REFERENCES TO ISOCRATES IN ARISTOTLE’S ART OF RHETORIC

Tomas Veteikis
Lecturer of the Department of Classical Philology, Vilnius University

The connection between Isocrates and Aristotle, two outstanding educators and rhetorical theorists of the 4th century BCE Athens, is a matter of interesting long-lasting discussion dating back to Greco-Roman antiquity. There is an opinion, based on doxography and anecdotes (cf. Philodemus II, 50, 21 (Sudhaus), Cic. De oratore III, 141, Quintilianus III, 1, 13–14), that Aristotle, after he had arrived to Athens in circa 367 BCE, first attended the school of Isocrates, but later, under the priority of stylistics, moved to Academy and started his pedagogical career by giving public lectures on rhetoric; on the basis of these lectures the dialogue Gryllus (ca. 362 BCE, now lost) emerged, in which he supposedly attacked Isocrates2. About ten years later (ca. 350 BCE), Aristotle wrote Protrepticus in defense of the Academic concept of philosophy as a response to the Isocratean view presented in Antidosis3. Biographical data recorded in ancient sources testify their competitive rivalry and perhaps certain enmity to each other4. The latter assumption occupies even more attention in recent studies of early Greek rhetoric and education, focusing on the similarities and dissimilarities between educational programs, ethical and political views, attitude towards rhetoric and theory of style5. Both of them are credited origi-

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1 The article is prepared on the basis of my paper presented at the international workshop “Translating and interpreting Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, held on April 28–29, 2011 at University of Tartu.


4 Beside the Aristotelian dictum “it is shameful to be silent, while allowing Isocrates to speak”, there is one more frequently cited evidence concerning their rivalry in Numenius’ fragment (fr. 25 Places; Euseb. Praep. evang. XIV, 6, 9–10) which mentions Cephsidorus, a student of Isocrates, who made an attempt to attack Aristotle for his critique towards Isocrates, but instead attacked Plato with whom he didn’t wish to quarrel at all.

5 The early stage of the research of the dichotomy of the Isocratean and Aristotelian rhetorical tradition is briefly reflected in Friedrich Solmsen’s several times reissued article “The Aristotelian tradition in ancient rhetoric” (first published in American Journal of Phi-
nality: Isocrates, for instance, for connecting rhetoric with ethics, emphasizing a well educated personality able to make proper decisions and contribute to the prosperity of the state (his idea that good speech reflects good soul later was picked up by Cicero and Quintilian)\(^6\), and Aristotle for paralleling rhetoric with dialectics, for emphasizing argument; for him, rhetoric is a counterpart and necessary completion of dialectics, which is “mostly absent in ordinary human communication”\(^7\). However, in his rhetorical theory, Aristotle inevitably makes use of inventions of previous rhetoricians, not excluding Isocrates. The same (the just mentioned reliance upon earlier authors) is true about Isocrates. However, the attitude of these two thinkers towards each other’s literary production is still relatively little explored. Therefore, the question follows: how much did Aristotle depend on Isocratean rhetoric and Isocrates on Platonico-Aristotelian dialectics?\(^8\) The purpose of the following discussion is not to answer this complex question; instead, it will contribute only to the first half of the question, dealing with the aspects of Isocratean quotations in the Aristotelian theory of eloquence as it is read in the three books of his \textit{Art of Rhetoric}.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOPIC BY OTHER RESEARCHERS

Our research has been stimulated by several recent studies on the connection between the two teachers of rhetoric and their opposition. Ekaterina V. Haskins sees Isocrates and Aristotle as two original thinkers gravitating to different dialectical positions, the more socially oriented rhetoric being postulated by Isocrates and a primarily instrumental one represented by Aristotle\(^9\). Their views are also carefully juxtaposed by David Depew and Eugene Garver who, \textit{inter alia}, arrive at such interesting statements as the inversion of


\(^8\) The latter side of the question is slightly touched upon by David Depew, 184, n. 7: “\textit{There are no allusions in Isocrate’s texts to Aristotle, although there are plenty of them to Plato’s Academy}”.

Isocratean virtues into vices in Aristotelian ethics\textsuperscript{10} or “Aristotle’s separation and Isocrates’ unity of theory and practice”, generating different models of civic education\textsuperscript{11}. The difference between Isocratean and Aristotelian theories of rhetoric is even more emphasized by Manuela Dal Borgo in her recent article (“Philosophy or \textit{Techne}”), whose abstract is available in the website of the American Philological Association\textsuperscript{12}. However, there is another approach to the two philosophers, which tries to reconcile their views, showing that Aristotle and Isocrates produced quite a number of similar ideas not only concerning philosophy and politics, but also in the field of theory of eloquence. Such an approach, although not a predominant one\textsuperscript{13} and usually silently lurking in margins and footnotes of various studies and articles\textsuperscript{14}, is a sort of \textit{spiritus movens} of our research.

Among the articles that deal directly with the subject of Isocratean references in Aristotelian \textit{Rhetoric}, there is one study which deserves special attention: Jeremy C. Trevett’s “Aristotle’s knowledge of Athenian oratory” (\textit{Classical Quarterly} 46 (ii), 1996), which is perhaps the first attempt to systematically examine citations in Aristotelian \textit{Rhetoric}, and it presents a useful background for further investigations. Trevett’s research discloses a very interesting fact that of all canonical orators only Isocrates is quoted both explicitly and implicitly. Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias and Isaeus are not mentioned by names\textsuperscript{15}. Demosthenes and Aischines most probably are not the names of canonical orators here\textsuperscript{16}. However, Trevett pays little attention to Isocrates himself and, to our view, accordingly fails to complete his argument concerning the circulation of forensic and deliberative speeches in Aristotle’s school. Trevett emphasizes Aristotle’s primary concern with epideictic rhetoric and promotes a rather bold assumption that Aristotle

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  \item \textsuperscript{10} Depew, \textit{op. cit.}, 173.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Garver, \textit{op. cit.} (2004), 210.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} M. dal Borgo states enmity between the two teachers and enumerates fundamental differences between Isocratean λόγων παιδεία and Aristotelian τέχνη ῥητορική: for Isocrates, ἐπιστήμη is unattainable (thus, he stresses the reliability of δόξα), for Aristotle it is attainable; for Isocrates, the purpose of rhetorical education is to become an “able man of affairs”, experienced in grasping kairos; for Aristotle, doxa and kairos are merely tools to be used for the purpose of persuasion; for Isocrates, his παθεία is indivisible into separate parts, while for Aristotle “rhetoric is an acquired skill”.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} The usual characterization of Isocrates and Aristotle as the two rivals is also encouraged by William Benoit’s account, despite his concentration on both of the differences and similarities of their lives, training, views on rhetoric and knowledge. Cf. William Benoit, “Isocrates and Aristotle on Rhetoric”, \textit{Rhetoric Society Quarterly}, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 1990), 251–259. The polemic aspect of the relations between the two pedagogues is also emphasized in some (scanty though they are) Lithuanian commentaries, cf. Antanas Rybelis, “Paishiškinimai [Nikomacho etika. Dešimta knyga]”, Aristotelis. \textit{Rinktiniai raštai}, vertė Jonas Dumčius, Marcelinas Ročka, Voslyius Sezemanas; sudarė Antanas Rybelis, 418, n. 12.

\item \textsuperscript{14} Cf. Benoit, \textit{op. cit.} passim; Stanley Wilcox “Criticisms of Isocrates and His \textit{φιλοσοφία}”, 132, n. 49 (possibility of Aristotle’s silent abstention from criticism of Isocratean rhetoric); Исаева В. И., \textit{Античная философия в зеркале риторики. Исократ, Москва: Наука, 1994, 102 (their consensus concerning the dependence of the power of persuasion on the orator’s character and reputation); Depew, \textit{op. cit.}, 158: “in criticizing Isocrates, Aristotle pays him a backhanded compliment. He cooptively incorporates within his own philosophy of human affairs the meanings that Isocrates (but not Plato) assigned to key terms, notably phronēsis”.

\item \textsuperscript{15} Trevett, \textit{op. cit.}, 371. The same remark concerns Aristotle’s contemporary anti-Macedonian orators Hyppereides and Lykurgos.

\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, 371–372.
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didn’t keep to hand any written forensic and deliberative speeches and that “most of the political and forensic quotations in the Rhetoric derive from oral tradition”\textsuperscript{17}. In our opinion, Trevett neither did refute conclusively the opposite view stated by Kenneth James Dover\textsuperscript{18}, nor did he affirm his own argument which could have been more convincing, had he built more on the evidence of Isocrates whose one of the forensic speeches is also quoted in Aristotle’s treatise (see below, section 1.2. of this article). Moreover, the classification of Isocrates’ works should not be oversimplified. The method of applying “the term *epideictic* in the Aristotelian sense to denote any speech that was not written to be delivered in the assembly or in court, even if it is deliberative or forensic in form”\textsuperscript{19} should be revised and supplemented by a couple of new suggestions: on the one hand, modern scholarship tends to classify Isocratean speeches in a more careful way\textsuperscript{20}; on the other, Aristotle never explicitly defined the category of either *Panegyricus*, or *Philippus*, or *Antidosis*. The frequent quotation of speeches of “mixed” genre makes it seem possible that Aristotle usually referred to a collection of sample speeches and sayings designed for teaching purposes. Thus, *Panegyricus*, *Philippus*, or *Antidosis* could be also labelled as chrestomatic or exemplary speeches with the predominant political or forensic content. Aristotle and/or his closest successors were collectors of various written and spoken sources\textsuperscript{21}, and there’s no reason to deny the possibility that what was hypothetically said about his references to Iphicrates (that Aristotle had a collection of his sayings or excerpts from his speeches)\textsuperscript{22} the same could be true in case of Isocrates\textsuperscript{23}.

**FIRST-SIGHT PICTURE OF ISOCRATIAN REFERENCES**

There are twelve occurrences of Isocrates’ name in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: one in book I, four in book II, and seven in book III. The real number of Isocratean references is significantly larger. Some works are

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 374.


\textsuperscript{19} Trevett, *op. cit.*, 375.


\textsuperscript{21} When dealing with this question, one should keep in mind that Aristotle’s own contribution to *Corpus Aristotelicum* and the actual shape of his *Rhetoric* in his lifetime is a matter of discussion, on which see, e.g., Vita Paparinska, “Text tradition of Aristotle’s on rhetoric: From post-Aristotelian Athens to Rome”, *Literatūra*, 51(3), 2009, 16–17; Brad McAdon, “Reconsidering the intention or purpose of Aristotle’s rhetoric”, *Rhetoric Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2004, 216–234.

\textsuperscript{22} Trevett, *op. cit.*, 374.

