντων, ἦτο δὲ ταῖς διατριβαῖς ταῖς ἐμαῖς πρεπωδέστερον ἃς ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεστησάμην. [152] Τούτων μὲν ἑνεκ’ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζῆν προειλόμην· τῶν δὲ λημμάτων τῶν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεσχόμην, δεινὸν ἡγησάμενος εἰ δυνηθέντων τῳ γενήσομαι τῶν ἐντεῦθεν ζῆν ἠναγκασμένων, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν παρουσίαν ἐνδεής τις γενήσεται τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπαίνου τυγχάνειν ἄξιος ἦν μᾶλλον ἢ διαβολῆς.

Panath. 172–173: (self-praise in combination with self-defence through appealing to this town and his readers’ consciousness and wisdom (καὶ μηδεὶς οἰεσθὼ μ’ ἀγνοεῖν, οὐδένα νομίζω ... ἀμαθίας εἶναι καὶ φθόνου μεστὸν) and goodwill (ὅστις οὐκ ἂν ἐπαινέσειέ με καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡγήσαιτο) and directly commending probity of this speeches)

Καὶ μηδεὶς οἰεσθὼ μ’ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τάναντια τυχάνω λέγων ὦς ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ λόγῳ φανεῖν ἄλλα γάρ ὡς νομίσῃς τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ παρ’ ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδένα νομίζω τῶν ταῦτα συνιδεῖν ἂν δυνηθέντων τῷ γενήσεσθαι τὸν τρόπον ζῆν μὲν ἑνεκ’ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζῆν μὲν λήψεσθαι δόξαν οὐ μείζω μὲν ἧς ἄξιος εἶ, χαλεπὸν γάρ, παρὰ πλείοσιν δὲ μᾶλλον ἦμιν εἰ συγχωρήσαιμι τῷ κατηγόρῳ καὶ προσομολογήσαιμι πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δεινότατος καὶ συγγραφεὺς τῶν λόγων τῶν λυπούντων ὑμᾶς τοιοῦτος ὦς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος γέγονεν, πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκοίην ἢ ζημιωθείην. [36] Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ γενέσθαι προέχοντα τῶν ἄλλων ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις εἰκότως ἄν τις τὴν τύχην αἰτιάσαιτο, τοῦ δὲ καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κεχρῆσθαι τῇ φύσει δικαίως ἂν ἅπαντες τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἐμὸν ἐπαινέσειαν.

Antid. 35–36 (self-praise in combination with self-defence tactics (see esp. examples 2.3, 2.4 on differentiation and transcendence) through reductio ad absurdum (εἰς ἄτοπον ἐπαγωγή) of the accuser’s argument)

[35] Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε νῦν οὐδείς μοι φανήσεται τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ἐγκαλέσας. Ὦστ’ εἰ συνχωρήσωμεν τῷ κατηγόρῳ καὶ προσομολόγησαμεν πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δεινότατος καὶ συγγραφεύς τῶν λόγων τῶν λυπούντων ὑμᾶς τοιούτος οἷος οὐδεὶς ἄλλος γέγονεν, πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκοίην ἢ ζημιωθείην.

Panath. 260–263 (indirect self-praise through imaginary words of the interlocutor):

[260] Ὅσον τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ γνώμην ἔχω περὶ σοῦ καὶ πρότερον. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς παρελθόντες χρόνοις ἐθαύμαζόν σου τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου τάξιν καὶ τὴν φιλοπονίαν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, νῦν δὲ μείζων περὶ τοιαύτως καὶ μακαρίζω τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, δοκεῖς γάρ μοι ἃς ἄξιος εἶ, ἀλλὰ γάρ, παρὰ πλείοσιν δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἦμιν εἰς ὑπαρχοῦσην, τελευτήσας δὲ τὸν βίον μεθέξειν ἀθανασίαν, οὐ τῆς τοῖς θεοῖς παρούσῃ, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔριξιν μνήμην ἐμποιούσης. [262] [...] Συμβουλεύω γάρ σοι μήτε κατακάειν τὸν λόγον μήτ’ ἄφαν-ζειν, ἀλλ’ εἰ τίνος ἐνδεής ἐστιν, διορθώσατε καὶ προςχράγαντε πάσας τὰς διατριβὰς τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν γεγενημένας διαδιδόναι τοῖς βουλομένοις λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ βούλει χαρίσασθαι μὲν τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις τὸν Ἐλλήνην καὶ τοῖς ὄσοι ἀλήθειας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μή προσποιουμένης, λυπῆσετε τοὺς ὑ διενεγκόντας τοῖς ἐπιτείχειν τῶν σπεύδων, κακῶς εἰδότες ὅτι πλέον ὑπελειμμένους τὸν σὸν εἰσιν ἢ τῆς Ὁμήρου δόξης οἱ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκείνῳ ποίησιν γεγονότες.
2. Examples of self-defence (four strategies from the Ware and Linkugel’s framework: denial, bolstering, differentiation, transcendence)

