Intergenerational Value Differences in Contemporary Lithuanian Society

Abstract. The article uses European Value Survey data to analyze intergenerational differences in Lithuanian society in the domains of religion, morality, family, work and sociopolitical attitudes and the development of these differences during the twenty years of independence. Results of the analysis show a trend of an intercohort value change in 1990–2008 toward increasing individual secularization, moderation of conservative attitudes in the domains of family and individual sexual morality as well as leniency toward breaches of public morality. The development of work-related attitudes does not show any intercohort differences in value orientations. These trajectories of development can be explained by a variety of interrelated macro-level factors: Lithuanian cultural and historical heritage, structural changes that took place in the transition of society, characteristics of the existing institutional context, modernization of society, media- and globalization-induced spread of Western culture.

Keywords: value change, cohort replacement, post-communist Lithuanian society, European Value Survey (EVS).

Value change can occur in two ways: on the one hand, it can be related to cohort replacement when younger generations develop different values than their parents and grandparents; on the other hand, intracohort changes can be observed when people belonging to the same cohort develop new value orientations during the course of their lives or due to radical changes taking place in the society.¹ This article uses the European Value Survey (hereafter EVS) data from three waves (1990, 1999 and 2008)² to identify intercohort differences in value orientations in Lithuanian society, related to religion, morality, family, work and sociopolitical attitudes, as well as to examine how these differences (or the absence of them) and their

¹ In the article, cohorts are defined by birth year, whereas the concept of generation refers to the specific historical and cultural conditions shared by people born in a certain period that has affected their socialization (see Kraniauskiene 2002).
development during the last twenty years can be understood with reference to modernization processes or country-specific context factors. The analysis also discusses the impact of the age variable and the historical period’s influence on the development of value orientations. The article aims to summarize the results of the one-and-a-half-year long project, 

**Development of Value Orientations in Lithuania During the Twenty Years of Independence**, which were published in a monograph with the same title, written by Rūta Žiliukaitė, Arūnas Poviliūnas and Aida Savicka (2016). It must be noted that some parts of the analysis presented here could be found in the book (Žiliukaitė et al. 2016), but the present article aims at a higher level of generalization and, at the same time, supplements the analysis with new aspects or dimensions of study.

**Generations and Value Change**

One of the dominant theories of value change is the *theory of modernization*, which maintains that interconnected economic, social, and political changes in industrial (and postindustrial) societies bring about changes in people’s way of life and their value orientations (Arts, Halman 2004; 2013; Inglehart 1990; 1997; Inglehart, Baker 2000; Inglehart, Welzel 2005). In modern societies, with rising levels of education, urbanization and good material living conditions ensured for a large part of the population, individuals acquire greater autonomy in choosing their way of life. The decline of an individual dependency on ascriptive bonds and traditional authorities (family, local community, church), which were typical for traditional societies, enables a much stronger individual independence than ever before, which is also reflected in people’s value orientations. Traditional family values (with an emphasis on marriage, having children, parental authority over their children, patriarchal male and female roles) are replaced by more liberal and egalitarian norms of family organization; in the area of work, the self-expression needs gain greater importance, more value is placed on leisure time; religious beliefs have less influence on people’s everyday life, personal religiosity becomes much less dependent on traditional religious institutions; people start taking a more active part in political life and engage in different forms of political and civic involvement. However, the processes of modernization that influence people’s living conditions do not bring about an immediate value shift in society. The modernization theory emphasizes that this value change is being brought about by generational replacement (Inglehart 1990; 1997).

The linking of value change in society with a generational replacement is based on the assumption that a person’s values are formed in his or her pre-adult years and change little later in life (Inglehart 1990; 19). Certain values that are characteristic to a particular generation can be explained by social, economic or political conditions prevailing in the country during the period when this generation reached adulthood. Therefore, to understand and explain intercohort value differences in a particular society, we have to find the turning points in the development of that society that had substantial influence on the change of living conditions and what might have caused the intergenerational value differences.
On the other hand, value change can take place within a generation due to the influence of life cycles and the historical period. It has been observed that when people get older, their value orientations change due to events marking their life cycle, such as the start of one's independent life, career trajectory, raising children, retirement etc., which change a person's attitudes about life and life's priorities (Ester et al. 2006; Schwartz 2012). Value changes within generations also occur because of social, economic or political factors affecting that period of time. When a society's social structure remains substantially unchanged and the social life proceeds as usual, slowly occurring social changes bring about only small intracohort value changes, which take decades to become evident. However, when a society experiences radical political, economic and social transformations, value changes can occur in all cohorts of the society and become manifest in a relatively short time.