\textsuperscript{23} The early use of excerpts from the gnomic anthologies is traced back to the first sophists, and Isocrates in particular, as one of the authorities of the new system of education based on selective reading (John Barns, “A new gnomologium: with some remarks on gnomic anthologies, II”, *Classical Quarterly*, 45, 1951, 4–7; Denis Michael Searby, *Aristotle in the Greek gnomological tradition* (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 19), Uppsala 1998, 31).
referred to by their title, some by hint at the main character, some are quoted without any reference at all. There are a few references based on scholarly speculations on the differences between Aristotelian and Isocratean rhetorical theory. The majority of Isocratean references were identified by the 19th 20th century philologists. Overall, in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* we can see around 40 (M. Dal Borgo counts 39) allusions to the Isocratean rhetorical technique. Their concentration seems to be highest in Book III (20 definite references). The number of occurrences could be reduced to 10 groups according to thematic patterns which roughly coincide with the number of chapters of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. These, in turn, could be summarized according to the tripartite structure of Aristotelian work: as is generally held, books I and II deal with *heuresis*\(^\text{24}\), chapters 1–12 of book III are basically devoted to *lexis*, and chapters 13–19 of the same book mainly treat the subject of *taxis*. After such a classification is done, we can cautiously assume that Aristotle refers to Isocrates in ten major places of his treatise: four times when discussing invention, three times in the sphere of elocution, and three times when dealing with the speech composition.

**MAIN POINTS OF THE FURTHER ANALYSIS**

The method of our analysis rests on the consequent description of each of the major ten groups of Isocratean references, examination of their main subject and establishment of their basic quality and value (accuracy of quotation, positive, negative or neutral in regard to the principle it describes); this analysis doesn’t aim at thoroughness due to limitation in time, space and measures, but it could serve for future research as a sketch of a synthetical picture which could be later enlarged by various details. In this account, we’ll concentrate only on the major occurrences of Isocratean references in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. Many small and less evident ones, hidden throughout the text, will be left aside for now. A somewhat shortened version of our analysis could be found in the tables attached.

**I. REFERENCES FROM THE SPHERE OF HEURESIS**

This sphere, which covers various methods of discovering the sources of persuasion for different rhetorical situations, is represented by four or five clearly discernible references\(^\text{25}\) to the Isocratean rhetorical technique. Each reference, described below, is defined both according to its formal appearance (explicit or not, exact quotation or not; the abbreviated version of these data is also available in the tables attached) and according to its subject (theme). The thematic aspect is a decisive one in the following arrangement

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\(^{24}\) We take the term from the post-Aristotelian technical rhetoric where it usually denotes the part of rhetoric which is concerned with the invention of proper arguments for the given case. On the discussion of the origins of this tradition, see Friedrich Solmsen, *op. cit.*, 221–222 (and footnotes).

\(^{25}\) In order to make our discussion shorter, we take several references of the same chapter under one heading and treat them as a unit (block of references). This is how the first two references from the sphere of *heuresis*, the second and the third block of the references from the sphere of *lexis* and each factual group of references from the sphere of *taxis* are treated in this article.
of our material: each heading is named in accordance with the basic principle to which one or more Isocratean references could be ascribed.

1.1. Two tricks in the analysis of the subject and sources of epideictic discourse: conversion of advice into a praise and comparison for the sake of amplification

The first clear26 encounter with Isocrates and his rhetorical art is in book I, chapter 9 (Arst. Rhet. I, 9, 1368 a. 5–7; 19–21) which is devoted to the analysis of the subject of epideictic speech and the most convenient methods of its treatment. Various aspects of beauty and a list of virtues mentioned by Aristotle have certain correspondences in Isocrates’ works, but Aristotle is mostly attracted by the two Isocratean tricks used in epideictic works: first, the conversion of a symbouleutic advice (or precept, ὑποθήκη) into a praise (ἐπαινος); second, the comparison of a person, being eulogized with other famous people when there is a lack of direct information about the person and the skills of objective narration characteristic of forensic speeches are not sufficiently developed. The first trick, illustrated with a popular topos of Isocrates’ speeches, has recently been clearly identified by N. Livingstone in the commentaries of Isocrates Busiris, although it was known in the 19th century27, but not always observed in German and French editions28. N. Livingstone calls this literary device “the τόπος of taking pride in achievements rather than (solely) in good fortune” and finds it in four speeches of Isocrates29. However, the place of Evagoras 45 most exactly corresponds to the example given by Aristotle; it may be reasonably regarded as a source of Aristotle’s paraphrase30. As regards the second trick – a comparison (σύγκρισις) – Aristotle does not illustrate it by Isocrates’ text; instead, he gives some brief comments: Isocrates used a comparison because of the lack of proficiency in delivering speeches before the courts (where a comparison does not have any probative value)31, but in an epideictic speech this device reinforces the praise, especially when a comparison is drawn between a person and other famous people (δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν): to show a person being eulogized as a better one than serious people

26 Less clear and dubious references are briefly reviewed in the last section of this article, just before the conclusions.

27 Cf. Edward Meredith Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877 (comment to Book 1, chapter 9, sec-


29 On the other hand, the use of the verb ὑπάρχειν, which is present in Panath. § 32, suggests that Aristotle was aware of more than one version of the same topos and its context (Cope, op. cit. in comm. ad loc. even notices that Isocrates himself used the same topos for different purposes, both for praise and for advice), and it is also not improbable that Aristotle had a collection of such topoi at his disposal.

is characteristic of epideictic speeches meeting the requirements of αὐξητικὸν and aesthetics of beauty (αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλὸν, εἰ σπουδαῖων βελτίων). To make this reference clearer, one could add that Isocrates compared Euagoras with Cyrus the Younger, paralleled Helen with Theseus, Philipp with Herakles (Phil. 109–112) and the like. As regards the true Aristotelian attitude towards Isocratean professional competence, expressed in this passage (whether Aristotle criticizes him as ignorant of the principles of the forensic λόγοι, or not), we cannot clearly establish it now in view of discrepancy both in ancient doxography and manuscript tradition. However, we shouldn’t doubt as regards the positive evaluation of the Isocratean practice in this particular case, i.e. in the discussion of epideictic speeches.

Thus, here we have one implicit paraphrase and one explicit, though not exact, remark. The other three references in this sphere are also explicit, but differ in the degree of accuracy.

1.2. Enthymeme based on a fortiori argument

The second reference to Isocrates, an explicit one, concerning heurēsis (Arst. Rhet. II, 19, 1392b 10–12), deals with a discussion of the common sources of arguments (τὰ κοινά, sometimes called κοινοὶ τόποι) in, in particular about the first of them, – a correlation between the possible and the impossible. In the long list of possibilities, an example from Isocrates emerges. It comes under the statement that what is possible for the inferior, weaker or less intelligent ones (τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφορονεστέροις), the same is even more possible for their opposites. Presuming that he himself is better than Euthynus, Isocrates claims that it would be surprising if he himself wouldn’t be able to come up with what Euthynus has invented. This piece of logical reasoning is indeed an enthymeme (“rhetorical syllogism”) based on the argument

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32 According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Aphaeur, Isocrates’ adopted son, reported that Isocrates composed no judicial speeches at all. On the other hand, Aristotle himself makes remark about the numerous bundles of Isocratean forensic speeches lying in the bookstalls (fr. 140). In our opinion, Yun Lee Too (op. cit., 118) is right when suggesting the possibility of different motivations for such contrary statements (esp. that Aphaeurus maintained Isocrates’ good reputation), but we cannot agree that Aristotle was primarily insisting on Isocrates’ “identity as a logographer”. The reconstruction of the original opinion of Dionysius is also important here: “What he does not believe of Aristotle is the hyperbolic extent, for he determines (on the authority of Cephisodorus, who lived with Isocrates, became his most sincere disciple, and defended him against Aristotle) that Isocrates had written such speeches, but not many (Is. 18)” (Thomas N. Winter, “On the Corpus of Lysias”, Classics and Religious Studies: Faculty Publications, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, Classics and Religious Studies Department) , 1973, 38).

33 For Isocrates, topos is a “subject-matter indicator” or a “strategy of argumentation” (cf. Sara Rubinelli, Ars Topica: The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero, Springer Science+Business Media, 2009, 69–70). The Aristotelian topos is rarely a “subject-matter indicator”; more often it is an “argument scheme of universal applicability”; when contrasted to idia, “indications of subject-matter” of special arguments, necessary in arguing the case. The Isocratean and the Aristotelian definitions converge in the three “common material topics”; “The More or the Less”; “Past or Future Fact”; “Possible and Impossible”. However, Aristotle is original in his theory of 28 “general topos” (also called “formal topics”, cf. Jeffrey Walker, “The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of Enthymeme”, College English, 56 (Nr. 1, January), 1994, 53–54).

34 This definition is taken from James Allen’s article “Rhetoric and Logic”, A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. by Ian Worthington, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007, 355. For a more detailed discussion about the meaning of the term and its relation to topos, see T. Ed Dyck, “Topos and Enthymeme”, Rhetorica: A
(or topos) a fortiori\textsuperscript{35}, most probably on its version, which is called “a maiore ad minus”. It is possibly the only reference to Isocrates’ forensic speech (Πρὸς Εὐθύνουν ἁμάρτητος, No. 21 of the corpus Isocrateum) in Aristotelian Art of Rhetoric, although, on the other hand, the real source of the reference is not yet clearly identified\textsuperscript{36}. There is some evidence that both Isocrates and Lysias wrote for the same lawsuit, – one for the plaintiff and the other for the defendant\textsuperscript{37}. Moreover, Diogenes Laertius mentions an exercise in reply to Isocrates’ speech written by Antisthenes (Laert. VI, 15, 11). We don’t know which of these sources were available to Aristotle, thus it remains unclear where his argument concerning possibility comes from. In our opinion, the conjecture of Hermann Karl Usener\textsuperscript{38} is the best for now as he presumes that Aristotle has in mind here an argument from another speech of Isocrates, namely Demurrer.


\textsuperscript{36} Cf. Mederic Dufour, op. cit., comm. ad loc. (Vol. 2, 101 No. 3): “La phrase ne figure pas dans le texte actuel du Contre Euthynous; mais il est permis de supposer que le plaidoyer est mutilé à la fin”.


Against Kallimachos (Παραγραφὴ πρὸς Καλλίμαχον) (Isocr. Call. 15). On behalf of the defendant, Isocrates expresses his surprise at the naivety of Kallimachos’ reasoning: Kallimachos denies the possibility that he might have agreed to accept 2000 drachmae instead of 10000, and yet he naively believes that the defendant (had he intended to lie) wouldn’t have thought of the same thing and, therefore, would have asserted that he had given more. Here, the possibility is derived in a similar way as in the reference provided by Aristotle. Whether Usener’s conjecture is right or not, we should not ignore the fact that Aristotle quotes here a forensic speech which was written at least 40 years before Aristotle’s coming to Athens. (Both Against Euthynus and Against Kallimachos were written soon after the rule of the Thirty and deal with the Amnesty of 403 BCE). Thus, it appears highly unlikely that he could reproduce it from memory without looking at any written text. However, Trevett’s opinion concerning the fact that Aristotle used forensic examples, based only on oral tradition, is still probable if we recall that the case of Euthynus was popular, as was indirectly pointed out by Diogenes Laertius.

