The Transcendental Basis of Critical Reflection

Introduction

Objectivist science has been criticized on the ground that it presupposes an uncritical disjunction between disembodied ‘truths in themselves,’ whether truths about nature or about human society, and the factualist positionality of actual cognitive life-accomplishments. The neglect on the part of the objectivist self-understanding of science to take into account its rootedness in the human social world that is ‘lived by everyone’ has obscured its awareness of the fundamental situatedness of scientific knowledge so completely that the foundations and the positivities of science have been left, to borrow from Husserl, suspended in mid-air. Regardless whether this critique is executed employing categories drawn from the cultural, social, linguistic, or psychological sciences, the underlying counter-assertion directed against the objectivist naiveté has been, in essence, that the context of the given, deployed across various empirical and systematic dimensions, anticipates ontologically and attenuates epistemically the propositional methodological rigor of objectivist knowledge claims.

Within phenomenological circles, this brand of criticism has ordinarily employed Husserl’s disclosure of the insertion of scientific cognition within the ‘lifeworld’ as its jumping-off point. According to Husserl, the phenomenological programmatic with respect to the sciences requires:

That one must quite systematically inquire back into those things taken for granted which, not only for Kant but for all philosophers, all scientists, make up an unspoken ground of their cognitive accomplishments, hidden in respect to its deeper mediating functions.¹

Broadly speaking, this is the phenomenological problem of the lifeworld constitution of all ontic validities. But, the analysis of the lifeworld as the a priori ground of objective structures is frequently coupled with the reduction or even outright abandonment of Husserl’s well-established concern for the function of the ‘transcendental’ within phenomenological inquiry into the bases of the natural and human sciences.

The elevation of the anonymously constituted context of the pregiven lifeworld to the central focal point for phenomenological reflection in isolation from transcendental reflection, which provided the methodical basis for its original recovery in Husserl’s philosophy, creates serious domain related issues for phenomenological social scientific reflection. For, in principle, the recovery of the lifeworld a priori in conjunction with the devaluation of Husserlian transcendental inquiry posits the lifeworld as the new phenomenological transcendental ground.²

Apart from the status of Husserl’s transcendentalism within phenomenological philosophy, from the standpoint of phenomenological social science, the exclusivity of the lifeworld point of access contains a fundamental paradox: on the one hand, the systematic problem of grounding the entire manifold of cognitive accomplishments becomes imported, or delivered over to, historical and social scientific reflection; on the other hand, an important, perhaps the crucial methodological orientation which phenomenological social science requires if it is to engage in the foundational self-criticism that will enable it to frame its proper style of inquiry and to delimit its objects has been denied to it by reason of the rejection of the transcendental vantage point.

Although this discussion will be limited to the social sciences, it would not be surprising if, at the formal level of analysis at least, the paradox should exhibit very much the same structure for the psychological and the historical sciences in their phenomenological formulations. In fixing the pregiven world of the social context as the one plus ultra of all theoretical activities, phenomenological social theorization has been left to fend for itself in the matter of grounding, thereby rendering social scientific inquiry vulnerable, in a kind of sociology of knowledge turned upon itself, to a chaos of critique and meta-critique, a sterile cycle of successi-
ve ideological reductionisms. 

Oddly enough, phenomenological social science finds itself forced into a position very much reminiscent of that advanced by the psychology against which Husserl struggled, beginning especially with his Logical Investigations: that of an historically immature and formally incompletely self-articulated science being expected to secure the foundations for conceptually and procedurally highly sophisticated and specialized exact science. We have thus a domain problem. The compounding of sociologisms one upon the other, even in the guise of a science of the lifeworld, would leave phenomenological social science unprotected against the same style of criticism that Husserl leveled against the psychology of his day.

It is a premise of this paper that phenomenological social science is not nor aspires to be phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological social science has more than sufficient tasks before it to dissuade it from extending itself into philosophical domains of inquiry. Furthermore, it is our assumption, or rather, the goal of demonstration that phenomenological social scientific reflection does not need to be paradoxical; but that the way out of the paradox presupposes the validity and the effectiveness of the transcendental orientation. The following analysis is abbreviated; it merely sketches some of the main points for clarification. The paper has two sections. The first attempts to demarcate the domain of social scientific reflection and provides a listing of significant theoretical and semantic considerations pertinent to the lifeworld grounding of social scientific inquiry. The section draws attention to the systematic function of transcendental reflection in phenomenological social science.