2.1. Denial (“I didn’t do it”; this strategy is usually accompanied by bolstering, or differentiation in the discussed speeches)

*Antid.* 33: (denial of the alleged harm to citizens made by Isocrates’ *deinotēs*): Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲς οὖθ’ ὑπὸ τῆς δεινότητος τῆς ἐμῆς οὖθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν συγγραμμάτων βέβλαται τῶν πολιτῶν, τὸν ἑνεστῶτα κίνδυνον ἢγούμαι μέγιστον εἶναι τεκμήριον. Εἰ γάρ τις ἦν ἡδικημένος, εἰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἤσχιζαν εἴδεν, οὐκ ἦν ἡμέλησε τοῦ καροῦ του παρόντος, ἀλλ’ ἤλθεν ἂν ἦτοι κατηγορήσειν ἢ καταμαρτυρήσειν. Ὄπου γὰρ ὁ μηδ’ ἀκηκοώς μηδὲν πόστοτε φλαύρον εἰς ἄγωνα με τηλικουτοινι κατέστησε, ἢ που σφόδρ’ ἂν οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἐπειρώντ’ ἂν δίκην παρ’ ἐμοῦ λαμβάνειν. [34] Οὐ γάρ δὴ τοιτό γ’ ἔστιν οὔτ’ εἰκὸς οὔτε δυνατόν, ἐμὲ μὲν περὶ πολλοὺς ἠμέλησεν, τούς δὲ ταῖς συμφοραῖς δι’ ἔμε περιπεπτωκότας ἤσχιζαν καὶ μὴ τολμᾶν ἐγκαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ πραοτέρους ἐν τοῖς ἕμοις εἶναι κινδύνους τῶν μηδὲν ἡδικημένων, εἴον αὐτοῖς διηλώσασιν ἂ πεπόνθασιν τὴν μεγίστην παρ’ ἐμοῖ λαβεῖν τιμωρίαν.

2.2. Bolstering (“I’m a nice person. I can’t have done it”; connecting oneself to some positive reality)

*Antid.* 164–165 (comparison to a sycophant: his fairness, *epieikeia*, against Lysimachus’ *ponēria*:)

Οὕτω γὰρ η Πόλης ἐν τῷ παρόντι χαίρει τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς πιέζουσα καὶ ταπεινοὺς ποιοῦσα, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς ἐξουσίαν διδοῦσα καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν Βουληθοῦσιν, ὡστε Λυσίμαχος μὲν ὁ προῃρημένος ζῆν ἐκ τοῦ συκοφαντεῖν καὶ κακῶς ἄει τίνα ποιεῖν τῶν πολιτῶν κατηγορήσειν ἦμων ἀναβεβηκέναι, ἐγὼ δ’ ὡς σο! περὶ ἕνα πόστοτ’ ἐξήμαρτο τόσον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ενθένδε λημματῶν ἀπεσχόμην, παρὰ ξένων δὲ καὶ νομίζοντων εὖ πάσχειν ἐπορισάμην τὰς ὁφελείας, ὡς δεινὰ ποιῶν εἰς τηλικουτοινι καθέστικα κίνδυνον. [165] Καίτοι προσήκε τοὺς εὐθ’ Φρονούντας εὑγεθαί τοις Θεοῖς ως πλείστους τῶν πολιτῶν παραγενέσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην, δι’ ἐμεῖς παρ’ ἑτέρων λαμβάνοντες χρησίμους αὐτούς, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ, τῇ πόλει παρεῖν.