\textsuperscript{1.3.} Topoi and enthymemes based on previous judgement and accepted opinions

The third explicit Isocratean reference is found in book II, chapter 23, where the sources of creation of argument-schemes (topoi)\textsuperscript{39} and enthymemes based on

\textsuperscript{39} Such a synonym we take from Sara Rubinelli, op. cit. (passim).
authoritative opinions or decisions of the past are discussed. Of the 28 Aristotelian topoi, here we deal in particular with the 11th one\textsuperscript{40}, illustrated by seven examples, three of them containing references to Isocrates’ works that include authoritative assessments: Helen was serious and virtuous, because Theseus judged her in such a way; so was Alexander (Paris), since he was chosen by goddesses as a judge of their beauty; and so was Euagoras whose aid was chosen by Konon in the moment of fatal misfortune (his defeat at Aegospotami), turning down help from all others (cf. Arst. Rhet. II, 23, 1399a 1–6). Helen’s assessment through Theseus is a very popular topos from Isocrates’ speech Helen, which includes a large digression about the eulogy of Theseus. In this speech, Isocrates twice (Isocr. Hel. 22 and 38) explicitly states that a positive assessment of a famous person (Theseus) increases the reliability of the reputation of the eulogized person. Another version of this topos – infallibility of the goddesses in their choice of Paris as a judge of their beauty – is also found in Isocrates’ Helen (Isocr. Hel. 46)\textsuperscript{41}. Finally, the probity of the Cypriot tyrant Euagoras is supported by the authority of Konon and by the fact that after the Peloponnesian war it was the land of Euagoras that was chosen by Konon as a place of his exile. This example of Euagoras is the first case of the Isocratean work being explicitly quoted in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (and it is one of the total of 26 quotations \textit{sensu stricto} of Isocrates’ speeches). It is not precise and it doesn’t fit the extant text of Isocrates. It seems that the author or composer of Rhetoric was not obliged to quote examples literally here because of the broadness of the material itself and not necessarily because of the lack of handwritten sources or due to the principle of objective pragmatism and economy in the exposition for the sake of clarity.

1.4. Topoi based on identification of analogous antecedents and consequents

The fourth reference, also an explicit one, appears in the same chapter 23, in the section which deals with the 17th topos out of the collection of 28 argument schemes (Rhet., 1399 b5–13), namely with the analogy between antecedents and consequents (“the identity of antecedents following from the identity of results”). This reference was identified in the 19th century by Leonhard Spengel, and since then all editions follow his emendation “Ισοκράτους” instead of the possibly erroneous “Σωκράτους”, which is, nevertheless, preserved in all extant codices. Thanks to Spengel we have one more explicit reference to Isocrates and a pretty clear allusion to his words in Antidosis (Antid. 173). The topos is exemplified with Xenophanes’ assertion that both sides are equally guilty of impiety, i.e. not only those who assert that gods are born, but also those who claim that gods die, since in both cases there seems to be an impious assertion that at some point gods do not exist. The reference to Isocrates appears as another example just

\textsuperscript{40} Or 12th according to S. Rubinelli’s classification (op. cit. 74).

\textsuperscript{41} Aristotle uses these examples (and most probably doesn’t forget Isocratean Helen) also in Rhet. I, 6, 1363 a 18–19.
after the generalization of the *topos*: its essence is to grasp (λαμβάνειν) the result from each of its antecedent component (particular, not universal one) always as the same. The statement is illustrated with the hint at Isocrates’ *Antidosis* (cf. Isocr. *Antid*. 173): “You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy” (translated by J. H. Freese). In other words, deliberation concerning Isocrates’ profession (or pursuit) of philosophy (by most scholars identified as rhetorical education) should result in a general assessment of philosophy in terms of its public value; a single element of the common phenomenon results in the same final outcome. Aristotle here paraphrases the Isocratean thought and doesn’t quote it exactly, thus once again evidencing his own concern with the subject-oriented narration. Moreover, Aristotle is very grudging in his comments here, despite his special involvement into a similar discussion in his *Protrepticus* ending with the conclusion that “one must do philosophy”.

2. REFERENCES FROM THE SPHERE OF LEXIS

The sphere of *lexis*, to which part of the third book is devoted, contains quite a considerable number of Isocratean references. In contrast to the first two books, here implicit quotations prevail. The manner how frequently Isocratean examples are presented gives an impression of a deep impact of the Isocratean antithesis-based style on the Aristotelian theory of persuasive (enthymeme-based) discourse.

2.1. Timely use of poetic diction and rare words (in the state of enthusiasm)

The stage for the first occurrence of Isocratean references in the sphere of style is set by the discussion about πρέπον and εἰδή τῆς λέξεως (Rhet. III, 7, 1408a10sqq.). Aristotle considers three modes of or conditions necessary to persuasion: τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον (correspondence to the subject matter); παθητικόν or παθητικὴ λέξις (pathetic or emotion-based expression) and ἠθικόν or ἠθικὴ λέξις (character-based expression). All these conditions share the principle of rational relevance (appropriateness, πρέπον): the manner of speech should fit the manner of the subject, the manner of the feelings experienced and the manner of the orator’s character and habits. Aristotle stresses the importance of adequacy between occasion and stylistic measures (Rhet. 1408b1: τὸ δ΄ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι). Here, he combines the theory of style with the guidance on performance, compares rhetorical devices with physiological and theatrical characteristics such as intonation and facial expression. In this context, the quote from Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* sounds as an example of a rational use of more elaborate words in the right moment, i.e. at the end

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42 It is interesting to note a certain variety of shades of meaning hidden in the word ἐπιτήδευμα here. Mederic Dufour translates it as “une règle de vie”, Freese puts it as “education generally”, Rhys Roberts as “the whole profession”.  
of the speech, in the state of enthusiasm, when the speaker has already made the audience overwhelmed with feelings and touched their hearts with praise, blame, anger, or friendliness. Such a pathetic moment approves of the employment of poetical devices, and a couple of Isocratean references serves as an example of their successful use. Aristotle’s words “δὴ οὕτως δεῖ” (Rhet. 1408b19) could be interpreted as an indirect approval or even praise of the Isocratean device, but it is elegantly shadowed by an immediate reference in the same sentence to a variation of the same device based on other authorities: the timely evoked enthusiasm could also be softened with irony, as Gorgias and Plato in his Phaedrus have done (cf. Rhet. 1408b 20).

2.2. Examples of disjunctive and antithetic clauses of the periodic style

The second reference to Isocrates in the sphere of lexis is the largest one and, according to the number of quotations, deserves some different designation, e.g., a block or a cluster of references. In contrast to the majority of the above discussed references, it consists of bare quotations without mentioning either the title of the work cited or its author. This is the famous passage on rhetorical periods in book III, chapter 9 (1409b.33–1410a.23). It deals with the types of the clauses of the periodic style – the disjunctive clauses (διῃρημένη λέξις) and the adversative / antithetic clauses (ἀντικειμένη λέξις); the latter are subdivided and illustrated with nine examples from Isocrates’ Panegyricus; to these, a statement of the anonymous author about Peitholaos and Lycophron is attached. In contrast, λέξις διῃρημένη is provided only with one example.

The subdivision of λέξις ἀντικειμένη is quite simple, although the formulation is somehow obscured with the use of neutral adjectives and a number of datives. Thus, the first group of antithetical clauses consists of a pair of cola in which opposites are brought close together (Rhet. 1409b36–1410a1: ἐν ἡ̄ ἐκατέρῳ τῷ κόλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται); the second group comprises a pair of cola in which opposites are coupled with the same idea or word (Rhet. 1410a1–2: ἢ ταὐτὸ ἐπέζευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις)44. (In these descriptions, one could notice a trace of the concepts that a modern scholar could call dialectical dyad and triad, respectively: thesis and antithesis in the first group, and thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the second). These examples are concluded by the assessment of the periodic style, which is an indirect praise of Isocrates. “Such style is pleasant” (ἡδεῖα δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, Rhet.1410a 20–21); since antitheses and parallels are easily discernable and intelligible (τἀναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ’ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, 1410a 21–22), they are similar to syllogism or denunciation (ἐοίκεν συλλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγή τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν, 1410a 22–23).

44 This is our literal translation of the just cited passage: “in which in regard to the two members (kōla), either a contrary thing / meaning is attached (lies close) to a contrary one or the same thing / meaning is appended to the contraries”. Thus, in the first case one member (kōlon) simply contradicts the other, and in the second case both members (kōla) share some general idea.
As we see, Aristotle is interested in the examples of Isocratean clauses primarily from the stylistic and aesthetic points of view. The assessment of their inner (ethical, political or philosophical) content is almost absent and has no clear allusions in this passage (although we can speculate upon some of them indirectly). The manner *Panegyricus* is cited indicates a rather strict pragmatism of the author of *Rhetoric*: the quoted clauses often belong to longer periodic sentences, but since these clauses are intended to illustrate a particular sentence structure, the rest of the Isocratean period is excluded from consideration. Thus, less understandable excerpts are accompanied by short comments of *Rhetoric*’s author. For instance, having quoted the excerpt from *Paneg. 41* (ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσαι βουλομένοις) (*Rhet. 1410a* 5–6), Aristotle adds a brief explanation: ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται (“consumption [or “enjoying”] is opposed to acquisition”) (*Rhet. 1410a*7).

In the mentioned chapter, only four quotations out of the total ten exactly correspond to the extant Isocratean text. The remaining ones have varying degrees of change: abridgements, lexical variations or an inverted word order.

### 2.3. Pretty enthymemes based on antithesis, metaphor, liveliness and witty expressions

The third block of Isocratean references expands in the 10th and 11th chapters of book III. Here, quotations from the works of Isocrates and other authors serve to illustrate several modes of creating stylistically (κατὰ τὴν λέξιν) pretty (or urbane, elegant) enthymemes (ἀστεία ἔνθυμηματα): antitheses, metaphors, liveliness and salt expressions (word puns). These devices satisfy one’s intellectual desire and thus are most pleasant. In these chapters, we find eight references to Isocrates (five in chapter 10 and three in chapter 11); his name is mentioned only twice (once in each chapter), and the rest bundle of references consists of anonymous quotations. As regards the main source of references, in these chapters there prevail two Isocratean works – *Philipp* (five references) and *Panegyricus* (three references).

According to Aristotle, stylistic (κατὰ τὴν λέξιν) enthymemes may be created in two ways: either on the basis of the form of a sentence structure (τῷ μὲν σχήματι) or on the grounds of the selection of words (τοῖς δ΄ ὀνόμασιν). The first – “figurative” – way is most effective when an antithesis is used (ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται). This statement is illustrated with the Isocratean quotation from *Philipp* 73 concerning the opposition between war and peace, which is briefly explained: ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ. This explanation should be supplemented with one more opposition, namely the one between public and private interests, since here the general consensus on peace is opposed to the opinion of individual orators engaged in anti-Macedonian propaganda.

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45 It is said in the very beginning of the analysis of these devices: τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἢν φύσει πᾶσιν εστὶ, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἠμῖν μάθησιν, ἧσυτα (*Rhet. 1410b*10–12).