Social Science and the Science of the Lifeworld

We begin by acknowledging that Husserl attributes a certain priority to the sciences of man; this priority is a function of Husserl’s systematic decision to ‘refer back’ all the constructions and natural self-evidences within the domains of objective science to the more inclusive, and often hidden, intentional contexts of personal and communal life.

Insofar as humanistic science, as the all-encompassing science of the spiritual world, has as its subject matter all persons and personal accomplishments, personal structures that are called cultural structures, it also encompasses natural science and natural-scientific nature in itself, nature as reality. 

Husserl continues:

Man, then, men in community, the communities themselves in their life and undertakings, are the scientific subject matter of humanistic science.

Provided then, that Husserl maintains that all objectivities, from the most ordinary to the most precisely mathematized, have their point of origin in explicit or implicit ‘intentionalities,’ and so must be regarded as having arisen out of subjective accomplishments. And granted further that, even at the most rudimentary level of intentional accomplishments, that of the perceptual, individual occurrences are always already social occurrences. Should it then be concluded that the sciences which are thought to have communities of human subjects qua communities of human subjects as their objects have prior access and foundational privileges with respect to the concrete individual/community life accomplishments of the lifeworld, out of which all subsequent conceptual and logical ‘substructions’ are viewed by phenomenology as emanating in principle?

The anonymity of the taken-for-granted lifeworld is the same for all human subjects, forming the ‘constant ground of validity,’ whether in practical or scientific life; with its invariant structures, the lifeworld frames the shared background for all the possible objects of theoretical and practical interest toward which, in the natural attitude, human beings orient themselves straightforwardly as the intersubjective referents of self-interpretation and self-correction.

But this lifeworld held in common by all is not and cannot constitute directly the object of phenomenological social scientific reflection. Like all the sciences, social science participates in that particular mode of lifeworld praxis which Husserl cha-
racterized as the “peculiar and historically late one, theoretical praxis.” When understood in this manner, social scientific cognition represents a particular restricted species of historical action, an interest structure, among all the myriad others. And this situation is no more plainly the case than in the advanced, highly differentiated organizations of social life in which, like our own, the acquisition as well as the employment of social scientific knowledge has been institutionalized by means of formalized professional scientific culture.

Hence, social science too requires its point of view, its kind of annex upon the lifeworld; for whose sake it promulgates its own positivities, its roles, its classes, its discursive formations, and its interpretive structures. And social science also, if in its own characteristic way, embraces the thoroughly metaphysical naiveté of rationality. Therefore, social science constitutes as well a kind of secondary reflection, a reflection that thematizes a methodically constituted abstraction, a mere sector of the lifeworld. Social science does not approach the lifeworld in all of its intersubjective intentional concreteness, rather it apprehends under the rubric of ‘human society,’ intercoordinated, if not entirely organized, temporal unities comprising loci of action.

For Alfred Schutz, the constitutive theoretical accomplishment at the basis of social scientific construal of the lifeworld establishes the ‘unique problem of social scientific knowledge.’

What is this problem? It consists in the fact that, although the social sciences start out from, and take for granted, the same social world in which we live from day to day, yet their methods of gathering knowledge are quite different from those of everyday life. For the social scientist organizes and classifies his data into quite different contexts of meaning and works them up in a quite different way.

To invert its Weberian formulation: the first methodical step of social science is to attach a social action to an actor’s meaning, to move the phenomenon it encounters from the presumptive naive meaningfulness of communality to the potential analytic unities denominated by ‘social’ and ‘action.’ For social science, phenomenological social science not excepted, if theoretical intuition does not reform the phenomena it lays hold of; it has yet to have laid hold of anything. Everyday reasoning may perhaps be more easily encountered, more incorrigible, and more intractable than its theoretical counterpart, but it is certainly no more reasonable. Yet despite its methodological detachment from, to be sure, its systematic violation of the lifeworld, the lifeworld has given birth to social scientific reflection, and indeed permanently constitutes the originary ground for its many manifestly meaningful conceptual validities. How is this possible? Or more precisely stated, how is social scientific reflection to be thought from the standpoint of the lifeworld “itself”?