*Antid.* 76–77 (arguments of probability commending excellent qualities of his speech in the shape of rhetorical questions; these serve as enhancement of his fairness and truthfulness of his words):

[76] Βούλομαι δ’ ὡς οὐδὲν διὰ βραχέων ἀπολογήσασθαι περὶ ἕκαστον καὶ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον ἐτί καταφανές, ὡς ἀληθῆ καὶ τότε προεῖπον καὶ νόν λέγον περὶ αὐτῶν. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ποῖος γένοιτ’ ἂν λόγος ὀσίωτερος ἢ δικαίωτερος τοῦ τοῦς προφάνους ἐγκομιάζοντος αξίως τῆς ἄρετῆς τῆς ἑκείνων καὶ τῶν ἐργῷ τῶν παραγαμένων αὐτοῖς; [77] Ἐπεὶτ’ τις ἂν πολιτικότερος καὶ μᾶλλον πρέπουν τῇ πόλει τοῦ τῆς ἡμετερίαν ἀποφαίνοντος ἐκ τέν ἄλλων ἐνθερμοσιν καὶ τῶν κινδύνων ἠμετέραν οὖσαν μᾶλλον ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων; Ἐτι δ’ ἂν περὶ καλλίμων καὶ μειζόνων πραγμάτων τοῦ τῆς Ἐλλήνας ἐπὶ τέν τῶν βαρβάρων στρατευόντως καὶ περὶ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλης ὁμονοίας συμβουλεύοντος;
Antid. 165–166 (probability arguments in the shape of pathetic parallels between Isocrates’ grateful disciples and ungrateful Athenians, between Isocrates and Pindar): 

Πολλῆς δ’ ἀλογίας περί με γεγενημένης πάντων ἄν συμβαίνῃ δεινότατον, εἰ οἱ μὲν δεδοκότες μοι χρήματα τοσούτων ἤξοιν χάριν ὅστ’ ἐτι καὶ νῦν με θεραπεύειν,  ὑμεῖς δ’ εἰς οὐς ἀνήλωκα τάμαυτοι, δίκην ἐπιθυμήσατε παρ’ ἐμοῦ λαβεῖν. [166] Ἐτι δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ Πινδάρον μὲν τὸν ποιήσαντα πρὸ ἡμῶν γεγονότες ὑπὲρ ἓνος μόνον ρήματος, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν ἐρέισμα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄνωμασθεν, οὕτως ἐτίμησαν ὡστε καὶ πρόξενον ποιήσασθαι καὶ δωρεὰν μυρίας αὐτῷ δοῦναι δραχμὰς, ἐμοὶ δὲ πολὺ πλείοι καὶ κάλλιον ἀνήλωκον τὰς ἄμαυτος, δίκην ἐπιθυμήσατε παρ’ ἐμοῦ λαβεῖν. [166]

Antid. 99–100 (proklēsis in combination with the offer to yield the floor to his opponents as a means of claiming for fairness and self-responsibility):

Ἀξιῶ γὰρ, εἰ μέν τινες τῶν ἐμοὶ συγγεγενημένων ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τὸν ἰδίον ὅκουν, ἐκείνους ὑμᾶς ἐπαινεῖν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ πονηροί καὶ τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις οἷοι φαίνειν καὶ γράφεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμεῖν, παρ’ ἐμοῦ δίκην λαμβάνειν. [100] Καίτοι τίς ἂν πρόκλησις γένοιτο ταύτης ἀνεπιφθονωτέρα καί ταπεινοτέρα τῆς τῶν μὲν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀμφισβητούσης, εἰ δέ τινες πονηροὶ γεγόνασιν, ὑπὲρ τῶν δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἐθελούσης; Καί ταῦτ’ ὁ λόγος μάτην εἰρημένος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ παραχωρῶ καὶ τῷ κατηγόρῳ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τις ἔχει τινὰ φράσαι τοιοῦτον, οὐχ ὡς οὐχ ἡδέως ἄν τινών μου καταψευσομένων, ἀλλ’ ὡς εὐθὺς φανερῶν ἐσομένων ὡς, ὥς καὶ τῆς ζημίας ἐκείνης, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰμοὶ γενησομένης.

2.3. Differentiation (distancing oneself from the event, separation of the fact/sentiment from a suspicious context)

Antid. 40–41 (distancing himself from the charge of gaining profit from teaching litigation): 