46 The picture as painted by Isocrates in *Philip* 73 contains a paradox: according to the contextual mean-
Aristotle particularly distinguishes two ways to make speech pretty through the use of words (τοῖς ὀνόμασιν): the use of metaphors (ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταφοράν, Rhet. 1410b31–32) and the method of “bringing-before-the-eyes” (ἐὰν πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ, Rhet. 1410b33–34), which elsewhere is almost identified with the concept of ἐνέργεια (translated as “actualization”, “vividness”, “activity” or “liveliness”). The latter two devices, together with the above discussed antithesis, constitute the triad of the main devices of a pretty (urbane) style.

The further discussion of the metaphors and the method of visualization (“bringing-before-the-eyes”) presents one more group of Isocratean references. Having emphasized one of the four types of metaphors, namely metaphors based on analogy, Aristotle becomes generous with examples (1411a2–1411b20); some of them are provided with additional notes, e.g.: τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορά καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων (Rhet. 1411a26), καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορά καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων (Rhet. 1411a 27–28), μεταφορά γάρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων (Rhet. 1411b8–9). Among the examples of metaphors based on analogy, four examples belong to Isocrates: one to his Philipp and three to Panegyricus.

All Isocratean metaphors found in the mentioned section of Aristotle’s Rhetoric could be summarized in the following four statements: 1) Isocrates referred to the participants of public festivals as “rushing together” (“co-runners”, “contestants”)? perhaps alluding to their lust similar to such phenomena as race, battle or accumulation of liquids; Aristotle doesn’t specify that, and he dismisses the whole Isocratean discussion concerning the public performances; this is one more case of a free quotation in Aristotle’s Rhetoric; 2) in the first of the three mentioned quotations from Panegyricus, Isocrates attached the verb μελετᾶν, denoting training and education (or acquiring something through training, e.g., knowledge, cf. αὐξεῖν τι, Rhet. 1411b11), to the sphere unrelated to training (or accumulating knowledge), μικρὸν φρονεῖν (cf. μικροφροσύνη coined by Plutarchus, 50


49 A more detailed classification of metaphors appears in Poet. 21, 1457b 7–9: transference from genus to species; from species to genus; from one species to another species; transference according to analogy (μεταφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁνόματος ἀλλοτρόν ἐπιφορὰ ή ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἴδους ή ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ή ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἴδους ή κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον).

50 Cf. Rhet. III, 10, 1411a29–30: καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρισιν [cf. Isocr. Phil. 12]. This example is in close relation with the preceding metaphor taken from Cephasidotos: Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευεν μὴ πολλὰς ποιήσωσιν τὰς συνδρομὰς [ἐκκλησίας] (Rhet. 1411a28–29).

which means “pettiness”, “littleness of mind”); 3) the second quotation from *Panegyricus* illustrates a metaphor based on an analogy between the truce and the postponement of war (armistice is a metaphor of temporal peace); 4) the third reference to *Panegyricus* alludes to Isocrates’ analogy between the two signs of victory – a trophy erected after a battle and a peace agreement; the latter was considered by Isocrates as a much more important and beautiful commemoration of victory. Isocrates used this metaphor to highlight the victory of the Persian king and the humiliation of entire Greece after the Peace of Antalcidas (387/386 BCE). However, Aristotle doesn’t mention the subtlety of such a paradoxical use.

Finally, one more pair of Isocratean citations comes after the definition of visualization (“bringing-before-the-eyes”) which deals with the connection between metaphor and actualization, or liveliness (ἐνέργεια). Aristotle gives some examples of live and lifeless metaphors: to refer to a good man as a quadrangle is a metaphor, but it doesn’t express liveliness, whereas such metaphors as found in Isocrates’ *Philipp* are much livelier. This time Aristotle mentions neither the author nor the title of the work quoted; instead, he provides only short excerpts that illustrate liveliness (ἐνέργεια): ἀλλὰ τὸ ‘ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν’ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ ‘σὲ δ΄ ὥσπερ ἄφετον’ [ἐλεύθερον] ἐνέργεια (Rhet. 1411b27–29). In both examples, taken from Isocratean *Philipp* (§10 and §127, respectively), liveliness is highlighted through the meanings of actions: the action of flowering (ἀνθοῦσαν) and relaxation or releasing from work and worries (ἄφετος particularly refers to the sacred animals devoted to gods and released from labour; it also refers to the persons who are released from public duties; also, to a loose sequence of things, uncontrolled drift or vacant time-span). The use of such short excerpts and the author’s neglect of a more detailed explanation possibly mean that the reader of *Rhetoric* is well aware of either the context (that in both cases the portrait of the physically strong and free-minded Philipp II of Macedonia is implied) or the popularity of the expressions quoted.

3. REFERENCES FROM THE SPHERE OF TAXIS

All references to Isocrates in this small section (chapters 13–19 of book III) devoted to the arrangement of rhetorical material are mainly either paraphrases (not citations) or even broader references to the Isocratean rhetorical technique. Some examples of it have certain resemblance to the examples presented in the first two books of Stagirite’s treatise, and this
contributes to the problem of the interface between an spheres of heuresis and taxis\textsuperscript{56} which, however, won’t concern us for now.

3.1. Methods of composing epideictic proems: initial digression and psogos

The first reference to Isocrates appears in connection with a discussion concerning the composing principles of the initial part of the speech, the proem (Gr. προοίμιον, Lat. exordium), which is the subject of chapter 14 (Rhet. 1414b19–1416a3). The proem of rhetorical speech is not only paralleled with the preludes of poetry and flute music (ἐν ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον), but also put into a universal “technological” system: πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ’ εἰσι, καὶ οἷον ὀδοποίησις τῷ ἐπιόντι (Rhet. 1414b20–21) – “all these are the beginnings (ἄρχαι), as if paving the way for what follows” (in speech or in melody). The term ὀδοποίησις, used metaphorically, is borrowed from the sphere of handicrafts and non-verbal arts. The orator, like αὐλητής, is presented on the same level as an ordinary craftsman who cares about the beginning as an essential condition for the good issue. Aristotle adds a detailed explanation of the resemblance between προαύλησις and epideictic προοίμιον: “for as flute-players, after they started (προαυλήσαντες) playing whatever they can execute skilfully, they attach it to the key-note (συνήψαν τῷ ἐνδόσιμῳ), so also in epideictic speeches should be the composition of the exordium; the speaker should say at once (εὐθὺ) whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject (ἐνδούναι καὶ συνάψαι); this is what all [speakers] do”\textsuperscript{57}. This description implies the division of the proem into at least two parts: improvisation of any kind and ἐνδόσιμον (a key-note or some hint at the main theme of the following composition); one may even think that the third, transitory, part is also implied here. The example of Isocrates Helen is quite instructive. As Aristotle notes, “the eristics and Helen have nothing in common” (οὐθὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένῃ, Rhet. 1414b27–28). Indeed, at the beginning of Helen, Isocrates extensively (§1–13) criticises his contemporary rhetoricians and philosophers, both practitioners of eristics (ἡ παρὰ τῆς ἐρίδας φιλοσοφία) and unpractical rhetoric based on paradoxical subjects; according to Aristotle’s division, this is actually the improvisatory part of προοίμιον; only in passage 14 the main theme, a short praise of Helen, appears. This is ἐνδόσιμον. A digression from the subject in the proem is approved by Aristotle, since it rescues the speech from monotony (μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὀμοειδή εἶναι).

Some scholars had claimed that Aristotle criticised the Isocratean proem\textsuperscript{58}, but this can hardly be true. When Aristotle

\textsuperscript{56} On the Peripatetic and non-Peripatetic content of taxis, see interesting observations by Solmsen (op. cit., 221–223).

\textsuperscript{57} This is the a literal translation by Warren Kirken-dale from his article “Ciceronians versus Aristotelians on the Ricercar as Exordium, from Bembo to Bach”, Journal of the American Musicological Society, 32, 1979, 3.

generalizes the principles of composing the proems of epideictic speeches, he states rather clearly: “δεῖ δὲ ἢ ἦν ὧν ὦ γὰρ ἐγείρα τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ” (“these exordia may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech”) 59). Aristotle actually approves the Isocratean technique. It is worth noting that here the term τὰ ἐνδόσιμα is used not in the meaning of a key-note, but rather is synonymous to the term προοίμιον.

Before generalizing the principles of an epideictic proem, Aristotle gives one more reference to Isocrates. It serves to confirm Aristotle’s statement that proems of epideictic speeches are composed either of praise or of blame. The former case is exemplified with the reference to Gorgian Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος and the latter with the Isocratean Panegyricus (cf. Rhet. 1414b.30-35). Aristotle paraphrases the main thought and merely states the fact: Isocrates censures the custom of awarding the athletes for brilliance of their physical strength and corporal excellence and giving no prize to those who excel others by their intellectual abilities 60.

Sometimes one more indirect reference to Isocrates is being discerned in this chapter. After a remark that the proem of epideictic speech could be drawn from advice (ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς) 61, Aristotle gives two examples which an anonymous commentator ascribes to Isocrates 62. Phrases “ἀὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ” and “οὔτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει” 63 refer to a speaker or an author of speech, but it is not necessarily Isocrates, although he was mentioned in the previous example. Modern translators translate these words neutrally, since the source of this quotation has not yet been established: no work from the Isocratean corpus praised Aristeides or Paris in the proem.

3.2. Employment of accusation in deliberative discourse and using witnesses in praise

Another two references in the sphere of taxis appear in chapter 17 which focuses

59 Full quotation: τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιθετικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ τούτων, ἐξ ἑπανοῦ, ἐξ συμβουλῆς, ἐξ ἀποτροπῆς, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· δεῖ δὲ ἢ ἔναν ὀικεία ἐγείρα τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ (Rhet. III, 14, 1415a5–8).

60 According to E. M. Cope (and Sandys) comm. ad loc., “the problem here proposed by Isocrates – the omission of the institution of prizes for intellectual competition – is solved by Aristotle, Probl. XXX 11”. The lack of judges for the wise, potential hatred for the judges, and the lack of the prize for the wise other than wisdom itself are among the chief arguments in this solution. However, there is no sound reason to suspect that Aristotle criticizes Isocrates in the mentioned passage of Rhetoric. Moreover, the problem is older than Isocrates: the contrast between the respect given to the physical strength of athletes and ἀγαθή σοφία was already stated by Xenophanes (fr. 2 West; Athen. X 6, 1–24).

