Baltic Journal
of Political Science

Content

RACE TO THE EUROZONE:
WHY LATVIA JOINED BEFORE LITHUANIA[1]

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ABSTRACT

Why did Latvia join the Eurozone in 2014, while Lithuania only acceded a year later? The two countries' diverging experiences are surprising. Latvia suffered a more pronounced economic crisis from 2008 to 2010, which created greater euro adoption challenges in terms of meeting fiscal criteria. This article argues that, while the willingness to adopt the euro increased in both countries during and after the crisis, the will to seek euro adoption was stronger, clearer and more consistent in Latvia than in Lithuania. In examining this divergence, we argue that relying on aggregate economic costs and benefits, identity considerations, geopolitical considerations, societal support, and interest group preferences does not produce a satisfactory explanation of fluctuations in these countries' willingness to adopt the euro. Instead, we propose that changes in this willingness can be traced to domestic political processes, such as the timing and results of elections and the magnitude of the economic crisis's impact.

Keywords: Eurozone, accession, Latvia, Lithuania

INTRODUCTION

Latvia and Lithuania both joined the European Union (EU) in 2004, which entailed a commitment to eventually adopt the euro. Despite numerous pertinent similarities between Latvia and Lithuania, such as country size, economic structure, level of development, and even monetary regime (a currency board system in Lithuania and *de facto* currency board arrangement in Latvia), their paths towards the adoption of the euro were not identical. In 2004, World Bank representative Lajos Bokros predicted that Lithuania, together with Estonia and Slovenia, would be among the first countries to adopt the euro (International Monetary Fund, 2004). Lithuania

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joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in 2004—a year earlier than Latvia. Furthermore, Lithuania was planning, and had a realistic opportunity, to adopt the euro as early as the start of 2007. This had been Lithuania's plan since 2003, as stated in its Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP). To the north, Latvia's PEP mentioned 1 January 2008 as the earliest possible date for euro adoption (Dean, 2004, p. 761). The years that followed the development of the two countries' PEPs brought increasing inflationary pressures and a subsequent economic crisis that precluded euro adoption in both countries.

In response to the Great Recession, all three Baltic countries sought to preserve fixed exchange rates, and therefore implemented internal devaluation by adopting rapid fiscal consolidation. All three countries also emphasized their willingness to adopt the euro, though their degrees of willingness varied. Estonia adopted the euro as early as 2011, largely as a result of its prudent pre-crisis fiscal policy, but also due to Estonia's better tax collection results during the crisis. Latvia and Lithuania struggled, much more than Estonia did, to achieve fiscal consolidation and fulfil the fiscal criteria. Yet the most important and interesting difference between the former two was Latvia's display of a greater willingness and a firmer commitment than Lithuania displayed to adopt the euro during and after the Great Recession (although the determination to seek euro adoption increased in both countries during this time). Latvia's willingness translated into specific policy actions that, in the end, meant that Latvia acceded to the Eurozone before Lithuania. Latvia adopted the euro before its southern neighbour despite the fact that Latvia faced tougher economic challenges than Lithuania and had to put in more effort to achieve Eurozone accession.

In this article, we aim to answer why the willingness to adopt the euro varied over time and between the two countries, a difference that resulted in their different dates of euro accession despite sharing similar economic, historical, social, and political conditions. To answer this research question, we draw on the most popular approaches in economic and political-economic literature to explain preferences for euro adoption. Further, we use aggregate economic cost-benefit calculation of joining the Eurozone based on optimum currency area (OCA) theory and we consider the impact of a collective identity and of geopolitics, of interest group pressures, and of societal opinion. We adopt a perspective that focuses on domestic political processes to determine why Latvia acceded to the Eurozone before Lithuania did. Finally, we also take into account a factor that has not been explored extensively in the literature: the role of the economic crisis. We find that the fluctuations in the willingness to adopt the euro (and the ultimate dates of Eurozone accession) in Latvia and Lithuania cannot be accounted for fully by aggregate economic arguments, interest group pressure, societal opinion, or identity and geopolitical factors. Instead, our explanation of changes in the values of our dependent variable is based on domestic political developments. First, we argue that the timing and results of elections in Latvia enabled the Latvian government to consistently focus on its euro adoption strategy. Second, the economic crisis was more profound in Latvia, which led to a higher sense of vulnerability and a desire to seek perceived safety within the single currency zone. Finally, Lithuanian authorities were less willing to make a strong commitment to a specific euro adoption date, partly due to Lithuania's failed first attempt to join the Eurozone.

1. FLUCTUATIONS IN LATVIA AND LITHUANIA'S WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT THE EURO: VALUES OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

It is necessary to first look at the dynamics of Latvian and Lithuanian positions vis-à-vis euro adoption over time—in other words, to describe the values of the dependent variable. Our period of analysis starts in 2004, when Latvia and Lithuania acceded to the EU and made a commitment to adopt the euro at some point in the future. The cut-off point of our period of analysis is 2014, Lithuania received its official invitation to join the Eurozone on 1 January 2015.

At the beginning of this period, prior to 2007, Lithuania was more active in seeking to adopt the euro than Latvia was. Between 2004 and 2013, Latvia and Lithuania each underwent four evaluations. In 2006, only Lithuania applied for evaluation as it had joined the ERM II earlier than Latvia. The differences between Latvia and Lithuania's pursuits of the euro at the beginning of this period can largely be attributed to exogenous factors, namely, the ability to meet the Maastricht criteria, and more specifically, to meet the inflation criterion (all other criteria were comfortably met by both countries during that period). Prior to 2007, Lithuania's inflation level was fluctuating around the reference value, while in Latvia it was well above the reference value (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1: Inflation in Latvia, Lithuania (twelve-month average inflation rate), and the Maastricht reference value, in percent.

Sources: for national inflation rates, Eurostat database; for the reference value, Convergence Reports, (European Central Bank, 2013; European Central Bank, 2014).

Although both Latvia and Lithuania were experiencing economic overheating driven by EU aid inflows, credit bubbles, and excessive optimism at the time, the differences in inflation between the two countries can be explained by the fact that the process of economic

'overheating' had started earlier and advanced more rapidly in Latvia. Thus, one could conclude that a willingness to adopt the euro at the beginning of the analysed period was similar in Latvia and Lithuania. Overall, both countries were, in principle, in favour of euro adoption, but did not see it as a priority and were not willing to sacrifice other objectives (such as growth) or write specific policy actions—in terms of government expenditure, tax policies, or price regulation policies—to achieve their euro adoption goals. This is well illustrated by Lithuania's failed attempt to join the Eurozone in 2007.

In March 2006, Lithuania submitted an application to adopt the euro, despite it being "already clear that the risk to breach the inflation criterion was high" (Vilpišauskas, 2014, pp. 225–226). Slovenia also submitted an application in March 2006. EU institutions confirmed Slovenia's application and rejected Lithuania's due to its breach of the inflation criterion. The decision was controversial; Lithuania's inflation was only 0.1 percentage point higher than the reference value, but the decision was additionally justified by judging Lithuania's inflation unsustainable (European Commission, 2006, p. 9). According to Vilpišauskas (2014, p. 226), "it is possible that Lithuanian politicians had not delved deeply [enough into the situation] and followed the suggestions [made] by diplomats and higher officials, which was in contrast to the opinion prevailing in EU institutions and informal forecasts regarding the possible negative evaluation of Lithuania".

Although Lithuania declared its eagerness to adopt the euro, it did not pursue a policy that was coordinated enough to achieve this goal. Specifically, it conducted a procyclical fiscal policy that contributed to inflation. Furthermore, inflation increased in Lithuania not only because of external circumstances, but also due to deliberate policy decisions, such as hikes in regulated prices (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 228). In summary, Vilpišauskas concludes that Lithuania's failure to achieve euro accession was due to the "ambivalent stance of the political elite, uncoordinated actions in several functionally related fields of economic policy, as well as a very strict evaluation of Lithuania provided by the EU institutions" (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 228).