We have thus a problem of two communities, a world within a world, or perhaps a reflection superimposed upon a reflection. Lifeworld and phenomenological social science. The everyday knowledge of social subjects and the not so everyday knowledge of social scientists; what, if any, is their relationship? By the nature of his/her profession, the social scientist, unlike maybe the physical scientist, is not disinterested in such questions.

For phenomenological social science, the primary theoretical task is not one of counterposing lifeworld and theoretical positionality. And it is most especially not one of reducing theoretic productions and theoretic interests to simple local events or circumstantial descriptive properties of everydayness, particularly where lifeworld mistakenly comes to be equated with ‘social process’ — itself an abstractive posit. To attempt such, in any case, would be merely to invert the tradition’s objectivist relationship between social historical explicandum and the social theoretical explicans. Common sense and ordinary language inspired philosophical approaches to social reflection tend to fall into this trap, with the result that they either illegitimately reify social meaning structures or reduce social science to an absurdity; sometimes they do both.

Instead, phenomenological social science faces the task of tying back the positivities of social reflection to the lifeworld, but in such a way that each explicates the other. This task of clarification remains uncompleted. Alfred Schutz offered some partial analyses, but this is not the context to
undertake the assessment of his contribution. Some of the major issues and concerns in need of phenomenological explication, and which simultaneously establish some of the parameters of phenomenological social science, include the following: 1) the formal conditions of covalidations, and so the translatability of social theoretic constructions in the lifeworld; 2) exploration of the invariant genetic structures which must, in principle, govern equally the constitution of meaning in them both; 3) examination of how each ‘world’ yields meaning-formations that get lived the one in the other. This is an important problem of social technology and its immanent critique - for instance, if in his own style, Foucault’s insights into the meaning of imprisonment and mental rehabilitation. On the other side, it pertains to issues of social relevance and social responsibility; 4) examination of the conditions under which each produce meaning-formations, whether material or ideal, such that in their interplay each gets ‘refracted’ in terms of the other, and thereby motivates change by virtue of the deficiencies educed, whether as ‘illegitimate,’ ‘limited,’ ‘distorted,’ or ‘repressed.’ Such analysis would provide material for a phenomenological response to critical theory; in this investigation, Luhmann’s work on generalization, coding, and reflexivity provide potentially valuable clues; 5) explication of the origin and function of social idealization; is there a complementarity with the codifiable universalization taking place in the theoretic? 6) Social scientific introspection is inevitably retrospective by its very nature; as Schutz observes, it is constructed upon the ‘because.’ But what is the relationship, and the conditions, of social time? Lifeworld explication of ‘social time’ is a prerequisite if phenomenological social reflection is to avoid the conceptual straitjacket of reified ‘social process.’

Each of these contain sets of issues of ‘relevance’ for phenomenological social science. While there seems to be no escaping these foundational concerns, they will not be pursued here. Instead, we can close this portion of our discussion with a rhetorical question: the social context of the theory of the social context remains unexplained. What phenomenological philosopher would take recourse to phenomenological social science for constructing a science of the lifeworld?

Transcendental Reflection and Social Science

Every merely actual science represents its own intrinsic telos with respect to its origin. Thus from the standpoint immanent to the process of social scientific reflection, what actually is about to happen, or better, has already happened expresses the contingent necessity that delineates the particular style of temporal self-articulation of the lifeworld which is already social scientific reflection itself. Thus, it is in the world in the very instant that it orients itself upon some sector of it. Hence, phenomenological social science encounters itself initially as one of the many merely available pregiven practical instruments comprised within the horizon of the lifeworld; it encounters itself, thus, in its alienated form, in a mode that denies it its own immanent possibility. It is a situation much resembling the Whiteheadian fallacy of misplaced concreteness; which is to say, one erects an highly constituted vision of reality, close one’s eyes for an instant, and upon reopening them pretends that this real world has been there all along. It must be remembered that the social world was not practical before it was theoretical, neither temporally nor ontologically, rather the ‘social’ only become the possible locus of praxis simultaneously with the emergence of theoretical interest.