61 Rhet. 1414b35–36.

62 Anonymi Rhetoris In Aristotelis artem rhetoricam commentarium, p. 229, v. 15–28: [b35] ἢ γίνεται τὸ προοίμιον ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς ἢ ἐπιθετικῶν, οίον συμβουλεύει εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ προοίμῳ ὁ Ἰσοκράτης τὸ δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστείδης ἀγαθός, ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς διὸ καὶ θαῦμα ὁ Ἰσοκράτης τοῖς <παινεῖ> τοῖς Ἀριστείδην ἀγαθόν· ἢ <τοὺς τοιούτους> ἐπαινεῖν δεῖ, όπινους <μὴν εὐδοκιμοῦν> φανερῶς καὶ ἐπιδεικνύεται τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν <μὴν φαινότω> εἰσιν, <ἀλλὰ> ὀς ἀγαθοὶ ὀντεῖς> κρύπτωσιν ἑαυτούς καὶ λαθεῖν σπουδάζουσι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ συμβουλῆς προοίμων. καὶ ὁ Θεολόγος Ἀθανάσιος ἐπαινεῖν ἀρετὴν <ἐπαινεῖσιμα>. [b38] καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος πρὸ τοῦ ἀργάζειν τὴν Ἑλένην ἀγαθόν ὁ Ἰσοκράτης δεῖν εἰς ὀρεί κρύπτετο, ἐκ τῆς μή δέξη τοιοῦτος, καὶ γὰρ καὶ <οὔτω> ὁ Ἰσοκράτης <συμβουλεύει> ἐν τοῖς προοίμιοις ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους, οἱ μὴ εὐδοκιμοῦν μήτε φαινοῦσθε εἰσίν, γράφεται τὸ <οὔτω> καὶ μέγα, <οὔτως> γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τούτουν τὸν τρόπον ὁ Ἰσοκράτης <συμβουλεύει> ἐπαινεῖν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐν τῷ προοίμῳ.

63 See Rhet. 1414b36–37.
on argumentation (pisteis), the third part of the popular fourfold partition of forensic speech. Examples of Isocrates are referred here to illustrate the principles and means of argumentation relevant to deliberative and epideictic speeches (accusation and praise, respectively). After asserting that political speeches are more complicated than forensic ones because of their subject matter (aimed at future and not at past events) and because of the lack of special auxiliary means (such as referring to law alone or making many digressions), in order to escape a sticky situation, Aristotle suggests following the practice of Attic orators (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρίστορες) and Isocrates: using accusation in a political discourse and praise in epideictic one. Of political discourses, two – Panegyricus and Symmachicus (usually identified as Περὶ εἰρήνης) – are mentioned, in which Isocrates attacked Lacedaemonians and Chares, respectively. Isocratean epideictic discourses are not specified; it seems plausible that the mentioned Isocratean practice of “bringing in” (ἐπεισοδιοῦν) people to praise as if using witnesses was very well known in Aristotle’s epoch and didn’t require any explanations.

3.3. Indirect self-characterization (self-defence or self-praise) through the words of another person

Finally, in the same chapter, one more device of persuasive argumentation from the Isocratean practice emerges: self-characterization of the speaker (especially the one who makes a defence against his prosecutor’s charges) through the words of another person. According to Aristotle, while speaking of himself directly, the orator is at risk of bringing jealousy upon himself, receiving reproaches for speechmaking, arousing adverse opinions, and while pointing directly to others he can evoke charges of being rough and abusive. Examples of indirect positive self-characterization are reported in brief: “This is what Isocrates does in Philippus and in Antidosis” (ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιδόσει, Rhet. 1418b 26–27). While referring to Philipp (cf. Isocr. Philipp 4–7), Aristotle has in mind the beginning of this speech, where Isocrates makes an indirect boast of his own work (a speech addressed to the Macedonian king with carefully selected arguments on peacemaking) which won recognition from the Athenian public: they were debating over its content, thus commending not so much stylistic embellishments of it, but primarily the subject matter as a reflexion of the excellence of the author’s mind and his sincere involvement in the actual state of affairs. In Antidosis, Isocrates mentions himself, twice simulating an imaginary conversation with his own disciples and associates, among them with the famous Athenian commander Timotheus (cf. Isocr. Antid. 132–139; 141–149). By the end of the chapter, these considerations about saving the orator’s repute are

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66 cf. Livingstone, op. cit., 119–120: “The use of ‘witnesses’ may be seen as exemplifying another Isocratean practice on which Aristotle remarks, that of ‘bringing in’ people to praise [...]”
67 Isocrates also mentions a favourable public reaction to his own speech in his Areopagiticus (Areop. 56–57).
supplemented by one more advice aimed at the orator’s “self-defence”, namely the change of enthymemes into maxims (Rhet. 1418b33–39). The example employed by Aristotle on this occasion is identified as a paraphrase of Isocratean Archidamas (Archid. 50), although it is quite loose and has no indications of authorship. Nevertheless, at least an indirect argument for the authorship of the Isocrates could be drawn from Rhet. 1368a.5–7, where an implicit quotation of Euagoras serves as an illustration of the change of an advice into a praise (see our discussion above, in section 1.1. of this article).

4. OTHER INDIRECT REFERENCES

The total number of Isocratean references in Aristotle’s Rhetoric doesn’t confine to those clear occurrences where the name of the orator, the title of his work or a clearly definable quotation appear. One could find various indirect allusions and references to the Isocratean teaching principles, theory of style, ethical concepts and anonymously rendered loose paraphrases, but these are not the main subject of the present section of the paper. What concerns us at present is a seemingly derogative aspect of Isocratean references. There are at least three such instances in Aristotle’s Rhetoric where scholars discern Stagirite’s enmity towards contemporary rhetoricians, not excluding Isocrates. First of all, in the beginning of Rhetoric (Rhet. I 1, 1354b16–22; 1355a19–20), where the factors influencing the decision of the judge are treated, Aristotle lays stress on the concentration on the matter of dispute and remarks that all those who occupy themselves with the definition of the content of each part of speech actually deal only with the questions “beside the subject” (ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογούσιν). This remark, made twice in the mentioned passage (Rhet. 1354b16–22; 1355a19–20), is usually interpreted as an implicit attack on contemporary rhetoricians-technographers, sometimes including Isocrates as one of them. A more specific remark on a similar subject (the precept of the brachylogy required for the second part of the speech, the narration), found in book III (Rhet. III, 16, 1416b30: νῦν δὲ γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασί δεῖν εἶναι ταχείαν), strengthens the probability of the Isocratean criticism in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, since it is referred to by Quintilian (IV, 2, 32) in similar words (praecptum brevitatis irridens). According to E. M. Cope, “this is one of Vettori’s evidences (perhaps the best) of Aristotle’s dislike of Isocrates”. Cope tries to reduce the probability of this hypothesis to a minimum and makes quite an opposite statement: “If they ever were

68 As we can infer from E.V. Haskins’ account of Isocratean references from book 3 of the Rhetoric (Haskins, op. cit., 65–66 and 79).

69 See e.g. Solmsen., op. cit., 216.


71 Cope, op.cit., comm. ad loc.
enemies – as is likely enough in Aristotle’s early life – after the death of Isocrates, by the time that this work was completed and published, all traces of hostility [72] [...] must have long vanished from Aristotle’s mind [73]. In either event, we should agree that “to maintain that the Isocrateans organized their entire material under these headings [i.e. four parts of speech – T. V.] would be hazardous [...]” [74]: one should always keep in mind the differences between the conception of the Isocratean school and that of the other sophists [75].

Finally, there is one more reference possibly (but not necessarily) unfavourable to Isocrates [76]. In book II, chapter 24 (Rhet. 1401a8–12), which is devoted to seeming or fallacious enthymemes (τὰ φαινόμενα ἐνθυμήματα), also called paralogisms, and their sources or τόποι (argument schemes), an example of one kind of such τόποι (namely ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν [τόπος]) appears where a series of conclusions enumerated one by one in the same sentence create an impression of a consequent reasoning. The Aristotelian example of such quasi-enthymeme has no reference to its source, and thus it is open to various interpretations. It consists of three parallel statements of the conclusions of unrelated syllogisms (Rhet. 1401a10–12: [...] τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοὺς δ’ ἐτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δ’ Ἐλληνας ἡλευθέρωσε: ἐκαστὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεται) which were identified by L. Spengel as a recapitulation of several long sections of Isocratean Euagoras (Isocr. Euag. 65–69) [77]. However, there is no clear evidence that Aristotle really meant particularly the deeds of Euagoras here. In the Isocratean passage, which is preferred by Spengel and his followers, we find none of the verbs (ἔσωσε, ἐτιμώρησε, ἡλευθέρωσε) used in Aristotle’s quasi-enthymeme. It is true that we can discern some conceptual resemblances between the two texts: the tyrant of Cypriot Salamis saved his people and country from ferity (cf. Isocr. Euag. 66–67; this could be compared with the statement in Rhet.: τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε), he revenged (if really?) his enemies, perhaps, Persians in the Cypriot war (cf. Euag. 67) or Lacedaemonians in the battle.

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72 Italization is ours.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Cf. E. V. Haskins, op. cit, 79, who though she admits that “the arrangement of examples from Isocrates in the Rhetoric presents Isocrates as a ‘parts of speech’ teacher”, nevertheless makes a plausible remark that “Isocrates explicitly distinguishes his teaching from both τειγμένα τεχνή, with its implication of precise arrangement of discursive elements, and abstract intellectuation”.
76 M. Dal Borgo, op. cit., asserts that “Aristotle rejects that rhetoric produces better citizens, but forwards rather that it is an amoral tool and cites Isocrates’ Evagoras to exemplify an invalid enthymeme (Rhet. 2.24.1)”. However, I find no particular repugnance against Isocrates in the mentioned passage, unless we attach to him the general Stagirite’s remark concerning the profession of sophists like Protagoras, made in the end of the chapter (Rhet. 1402a20–28).
77 Spengel’s words ending his prolonged footnote in pp. 20–21 of his Über die Rhetorik des Aristoteles, München: Verlag der k. Akademie, 1851: “Aristoteles meint die Recapitulation in Isocr. Euagoras §. 65–9” don’t sound convincing enough. Nor does Cope’s commentary ad loc.: “this is from Isocr. Evag. §§ 65–9, as Spengel has pointed out, Tract. on Rhet. in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle gathered into these three heads of the contents of Isocrates’ five sections. The person of whom this is said is of course Evagoras, the hero of the declamation. The same speech was already referred to in II 23. 12”.

25
at Knidos (cf. *Euag*. 68 and *Rhet*. 1401a 9–10: τοῖς δ’ ἐτέραις ἐτιμώρησε, and he greatly contributed to the autonomy of Greek countries after the same battle (cf. *Euag*. 68 and *Rhet*. 1401a10: τοὺς δ’ Ἑλλήνας ἠλευθέρωσε). To these we could also add an argument from the earlier passage, *Euag*. 56, where the deeds of Konon and Euagoras are summarized (cf. “[…] Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν κατεναυμαχήθησαν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπεστερήθησαν, οἱ δ’ Ἑλλήνες ἠλευθέρωσαν, ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡμῶν τῆς τε παλαιᾶς δόξης μέρος τι πάλιν ἀνέλαβεν […].”) Keeping this in mind, one may also suggest that Aristotle’s quasi-enthymemes are derived from another Isocratean speech, namely *Philipp* 63–64, where the phrase about the liberation of Greeks (“τοὺς δ’ Ἑλλήνας ἠλευθέρωσεν”) more accords with the Aristotelian phrase. In this case, the main hero whose deeds are presented in a recapitulated manner is Konon.