Considering the Lithuanian political history in the 20th century and its socioeconomic development, we can expect to see significant value differences both between and within generations. Lithuanian history can be divided into several periods, characterized by rather different living conditions. The first Republic (1918–1940) and the Russian and successive German occupations (1941–1944) are followed by four successive decades of Communist rule, related to a different leader of the Communist party, each with a different Zeitgeist: the Stalinist (1945–1953), Thaw (1954–1964), Stagnation (1965–1984) and Perestroika (1985–1989) periods. Finally, of course, we have the second Republic of Lithuania (from 1990) (Žilinskienė et al. 2016). Regarding the intergenerational differences in value orientations, the important question is in what civic, political and social rights each of these generations were able to enjoy. The years of Communist rule were marked by limited civic and political rights, although people's social rights were protected much better than in the first and second Republics of Lithuania. The Communist period was also characterized by strenuous attempts to propagate the collectivist ideology, which, in its turn, had an influence on interpersonal relationships and values. These features of the Communist regime can be linked to the greatly increased degree of privacy (privatism) and the decline of the individual responsibility for one's own and one's community's life (Laumenskaitė 2015). These aspects lead to the assumption that value differences must be most notable between those generations that had their socialization period in interwar Lithuania, the generations of the Soviet time and the generation whose values were formed in independent Lithuania.

An important factor adding to intergenerational differences was the fast modernization of the country in the second part of the 20th century. Since 1950, the urban population in Lithuania was increasing by 10 percent a year, although the larger part of the population had consisted of rural inhabitants until 1970 (Vaitekūnas 2006; Žiliukaitė 2007; 121–123). Only in the last decade of the Soviet period the proportion of people with a higher than secondary education exceeded 50 percent of the population. Considering these aspects of development, it can be assumed that there should be a difference between the generations born before
1970 and after, at least insofar as people’s way of life is influenced by their level of education and place of living, and, at the macro level, by changes in society’s composition.

In order to understand the intracohort differences that developed during the twenty years, an assumption can be made that the effect of age would not be very strong. Of course, the cross-sectional analysis of data from different EVS waves shows that age is one of the most important individual-level factors explaining differences in value orientations in all domains of life, such as family, work, leisure time, religion and politics (Žiliukaitė et al. 2016; Žiliukaitė et al. 2006). However, twenty years is too short period to be able to clearly see the trajectory of an individual’s value development during the life-cycle; without denying that, some tendencies of age-related value development could be identified.

A much more important factor of the development of intracohort differences during the twenty years must be the historical period. Political, economic and social transformations that took place at the end of the 20th century, the transition from a planned to market economy and from communist to democratic rule have led to rather large changes in value orientations in nearly the entire society: the behavior models of the Soviet period and the values behind them became obsolete as the new economic and political system required new models of behavior. Other factors of change in value orientations were intensifying and more effective processes of globalization and the spread of contemporary media, which paved the way for the influence of Western popular culture on people’s worldviews.

Further in the article, we will show what value differences can be observed between generations in various spheres of social life and how they can be explained by the indicated coordinates of societal development. At the same time, we take a look at how they are shaped by age and the historical period.

Growing Religiosity or Individual Secularization?

Growing Religiosity or Individual Secularization?

Religious changes observed in the last decade in the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe presented researchers with a puzzle: do they mean that these modern societies, after long decades of restrictions on religious freedom, are undergoing processes of secularization, or is the religious revival, observable (in different degrees) in these societies, rather superficial (Müller 2011)? It is noted that people that have returned to churches are not striving for the unity of faith and life. They do not consistently follow the teachings of traditional churches, but believe in what they want to believe, i.e., religiosity shows clear signs of religious individualization (see Davis 2008). Therefore, the hypothesis is that the observed religious revival does not contradict modernity and globalization-induced secularization at the individual level. One of the arguments used in support of this thesis is the constant intergenerational decline of religiosity (Voas 2008). Thus, what does the Lithuanian data tell us about intergenerational differences in religiosity and its development trajectory?