Now when we turn to the question of methodical self-grounding, of a phenomenologically clarified thinking back to the prescientific sphere of the lifeworld, for the sake of obtaining ratification for the theoretic detachment which has originated at the lifeworld as the only means for legitimately sustaining that very detachment, there takes shape that paradoxical orientation, or better, that essential tension, or better still, that configuration of reflection which Husserl labels ‘transcendental reflection.’ Husserl writes:

From the beginning the phenomenologist lives in the paradox of having to look upon the obvious as questionable, as enigmatic, and of henceforth being unable to have any other scientific theme than that of transforming the universal obviousness of the being of the world - for him the greatest of all enigmas - into something intelligible.
"The problem of the reduction," Sokolowski has remarked, "is an attempt to raise a question about everything." The principle issue here is not if one can, but how one is to go about this questioning, how to execute this worldly naiveté of situated detachment. For from a pragmatic orientation, that is to say, from the standpoint of its actual accomplishment, it is, as modern science has amply demonstrated, the "how" question which bears the potential for revealing the "if," and indeed so completely as to radically delimit the usefulness of the ontological "what" and the metaphysical "why.

So, how is it to be done?

A careful reading of the Husserlian corpus cannot help but to discern a lively and sustained interest on Husserl's part regarding the matter of the concrete context of the actual givenness of real individuals. With respect to perception, there are the analyses of objects and their adumbrations (Gegenstande and Abschattungen), and of hyletic constitution, and of the perceptual field. There is, of course, as well those of bodily contextuality, of corporeal "holding sway" and the "I can." Then there are intentional modifications like recollections, fantasy, and imaginative variation. At another level, there is the constitutive synthesis of ideal unities, as well as of ideal objects, which have their own manner of perspective centering and decentering. And then, the formal schemata of instantiation and iteration, the "und so weiter." At another level, there is perception/apperception and the protentional/retentional context of the "now." So also there is the ostensive "here," with the implicit "now," constituted against a world-horizontal coordinate system. And passive genesis, a contextual issue of a sort; the passively constituted transcendental ego which is already ahead and beyond itself, always a "more." Certainly, there is the context of consciousness itself; by virtue of intentionality, it is already filled with the world, and still a circumscribable region within it. This listing makes no claim to precision, and it is by no means comprehensive.

These many analyses and, to be sure, the entire project of constitutional analysis have been generated through the oblique reflection instituted and sustained - for the transcendental posture is not a momentary imposition upon the natural attitude, rather in the Crisis it is likened to a "vocation" - through the methodological employment of the transcendental question, the how; tracing back the givenness of the worldly beings by regarding them as "meant unities" constituted on the grounds of their modes of givenness. For Husserl, the singular is never origniary, rather it is "given" only within a horizon. And this horizon, which cannot be an object in any ordinary sense, is given only through or in relation to the objects it surrounds. Each is given only with respect to the other in a manner that they are copresent, intersect, and interpenetrate one another, and so constitute a kind of "if-then" of intentional implication. This is not a matter of parts and wholes, nor needless to mention of universal and particular, but rather a transcendently disclosed tensity of consciousness or world, for they amount to the same thing, with respect to itself, a concrete a priori universality.

If it is proposed that the given is always mediated by a context, then Husserl would agree. But, he would add, this presents a problem for intentional analysis, some of whose dimensions have been enumerated above. But if it is asserted that this mediation is incorrigible, and on the presupposition that it is not a case of sheer dogmatism, then either a) it can be explicited with respect to its consequences, and so shown to be not in fact incorrigible, or b) the constitutive analysis has reached the level of intuitive self-evidence. Because, according to Husserl:

Every kind of self-evidence is the title of a problem, with the sole exception of phenomenological self-evidence, after it has reflectively clarified itself and shown itself to be the ultimate self-evidence.