On the other hand, there are still some uncertainties concerning the other two statements in Aristotelian quasi-enthymeme: neither *Euag*. 65–69, nor *Phil*. 63–64 give a clear explanation for the second statement concerning the subject of revenge (τοῖς δ’ ἐτέροις ἐτιμώρησε). For this and some other reasons we prefer to abstain from a more decisive attribution of the discussed reference to the main body of Isocratean references, but we still include them among the results of our analysis, presented in Table 1 (under the heading “Dubious references”).

**CONCLUSIONS**

The value of the conclusions of the present research is only tentative because of the limitations of time, place and measures. Our analysis of the Isocratean references shows that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is indebted to Isocrates in several points. First of all, Isocratean works provided Stagirite himself with useful references for his analysis of the treatment of rhetorical material. They helped him to verbalize and visualize his own insightful observations. We may say that Isocratean references provided the Aristotelian theory with a certain degree of liveliness.

The majority of Isocratean examples in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* are taken from the most popular speeches concerning social, political, moral and educational questions. This could have contributed to Aristotle’s major concern with the deliberative aspect of rhetoric and to the original idea of rhetoric as a civic activity.

From our analysis, a tentative synthetic picture may be derived. All these unbound references, if arranged in a more concise order, constitute a tiny collection or catalogue (or “community” if we may use a metaphor) of about 40 constituents (“members”) governed by the three general rules or duties, *officia oratoris* – *heuresis*, *lexis*, *taxis*. The number of adherents to each of the duties is different. The sphere of *heuresis* has four small units of Isocratean quotes, the spheres of *lexis* and *taxis* have three larger units (or clusters)

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78 To illustrate his idea, Aristotle not always refers to a particular authority, but sometimes gives his own example. Cf. *Rhet*. 1410a31–36.
each, but units of the lexis sphere are the largest ones. Here we find 20 references to Isocratean works. They imply that it is the stylistic aspect of the Isocratean rhetoric that left the brightest stamp in Aristotle’s theory. On the other hand, Stagirite’s rather frequent concern with the thematic and structural variations taken from Isocratean speeches significantly broadens his original conception of rhetoric as a “counterpart” (“differing sister”) of dialectic.

Aristotle’s explicit remarks on Isocrates are usually positive. This points to a certain degree of reverence towards his former teacher. Reproaches and critical assessment are not evident but only implicit. In this respect, Isocrates holds a rather high position among other rhetoricians mentioned in Rhetoric, perhaps higher than his master Gorgias and other sophists.

Quotations of Isocrates’ works are of various degree of accuracy. Aristotle preferred to paraphrase him than to quote precisely (only eight precise quotations out of the total of 26 quotations sensu stricto). Perhaps, this could be explained in terms of objective pragmatism and the principle of economy of narration aimed at the main stylistic virtue – clarity. This fact also supports the idea that Aristotle used to quote from memory. However, it is too strong to say that he didn’t use any written text of court and assembly speeches. At least one reference to an Isocratean forensic speech and the very fact of the existence of the Aristotelian library slightly contradict this assumption. It is more cautious to state that Aristotle and his pupils, who wrote down his lectures, were not accurate enough to verify all the quotes according to their originals.

The analysis of Isocratean quotations shows the early stage of the reception of this rhetorician. Aristotle certainly values him as an authority of epideictic prose and a user (if not originator) of certain topoi, methods of argumentation, stylistic devices (especially periods and antitheses) and principles of composition relevant to this genre. However, Isocrates is never regarded as the first, the only or the best practitioner of any of the mentioned devices. We find no laudatory epithets of Isocrates in Rhetoric. Nevertheless, the mere fact of quotation and reference to stylistic devices is indicative of Aristotle’s favourable attitude, his implicit admiration and praise of the Isocratean rhetorical practice.

Our observations present neither a complete nor a perfect picture of the reception of the Isocratean rhetoric in the context of the Aristotelian tradition. The above analysis should be supplemented with further research based on the evidence of more sources and more personalities (including Isocratean disciples and enemies).

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79 He is criticised more sharply, especially concerning frigidity resulting from the usage of far-fetched metaphors (cf. Rhet. 1405b–1406b).
### APPENDIX

**Table 1.** List of Isocratean references in Aristotle’s *Art of Rhetoric* (E – exact quotation, NE – not exact quotation, EXP – explicit reference in which Isocrates is mentioned by name, IMP – implicit reference without mentioning Isocrates, DUB – dubious reference in which Isocrates is either implied or not)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Arst. Rhet. I, 9, 1368a.5-7</td>
<td>Cf. Isocr. Ev., 44–45; Cf. item Isocr. Panath. 30–32; Cf. item Isocr. Busiris 10; De bigis 29.</td>
<td>NE, IMP</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Arst. Rhet. II, 19, 1392b.10–12</td>
<td>Cf. Isocr. In Callimachum 15 (?)</td>
<td>NE, EXP</td>
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<td>III.</td>
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<td>V.</td>
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<td>Isocr. Paneg. 186</td>
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<td>Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 181</td>
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<td>Arst. Rhet. III, 10, 1410b.29–31</td>
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<td>Isocr. Philipp. 127</td>
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<td>Cf. Isocr. De pace. 27 (?)</td>
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<td>Arst. Rhet. III, 17, 1418a.33–34</td>
<td>Cf. Isocr. Hel. 22–38 (laus Thesei); Busiris 12–29 (laus Aegyptiorum); Panath. 72–84 (laus Agamemnonis)</td>
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<td>X.</td>
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<td>Cf. Isocr. Philipp. 4–7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arst. Rhet. III, 17, 1418b.27</td>
<td>Cf. Isocr. Antid. 132–139; 141-149</td>
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80 Running number of reference or referential unit.
Dubious references

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<th>Arst. I, I, Rhet. 1354b.16–22; 1355a19-20</th>
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<td>iii.</td>
<td>Arst. Rhet. III, 14, 1414b.36–1415a1</td>
<td>[?]</td>
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Table 2. Isocratean quotations in comparison with extant texts from Corpus Isocrateum

I. Two tricks in the analysis of the subject and sources of epideictic discourse

1) Conversion of advice into praise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excerpt from Aristotle’s text (ed. W. D. Ross)</th>
<th>Corresponding Isocratean passage (ed. G. Norlin)</th>
</tr>
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</table>
2) Comparison for the sake of amplification


II. Enthymeme based on argument a fortiori

Rhet. 1392a8: Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγωμεν. [...] Rhet. 1392b10–13: καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἢπτοσι καὶ ἀφφονοστέροις δυνάτον, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὡσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἐφ’ ἄξον ἔδειν εἶναι εἰ μὲν Ἐθύνους ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνηστεύεται εὑρεῖν. περὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρήμενοις ἐπάρχει.

Cf. Isocr. In Callimachum (!) 15: Θαυμάξω δ’ εἰ αὐτὸν μὲν ἰκανόν γνῶναι νομίζει ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός ἀντὶ μυρίων δραχμῶν διακοσίων ἐβελήσασθαί εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἐμὲ δ’ οὕτων οἴεται τούτ’ ἐξουσίειν, εἰπερ ἡβουλομένης ψευδής λέγειν, ὅτι πλέον ἐδει φάσκειν τούτων δεδωκέναι.

III. Topoi and enthymemes based on previous judgement and accepted opinions

Rhet. 1398b28–1399a4: ὡσπερ Σατρύς, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν κακῶν οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὕτω κεκοικαστ’ ἀπεθνησκόν γὰρ ἀν. ὡσπερ Αριστιππός πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώς τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ἄτας ἀλλὰ μὴ γ’ ἐταίρος ἔμοιν, ἐφ’ ἀποθεόν τοιοῦτον, λέγων τὸν Ζωκράτη, καὶ Ἡγγήσιος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἠρώτα τὸν Θεόν, πρὸστρεθεὶ τοιχημένος Ὀλυμπίας, εἰ αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ ἀπερὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, ᾧ αἰχθρόν ἄν ταναντία εἰπεῖν, καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἐλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἐγράφειν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἰπερ Θησείους ἔκρινεν, καὶ περὶ Αλεξάνδρου, ὅτι αἱ θείαι προεκύναιν,

Cf. Isocr. Hel. 18–38

Cf. Isocr. Hel. 41–49

IV. Topoi based on identification of analogous antecedents and consequents

Rhet. 1399b5–14: ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαίνον ἔδων ἢ ταύτων, ότι καὶ ἐξ ἂν συμβαίνει ταῦτα· ὣν ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβέστην οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς αποθανεῖν λέγουσιν ἀμφιτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαίνον ἐξ ἐκάστου λαμβάνειν ὡς τὰ αὐτὸ αἰὲ ἡ ἔλεγεν „μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν ώς περὶ Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρῆ φιλοσοφεῖν” καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδάσκαλος γνήν καὶ ἧδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προστατεύων. Αρπτάν δ’ ὀπότερον ἄν ἢ χρήσιμον.

Cf. Isocr. Antid. 173: Όν ἐνθυμουμένους χρῆ μηδενὸς πράγματος ἀνέων λόγου κατα-γιγνώσκειν, μηδ’ ὁμοίως διακειθίσθα τικά-ζοντας ὡσπερ ἐν ἴδιας διατριβαῖς, ἀλλὰ διακριθοῦσαι περὶ ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν ἀληθεύειν ἐπειδή, μεμνημένους τῶν ὁρκῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων καθ’ οὓς συνεληφθήσατε δικάςοντες. Ἐστιν δ’ οὐ περὶ μικρῶν οὐθ’ ὁ λόγος οὐθ’ ἡ κρίσις ἐν ἢ καθέστατον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐμὸν μέλλετε μόνον τὴν ψήφων διοίκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ὃς πολλοὶ τῶν νεοτέρων προσέχουσι τὸν νουν.