The Great Recession changed the stances of the Baltic governments towards euro adoption. In response to the economic downturn, Latvia and Lithuania (as well as Estonia) sought to defend their currency pegs with the euro and implemented rapid fiscal consolidation. As fiscal revenue contracted, public deficits soared (see Figure 2). In contrast to Estonia, neither Latvia nor Lithuania had accumulated fiscal reserves, and they were forced to borrow to cover governments financing. They did this in different ways. Lithuania turned to the bond market, Latvia applied for international financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the EU. This difference can be attributed to the collapse of Latvia's important domestic bank, Parex, in late 2008, an event that further complicated Latvia's situation.

In both Latvia and Lithuania, euro adoption was seen as part of a crisis exit strategy. However, in Latvia, the willingness to adopt the euro was firmer and clearer throughout the crisis and post-crisis years. The head of Latvia's central bank, Ilmārs Rimšēvičs, "in nearly every public statement insisted on the fixed exchange rate and a budget of 3 percent of GDP in 2012 to qualify for euro adoption in 2014" (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011, p. 68). In a co-authored book written in 2014, Dombrovskis argues that the Latvian government's 2009 plan

FIGURE 2: Public deficits in Latvia and Lithuania, in percent of GDP, and the Maastricht reference value (three per cent of GDP).

Sources: for public deficit data for Lithuania up to and including 2012, (European Central Bank, 2014, p. 134); for Latvia up to and including 2012, (European Central Bank, 2013, p. 54). For 2013 and 2014, Eurostat database. Different data sources were used because the methodology of calculating the budget deficit was changed in 2014, and earlier figures were recalculated.

and commitment to adopting the euro in 2014 seemed realistic (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011, pp. 109-110). In his annual report in 2012, Dombrovskis emphasizes that the country's foreign policy was focused on the EU, that further euro integration was in line with Latvia's interests, and that the government's goal was to garner support for Latvia's euro accession from other EU countries (Dombrovskis, 2012a). According to former Lithuanian Minister of Finance Ingrida Šimonytė, Latvia displayed a stronger willingness to seek euro adoption during the crisis and recovery periods. Šimonytė (2014) argues that, in Latvia, euro adoption had been seen and discussed as a key part of the anti-crisis program since the start of the crisis. Not only was the Latvian government clearer on its public commitment to the euro, the government also took concrete policy steps to achieve euro adoption. First, the Latvian government pressed more forcefully for fiscal consolidation, and as a result, its budget deficit was already well below the Maastricht reference value by 2012 (see Figure 2). Furthermore, Latvia's strategic tax policies—cutting the VAT rate in 2012 to slow inflation—maximized Latvia's chances for a positive evaluation of its 2013 Eurozone application (Seputyte, 2012; Bukovskis, 2014).

The Lithuanian case was different. The so-called crisis government of Kubilius, which came to power at the end of 2008, declared euro adoption as its goal. It even sought to meet the public deficit criterion of three per cent of GDP in 2009 and planned the budget accordingly,

but those plans were abandoned due to a much more dramatic economic contraction during the crisis than expected (Šimonytė, 2014). Later, the government was less clear about Lithuania's euro adoption date, although it argued that euro accession remained its goal. During an interview in 2012, President Grybauskaitė stated that despite earlier plans to adopt the euro in 2014, there was no specific date of adoption set (BNS, 2012). To preserve Lithuania's chance to join the Eurozone, Kubilius's government had also planned the 2012 budget so that the deficit would be below three per cent of GDP (Šimonytė, 2014). However, by 2012, the deficit was 3.2 per cent of GDP (see Figure 2). The new government, led by Social Democrats, came to power in 2012. Before the elections and immediately after the new coalition was formed, the new government was silent on euro adoption until early 2013 when Prime Minister Butkevičius named introducing the euro the government's strategic goal (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 231). Vilpišauskas observes that, "increasingly intensive efforts for euro introduction. . . [and] political rhetoric strengthened with the culmination in January 2014 when the Prime Minister declared he would resign if Lithuania does not adopt the euro from 2015" (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 231). All in all, during the crisis and post crisis years, Lithuania did not pace itself as consistently as Latvia did, opting instead for a more cautious, "wait and see" approach towards euro adoption.

The values of our dependent variable are summarized as follows: At the beginning of the analysis period, both countries were in favour of euro adoption, but did not set it as a priority and were not willing to take concrete policy steps or make significant sacrifices to adopt the euro. The crisis years prompted a change in both countries' policy stances and euro adoption emerged as an important goal and as part of their crisis exit strategies. Nevertheless, euro adoption was communicated more clearly and sought more strongly and consistently in Latvia. Lithuania's stance was vaguer, and less firmly committed. As a result of these differences, Latvia joined the Eurozone a year earlier than Lithuania.

2. AGGREGATE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS

According to the aggregate economic costs and benefits perspective, a willingness (or reluctance) to adopt the euro should stem from how well (or poorly) a country's economy "fits" with the single currency zone. This perspective builds on the optimum currency area (OCA) theory (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963) and holds that countries will be willing to enter the Eurozone if the aggregate economic benefits of membership—increased trade, higher efficiency, and lower transaction costs—exceed the aggregate costs of membership, such as losing exchange and interest rate policy as a tool to respond to asymmetric shocks and improve competitiveness (Caporale, Ciferi and Girardi, 2011, p. 432; Frieden, 2002, pp. 831–832). In general, a country should be reluctant to join the Eurozone if it faces different (asymmetric) shocks than other members of the currency union, or if it will take a long time for a country to adjust to those shocks without recourse to monetary and exchange rate policies. Hence, the following factors should *ceteris paribus* make countries more eager to adopt the euro: economic openness, a large share of trade and a high degree of business cycle synchronization with other members of the currency union, flexible prices and wages, mobile capital and

FIGURE 3: Real GDP per capita in Latvia and Lithuania from 2004 to 2014, in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), Index EU 28=100.

Source: Eurostat database.

labour, and economic convergence with other members of the currency zone as reflected in real GDP per capita, labour productivity, and economic structure (Angeloni, Flad and Mongelli, 2007; José and Larribe, 2008)[2].

From this vantage point, were Latvia and Lithuania good candidates for membership in the Eurozone? On the one hand, both Latvia and Lithuania lagged markedly behind the Eurozone in terms of economic development (see Figure 3) and labour productivity; furthermore, their business cycles were not synchronized well with the Eurozone's, as revealed by very large booms and busts in the two countries during their decade of EU membership. On the other hand, both countries were exceptionally flexible, an important factor in overcoming the crisis of 2008 to 2010 (Purfield and Rosenberg, 2010; Kuokštis, 2015). Apart from nominal wage flexibility, this also encompasses labour mobility and firms' abilities to adapt to changing circumstances (Kuokštis, 2015). Besides, Latvia and Lithuania both have relatively small and open economies (and Lithuania's, despite its larger size, is actually more open).[3] As for trade with Eurozone countries, Latvia and Lithuania's shares comprised a substantial, but not a dominant part of

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[2]   In this section, we focus on the so-called real convergence factors as nominal convergence criteria are already covered in the Maastricht criteria.

[3]   For instance, in 2007, the exports of goods and services to GDP ratio in Latvia and Lithuania stood at 39 and 50 per cent respectively; in 2012, this measure was 61 and 82 per cent respectively, (Eurostat).

the two countries' overall trade—with 32 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, during the analysis period of 2004 to 2012.[4]

Overall, OCA theory has a hard time explaining variation in the values of our dependent variable, especially the divergence in Latvia and Lithuania's willingness to adopt the euro at the end of the analysed period. First, whether or not Latvia and Lithuania were, or have become, good candidates for participating in the euro area is debatable. Although it is true that both countries saw rather rapid real convergence towards the Eurozone throughout the analysed period (see Figure 3), the very high volatility of Baltic economies—as manifested by their massive booms after entering the EU and large contractions during the Great Recession—revealed the dangers of sticking to exchange rate pegs and common monetary policy. In hindsight, it is evident that the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policy was not in line with the needs of the Baltic economies.