In the present study, we applied a religiosity factor constructed from six variables: importance of religion, church attendance, orthodoxy
A strong period effect: the religious revival that took place in 1990–1999 is observed in all cohorts. However, precisely because of the strong period effect, the influence of age is harder to determine: only future survey data will be able to show if religiosity will increase in all generations when they will get older. However, we can only say that the performed analysis of the determinants of religiosity using 2008 EVS data unambiguously shows the importance of age in explaining religiosity differences in the population (Žiliukaitė 2016a: 154). In the second decade, religiosity shows no increase or decline (in 1999 and 2008 data, averages for the same generation differ within the limits of the statistical error).

Although all generations that grew up in the Soviet period experienced religious revival, the data from all three EVS waves do not refute the development of religiosity as proposed by the modernization theory, since the averages for the older cohorts are higher than for the younger cohorts. However, the data does not show an ideal linear correlation: although averages form a sloped line, a considerable part of the differences between cohorts have no statistical significance, i.e., in some instances, intercohort differences are larger than in other instances. The highest gap exists between respondents from the first

3 Coding of the variables: 1) Church attendance scale score: 0 = “never” to 5 = “once a week or more often”; 2) Orthodoxy index scale: 0 to 4 (the sum of adherence to the traditional religious beliefs: life after death, heaven, hell, sin); 3) Importance of religion: 1 = “not important at all” to 4 = “very important”; 4) Importance of God: 1 = “not important at all” to 10 = “very important”; 5) Comfort and strength from religion scale: 1 or 0; 6) Getting moments of prayer or meditation scale: 1 or 0. Cronbach’s alpha for the items in the factor was 0.784. The factor explains 65 percent of variance. Factor loadings of the variables: church attendance = 0.812; orthodoxy = 0.731; importance of religion = 0.784; religion as a source of comfort and strength = 0.823; prayer = 0.781.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohorts (born)</th>
<th>1990 Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>1999 Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>2008 Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935–1944</td>
<td>–0.174</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–1954</td>
<td>–0.334</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955–1964</td>
<td>–0.681</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>–0.048</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1974</td>
<td>–0.675</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>–0.183</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>–0.076</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1984</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–0.139</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>–0.164</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After-1984</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–0.363</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Eta Squared   | 0.025     |

two cohorts (born before 1935 and from 1935 to 1944) and the subsequent cohorts that show no statistically significant difference among themselves (the third, 1945–1954; fourth, 1955–1964; fifth, 1965–1974), as well as the sixth cohort (1975–1984), which is only slightly different from the latter ones. The youngest cohort of those who grew up in independent Lithuania (i.e., were born after 1984) is similar only to its preceding cohort. However, to compare to all other cohorts, its average index of religiosity is statistically significantly lower, albeit in a different extent: the difference between the youngest and the two oldest cohorts is twice as large as between the youngest and the cohorts born after 1945.

In discussing intergeneration differences in religiosity, the policy of atheism implemented by the communist regime can be a better explanation than the process of modernization (Inglehart, Baker 2000; Žiliukaitė 2007b; Laumenskaitė 2015). Intergenerational differences in the primary religious socialization clearly show the effect of this policy. Increasingly, a larger proportion of each new Soviet generation has not had a consistent religious upbringing: according to 2008 EVT data, 6 out of 10 (56 percent) people that grew up in interwar Lithuania (i.e., those who were born before 1935), at the age of 12 attended church at least once a week – the proportion is almost twice smaller in the first Soviet generation (34 percent), three times smaller in the subsequent generation (22 percent) and six times smaller in the generation of the late Soviet period (9 percent). The possibilities of practicing religion that opened up with the political independence of Lithuania and the introduction of democracy have not changed the direction of the development: according to 2008 EVS data, those belonging to the youngest generation (born after 1984), who started school in a new political system that permitted the reintroduction of religion classes in schools, are similar in church attendance numbers to generations of the late Soviet period (only 11 percent of them attended church at the age of 12). This is understandable, since religious behavior and the relationship with the church of their parents were shaped in the Soviet period.