For it is the assumption that any question about human experience and cognition that can arise, emerges only within the context of experience itself, and accordingly may be answered through intentional analysis of the genesis of experience. Hence, from the Husserlian standpoint, disputes about self-evidence are, whatever the referent, in fact disagreements about the radicality and completeness of a particular constitutive explication of an intentional structure.
At the present time, these are two important categories of issues confronting social science. 1) On the one side, there exists a kind of a naive metaphysics of technical and cognitive domination of social objects (social beings), which seeks to talk about human subjects, but in a language that none can but the initiated seem to be able to comprehend. Working in combination with this trend, there is a growing penchant for exoticizing social scientific techniques. This mystification of social science takes the form of enhanced professionalization and the technical privatization of social scientific knowledge correlated with a disinterest in the common sensical meaning structures of "ordinary" social agents. Nonetheless, these professional social research scientists exercise significant impact upon daily life, for their audience comprises most especially policy makers, and institutional structures generally. Consequently, their inputs have consequences in the classroom, in the courtroom, in business organizations, in human service delivery structures, and in assorted legislative bodies.

2) On the other side, there is a brand of research undertaking which attempts to speak from the social world but tends to have little to say to or about it. In a kind of apotheosis of the ordinary, the research records, describes, and "analyzes" everydayness putatively in its own terms. A kind of measure of this research activity is that their research reports typically get written only for one another. This is a narrow descriptive, empirical orientation in search of "subjective meanings" in the naturalistic, ethnographic sense, as a part of the repudiation of the abstractness of theoretical social science positivity. Can there exist a style of reflection that is simultaneously social and scientific? We seem to be forced to choose between being scientific and simply telling stories. Schutz's postulated criteria for the construction of ideal types sought to secure a compromise position between these alternatives. Schutz himself was not exception to this manner of conceptualizing the issues. But the tendencies toward staticity and totalization of this discursive style, each from its own interest-laden vantage point, can be counteracted or, at least, compensated for by refocusing social scientific reflection upon the "how" of asking questions and the conditions for their being posed effectively. Such a theoretic posture seeks to recover the natural reflexivity of the life-world by deploying the excess of meaning, the possibilities, embedded within it.

It is not the role of phenomenological social science to reproduce descriptively the dogmatic (sedimented) discursive and action structures of everydayness, whether the everydayness of the socially ordinary or that of social scientific reflection itself. Rather, the perspective of everydayness, of the presumptive meaningful self-sameness of the life-form, needs to be reconfigured as problematic everydayness, as merely possible everydayness, as the immobile opinionation of the ready-to-hand milieu.

Phenomenology is never mere description; as Bahrdt observes, mere description is "phenomenography." Phenomenology is a carefully controlled, and so theoretically informed, analytic disclosure of the "logic" of experienced phenomenon. Such "possibilizing" methodological disclosure contains the capability for "uprooting" naturally occurring social/significative substructions and for re-establishing the lifeworld's immanent originary reflexivity by invoking the slippage expressed by the transcendentally disclosed correlation of consciousness and world.

The elevation of a culturally transmitted social environment to conscious awareness <accomplished through> a phenomenological description does not yield a mere copy of the environment. <Rather> such elevation is a reflexive process in a particular situation and will constitute a partial re-evaluation of the social environment from the standpoint of interest of that situation.
In other words, the phenomenological social scientist retrieves the enigma of the obvious by comprehending the giveness of context as a limit on the ground of a transcendentally disclosed horizon of possible resignifications available within the lifeworld. Stated somewhat differently, giveness already implies an absence, though not necessarily a negativity, for the retrieval of possibility is a positivity. Phenomenological description — though it is better understood as situated detachment — illuminates the originary giveness of what Waldenfels calls the “policentric structure” (polyzentrische Gestalt) of the social world. It is precisely this originary generalized policentricity of consciousness that Husserl has deduced through the oblique reflection executed by the transcendental orientation; the systematic disclosure of the “how” already contains the social restructuration articulated by the “if”; together they are underlain by the concretely motivated “I can.”

The parasitism of the theoretic upon the lifeworld, if you will, is ratified, and the two communities, the one with its “objective” and the other with its “subjective” truths, co-found their mutual legitimacy through a double movement of reflection, where each is thrown back upon itself as a mere local occurrence circumscribed by the “more” of constitutive life. Scientific intuition quite justly must illuminate the solid immobility of opinion as the condition for comprehending it as a “given.”