Furthermore, Lithuania actually met OCA criteria *better* than Latvia did. Throughout the period of analysis, Lithuania had a higher GDP per capita and also converged more quickly to the Eurozone than Lithuania did (see Figure 3). Secondly, Lithuania's economy was arguably more flexible; during the last recession, the country dealt with the crisis more successfully. This flexibility was manifest in Lithuania's substantially faster growth in exports.[5] Thirdly, the pre-crisis boom was less pronounced in Lithuania. Thus, based on a country's "fit" with the Eurozone, Lithuania should have been the more willing one to adopt the euro, but empirically this did not turn out to be the case.

3. IDENTITY AND GEOPOLITICS

An alternative explanation of a country's willingness to adopt the euro is based on the importance of a country's collective identity (Risse, et al., 1999; Risse, 2003). Currency affairs have always been closely tied to issues of national identity and statehood (Helleiner, 1998). Thus, according to Risse, et al. (1999, pp. 148–149), only those countries whose elites treat euro integration as part of the country's national identity will move forward with euro adoption, especially since there are often good economic arguments both for and against becoming a Eurozone member. Risse, et al. (1999, p. 148) argue, "the Euro is about European union and political order rather than only lowering transaction costs or creating exchange-rate stability".

Turning to the empirical cases of Latvia and Lithuania, it would be hard to completely dismiss this identity-based argument. In the Baltic countries, European integration has always been at the core of their external economic and political orientation (Austers and Bukovskis, 2013, p. 30), and entering the Eurozone could be regarded as yet another step towards returning to the West—two key steps in this process were attaining memberships in the EU and NATO. This stemmed from these countries' geopolitical anxieties, their relatively small sizes, and being vulnerable states close to traditionally hostile Russia, but is also related to both states' identities being built on a

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[4]   Calculations based on data on Latvia and Lithuania, (Statistics Lithuania; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia).
[5]   Between 2007 and 2013, Latvian exports grew by 56 per cent and Lithuanian exports grew by 95 per cent (authors' calculations based on statistical data from Eurostat database).

sense of Europeanness. According to Bukovskis (2014), "Latvia has traditionally been very pro-European, at least on the elite level". Feldmann (2008, p. 247) agrees, "in the second half of the 1990s European integration became the main focus of policymaking. Full membership of the EU was the main goal, and most political activity was subordinated to this objective". Furthermore, on an even more pragmatic level, entrance into the Eurozone was also associated with the desire to have a stronger voice at the EU decision-making level, to be at the core of this project (Austers and Bukovskis, 2013, p. 31). All in all, for the Baltic countries, euro accession has always been as much about foreign policy considerations as it was about economic objectives.

However, this foreign policy orientation of "returning to" and integrating with the West has been present in both countries ever since they regained independence. Thus, it cannot explain why the desire to adopt the euro increased during the last economic crisis or why it intensified more in Latvia than it did in Lithuania. Of course, one could also point out that an identity-based perspective in general has a hard time accounting for short-run shifts in policy views and actions, as "collective nation-state identities are usually rather sticky and only gradually subject to change" (Risse et al., 1999, p. 156).

A related, although distinctive, explanation could be based on the changing perceptions of the *intensity* of geopolitical threats due to Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014. Vilpišauskas explains that euro adoption could satisfy 'the need to be in the group (core) of most integrated EU countries, thus aiming to increase the economic and political (institutional) relations with EU countries with the expectation that this could bring more security in the case of Russian threat" (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 210). Austers (2014) also argues that efforts to increase security against Russian threats motivated euro adoption. Furthermore, politicians in both countries publicly named geopolitical security as a reason to enter the Eurozone. For example, during his term as Latvia's Finance Minister, Andris Vilks stated, "We are in a very fragile geopolitical situation. We should be as deeply integrated as possible into European institutions" (Milne, 2013). However, the timing of changes in the values of the dependent variable does not fit this explanation well, as the firm commitment to adopt the euro emerged in Latvia well before Russia's actions in Ukraine. Second, from this vantage point, it is not clear why Latvia had a firmer commitment despite Lithuania sharing a similar sense of geopolitical threat. In fact, Lithuania arguably showed more concern regarding an increased Russian threat, as revealed by its more vocal opposition and the decision to reintroduce conscription.

4. INTEREST GROUP PREFERENCES

According to Frieden (2002), an explanation of a country's position regarding euro adoption should take into account the preferences of its most powerful interest groups. This argument builds on the notion that while adoption of the euro (as a form of fixed exchange rate) is often difficult to evaluate from an aggregate efficiency point of view, the distributive consequences for different groups in a country are usually much clearer. In particular, import-competers and exporters (especially those specializing in the production of standardized goods) stand to benefit from the flexible exchange rates that could be used to boost their competitiveness, and thus are expected to oppose euro adoption. On the other hand, cross-border investors,

the financial sector, and exporters of specialized manufacturing should favour euro adoption due to greater certainty, the elimination of exchange rate volatility, and favourable effects on financial and trade flows (Frieden, 2002). One could further expect that countries with more influential sectors interested in euro adoption will be the countries more willing to accede (the influence is usually proxied by sector's share of employment or value added).

Certain predictions of this interest group explanation are corroborated by the Lithuanian and Latvian cases. The banking sectors unequivocally supported euro adoption; this was due to lower balance sheet risk (most loans were in euros, while most income came in national currencies) and due to unlimited access to ECB liquidity resources (Šimonytė, 2014). In addition, one could also point out that the importance of the financial sector in the economy has been higher in Latvia than in Lithuania.[6] However, one problem with this explanation is that it cannot account for the timing of changes in preferences in both countries—in fact, the share of the financial sector was higher in both Latvia and Lithuania before the crisis than it was during the downturn.

Other businesses have also been mostly supportive of euro adoption in both countries (Feldmann, 2008, p. 251; Swedbank Analysis, 2012, p. 15; on Latvia (Bukovskis, 2014); on Lithuania (Besagirskas, 2014; Arlauskas, 2014)). According to Besagirskas (2014), both Latvian and Lithuanian firms adopted a pragmatic position which posited that euro adoption was economically beneficial, as businesses "made calculations related to the benefits this would bring, [and] how much lower the risk and borrowing costs would be". It should be noted that there was also some opposition to euro adoption. Negative opinions towards euro introduction were expressed mainly by smaller firms concentrating on the domestic market, and were largely due to currency switching costs (Arlauskas, 2014; Bukovskis, 2014) and an element of patriotism (Besagirskas, 2014). Furthermore, to the extent that euro adoption risk was related to the possibility of currency devaluation during the economic downturn of 2008 to 2010, the business community was slightly less enthusiastic about euro adoption in Latvia as there were more voices calling for currency devaluation in this country, while no businesses expressed support for such a move in Lithuania (Kuokštis, 2013, p. 77).

To summarize, the Latvian and Lithuanian business communities in general, and especially their financial sectors, supported Eurozone membership. However, their stances or relative influence did not change markedly throughout the period of analysis or between the two countries. Therefore an interest group based perspective does not lead us to an answer to our research question.