As noted by Laumenskaitė (2015), a strong limiting factor for religious socialization of Soviet and post-Soviet generations was the privatization of religion, which took place under the Communist regime when people were not free to practice religion in public, and the erosion of traditions of church communities. Religious privatization gave the way to the growth and entrenchment of religious individualization. Laumenskaitė also notes that although for most young people religion is not an important part of their life, it does not unambiguously mean that generation change will lead to an increased secularization at the individual level, further enhanced and sustained by Western modernization, and the spread of popular Western culture and globalization. It is worth pointing to certain qualitative changes in the Church, e.g., the proliferation of communities of actively religious young people, particularly in the cities. However, the dominating features of religious identity, characterized by the practice of religion as a cultural tradition, revealed by the available EVS data from the last two decades, supports
the turn of the direction of religious development toward individual secularization (where individualized religiosity is regarded as one of its manifestations).

Family and Personal-Sexual Morality: Increasingly Moderate Conservatism

Another area of life that has undergone substantial changes in Lithuanian society is the field of family-related values (Savicka 2016a; 25–27). On the basis of numerous studies of Lithuanian researchers on family, Aida Savicka noted that the changes of matrimonial and procreative behavior, which took place in the Western countries in 1960s and were driven by modernization and the individualization of values, began in Lithuania two decades later, after the fall of the Communist regime. In the Western world, these changes are associated with value change, when individual choice and equal opportunities are emphasized more than ever before and family interests cease to be superior to individual interests (ibid.). The changes of matrimonial and procreative behavior in Lithuanian society, as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are explained not only by the processes of modernization of the Western type, but also by the specific context of the country (Maslauskaite 2010; Savicka 2016a; 28). There is no doubt (anymore) that these changes are accompanied by both inter- and intragenerational value change (Kanopiené et al. 2014).

In discussing differences between cohorts according with attitudes toward marriage, parent-child commitment and gender roles, Savicka (2016a; 59–61) says that the Lithuanian data show an increasingly clear liberalization of family value orientations. In the present article, we devised an index of traditional family values\(^5\) to illustrate intergenerational differences. The index has values between 0 and 8, where a higher score means a stronger (more encompassing) orientation to traditional family values. An analysis of the index scores (see Table No. 2) shows that stronger traditional family value orientations are characteristic to the same two cohorts of Lithuanians that also displayed higher religiosity scores, i.e., generations born in interwar Lithuania and during the Second World War, which received stronger religious socialization during childhood and grew during the time when the processes of industrialization and urbanization in the country were just about to get momentum. With every subsequent cohort, these values become less common. However, it is important to note that during the two decades, all cohorts showed a certain

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\(^{4}\) Such as delayed marriage, new forms of partnership, smaller families, the rise in childbearing outside marriage, an increase in divorce rates etc.

\(^{5}\) The index of traditional family values was calculated by adding eight indicators: a disagreement with the statement that marriage is an outdated institution and an agreement with the following statements: a child needs a home with a father and a mother; a woman has to have children to be fulfilled; the parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them; the index also includes an agreement with three statements representing patriarchal attitudes toward a woman’s role. The variables were dichotomized.
Table No. 2. **Average scores for the traditional family value orientations index, by cohort and year (EVS 1990, 1999, 2008, N = 3518)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohorts (born in)</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>6.616</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>5.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935–1944</td>
<td>6.500</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>5.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–1954</td>
<td>6.485</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>5.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955–1964</td>
<td>6.312</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>5.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1974</td>
<td>5.893</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>5.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1984</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After-1984</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eta Squared</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liberalization of values, or, to be more precise, increased moderation of conservative orientation, which means that there were significant intracohort changes as well.

An explanation of these changes and their extent must take into account different factors. On the one hand, the specific cultural context of the Lithuanian society, created by a strong tradition of familism and conservative attitudes toward gender roles, limits the pace and extent of the shift toward greater liberalism and egalitarianism in the sphere of family life. On the other hand, there are some aspects of the country’s socioeconomic development, related to changes of structural conditions in the society, which are induced by the transition to a market economy, such as the appearance of unemployment, rise in poverty, low average family income and the increased influence of Western culture. These aspects facilitated change of behaviors and attitudes regarding family life and fostered a liberalization of attitudes in all cohorts, particularly in the youngest one. It has been noted that generational change leads the Lithuanian society from familist toward more individualist attitudes with regard to family life (Kanopienė et al. 2014; Savicka 2016a).