V. Timely use of poetic diction and rare words (in the state of enthusiasm)

Rhet. 1408b1–2: τὸ δ’ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρησθαί κοινὸν ἀπάνταν τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστιν. [...] Rhet. 1408b9–16: ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, πιθανόν γίγνεται. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ δυτικα καὶ [τα] ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ἔξω μάλιστα ἀρμότερει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνωμή γὰρ ὁργιζομένως κακὸν φάναι συναφομενής, ἡ πελώριων εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὅταν ἔχῃ ἡδί τοὺς ἀκροατάς καὶ ποιήσαι ἐνθουσιάσας ἡ ἐπαύεις καὶ φώς οὐρανόμηκες, οἶον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποίησι ἐν τῷ Παννυχίῳ ἐπὶ τέλει „φήμην δ’ καὶ μνήμην”

Isocr. Paneg. 186: Φήμην δ’ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόεαι πόσην τινα χρη νομίζειν ὠς ἕλθαι ζείειν ἡ τελευτήσαντας καταλείπειν τους ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἥγος ἀριστεύσας;

Isocr. Paneg. 96: Καίτοι πῶς ἄν ἔκεινον ἄνδρες ἀμεινοὺς ἢ μάλλον φιλέλληνες ὄντες ἐπιδιεθείσαις οἰτινες θελήσαν ἐπιδεῖν, ὥστε μὴ τοῖς λοιποῖς αἰτίοι γενέσθαι τῆς δουλείας, ἐφῆμν μὲν τὴν πολίν γενομένην, τὴν δὲ χώραν πολεοδομομενήν, ιερὰ δὲ συλλογεῖν καὶ νεως εἵμποταμένας, ἀπαντά δὲ τὸν πόλεμον περὶ τὴν πατρίδα τὴν αὐτῶν γεγομένον;
VI. Examples of disjunctive and antithetic clauses of the periodic style

| 1410a5–7: „ὅστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσας βουλομένοις“, ἀπόλαυσις κτῆσιν ἀντίκειται. | Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 41: Τὴν τοῖνυν ἄλλην διουκήσαν οὕτω φιλοξενίας κατεσκεύαστο καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς οἰκείως ὡστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσας τῶν ὑπαρχοντών ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμφιτέρους ἀρμότειν καὶ μήτε τοῖς εὐδαιμονούσιν μήτε τοῖς δυστυχεῖσιν ἦν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀχρηστῶς ἑχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐκατέρος αὐτῶν εἶναι παρ’ ἤμι, τοῖς μὲν ἡδύσις διατριβάς, τοῖς δ’ ἀσφαλεστάτην καταφυγὴν. |
| 1410a7–9: καὶ ἢ ἁρμότειν τοῖς ἀπολαύσας πολλάκις ἐν | Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 47–49: Φιλοσοφίαν τοῖνυν, ἢ πάντα ταῦτα συνεξεύρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασαν [...] ἢ πάλιν ἡμῶν κατέδεικτε, καὶ λόγους ἐτύμησαν, ὡς πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, τοῖς δ’ ἐπισταμένοις φόνοσαν, [48] συνείδαυ τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν ἑορτῶν ἑόρομεν ἐχοντες καὶ διὸ τούτω πλεονεκτησάντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπανην αὐτῶν δειγμάκαμεν, ὡσύνε δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις οὕτω ταχιζώδεις ὡσεῖ τὰς θυσίας ὡστε πολλάκις ἐν αὐταίς |
ταύτας καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἁτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀφρονας κατορθοῦν”.

καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἁτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους κατορθοῦν, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἔχοντων οὐ μετὸν τοῖς φαιλοῖς, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς εὐ φρονούσης ἔργον ὄντας, [49] καὶ τοὺς τε σοφοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ταύτη πλείστον ἀλλήλοις διαφέροντας, ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλευθέρους τεθραμμένους, ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ἀλλήλων καταψάνεις ἀγρομένους [...].


Isocr. Paneg. 89: Ὅς εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥλθεν υπερηφανίας ὡστε μικρὸν μὲν ἡγησάμενος ἔργον εἶναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα χειρώσασθαι, βουληθεὶς δὲ τοιούτων μνημείων καταλυτεῖν ὁ μή τις ἀνθρωπίνῃς φύσεως ἕστιν, οὐ πρότερον ἐπαινεῖ οὐδὲ συνηνάγκασεν ὁ πάντες θυμόλους, ὡστε τῷ στρατοπέδῳ πλεύσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ’ Ἀθω διορύξας.”

1410a9–10: „εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἄριστειων ἡμῶρησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὑστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον”.

1410a10–12: „πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεύσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ’ Ἀθω διορύξας.”

cf. Isocr. Paneg. 104–105: Οὐ γὰρ ἐρθοῦνομεν ταῖς αὐξανομέναις αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ταραχὰς ἐνεποιοῦμεν πολιτείας ἐναντίας παρακαθιστάντες […], ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν συμμάχων ὁμόνοιαν κοινὴν ὀφελείαν νομιζόντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις ἀπάσας τὰς
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<td>&quot;καὶ φύσει πολίτας θντὰς νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1410a13-14</td>
<td>&quot;οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ’ αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410a15-16</td>
<td>&quot;καὶ ἓδη μὲν τοῖς βασιλέοις αἰκέταις χρήσθαι, κοινὴ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν συμμάχων περιορὰν δουλεύοντας.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410a16-17</td>
<td>&quot;Ἡ ζώντας ἔξειν ἡ τελευτησάντας καταλείψειν.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

πόλεις διωκοῦμεν, συμμαχικῶς, ἀλλ’ οὐ διορθώμενοι, διότι ἐν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες, ἰδιὰ δ’ ἐκάστους ἐλευθέρους ἐώντες εἶναι, [105] καὶ τῷ μὲν πλῆθει βοηθοῦντες, ταῖς δὲ δυναστείαις πολεμοῦντες, δεινὸν οἴομενοι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπὸ τοὺς οἷον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνδεδειχθέντας, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα μηδὲν χεῖρος ὄντας, ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐτί δε κοινῆς τῆς πατρίδος οὔσης τοὺς μὲν τυράννους, τοὺς δὲ μετοικίους καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πολιτείας ἀποστερεῖσθαι.

cf. Isocr. Paneg. 149: Κεφάλαιον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ λείαν ἔλθοντες, οὐδὲ κόμην καταλαβόντες, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα στρατεύοντας, ἀσφαλέστερον κατέβησαν τῶν περὶ φύλας ἦσαν προσβεβούνταν. Ὅτε μοι δοκοῦσιν ἐν ἀπασί τοις τόποις σαφῶς ἐπιδείχθαι τὴν αὐτὸν μαλακίαν καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ τῆς Λασίας πολλὰς μάχας ἤτησται, καὶ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην δίκην ἔδοσαν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλονθ’, οἱ δ’ αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν, καὶ τελευτῶντες ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῖς βασιλείσσοις καταγέλαστοι γεγόναντι.


Isocr. Paneg. 186: Φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δοξήν πόσην τινα χορὸν νομίζειν ἥζωντας ἔξειν ἡ τελευτησάντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας. Ὡτιο γὰρ οἱ πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου πολεμή-
VII. Pretty enthymemes based on antithesis, metaphor, liveliness and witty expressions

Rhet. 1410b27–35: κατὰ μὲν εὐθὺς τὴν ἀντὶκεῖσθαι τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ τοιούτα εὐδοκεῖ μέν ἑνῶς τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τὸ μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικεῖσθαι λέγηται, οἷον „καὶ τὴν τοῖς ἀλλοίς κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς αὐτῶν ἴδιος πόλεμον“, ἀντίκεισθαι πόλεμος εἰρήνης τοῖς δ’ ὀνόμασιν, ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην μητ’ ἀλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖ, μητ’ ἐπιπόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν, ἐτὶ εἰ πρὸ ομμάτων ποιεῖν ὡς ἄρα δὲ [τὰ] πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. [...]  

Cf. Isocr. Philipp. 73–74: Αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ σε ὄνομα διαβαλλόμενον ύπό τὸν σοὶ μὲν ὀθωνόνταν, τὰς δὲ πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν εἰσδημάνοις εἰς ταράξας καθιστάναι, καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν πόλεμον τοῖς αὐτῶν ἴδιος εἶναι νομιζόντων, οἱ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων αμελήσαντες περὶ τῆς συνάμενος λέγουσιν ὡς σὺ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ταύτην αὐξάνεται, καὶ σὺ πολὺν ὇μοίαν ἄλλην ἀποκειμένης καὶ λόγῳ μὲν μέλλεις ἐρευνηθῆναι μὲν τὰ περὶ Φωκέας διοικήσεως, ἐργὼ δ’ ὑπὸ σαυτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι Πελοπόννησον ύπάρχουσι δὲ σοὶ Θετελαίου μὲν καὶ Ὁμβαίου καὶ πάντες οἱ τῆς Ἀμφιπολονίας μετέχοντες ἔτοιμοι συνακολουθεῖν, Ἀργείοι δὲ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Μεγαλοπολίται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοί συμπολεμεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀναστάτους Λακεδαιμονίους ἣν δὲ ταύτα πράξεις, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἄρδιος κρατῆσαι.

1411a26–30: καὶ „ὁστε βοησισατην Ἑλλάδα“, καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορά καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὡσπερ Κηφισόδωτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι έκέλευεν μὴ πολλὰς ποιήσωσιν τὰς συνδρομὰς [ἐκκλησίας]. καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. [...]  

Cf. Isocr. Philipp. 12–13: ἀλλ’ ὀμοὶς ἀπάσας ἐγὼ ταύτας τὰς δυσχερείας υπερίδων ὑπότας ἐπὶ γῆς γέγονα φιλότιμος ὅστ’ ἡμελήθην ἄμα τοῖς πρὸς σε λεγομένοις καὶ τοῖς μετ’ ἐμοὶ διατρήσανται ὑποδείξει καὶ ποιήσας φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὰς πανηγύρισες ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἀπάσας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐτὰς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὀμοὶς οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄκουσι τυγχανοῦσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις, δεὶ δὲ τοὺς βουλομένους μὴ μάττην φλιταρεῖν, ἀλλὰ προῦργοι τι ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς οἰκεὶους ἄγαθον τοις κοινοῖς ἐφηκήσεσα τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἑαν πανηγυρίσαθεν, αὐτοῖς δ’ ἄν εἰσηγοῦνται ποιήσασθαι τινὰ προστάτην τῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν
καὶ οὐδὲ ἐμψυχὸν ἄμφω μικρῶν τρόπαιον γὰρ τῶν τὸ κινδυνεύοντος παρόντι ἱκετηρίαν Λυκολέων κινδύνους τῆς γὰρ τὴν, θεὸς ἄνδρα εἶναι μέλλοντα πόλεως δηλοῖ καὶ ἀλλ᾽ αὕτην τῶν τοῖς πόλεως ἐργῶν. καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες τὸ γὰρ μελετάν αὐθείν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τῶν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνήψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφοὶ γὰρ δηλοῖ τι.

δυναμένων καὶ δόξαν μεγάλην ἔχοντον, εἴπερ μέλλουσι τινες προσέξειν αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν.

Isocr. Paneg. 151: Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις δόξαις ὅντες αὐτῶν ὁμάλως μὲν οὐδὲ κοινῷς οὐδὲ πολιτικῶς οὐδέποτε ἐβίωσαν, ἀπαντὰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον διάγουσιν εἰς μὲν τοὺς ὑβριζόντες, τοῖς δὲ δουλεύοντες, ὡς ἂν ἀνθρώπου μᾶλιστα τὰς φύσεις διαφθαρεῖν, καὶ τὰ μὲν σῶματα διὰ τῶν πλοῦστων τρυφῶντες, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς διὰ τὰς μοναρχίας ταπεινὰς καὶ περιθεῖς ἔχοντες, ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τὸς βασιλείας καὶ προκαλινδυνοῦμεν καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες, θητὸν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνοῦντες καὶ δαίμονα προσαγορεύοντες, τῶν δὲ θεῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀλιγοφρονίτες.