5. SOCIETAL OPINION

Another factor that could potentially explain the willingness (and eventual decision) to adopt the euro is societal opinion. After all, in a democracy, government policies should be influenced by the preferences of the majority. Flash Eurobarometer surveys provide information about several

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[6]   Over the period of 2006 to 2015, the share in value added in GDP fluctuated between 3.0 per cent and 5.0 per cent in Latvia, and between 1.9 per cent and 3.1 per cent in Lithuania (authors' calculations based on statistical data from Eurostat database).

questions pertaining to society's views towards the euro. The general picture that emerges from these data is that Lithuanians and Latvians have been largely sceptical of euro introduction. Except for a brief period during the last crisis in Lithuania, the proportion of respondents who thought that euro accession was negative for their countries was higher than those who held the opposite opinion. Asked about whether they were generally in favour of euro adoption in April 2012 (European Commission, 2013, p. 65), 46 per cent of Latvians were "very much" or "rather in favour," and 53 per cent were "very much" or "rather against" euro adoption. In Lithuania, the corresponding figures were 44 per cent and 51 percent. Last but not least, when asked specifically about the desired timeframe of euro adoption, both Latvians and Lithuanians overwhelmingly preferred to delay euro introduction for as long as possible. In March 2012, 49 per cent of Latvians and 41 per cent of Lithuanians said they wanted the euro introduced "as late as possible"; as few as 9 per cent of Latvians and 14 per cent of Lithuanians wanted to adopt the euro "as soon as possible" (European Commission, 2013, p. 68).

Politicians understood this scepticism regarding euro adoption. In fact, this could have been one of the factors affecting the lack of willingness to press for euro accession at the beginning of the period analysed, when sacrifices to achieve this would have been necessary in Lithuania (on Lithuania (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 230); on Latvia (Bukovskis, 2014; Austers, 2014)). It is also telling that in both Latvia and Lithuania, the government refused to hold referendums on euro adoption. Nevertheless, societal opinion does not explain shifts in the willingness to adopt the euro during or after the crisis. First, Latvians and Lithuanians did not generally become more supportive of euro adoption—most importantly, both countries' citizens preferred to delay euro adoption for as long as possible. Second, the prevailing societal opinion was similar in Latvia and Lithuania, and thus cannot account for the subsequent divergence. Third, in the Baltic countries, euro integration policies are generally an elite-driven affair, as has been the case generally in other countries (Dyson, 2008a, p. 3). In the Baltic States, this is generally true of economic affairs and of macroeconomic policy in particular.

6. DOMESTIC POLITICS: ELECTIONS, CRISIS, AND RISK-TAKING

According to Dandashly and Verdun (2010, p. 3), "for a complete understanding of the euro adoption strategy in NMS [new member states] one needs to look at the domestic political situation." (see also Dandashly, 2012). Specifically, they name "government policies, elections, electoral cycles as well as constitutional rules" as potential driving forces of euro adoption (Dandashly and Verdun, 2010, p. 3). As Dandashly and Verdun notice, this perspective might be particularly helpful in explaining "the *timing* of euro adoption" (2010, p. 8; see also Dandashly, 2012, p. 5). Drawing from this perspective, we outline how domestic politics played out in Latvia and Lithuania, leading to different levels of commitment towards euro adoption.

To begin with, one should take into account their divergent developments in terms of election dates and results. The first "crisis" government in Latvia, led by Prime Minister Godmanis, was formed in December 2007 and collapsed in March 2009 following massive protests over the government's policies. Subsequently, Dombrovskis took over as Prime Minister and won the 2010 elections as the leader of the Unity (*Vienotība*) alliance. According to Salines and Bērziņš

(2012, p. 155), "notwithstanding these stringent measures [the austerity program], Prime Minister Dombrovskis was re-elected in October 2010 with an even stronger parliamentary majority". In the 2011 Parliamentary election, Dombrovskis's party lost seats and took third place, while the ethnic Russian party, Harmony Centre (*Saskaņas Centrs*), won first place. Despite this, Dombrovskis's Unity alliance formed a coalition with a party recently founded by former President Zatlers and Dombrovskis remained Prime Minister. He remained in this position until the beginning of 2014. Thus, Dombrovskis had an opportunity to introduce the euro during his reign and claim it as his own achievement. It should also be noted that Dombrovskis was a rather exceptional figure in the Latvian political context— he was generally regarded as an honest and competent politician when politicians were generally perceived as incompetent and corrupt. Dombrovskis's re-election can be considered an approval of the government's policy. According to Šimonytė (2014), while "there had been a lot of tension with creditors and also domestically in 2009 to 2010 . . . the elections gave new breath and a new mandate to the Latvian government to finish the job". In Bukovskis's opinion, the fact that Dombrovskis kept his position and the same government remained in power after the elections greatly influenced Latvia's achievement of euro adoption in 2014 (Bukovskis, 2014). Austers and Bukovskis (2013, p. 31) observe, "Eurozone membership began to be advocated as the 'prize' for overcoming financial and economic problems through austerity". In 2012, Dombrovskis himself writes, "one of the lessons we have learned is that in every crisis situation one has to have a clear exit strategy. For us the exit strategy was and still is joining the Eurozone in 2014" (Dombrovskis, 2012b, p. 7).

In contrast, in Lithuania's first post-crisis elections in 2012, the ruling coalition that had presided over the austerity program lost to the opposition. As a result, Prime Minister Kubilius was replaced by Social Democrat Butkevičius. The prospect of the 2012 elections also led Kubilius's government to be less enthusiastic about pressing for more expenditure cuts and less willing to focus on euro adoption; given the very low approval ratings of the government and of the Prime Minister the possibility of losing power was very realistic (Swedbank Analysis, 2012, p. 2). As mentioned above, although Kubilius's government planned the 2012 budget with a deficit of under three per cent of Lithuania's GDP, it eventually turned out to be higher. Tauraitė (2013) observes, "Kubilius' government, although pro-euro, was rather reserved. Apparently, the upcoming Parliament elections and associated doubts about the continuity of policy course was one of the reasons for this". Furthermore, Social Democrats, as mentioned before, were also reluctant to give a firm opinion on euro accession before the elections and they committed to adopting the euro only after they secured power. By contrast, when Latvia applied for euro membership, some Eurozone members doubted whether Latvia should be allowed to join, and thus "[Latvia's] entry was far from assured" (Milne, 2013). It is also noteworthy that Kubilius's and Butkevičius's governments essentially did not differ in their stances regarding euro adoption, except for some radical public declarations made by certain members of Butkevičius's coalition (Šimonytė, 2014; Besagirskas, 2014).

Another factor that contributed to differing opinions regarding euro adoption in Latvia and Lithuania was a difference in how the crisis impacted them. It is true that both countries were among the hardest hit during the crisis, in 2009 their real GDPs contracted by double digits. But

the crisis in Latvia was harsher due to its higher pre-crisis vulnerabilities and the collapse of its important domestic bank, *Parex.* As a result, Latvia was forced to apply for international financial assistance, while Lithuania tested the bond market. Furthermore, Latvia was the primary object of discussion in financial circles and in the media. Paul Krugman (2008) even dubbed Latvia the "new Argentina". Political repercussions were also more pronounced in Latvia; protest activities were more intense there and their effect on the Latvian political system was greater. According to Salines and Bērziņš (2012, p. 164), "the crisis was so severe that it went beyond the economic realm to revive political fears. Many felt that the very survival of the nation was at stake, not least due to the accelerating emigration trend." Besides, "the crisis reinforced the existential doubts about the future of the nation which had fought so hard for regaining its independence and sovereignty" (Salines and Bērziņš, 2012, p. 164). The risk of devaluation and financial meltdown in Latvia was more substantial than in Lithuania, the austerity program significantly more painful. Dombrovskis (2012b, p. 8) remarks, "introduction of the euro will put an end to all speculations about devaluation of the lats". Both the objective and subjective impacts of the crisis were greater in Latvia, leading to a greater sense of vulnerability, which induced a stronger determination to seek safety within the single currency zone. Interestingly, Spendzharova has argued along similar lines on a related integration dimension, transferring the regulatory power of the financial sector to the EU level. She hypothesises that "the economic vulnerability of the region may prompt new EU Member States to be more open to supranational solutions" (Spendzharova, 2012, p. 324).