The influence of Western (popular) culture is an important factor that explains not only the detradiationalization of family values, but also the change of the population’s attitudes regarding personal-sexual morality that took place in Lithuania during the twenty years after independence. According to the modernization theory, socioeconomic development, which facilitates individual autonomy as well as secularization, has led to the spread of moral relativism in modern societies (Harding et al. 1986; 25; Ester et al. 1993; 9–10, 64; Inglehart 1997; 88). For centuries, the norms of morality stemming from the Christian doctrine and based on absolute principles provided a strict control over family lives and sexual behaviors. Now they have lost their appeal, thus opening space for the spread and establishment of moral individualism and liberalism.

Lithuanian society could not be classified as liberal in regard to the individual attitudes toward personal-sexual morality. EVS data show that both in 1990 and 2008, the majority of Lithuanians tended to not justify, rather than
justify such morality-related behaviors as abortion, divorce, adultery, sex outside marriage, prostitution and homosexuality (Žiliukaitė 2016b; 175). Nevertheless, the analysis of these attitudes in 1990–2008, based on the individual personal-sexual morality index, shows an increase of moderation by half a point over each decade (ibid.; 177). The changes of the personal-sexual morality index scores by cohort (see Table No. 3) show several things.

The changes of value orientations regarding personal-sexual morality in Lithuania are explained by generational change. In 1990, the most conservative generations were those born in interwar Lithuania and during the World War II (up to 1944), i.e., those that (as mentioned before in the article) were also characterized by stronger religiosity than other generations then and twenty years later. They remained much more conservative than younger generations in 2008 as well. In 1990, there were no differences among different Soviet cohorts regarding personal-sexual morality. However, after twenty years and a new generation that had most of their formative years in independent Lithuania, differences among all cohorts became more pronounced and formed a linear curve. It must be nevertheless noted that even taking into account this development, according to 2008 data, the youngest Lithuanian generation was not liberal: it is rather conservative on issues of personal-sexual morality, only that its attitudes are more moderate.

A common assumption is that when people grow older, they become more conservative and socially conformist. However, the data on intracohort differences in Lithuania during the two decades does not indicate this trend of age-related strengthening of conservative attitudes. All cohorts (both oldest and youngest)

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Table No. 3. **Average scores for the personal-sexual morality index, by cohort and year (EVS 1990, 1999, 2008, N = 3518)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>1.901</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>1.962</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>2.379</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935–1944</td>
<td>2.331</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>2.444</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>2.588</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–1954</td>
<td>2.859</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>2.963</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>3.284</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955–1964</td>
<td>2.922</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>3.259</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>3.471</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1974</td>
<td>3.006</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>3.736</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>3.643</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1984</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.584</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>3.933</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After-1984</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.776</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eta Squared</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 The personal-sexual morality index was calculated as an average score of how much justifiable five types of behavior (abortion, divorce, homosexuality, adultery and prostitution) are in the scale of ten, where 1 means it can “never” be justified and 10 means it can “always” be justified. A higher score means that the type of behavior is regarded as more often justified. The analysis includes only those respondents that expressed opinions on at least three of the items.
became more moderately conservative during the analyzed period. The fact that the data in Table No. 3 does not show this age-related effect does not deny the relationship between age and moral attitudes: older people are much stricter than younger people in their views on behaviors that are related to personal sexual morality (Žiliukaitė 2016b; 185). On the other hand, the available data shows the importance of the period: economic and political transformations, processes of modernization and globalization have affected the attitudes toward personal-sexual morality in all Lithuanian generations.

**Work-related Values: No Influence of Generation**

According to the modernization theory, socioeconomic development in a society and rising educational levels lead to an increasing importance attached to work values related to self-expression needs (Inglehart 1990; 1997). If previously the most important motivation for work was instrumental (good pay, good working conditions etc.), in contemporary societies an increasingly valued aspect of work becomes what sociologists call ‘intrinsic work orientation’: work has to be interesting, creative, providing a sense of achievement, enabling independent decisions and achieving recognition from other people (Savicka 2016b; 70).