From within the structure of everydayness, “giveness” does not emerge as such; for it the present is merely actual. For phenomenological social scientific reflection, “society” is merely an empty positivity against which to construe the limits of the everyday as a practical and discursive “course of action.” In its well-founded naiveté, the everyday does not grasp its hidden binary function, as an orientation which by its very constitution includes and excludes possible orientations. Scientific positivity thinks the perspective by detaching it from the globality of everydayness, and so establishes its special nature as a perspective.

At this point, social scientific reflection can, if it has indeed “thought through” that perspective, undertake to articulate it in a fashion that permits it to speak to everydayness. What has occurred is bracketing of everydayness through informed reflection - the condition of the knowledge of the social. The everyday is not yet knowledge, but that it can become knowledge is the possibility of the invention of social science. But, it is never necessary that it become knowledge, just as the social history of Husserl’s own era evidences; and so in the boundless fluidity of everydayness, there is much that militates against it - and this perhaps most especially is the sophisticated ordinariness of social scientific reflection.

In conclusion, we return to the question of beginnings. Quoting from Heracleitus:

“You will never find the boundaries of the soul, even if you follow every road; so deep is its ground.”

But, then, from ‘another’ perspective, Husserl writes:

“Every object stands within another open horizon extending beyond what is coperceived and already cofamiliar in the way of experiential objects, extending into the infinity of unknown things, things of possible experiential knowledge.”

In sum, the way out of the paradox we constructed in the first stage of this paper is precisely the transcendentally disclosed subject-object correlation.
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4 Of course, the reverse is also taken for granted: phenomenological philosophy is not phenomenological social science.

5 Crisis, 319.

6 Ibid., 322.

7 Husserl writes: “But in living with one another, each one can take part in the life of others. Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized.” Ibid., 163.

8 Ibid., 122 and 164.

9 Ibid., 111.

10 As in Schutz, for example: “... even when social science is dealing with the action of a single individual, it must do so in terms of types.” The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. G. Walsh and F. Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 227.

11 For instance, Schutz writes: “Sociology can claim no monopoly on rational method. The methodologies of all true sciences are rational, involving as they do the use of formal logic and interpretive schemes. All sciences demand the maximum of clarity and distinctness for all their propositions. There is no such thing as an irrational science.” Ibid., 240.

12 Schutz continues: “And so the problem of the social sciences is already present in the prescientific sphere, and social science itself is only possible and conceivable within the general sphere of life in the social world. <But this> is by no means to say that the social scientist may characterize as scientific that knowledge which he picks up in everyday life and in his ordinary associations.” Ibid., 220-221.

13 That Weber had already performed this abstractive synthesis is evident in his original formulation, in which the task of interpretive sociology is to understand social action; social action being understood as that action to which “subjective meaning” is “attached.”

14 There is a difficulty associated with the immanent life-world genesis of social scientific reflection: a problem of constitutive genesis which can be distinguished from that of its factual, historical gelling. Knowledge of who invented sociology, as Comte for instance, does not answer the question of who and how it was founded, no more than, say, we can blame the ‘first’ pre-Socratic for the origination of philosophy. Husserl’s apparent naivete in raising the question of occidental teleology, or indeed, that the history of philosophy as a whole represents merely a preparatory stage for the achievement of transcendental phenomenology, contains a genuine question about legitimacy. Constitutive life accomplishments must attempt to think themselves from their orogins. With respect to social scientific reflection this problem has particular importance; for, the skeptic’s ready-to-hand account is that it represents merely a tool for rational domination rooted in the bourgeoisie revolution. The very notion of pre-scientific implies this teleological inquiry.

15 That is, as Husserl puts it: “Science is lost in the anonymity of the world <Weltverlorenheit>. Such that one must first relinquish the world in the epoche in order to recoup it once again in universal self-reflection <Selbstbesinnung>.” Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 183.

16 Crisis, 180.


18 Crisis, 142-143.

19 Ibid., 189.


21 Algis Mickunas, “Structuration of the Environment.”

22 This is, in part, a modalized reconfiguration of Schutz’s adequacy postulate.

23 Regarding the “practicability” of this scientific strategy: Pilotta/Widman “Dialogical Structure of Social Relevence: Establishing Social Validity.”

24 Crisis, 170.

25 Ibid., 344. Emphasis added.