Finally, there is one more factor that dampened Lithuania's enthusiasm for adopting the euro. Lithuania's failure in its first attempt to join the Eurozone back in 2006 made Lithuanian authorities relatively more risk averse and they sought to avoid another potential embarrassment (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 233). To this day, Lithuania remains the sole country to have been denied Eurozone membership upon initial application. It is worthwhile to point out that, until the beginning of 2013, it was not clear whether Lithuania would meet the inflation criterion (Tauraitė, 2013). The fact that Lithuania eventually complied with the inflation criterion, beginning in September 2012, was due to two factors: the fall of oil prices and the EU institutions's decision to exclude Greece's inflation from their criterion value calculations (Tauraitė, 2013). Thus, Lithuanian authorities were only willing to commit to euro adoption when the probability of another failure was sufficiently low.

CONCLUSIONS

While economics sets boundaries and creates opportunities for euro adoption, ultimately the decision to enter the single currency area depends on political will. Latvia and Lithuania's experiences during the decade following their EU entrances shows that this political will—driven by opportunities created by economic conditions and by political developments, which can also to some extent influence economic conditions—wax and wane over time. While Lithuania was more eager to join the Eurozone in the early years of EU membership than Latvia was—largely as a result of favourable, though exogenously granted, economic circumstances—the economic crisis of 2008 to 2010 changed the stances of the two Baltic countries in two important ways.

First, both Latvia and Lithuania became more committed to euro adoption. Second, and even more interesting, this commitment was more evident and firmer in Latvia throughout the crisis and post-crisis years. As a result of its faster and stronger fiscal consolidation, and due to other specific policy steps, Latvia joined the Eurozone in 2014. Euro adoption served as Latvia's "exit" strategy from the harsh crisis and years of austerity. Lithuania only joined a year later, in 2015. Prior to the beginning of 2013, Lithuania made no firm commitment to an exact euro adoption date; furthermore, Lithuania did not undertake "precautionary" measures to maximize its chance to adopt the euro.

This empirical case of the Baltic countries demonstrates the limits of: economic-structural arguments based on OCA theory, interest group preference interpretation, the influence of identity, and geopolitical considerations. These factors are by no means irrelevant. In fact, one could make a strong case that the relative smallness and openness of the Baltic economies, their generally Western orientations, and their geopolitical insecurity explain why Latvia and Lithuania (and Estonia) have generally been more in favour of euro adoption than most other new member states. Nevertheless, these approaches do not explain Latvia and Lithuania's fluctuations in their willingness to adopt the euro; and most importantly, do not uncover Latvia and Lithuania's different euro adoption paths during and after the economic crisis of 2008 to 2010. To reach a convincing explanation, one needs to look at domestic politics, namely electoral processes combined with the impact of the crisis. Our conclusions are thus in support of those authors who call for more focus on domestic political situations to explain preferences for and the timings of euro accession (Dandashly and Verdun, 2010; Dandashly, 2012; Dyson, 2008b).

Based on our analysis in this article, we suggest focusing more on the roles of crises in future scholarship. Economic crises can affect euro adoption in a complex manner. First, and most obviously, they can shape the nature of bids for euro adoption. As the Latvian and Lithuanian cases demonstrate, the economic crisis made it much easier for these countries to meet the inflation criterion, but at the same time, a new challenge of fulfilling fiscal requirements arose. Second, economic crises can strengthen a country's resolve to accede to the Eurozone. Both Latvia and Lithuania demonstrated a firmer willingness to adopt the euro during the crisis, and Latvia was the more eager of the two. This could in turn be attributed to the more substantial impact of the crisis in Latvia. In contrast, other countries—such as Poland and the Czech Republic—who suffered much less from the downturn have since communicated reluctance regarding Eurozone membership (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 208; Dandashly, 2012, pp. 252–254). Third, economic crises can bring about the need for fiscal consolidation. Austerity enables a country to fulfil euro adoption criteria by reducing public deficit, debt, and possibly inflation—with euro entrance as both a prize for the political leaders in power and a marking of the end of anti-crisis policy.

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INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM FACADE DEMOCRACIES TO VELVET DICTATORSHIPS

Attila Ágh

ABSTRACT

Brexit and Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 US presidential election has launched a wave of discussions in the international media and political science literature on "authoritarian populism" and a "populist explosion." Although this paper also reflects on this new wave of populism in the West, it concentrates on the connections between democracy's decline and the so-called populist explosion in eastern central Europe (ECE) and closely investigates the Hungarian case within the context of ECE. This paper describes populism in ECE as a product of the transition from fading facade democracies to emerging velvet dictatorships. These velvet dictatorships rely on the soft power of media and communication rather on the hard power of state violence. Paradoxically, the ruling anti-elite populist parties have developed a system of populism from above, managed by the new politico-business elite. Populism (social and national) and Euroscepticism are the two most basic, and twin, terms used to describe these new (semi)authoritarian regimes. Populism and Euroscepticism are convertible; they are two sides of the same coin as they express the same divergence from the EU mainstream. Therefore, this paper introduces the term: Eupopulism.
Key words: *decline of democracy, comparative ECE populism, three periods and types of populism*

INTRODUCTION: INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

Populism's many faces change within different socio-political environments, therefore it is very difficult to give a comprehensive definition of populism. All approaches to populism, however, converge at a general condition for populism: two homogeneous and antagonistic groups—the "pure" people and the "corrupt" elite—face off in a political contest based on this people-versus-elite dichotomy. In this Manichaean vision of society, a decision-making shortcut between the people and the elite emerges in the form of a charismatic and honest leader, who with sizeable popular support, makes all decisions—eliminating the need for the intermediary institutions as the general will of the people is evident. Populism is messianic, the charismatic leader offers salvation to the people by defeating society's internal and external so-called enemies. "Although vague and ill-defined, the concept of 'populism' does a better job than

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any other currently circulating well-defined concepts of capturing the nature of the challenges facing liberal democracy today." (Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p.7). Thus, there is a paradox in the academic research: despite the large amount of literature on populism, content on populism's nature is missing or minimal. Because populism is a *thin* and eclectic ideology, it can easily be combined with *thicker* ideological counterparts such as conservatism, liberalism, and socialism.[1]

Populist parties can be analysed more deeply by examining the contrasts between responsive and responsible parties, between short-term and long-term approaches, and between direct political action and strategic vision (Bardi et. al, 2014). Actually, according to the seminal work of Mény and Surel (2002), populism is a pathology of representative democracy because populism always reveals the primary national and regional deficiencies of a representative democracy. As most studies mention, populism is difficult to conceptualize because its varieties depends on context, time, and local conditions.[2]

As populism has a different form for every period of democratic malaise and a face specific to different countries, regions, and continents, and as the definitions and descriptions of populism as a pathology hinge on the standards of democracy in a given period and reflect the features of a particular country or region, this paper—though it relies on mainstream literature on populism—deals only with populism particular to ECE.[3]

Populism has been a megatrend in eastern central Europe since the onset of systemic changes in the region in 1989. Populism has been, to some extent, an endemic feature of all parties in the region—including the mainstream parties—and reached its peak in the populism-from-above of the currently ruling parties. The basic statement of this paper is that the main reason behind ECE's populism is the region's failure to catch up to the West and "return to Europe." This unsuccessful attempt to achieve the so-called central European dream (Darvas, 2014) has defined the region's last quarter century. In reaction to the global crisis, "countries like Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and [the] Czech Republic appeared to take a 'populist turn' . . . the incidents of threats to the EU's democratic principles and values has increased" (EPC Discussion Paper, Balfour and Stratulat, 2012, p. 2). Hence, the populist drug has been instrumental to the ECE's survival of a long triple-crisis and to bridging the gap between unrealistic expectations

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[1]   As Richard Youngs indicates, we have to "reframe the debate on populism" after its victory in the United Kingdom and United States. On the new wave, see Judis (2016a,b) and Mishra (2016). There have also been two waves of politics of memory in the West, first Patterson and Monroe (1998) and Winter (1998), and second, Lebow et. al. (eds) (2006), Mark (2010) and Blacker et al.(2013).