Ἡκούσατε δὲ καὶ τοῦ κατηγόρου λέγοντος ὅτι παρὰ Νικοκλέους τοῦ Σαλαμινίων βασιλέως πολλὰς ἔλαβον καὶ μεγάλας δωρεὰς. Καίτοι τίνι πιστὸν ὑμῶν ἔστιν ὡς Νικοκλῆς ἔδωκέ μοι ταύτας ἵνα δίκας μανθάνη λέγειν, ὃς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῶν ἁμφισβητούμενων ὅσπερ δεσπότης ἐδίκαζεν; Ὡστ’ ἐξ τῶν αὐτοῦ εἴρηκεν, ῥᾴδιον καταμαθεῖν ὅτι πόρρω τῶν πραγματειῶν εἰμι τῶν περὶ τῶν συμβολῶν γιγνομένων. [41] Ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνο πᾶσι φανερὸν ἔστιν, ὅτι παμπληθεῖς εἰσιν οἱ παρασκευάζοντες τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀγωνιζομένοις. Τούτων μὲν τοῖς τοσούτων ὄντων οὐδεὶς πώποτε φανήσατο μαθητικὴν ἡξιωμένον, ἐγὼ δὲ πλέον εὐληφος, ὡς φησιν ὁ κατήγορος, ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν [διατρίβοντες]. Καίτοι πῶς εἰκὸς τοὺς τοσούτως εἰπέτευχον ἀλλήλους ἀφεστῶτας περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρίστους ῥήτορας καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν λαβόντας πλείστων ἄγαθον αἰτίους τῇ πόλει γεγενημένους, ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ Σόλωνος.

Antid. 230–231: (distinction between the good and bad issues of the “cleverness in speech” and self-attribution to the former)

Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, εἴπερ ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοῖς ἄλλοτρίοις ἐπιβουλεύειν, προσήκην ἄπαντας τοῖς δυναμένοις εἰπεῖν πολυπράγμονας καὶ συκοφάντας εἶναι· ταῦτο γὰρ αὕτων ἐπασιν ταῦταν πέρωκεν ἐνεργάζεσθαι. [231] Νῦν δ’ εὑρίσκεται καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πολεμευόμενον καὶ τὸν νεοστὶ τετελευτηκότων τοὺς πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν λόγων ποιουμένων βελτίστους ὄντας τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παριόντων, ἢτι δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους μῆτορας καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν λαβόντας πλείστων ἄγαθον αἰτίους τῇ πόλει γεγενημένους, ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ Σόλωνος.
2.4. Transcendence (legitimization of the act by connecting it with a greater meaning)

*Antid.* 130–131 and 138 (Isocrates defends his reputation as the adviser of Timotheus not only by praising the latter as a general but also minimizing the ill fame of the latter by reference to the idea of the weakness of human nature):


Panath. 86–87: (approval of digression by making reference to the idea of higher moral standarts: the speaker’s profit, i.e. good reputation, is sacrificed for the sake of truth): Ὄμην δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς χαριεστάτοις τῶν ἄκροιστῶν εὐδοκιμήσειν, ἂν φαίνομαι περὶ ἀρετῆς μὲν τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενος, ὅπως δὲ ταύτης ἀξίως ἐρήμον τῶν διάμαχων ἐπελεύσασθαι οὕτω περί τὴν τῶν λόγων συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα σαφῶς εἰδῶς τὴν μὲν περὶ τὸν λόγον τοῦ ἀκαριστοῦ ἀδοξότερον ἐμὲ ποιῆσαι, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὰς πράξεις εὐφυλίαν αὐτοῦς τοῖς ἐπαινευμένοις ὄφελήσεισθαι· ἄλλ’ ὅμοιος ἐγὼ τὸ λοιπὲς ἔχασα τὸ δίκαιον εἰλόμην. [87] Οὐ μόνον δ’ ἢν εὐφετειήν ἐπὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις ταύτην ἔχον τὴν διάνοιαν, ἄλλ’ ὅμοιοι ἐπὶ πάντων, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν πεπλησίων μοι φανείην ἂν μᾶλλον χαίρων τοῖς ἐπί τῷ βίῳ καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν εὐδοκιμοῦσιν ἃς τοῖς περὶ τῶν λόγων δεινοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.

3. Self-blame

*Paneg.* 187 (recognition of his human infirmity when applying arguments to the topic; this disadvantage serves as a transition to the exhortation addressed to his hearers): Οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου. Τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅμην δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου. Τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅμην δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου. Τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅμην δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου. Τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅμην δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου.