In Lithuania, the transition from a planned to a market economy at the end of the 20th century meant huge changes in people’s lives and work. Economic restructuring brought about a decrease in the level of prosperity and the appearance of unemployment. In the second decade of independence, the economy started growing but remained vulnerable to crises accompanying the global market; therefore, financial instability and material prosperity became a pressing and recurring problem for a large part of the population. This could lead to an assumption that the importance of some of the instrumental values had to be increasing during the whole first decade of independent Lithuania. As Savicka (ibid.) notes in her discussion of the theoretical framework of the analysis of work values, modernization theory does not propose that socioeconomic development undermines the importance of instrumental values; it only emphasizes the increased importance of ‘self-expression’ values. In its turn, the latter change in value orientations is related not only to the increase of the material welfare of people, but also to higher educational levels. Thus, keeping in mind the changes in the composition of the society that became increasingly visible in Lithuania since the second half of the 20th century, intrinsic work orientation could have grown in importance in the Soviet period due to the advanced process of communist economic and social modernization.

In order to test these assumptions, we will focus right away on an intergenerational comparison. Unlike the monograph presenting the results of the project, here we include into our analysis only those respondents that were employed at the moment of the survey. The analysis of EVS data by Savicka (2016b; 74) showed that both in 1990 and 2008 the most important aspect of work for Lithuanians was good pay, which even grew in importance during that period. However, the largest change occurred in the evaluation of another instrumental aspect of work – an increased importance of good job security. As data in Table No. 4 shows, these
trends in the evaluation of instrumental aspects of work are also noticeable when comparing cohorts: in all cohorts, except of the oldest, which at the moment of the second wave of EVS was already retired, pay and job security grew in importance. The data also show that for twenty years, these aspects of work became most important to that part of the population, who, at the time of institutionalization of the new economic and political system, had just started or were in the middle of their professional careers, not at the end of it. Savicka, in her analysis, also notes that during that period, intrinsic work motivation became more important (ibid.; 75). This tendency is reflected in Table No. 4, in the comparison of the scores of the index of intrinsic work aspects by survey years. However, differences do not show a systematic pattern; thus, there is no evidence to confirm any intergenerational differences. By summarizing the section, we can note that a more important factor in the development of work-related values is not intergenerational change, but age and, notably, the specific conditions of the job market and the economy characterizing a particular period (also see Savicka 2016b; 83–85).

Table No. 4. Average scores of job-related aspects, by cohort and year (EVS 1990, 1999, 2008, N = 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohorts (born in)</th>
<th>Good pay (0–1)</th>
<th>Job security (0–1)</th>
<th>Intrinsic work aspects (0–5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1935</td>
<td>0.767 0.042</td>
<td>– – – –</td>
<td>0.524 0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935–1944</td>
<td>0.855 0.029</td>
<td>0.863 0.049</td>
<td>– – – –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–1954</td>
<td>0.811 0.031</td>
<td>0.948 0.021</td>
<td>0.970 0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955–1964</td>
<td>0.812 0.028</td>
<td>0.973 0.012</td>
<td>0.968 0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1974</td>
<td>0.757 0.040</td>
<td>0.971 0.014</td>
<td>0.981 0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1984</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>0.950 0.035</td>
<td>0.975 0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after-1984</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>1.000 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eta Squared</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The index of intrinsic work aspects was devised by adding how many aspects of work the respondent mentioned from the following five: an opportunity to use initiative, a job in which one feels that one can achieve something, a responsible job, a job that is interesting, a respected job. The index has scores between 0 and 5.
A Growing Political Alienation or the Effect of a Life Cycle?

In our book on value change (Žiliukaitė et al. 2016), we have not analyzed how social and political attitudes in Lithuania changed during the twenty years of independence, although EVS provides data for such analysis. A comprehensive analysis of the development of these attitudes in 1990–2005, including intergenerational differences in civic and political participation and value orientations, was published earlier (see Žiliukaitė et al. 2006; Ramonaitė 2007). In this respect, there were no significant changes in the society during the three years from 2005 to 2008. Then, the analysis of intergenerational differences focused mostly on the youngest ‘post-Soviet’ generation, although the study also emphasized the discrepancy between the ‘pre-Soviet’ (born in interwar Lithuania and during the Second World War) and Soviet generations, at least insofar as social-political attitudes were connected with religiosity (Žiliukaitė 2007a; also see Laumenskaitė 2015). The studies concluded that the youngest generation of Lithuanians (those that at the beginning of independence were teenagers or recently born), which had their formative years in the independent, democratic Lithuania, differ from the older generations in having very little interest in politics, low participation in elections, much weaker solidarity with socially excluded groups and weaker philanthropic attitudes (Žiliukaitė 2008). It is important to keep in mind that the discussed aspects could be not as much a feature of the generation as an age- and life-cycle-related behavior, particularly so since numerous studies clearly show such influence of the life-cycle on youth political participation (see, e.g., Glenn, Grimes 1968; Jennings, Niemi 1975; Putnam 2000; 248).