[2]   From the massive collection of Western mainstream literature on populism, see Barr (2009), Chwalisz (2015), Degan-Krause and Haughton (2009), Giusto et al. (2013), Haughton (2014), Herman (2015), Kessels (2015), Krastev (2007), Kriesi (2014), Kriesi and Pappas (2015), Laclau (2007), Ladrech (2014), Lewis (2014), Mair (2002), Mény and Surel (2002), Mudde (2002,2007), Painter (2013), Pytlas (2016), Rupnik (2007a,b), Wolinetz and Zaslove (2016), and Woods (2014). The academic history of populism since the late 1960s has been presented by Pappas (2015). For international literature on ECE, and on populist parties, see Cabada et al. (2014), Casal Bértoa (2012), Gherghina (2014), Haughton (2014), Kopecky et al. (2012), Lewis (2014), and Sedelmeier (2014).

[3]   The populist drive has been stronger in ECE than in the Baltic states, since the latter have been much more internationally competitive, as indicated by ranking institutes like Bertelsmann and others. The Baltic states have not suffered from a decline in democracy to that extent that ECE's states have. Unlike ECE's states, the Baltic states still stand a reasonable chance of integrating into the European core. Thus, this paper deals only with five ECE states and focuses on the Hungarian case, which has been regarded as the worst case by international political scientists and the media (BF, 2016a,b).

and the region's worsening realities. ECE's populism has been an international and domestic product of at least two of the West's fallacies: 1) that traveling the road to the West would be an easy journey; and 2) that ECE's states would rise from Soviet repression ready to become European overnight with the same ease that Sleeping Beauty awoke from the witch's spell.[4]

Populism may be an important feature of the party system in the West, but it has been much more influential in eastern central Europe where there has been a megatrend in party development due to ECE's populations' high and unmet expectations. In fact, eastern central Europe was a semi-periphery of western Europe for centuries and, after regaining independence from Soviet repression, the region has indeed "returned to Europe," but only with a new form of semi-peripheral status. Increasing populism in ECE is the political price the region has paid for its transition from socialism to various forms of semi-western market economies and formal-legal macro-democracies. Thus, this paper will not engage in a discussion on the definition of populism in general, but it will pursue the specificities of populism in ECE. This paper contributes to the rich academic literature on populism in ECE by both widening the topic first to the ECE's general features based on the region's common historical trajectory, and by narrowing the topic later to describe the successive stages and types populism.

Of course, populism is not a new phenomenon in ECE, populism has a long history in the region and its path, characteristically, includes many forms of populist movements and narratives. ECE's populism—or the populism of individual countries in ECE—is an organic extension of traditional forms of populism from the region's former periods. The region's historical turning point occurred around the late 1980s and early 1990s. The collapse of the bipolar world rendered systemic change in the region that were so drastic a new kind of populism was born. A new period of hopes and expectations began and the path dependence motives returned with a vengeance. I will discuss this return-to-history scenario, in lieu of a return-to-Europe scenario, as the re-emergence of a traditional narrative articulated in the region's new situation. The path dependence motives, however, just scratch the surface in reframing this narrative as a freedom fight against the EU (Orbán, 2016), which is evident in the absolutely new approach of confrontational, anti-EU, hard populism.

Finally, ECE's case demonstrates how populism traditionalizes an anti-EU narrative with soft power by manipulating the masses with simplistic traditionalizing narratives—the main weapons of populist parties and actors, both oppositional and in government. The populist parties in ECE are often prisoners of history, they use the politics of historical memory as their main ideological weapon in domestic politics. After the so-called illiberal turn (Rupnik, 2012), the newly emerging velvet dictatorships have been modernized. Hence, as Smilov and Krastev point out, instead of using physical violence, their main instrument of repression is the capture and abuse of soft-power: "There are certain long-term changes in the political process, which

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[4]   This paper follows my recent publications on ECE (Ágh, 2015a,b, 2016a,b). I do not deal here with the socio-economic causes of increasing populism, I have written a series of papers on the triple crisis (transformation crisis in 1990s, post-accession crisis in 2000s and global crisis in 2010s) and ECE's failures in the catching-up process in socio-economic and competitiveness terms (see Ágh 2015c). Data on the general impoverishment in ECE due to the global crisis are available in IMF (2014, 2016) and ILO (2016). The democratic malaise in ECE can also be seen in Pew survey results (2009, 2014, 2016).

seem to facilitate the spread of populism. First, politics has become much more media-centred and personalized. The importance of loyalty to ideas and programs is diminishing . . . Populist parties, with their focus on communications and personalities, are much better suited for such an environment, than 'traditional' parties . . . it has almost made the concept of [a] 'party program' devoid of meaning" (2008, p. 10).

Even democracy itself has been included in the simplistic traditionalizing narratives incumbent ECE governments frequently abuse. The ruling politico-business elites have narrowly defined democracy as a government with free elections, despite the fact that the most recent elections in Hungary, in 2014, may have been free, but they were certainly not fair. At every step of the decision-making process, ECE's governments seem to argue, "We are entitled to make this decision because we won the election and this is a democracy." Therefore, ECE's populations are understandably suspicious of democracy and may be thinking, "If this system of governance is democracy, I don't like it." It is no wonder that ECE's populations have serious reservations about their experiences with such so-called democracies. These formal, electoral democracies, instead of have becoming substantial liberal democracies, have turned into facades of democracy.[5]

1. SOFT AND HARD POPULISM: PERIODS AND TYPES OF POPULISM IN ECE

ECE's populism departs from general populism's people-versus-elite dichotomy and Manichaean approach to political contestation in a manner specific to the region's historical trajectory and to the emergence of ECE's facade democracies over the last quarter-century. The issue most specific to populism in ECE is the merging of political elites and business elites that resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of political actors, a narrowing of the very sphere of politics, oligarchization, and state capture. Accordingly, there are three forms and *periods* of populism in ECE—shy, soft, and hard-populism—following the reduction of politics. And there are three main *types* of populism, marginal, business-centred, and the politics-centred, which follow specific forms of oligarchization in a given country in ECE.

I apply the term *shy populism* to describe the ECE's first period of populism in the 1990s when a naïve optimism dominated public discourse and populism was weak and marginal. The distinction between soft and hard populism in ECE dates back to the 2000s. "Soft populism is the challenge to the existing system of representation and mainly to existing party system . . . Hard populism is characterized by more severe threats to the constitutional framework: it challenges not only the existing structure of representation but also some of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy such as the protection of individual and minority rights, etc," (Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p. 9). Usually, the dividing line between soft and hard populism is rather fluid, the ECE's parties move back and forth across the grey zone between populist and non-populist actions. Hence in general, all parties are populist to some extent.[6]

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[5]   *The Journal of Democracy* has published a series of special issues on democratic backsliding , see 27(1), January 2016. The term *free but not fair* has been used to describe elections by experts (see Mudde, 2014), and also by official institutions, such as the Council of Europe (Muiznieks, 2014) and OSCE (2014).