Isocr. Paneg. 172: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὅσοι μικροψυχότεροι τιγχάνουσιν ὅντες οἱ προεστῶτες ἡμῶν, τοσοῦτοι τοὺς ἄλλους ἐργομενεστέρως δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς αὐτοῖς τῆς παρούσες ἐχθρᾶς. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ μάτιν ποιομεθά τὰς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης συνθήκας ὃ γὰρ διαλυομέθα τοὺς πολέμους, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναβαλλόμεθα καὶ περιμένουμεν τοὺς καιροὺς ἐν ὕσσε καθιστῶ. διαλυομέθα δὲ τρόπαιον, τοὺς τὰς καταθέσαι μὲν ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένων καὶ ταῖς καταθέσας, τὰς τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳς ἄρχων εὐσεβῶς διδάσκων· γὰρ εὐθῆς τὴν διάλυσιν.

Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 180: Καὶ ταῦτα ἡμᾶς ἤναγκασφθέν τως στῆλαι λείαντες ἀναγράφαντας τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν καταθέσαι, πολὺς κάλλιον τρόπαιον τὸν εἰς ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν ἔργων καὶ μιᾶς τύχης ἐστίν, αὐτὰ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἀπαντὸς τοῦ πολέμου καὶ καθ᾽ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐστήκασιν.

cf. Isocr. Philipp. 10–11: Ταῦτα δὲ διηνοηθεῖς καὶ νομίσας οὐδέποτ᾽ ἄν εὐρεθητὶς καλλῖος ταύτης ὑπόθεσειν οὐδὲ κοινοτέρας οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἄπασθ᾽ ἡμῖν συμφέρουσαν, ἐπήρθην πάλιν γράφαι περὶ αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἄγνωσιν οὐδὲν τῶν περὶ ἐμαυτὸν, αὐτ᾽ εἰδὼς μὲν τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐ τῆς ἡλίκιας τῆς ἐμῆς δεόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθεύσας τὴν ἀκμὴν ἔχοντος καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολὺ τῶν

1411b4–13: καὶ τὸ φαναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὁμμάτων <καὶ> μεταφορά. καὶ Ἀυκολέων ὑπέρ Ἡαριῶν „οὐδὲ τὴν ἰκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθῆντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν": μεταφορά γὰρ εν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὁμμάτων κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἰκετεύει η εἰκόνων, τὸ „ἐμψυχον δὴ ἀψυχον", τὸ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἐργῶν. καὶ „πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες": τὸ γὰρ μελετάν αὐθείν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι „τῶν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνήψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ" ἀμφοὶ γὰρ δηλοῖ τι.

1411b13–15: „οὐ γὰρ διαλυομέθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ᾽ ἀναβαλλόμεθα": ἀμφοὶ γὰρ ἐστίν μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολή καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη.

1411b16–21: καὶ τὸς συνθήκας φανὰ τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἔν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὐτὰ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἀμφοὶ γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα, καὶ ὅτι ἀλλὰ πόλεις τὸ ψύχος τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδάσκων· γὰρ εὐθύνα βλάβη τὶς δυκαία ἐστίν.

1411b24–28: λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὁμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει, οἰον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φανὰ εἶναι τετράγονον μεταφορά, (ἀμφοὶ γὰρ τέλεια), ἀλλ᾽ οὔ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· ἀλλὰ τὸ „ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμὴν" ἐνέργεια,

Isocr. Philipp. 127: Διὸ καὶ σοι νομίζω συμφέρειν οὕτως ἀνάνδρως διακειμένων τῶν ἄλλων προστίθηναι τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. Προσῆκε δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις τοῖς ἁρεικλέους περικόσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν πολιτείᾳ καὶ νόμως ἐνδεδεμένοις ἐκεῖνην τὴν πολίν στέρειες ἐν ἢ τυγχάνουσι κατοικούντες, σὲ δ’ ὅσπερ ὄφετον γεγενημένον ἀπασάν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν, ἀσπερ ὅ γεγενήσασθαι ὑμᾶς, καὶ κινδυνεύεις ύπερ αὐτῆς ὁμοίως, ἀσπερ ύπερ ὁμᾶστα σπουδάζεις.

1412b4–11: οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεία, οίον τὸ φάναι Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχήν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· ὅσσον λέγει ἀρχὴν ἀρχήν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ἀμφότερος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὤστε τὶς ἐρείν, τούτ’ εἰρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσῃ ὅτι ἀληθὲς τὸ τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχήν φάναι ἀρχήν εἶναι οὐθὲν σοφόν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλ’autος, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὁ εἶπεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλως.

Cf. Isocr. De pace 101: Χρῆ δὲ τὰς αἰτίας ἐπιφέρειν οὐ τοῖς κακοῖς τοῖς ἐπιγνομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἐξ ὃν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνενεργήν ταύτην κατηχήσῃς. Ὡστε πολὺ ἁ δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τὸς τὴν ἀρχήν ἀρχήν αὐτοῖς γεγενήσασθαι τῶν συμφώνων, ὅτε τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς θαλάττης παρελάμβανον· ἀκῦκα γὰρ δύναμιν οὐδὲν ὁμοίως τῇ πρότερον ὑπαρχοῦσῃ.

VIII. Methods of composing epideictic poems: initial digression and psogos

1414b19–35: Τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον ἔστιν ἀρχή λόγου, ὅπερ ἐν ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰσί, καὶ οἶον ὀδοποίησις τῷ ἑπίσημτι, τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ομοιὸν τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμιον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταῖ, ὅ τι ἔχοσιν αὐλήσασθαι, τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνήψαν τῷ ἑνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτως γράφειν, ὅτι [γὰρ] ἀν βουλήτη συνάψατα ἑνδοῦν εἰπόντα ἑνδοῦν καὶ συνάψα, ὅπερ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένῃ. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ, ἁρμόττει, καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὀμοειδῆ εἶναι. λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου (οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ "ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀξίων θαυμάζεσθαι, ὧν ἄξια ἔκχεμες Ἑλλήνες"· ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας Ἰσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει ότι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς δωρεᾶς ἑτίμησαν, τοῖς δ᾽ εὐ φρονοῦσιν οὐθὲν ἀθλον ἑτίμησαν),

1414b35–1415a1: καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς (οἶον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Αριστείδη ἐπαίνει, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους οἱ μήτε εὐδοκιμοῦσιν μήτε φαύλου, ἀλλ᾽ ὡσοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἀδηλοῦ, ὡσπερ Αλέξανδρος ὁ Πιράμονος ὁ γὰρ συμβουλεύει) [?]

Cf. Isocr. Helen 1–15 (too long to be quoted here)

Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 1–2: Πολλάκις έθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας εὐτυχίας ὑπὸ μεγάλων δωρεῶν ἡξίωσαν, τοῖς δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἵδια πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς οὕτως παρασκευάσασιν ὡστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι, τούτους δ᾽ οὐδεμίαν τιμῆν ἀπένειμαν, ὅν εἰκός ἦν αὐτοὺς μάλλον ποιήσασθαι πρόνοιαν.

38
## IX. Employment of accusation in deliberative discourse and using witnesses in praise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1418a21–32: τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικαίωσθαι, εἰκότως [...] καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβὰς, οἷν πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἣκοτα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἔξιστῃ, δεὶ οὖν ἀποροῦντα τούτῳ ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Αθήνησι ὑπότροφοι ποιοῦνται καὶ Ἰσοκράτης καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ,</th>
<th>Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 110–114 (too long to be quoted here)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1418a33–36: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν εἰςφάγει, καὶ δ’ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταυτὸ ἐστὶν [...]</td>
<td>Cf. Isocr. Hel. 22–38 (laus Thesei); Busiris 12-29 (laus Aegyptiorum); Panath. 72-84 (laus Agamemonis)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## X. Indirect self-characterization (self-defence or self-praise) through the words of another person

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1418b23–39: περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἤθος, ἐπειδὴ ἔννοι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπιφθοῦν ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λοιδοφιάν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἔτερον χρή λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Αντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος φέει [...]</th>
<th>Cf. Isocr. Philipp. 4–7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>δεὶ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμηματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον „χρή δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἐχοντας ἐνυτυχοῦνται· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν μεγίστα πλεονεκτῶν;“ ἐνθυμηματικός δὲ „εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ἢταν ὁφελισμότατον ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πλεονεκτικῶταταί καταλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, ἐνυτυχοῦντας δεὶ καταλλάττεσθαι.”</td>
<td>Cf. Isocr., Archilammas, 50: Χρή δὲ τοὺς μὲν εὗ πράττοντας τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖν· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλεῖστον ἀν τις χρόνον τὰ παρόντα διαφυλάξειν· τοὺς δὲ δυστυχοῦντας τῷ πολέμῳ προσεχέειν τὸν νοῦν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ τῆς καίνοργιας ἔκτοτε ἀν μεταβολῆς τύχοιν</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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39
NUORODOS Į ISOKRATĄ ARISTOTELIO RETORIKOS MENE

Tomas Veteikis

S a n t r a u k a


Aristotelio eksplicitinės pastabos apie Isokrą paprastai esti teigiamos, o prieikaistai arba neesmini, arba nepersonalizuoti. Tai rodo ir aukštą bendravimo kultūrą, ir tam tikrą pagarbą buvusiam mo-kytojui. Šiuo požiūriu Isokratos užima pakankamai reiškinęs vietą tarp kitų Aristotelio veikale minimių retorikos mokytojų.

Tai, kad Isokrato veikalų citatos yra skirtingo tikslumo (iš 26 citatų – tiek jų yra tarp visų minėtų 40 nuorodų – su mums išlikusiais Isokrato tekstais tiksliai sutampa tik 8), paremia tyrėjų skelbtą hipotezę, kad Aristotelis paprastai citavo iš atminties. Tačiau daug stiprų yra tvirtinti, kad jis nesinaudojo jokių rašytinių teismo ar tautos susirinkimo kalbos tekstų. Bent viena, nors netikslis, nuoroda į Isokrato teisminę kalbą ir pats faktas apie Aristotelio bibliotekos egzistavimą tam subjutaiškų. Todėl atsargiau yra teigti, kad Aristotelis ir jis mokiniai, kurie užrašė ją paskaitas, nebuvo pedantiškai kruopščiai arba neturėjo motyvo sutikrinti visas citatas su jų originalais. Kita vertus, Aristotelio preferenciją parafræžėms arba supaprastinant, sutrumpintam, o ne tiksliam citavimui galima aiškinti jo pasakoju pragmatiškuma ir taupumą, koncentracija į teorinius principus (dalykų esmę), orientacija į pagrindinę stilistinę dorybę – aiškumą.

Autorius adresas:
Klasikinės filologijos katedra
Vilniaus universitetas
Universiteto g. 5
LT-2734 Vilnius
El. paštas: tveteikis@gmail.com

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