Nevertheless, a worrying tendency remains the lower degree of political support observed among the young generations as compared to their older counterparts – they exhibit a low level of patriotism (Žiliukaitė et al. 2006; Ramonaitė 2007). The available data on intergenerational differences in Lithuania does not provide evidence that the older generations, raised in the Soviet years, are replaced by new generations with stronger prodemocratic value orientations, more actively engaged in civil society and politics and with higher levels of political support along its various dimensions. 8

An intercohort analysis of public good morality attitudes performed within the framework of our study, presents an illustration of this statement.

As in other European countries, most Lithuanians judge negatively such civic morality-related behaviors as lying in your own interest, claiming state benefits which one is not entitled to, accepting a bribe in the course of one’s duties, cheating on taxes if one has a chance or avoiding a fare on public transport (see Žiliukaitė 2016; 177–178). On the other hand, it must be noted that Lithuania is among the countries that appear to be a little bit more

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8 In accordance with the typology by Dalton (1999), it includes the support for political community, for principles, performance, institutions and authorities of the political regime.
lenient toward such behaviors, or ‘public good offences’ (Halman, Sieben 2013). To reveal the development of the views regarding civic morality, we applied a civic morality index based on the mentioned behaviors. Unlike the case of personal-sexual morality, where the development of attitudes maintained the direction toward a higher moderation of conservatism or liberalism, a comparison of scores for the public good morality index in 1990, 1999 and 2008 showed different trends. The first decade saw a clear increase in leniency toward breaches of civic morality. The second decade did not keep the same trend; on the other hand, the trend had not reversed either. It can be said that the leniency toward breaches of civic morality ‘froze’ at a certain level (Žiliukaitė 2016: 179).

Turning to intergenerational differences (see Table No. 5), we see that already in 1990, the more religious interwar and Second World War generations were stricter on breaches of civic morality than the later Soviet generations. The generation of the late Soviet period had relatively the most ‘cynical’ outlook regarding civic morality. On the other hand, data analysis shows that even these generations experienced some, albeit a small, increase in leniency toward such behaviors. In 2008, two youngest cohorts, which may be called the ‘post-Soviet’ generations, held the most ‘liberal’ attitudes with regard to civic morality. Studies show that a similar tendency is also observed in other post-Communist countries: adversity to the state is most characteristic to those cohorts that lived a relatively shorter time under the communist regime and grew up in the period of radical transformations (Halman, Sieben 2013).

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9 The civic morality index was calculated as an average score of how much justifiable five types of behavior (lying in your own interest, claiming state benefits which one is not entitled to, accepting a bribe in the course of one’s duties, cheating on tax if one has the chance, avoiding a fare on public transport) are on a scale of ten points, where 1 means it can ‘never’ be justified and 10 means it can ‘always’ be justified. A higher score means that the type of behavior is regarded as more often justified. The analysis includes only those respondents that expressed opinions on at least three of the items.
The modernization theory can hardly explain the intergenerational differences in civic morality observed in Lithuania. The most important factor in this development was the people's disappointment in the performance of the new political system and the accompanying political alienation, i.e., particularly low levels of political support as well as political and civic participation. However, precisely the processes of modernization and socioeconomic development are the necessary prerequisites to change this trend observed in the youngest, post-Soviet generation. With the strengthening of civil society, the effectiveness of the law enforcement system, an increase of socioeconomic wellbeing and civic morality could eventually rise again.