Panath. 88 (apologizing for disadvantages of senility): [88] Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτως ὅποι τυγχάνοι φερόμενος· ἢς γὰρ οἰόμενος δεῖν προστίθεναι τοῖς προειρημένοις ἔχομεν, παντάπασι πόρρω γέγονα τῆς ὑποθέσεως. Λοιπὸν οὖν ἐστίν οὕτως ἄλλο πλὴν αἰτησάμενον τὸ γῆρα συγγνώμην ὑπὲρ τῆς λήθης καὶ τῆς μακρολογίας, τῶν εἰθισμένον παραγγέλεσθαι τοῖς τηλικοῦτοις, ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὸν τόπον ἐκεῖνον ἔξω ὑπὲρ εἰσέπεσον εἰς τὴν περιττολογίαν ταύτην.
4. Self-advice (self-encouragement, self-incitement, self-exhortation, or self-restrain, self-dissuasion) and other aspects of deliberation

Panath. 30 (Isocrates criticizes himself for the undue behaviour in the discussion with one of his associates who maintained the merits of Lacedemonians):

'Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄπηει φρονιμώτερος γεγενημένος καὶ συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν, ὀσπερ χρή τοὺς εὐ φρονοῦντας, καὶ πεπονθός τὸ γεγραμμένον ἐν Δελφοῖς, αὐτὸν τ’ ἑγνοκός καὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων φύσιν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον· ἐγὼ δ’ ὑπελειπόμην ἐπιτυχῶς μὲν ἴσως διειλέγμενος, ἀνοητότερος δὲ ὑπελειπόμην τοῦτο γεγενημένος καὶ φρονόν μεῖζον ἢ προσήκει τοὺς τηλικούτους καὶ ταράχης μειρακιώδους μεστὸς ὑπελειπόμην."

Panath. 97–98 (self-correction after an important message about Athenian advantages against Peloponnesians in the context of the prelude to the battle of Salamis; a kind of praeteritio)

"Καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτ’ ἀπέχρησεν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς χιλίας καὶ διακοσίας τριήρεις μόνοι διαναυμαχεῖν ἐμέλλησαν. Οὐ μὴν εἰάθησαν· καταισχυνθέντες γὰρ Πελοποννήσιοι τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν, καὶ νομίσαντες προδιαφθαρέντων μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων, ἄλλων δὲ διὰ τοῦτο ἔναντι τῶν τηλικούτων καὶ ταραχῆς μειρακιώδους μεστὸς ὡς καταισχυνθέντες τῶν τηλικούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς τηλικούτους καὶ ταραχῆς μειρακιώδους μεστοὺς τοὺς εὐνοεῖτε·"

Panath. 36–37 (self-exhortation)

"Ἔστι δ’ ἀνδρὸς νοῦν ἔχοντος μὴ τὴν εὐπορίαν ἀγαπᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν διαφυλάττειν, ὧν ἀεὶ τυγχάνει διαλεγόμενος· ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς ἔργον ἐστίν εἰπεῖν."

Panath. 34 (self-advice, self-incitement)

"Ὅυκ ἀγνοῶ δ’ ἡλίκος ὡς μήτ’ ἐστιν τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ’ ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς καὶ πολλάκις εἰρηκὼς ὡς τὰ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει χαλεπὸν ἐξισῶσαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους."

Antid. 153 (aporia)

"Νῦν δ’ εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν καθέστηκα· ἐπεῖδ’ ἐμοὶ ποιητέον ἐστίν ἐπιεικές ἄξια καὶ τοῖς προειρημένοις ὁμολογούμενα, ταῦτα δ’ ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστίν εἰπεῖν."

Antid. 310–311 (aporia in combination with gnōmē and the expression of desire)

"Πολλῶν δ’ ἐφεστώτων μοι λόγον ἄπαντες ἐχομενεν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὡς ἀπαντῶν ὑπερβαλλόμενον δοκεῖ δοκεῖ δ’ ἐντολήν ἀκριβῶς ἄξια καὶ τοῖς προειρημένοις ὁμολογούμενα· ὡς ὁ δ’ ὑπερβάλλομεν εἰς τὸ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει· πολλῶν δ’ ἐφεστώτων μοι λόγον ἄπαντες ἐχομενεν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὡς ἀπαντῶν ὑπερβαλλόμενον δοκεῖ δοκεῖ δ’ ἐντολήν ἀκριβῶς ἄξια καὶ τοῖς προειρημένοις ὁμολογούμενα."

30
### Division of rhetorical material in the Greek rhetorical tradition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν (ἐγκωμιαστικόν, πανηγυρικόν)</th>
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<th>γένος συμβουλευτικόν (δημηγορικόν)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>ἔπαινος</td>
<td>ψόγος</td>
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### Hypothetical division of speaker’s attitudes towards self

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Klasikinės filologijos katedra
Universiteto g. 5, LT-01513 Vilnius
El. paštas: tveteikis@gmail.com