Conclusions

It is a difficult task, in a longitudinal analysis, to disentangle the influence of generation (or cohort), age and period, which are closely interconnected and have intertwined effects. Using the results of the analysis presented here, we attempt to formulate several conclusions on intergenerational differences in value orientations. First, we claim that intercohort differences in Lithuanian society exist between cohorts that were socialized or were born in interwar Lithuania, during the Second World War or in the Soviet period and those that grew in the post-Communist period. The older generations differ from the Soviet generation and the youngest generations in the religious educations they received at home. The older generations have a stronger religious identity, which distinguishes them from other generations of Lithuanians not only in terms of religiosity, but also regarding family values, personal-sexual and public morality. In other words, the generations that have received primary religious socialization before the Soviet period and those generations that could have been strongly affected by traditional family and community values in the beginning of the Soviet period hold stronger traditional family values, more conservative attitudes regarding personal-sexual morality and stricter views on the breaches of public morality than the generations that grew up in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The youngest generation that grew up and reached adulthood in the new democratic and economic system, in their turn, are different not only from the oldest cohorts, but also from other Soviet cohorts (that grew up in the periods of the Khrushchev Thaw and the Brezhnevian Stagnation) and are characterized by the lowest degree of religiosity, the most liberal attitudes regarding personal-sexual morality and a relatively high tolerance in the domain of public morality.

When discussing these intergenerational differences, however, we have to emphasize another aspect. Cohort replacement-related differences in value orientations are relatively small: despite the identified differences, value orientations observed in different cohorts remain rather similar (‘like father, like son’) and do not show any substantial value shifts in the society. An analysis of the dynamics of value change showed that intracohort change, in many cases, was much larger than intercohort change: during the first decade of independence, all cohorts showed an increase in religiosity, a higher moderation of conservative attitudes regarding family and personal-sexual morality, a slight increase of leniency toward breaches of public morality and an increased
importance of good pay and work security in the domain of work. Since different cohorts had different ‘start positions’, these changes have not changed the position of cohorts in the trajectory of value change. The second decade saw a deceleration of intracohort value change. It is important to note that in a society that has undergone radical transformations, an intracohort analysis reveals a stronger effect of period than that of age. Therefore, drawing on the data analyzed in the article, intercohort comparison says more about the effect of age than an intracohort analysis, which is based on a relatively short period regarding life-cycle development. In conclusion, we can say that the intercohort analysis of the dynamics of value change in Lithuania shows trends toward an increasing individual secularization, a moderation of conservative attitudes in the domains of family and personal-sexual morality and leniency toward breaches of public morality. The trajectory of work-related values is more difficult to define, except for the obviously increased importance of the instrumental aspects of work and the slightly increased self-expression aspects, all of which do not show intercohort differences in work value orientations. These (roughly drawn) trajectories of development can be explained by a variety of interrelated macrolevel factors: Lithuanian cultural and historical heritage, structural changes that took place in the transition society, characteristics of the existing institutional context, modernization of the society as well as the media- and globalization-induced spread of Western culture.

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SANTRAUKA

VERTYBINIAI KARTŲ SKIRTUMAI DABARTINĖJE LIETUVOS VISUOMENĖJE

Šiame straipsnyje, naudojant Europos vertybių tyrimo duomenis, siekiama atskleisti, kaip skiriasi Lietuvos gyventojų kartos savo vertybinėmis nuostatomis dėl religijos, moralės, šeimos, darbo bei socialinės ir politinių pažiūrų ir kokia buvo šių skirtumų dynamika per dvidešimt šalies nepriklausomybės metų. Duomenų analizės rezultatai rodo, kad Lietuvos visuomenei 1990–2008 metais buvo būdingos vertybinės kartų brėžiamos sekuliarizacijos individualių lygmenių, vertybinės nuostatų konserwatyvumo šeimos ir asmeninės seksualinės moralės srityje nuosaikėjimo, didesnio atliekimo viešosios moralės principų pažeidimų kaitos trajektorijos. Darbo vertybių dinamika neatskleidžia su kartų kaita sietinių vertybių pokyčių visuomenėje. Šias kaitos trajektorijas galima suprasti ir paaiškinti atsižvelgiant į daugybę makrolygio veiksnių ir jų tarpusavio sąveiką: Lietuvos kultūrinį ir istorinį paveldą, perėmiamo laikotarpio visuomenėje vykusius struktūrinus pokyčius, esamos institucinės aplinkos bruožus, visuomenės modernizaciją, vakarietiškos kultūros plitimą, susijusį su medijų plėtra ir globalizacijos procesais.