[6]   I do not deal here with the early form of shy, marginal, and weak populism in the 1990s, when there was still belief in an upcoming horn of plenty, since the deviation from the EU mainstream basically began in the late

Before the global economic crisis, there was a wide range of grey, in-between positions instead of polar cases. But after the crisis, there have been clear, classic moves from soft to hard populism. Thus, soft and hard populism have to be distinguished not only analytically, but also historically. Soft populism emerged with its deep people-versus-elite dichotomy due to the narrowing of the political arena. This reduction in politics was due to the socio-economically based exclusion of the masses from politics, which also led to partocracy. Finally, the emergence of hard populism—in the region's third period of populism—and the rise of an aggressive populist elite is strongly connected to the protracted global economic crisis, which contributed to the people's deep dissatisfaction with an impotent political elite. In the Polish and Hungarian cases, hard populism has appeared in its classic form in response to the global economic crisis; whereas in the Czech and Slovak cases, soft populism didn't harden until the 2010s. Altogether, since the early 2010s, mainstream analysts have pointed out a common tendency towards populism in ECE, a populism that shares a common essence but varies by individual country (EPC, 2012; EPC, 2016).[7]

These three periods of populism have been closely connected with the types of populism in ECE. Abby Innes's analysis of the various types of populism in ECE contributes to descriptions of the present period of populism. Specifically, Innes identifies two types of political developments in ECE. In a corporate state capture, economic motivations dominate and powerful corporations and almighty oligarchs appear on the political scene rather directly—as they did in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia—and produce business-centred populism. In this model, neither party politicians nor oligarchs endeavour to make long-term ideological changes to the state machinery as an expression of their values and expectations, but instead strive to institute short-term, rent- or profit-seeking changes driven to the fore by business oligarchs active on the political scene. In Innes's opposite model, party state capture, political motivations drive the new elite. In this scenario, parties want long-term control of state machinery in order to transform the state according to their values and expectations. Poland and Hungary have produced politics-centred populism. In Slovakia, the ruling Social Democratic party, Smer-SD, tried to build a closer version of the "political" populism, but this attempt failed at the March 2016 elections. In this model, oligarchs are less prominent and less likely to play direct political roles, but they enjoy the privileges of state capture nevertheless. Rent- or profit-seeking drives appear first in domination over the state. Therefore, "the EU's leverage is necessarily limited in the cases of party state capture" (Innes, 2014, p. 101).

In my view, the common denominator shared by party state captures and corporate state captures is *democracy capture*, which occurs when the dominant parties in the hegemonic

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1990s with soft- and hard-populism. I have analysed the ECE countries here using the term *facade democracy*, which has been widely used in international political science, and I have introduced the term *Golem parties* to describe political organizations that extend into or capture large parts of the economy and the media.

[7]   Increasing populism in ECE has been analysed extensively, see Meseznikov et al. (2008), in which the authors treat ECE's populism as a region-specific political issue, rather different from that of other regions and continents. There are some recent papers on the populism written by Bugaric (2008) and Enyedi (2015, 2016a,b). The Policy Solutions Institute has also published a general report on ECE (2015). Bertelsmann's report on the Czech Republic (pp. 2,4) points out that "the increasing public disenchantment with political parties" leads to "the fluidity of party system." The report describes President Zeman as the main figure of populist politics. See also, Klíma (2015).

party system abuse their majority to legally transform the democratic polity into a facade democracy. This democracy capture has recently appeared in ECE as a form of populism from above. In these appearances, strong elite rulers transform the basic social, economic, and political structures and colonize civil society in a "society capture." The current governments in ECE have been based on tight networks formed by a joint politico-business elite, a privileged political class with tough party discipline and high incomes. These joint politico-business elites have organized statocracies. The statocracizing of populist democracy has been based on nativist state capitalism, state capitalism combined with a parasitic national capitalism created by drastically intervening with the market economy. There have been many detailed analyses on the oligarchization of market economies and emerging negative informal institutions comprising a large clientele for joint political and business networks, resulting in the uncontested rule of a power-hungry politico-business elite. This nationalist anti-elite ideology, in fact, represents and defends its own elite rule with unlimited power, as checks and balances have been reduced to a mere facade. There has been a wide variety of populist parties and movements, populism has increased in all countries in ECE. All in all, populism has been a megatrend in ECE, accompanied by its twin process, Euroscepticism.[8]

In general, the deepening socio-economic crisis has led to "populist polarization" in ECE (Enyedi, 2016a,b). One objective of populism is to provide a strong, charismatic leader with unquestionable authority with an enemy—the incumbent elite or foreigners—for political exploitation in black-and-white populist narratives. ECE's countries' failure to catch up in the EU has become clearer given global crisis management in these countries and has been the driving force of populism nowadays. Consequently, serious conflicts between the EU and domestic ruling populist elites in ECE have surfaced. Hence, the new politico-business elites have found images of an enemy inside the country and also outside the country: the EU. Again, populism and Euroscepticism are twin phenomena, since it is particularly true in ECE that "populists can easily project these problems onto 'Europe,' which in this case merely represents fear of the outside world in general . . . What has taken the form of an anti-EU vote constitutes in reality a protest against socio-economic problems at home" (Gros, 2014, pp. 2-3). Populism has emerged basically, although not exclusively, as Eupopulism, an anti-EU movement and mentality: "On both sides, an increasing national focus and a rise in populism as well as anti-EU sentiment are evident in all parts of society. The EU is more and more perceived as a problem. The weakest hold that the EU, and especially core countries in the euro zone, are imposing too much on them and asking too much from them." (Emmanouilidis, 2011, p. 13).

As usual, the ruling populist parties try to divert the political agenda from vital socio-economic issues to nationalist-nativist narratives about refugees and international conspiracy theories. Above all, the populist governments thrive on international crises, times when it is

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[8]   Policy Solutions (2015, pp. 26-30) counters that in 2014 and 2015 support for populist parties increased and explicitly named ECE's relevant populist parties: HU 72% (Fidesz and Jobbik); CZ 48.2% (Czech Communist Party, Party of Free Citizens, Dawn-National Coalition, Freedom and Direct Democracy, and ANO 2011); PL 51.18% (Law and Justice, Congress of the New Right, Kukiz, Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic), SK 7.1% (Slovak National Party, but Smer is not included).

easy to find enemies. Recently, new issues have come up such as anti-refugee rhetoric in a campaign allegedly defending a country—or sometimes more generally, Europe as a whole—from Muslim arch-enemies or from inevitable invasions due to the declining West's inability to protect a country or Europe. It proves that, even in the present period, the governments in ECE have been successful in getting popular support by opening or closing new issue niches, by entering issue niches into the political arena or by supporting niche actors with the ownership of resonant frames.[9] Lubomir Zaorálek, the Czech minister of foreign affairs rightly notes:

> In today's jarred climate, no member state is immune to the temptations of inward-looking populism, though it may feed off different sources and manifest itself in different forms. In Central Europe, the legacy of communist rule casts a long shadow— but so do the mistakes of the transition period, with its overreliance on technocratic modes of change, often at the expense of social cohesion, inclusive development and democratic accountability. It has left too many of our citizens on the losing side of economic transformation, alienated from what they perceive as a closed system shot through with corruption. In today's time of distress and uncertainty, past failures are coming back to haunt us, empowering far-right extremists, polarizing our societies and undermining trust in Europe's liberal order" (2016, p. 2).

In the political turmoil in east central Europe, populists often win elections easily by mobilizing public support with simplistic populist slogans. The people, enchanted by messianic populist appeals, distance themselves from parties that do not use populist slogans. A closer analysis of the periods and types of populism in ECE leads to a discussion of the weak and volatile party systems in ECE; Eupopulism as a megatrend has penetrated the political system as a whole in ECE, although it characterizes the ECE countries to different extents and in various ways. This common populist disease can be seen in oppositions to the EU mainstream in the refugee crisis, such as the V4 Prague Declaration (2015).

2. CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND VICTORIOUS POPULIST-PROTEST PARTIES IN ECE

The countries in ECE had not fully completed their process of adjusting to EU membership when the global economic crisis struck. Because the crisis closely followed their EU accessions, the global crisis hit ECE's countries harder. There, the crisis provoked popular dissatisfaction, giving populist parties an edge in ECE. In the last decade, increasing populism has also led to the rise of Eurosceptic parties. In the three European Parliament (EP) elections held in ECE—in 2004, 2009, and 2014—five countries in ECE sent a total of forty-three parties to EP seats. ECE's representation of mainstream party members in the European Parliament (MEPs) is relatively small, only about half (123 of 237)mainstream MEPS hail from ECE. These numbers reveal a tsunami of small populist-protest parties winning EP elections and clearly show a Eupopulism trend. The basic issue, from a bird's-eye view of ECE's historical

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[9]   The protracted social crisis has created a high level of xenophobia in ECE. Two Hungarian institutes, Political Capital (see www.politicalcapital.hu) and Policy Solutions (see www.policysolutions.hu), have been deeply involved in international research on DEREX (Demand for Right-Wing Extremism, see www.derexindex.eu) and published many papers on extreme-right parties, including Jobbik.

trajectory is the decreasing popularity of political elites and low participation in elections with very high party volatility.[10]

The West's usual typologies of parties and party systems do not work in ECE, and a formal-legal approach to the region's narrow political history does not help either, since the historical trajectory of countries in ECE has been determined to a great extent by the socio-economic history of the region. It is important to identify the special role parties and party systems have played in ECE during its quarter-century of systemic changes. After the first decade of EU membership, countries in ECE had still not effectively institutionalized parties as the main actors of both representative and participative democracy. All of the eastern central European countries' formal-legal institutions have been built like sand palaces—without solid social backing or patterns of civic culture. When these countries failed to achieve unrealistically high expectations, of some kind of welfare society, national-social populism offered the population a mirage of a new age and ideological drugs as recompensation. Thus, in ECE, the population's perceived reality differs very much from the genuine socio-economic reality, and this contrast between dream and actuality grew during the region's first decade of EU membership. In the EU, a deep democratic malaise has appeared in both the so-called East and in the West, but in very different ways. ECE has been haunted by the nightmarish and increasing gap between the core and the periphery and by the threat of deepening peripherialization. Hence, the region's disappointment over not being able to easily and rapidly catch up during the global crisis has led to much deeper democratic malaise in ECE than in the West.

EU membership in ECE brought a series of achievements, but it also caused region-specific negative externalities. First of all, the eastern enlargement developed dependency by closely integrating ECE's production structures to the West. The East has become an economic semi-periphery of the near West, especially of Germany and Austria (Galgóczi, 2016). This semi-peripheral status has produced marked underdevelopment by creating islands of poverty within eastern central Europe's countries. The countries are deeply divided internally between their developing, modern regions and their backward, declining regions. A crucial issue for ECE is internal and territorial social cohesion; these countries need to be closely integrated not only with the EU, but also to unite their own modernized and backward regions. The rise of national-social populism as a megatrend in ECE is based on deepening social-vertical and national-horizontal splits within ECE. Simply put, ECE's democratic malaise has been caused by the profound social malaise of the last quarter-century.[11]

Thus, in the new political geography, ECE's countries have been splitting into two groups: the west of the East and the east of the East. The former achieved some kind of western

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[10]   I provide only a rough estimation, since it is rather difficult both to identify the long-term mainstream parties in ECE—given that there has been a drastic change among the leading parties—and to qualify the short-term, smaller parties getting EP seats. Yet, this changing party landscape shows the fragility of the EP's representation of mainstream parties and the relatively large representation of changing, smaller populist parties.

[11]   Many policy institutes—Bertelsmann (2016a,b), European Catching Up Index (2014) and FH, 2016—have analysed this contrast between the formal and substantive democratization in ECE. Ten years of EU membership has been evaluated in the introduction of Rupnik and Zielonka 's work (2013). See also Banac (2014). There are also some analyses emphasizing the lack of participatory democracy in ECE, see the chapter by Cabada in Demetriou (2013), and see Bugaric (2008).

development, and relatively speaking, is catching up. The latter group, however, has absolutely declined. The east of the East has lost its competitiveness, experienced high unemployment, and witnessed a worsening standard of living. Furthermore, national statistics relate wide territorial polarization there. Therefore, a distinction is needed to identify the relative and fragile—precarious—satisfaction of ECE's populations in the west of the East and the deep dissatisfaction of eastern central Europe's populations in the east of the East. Nonetheless, given this political geography, the general disappointment of ECE's populations after ten years of EU membership has determined domestic party landscapes. This basic domestic territorial and social divergence has also been responsible for the distinctions between the soft and hard social movements, parties, and ideologies in the west of the East versus those of the east of the East within ECE's countries. These differences can be easily detected on the countries' electoral maps through the varieties of populism and Euroscepticism at national and EP elections. The hard populist and Eurosceptic parties have found popular support in the east of the East among the region's so-called absolute losers, the unemployed. The soft populist and Eurosceptic parties in the west of the East are supported by the so-called relative losers: the declassed middle strata. This can be seen best on the electoral maps of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, which are completely partitioned between East and West. All in all, due to the global crisis, ECE's populations have generally been living in a state of permanent insecurity in these precarious countries and there is an increasingly real precariate class or strata in the middle (ILO, 2016).

Actually, to discover the secret history of ECE, one has to identify the political actors and define the parties and party systems in ECE in a manner that diverges from the standard definitions in the West. This history can be described as a negative tendency towards the emergence of Golem parties in hegemonic party systems. These strong parties have been the most relevant actors in the young, declining democracies in the last quarter-century of ECE's history. The particular features of the parties, and their hegemonic party systems dominated by the strongest—by Golem parties—have structured political and social life as a whole. They have appeared in different ways in ECE's countries as dominant actors of party landscapes. The biggest eastern central European parties, as monopolistic political actors, have become almighty, comprehensive social actors with large, strong, informal networks. These parties have also embraced the economy and media in a close merger between politics and business (see Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). Golem parties have created well-working country-size corruption networks based on public procurement and EU transfers. In this way, Golem parties have to a great extent controlled paralysed societies. Moreover, in systems of crony capitalism (The Economist, 2014a), Golem parties have organized their own special pseudo-civil society from above as well as a domestication of civil society. The social embeddedness of all of ECE's parties has been very weak, hence socially and ideologically "unanchored political elites" have emerged and been controlled, to a great extent, by business oligarchs (Herman, 2015).

The large formal institutions—including parties as far as membership and relations to civil society and its organizations is concerned—have been organized without social support and participation. Therefore, paradoxically, the most institutionalized party systems are the most unstable. As Golem parties neglect support of their membership more and more, the

formal stabilization of party systems into huge parties actually means the cumulative social destabilization of party-political systems in ECE. From the outside, party hegemons or Golem parties look like big, strong, well-organized parties; in fact, they are cadre parties appointing only loyal followers to public posts and they lose public support at critical elections due to undelivered promises and high levels of corruption. In general, there has been an increasing alienation of the common people from the world of political promises and a growing lack of confidence in public institutions, parties, parliaments, and governments. As a result, due to cumulated social tensions, new parties appear abruptly in the old party systems. These critical parties—as deviations from mainstream parties—now represent a political reaction to the management of the global economic crisis, they express the masses' suffering from the full, long-term effects of a triple crisis. The low levels of trust in the new democratic institutions—and above all in the parties—have generated their long-standing, cumulative negative effects.[12]

Although populists usually appeal to "the people" as a whole, as opposed to the corrupt and impotent elites, the populist parties do not appear only in oppositional roles. Populists offer an alternative to representative democracy in the form of strong-handed majoritarian rule and they propagate the belief that supporting the majority at elections gives government a free hand in decision-making. Therefore, populists oppose minority rights and interest intermediation. Paradoxically, populism, as an anti-elite movement and ideology, tries to establish an exclusive elite rule with a strong leader and a disempowered population. Populist parties and leaders refer to the people's opposition against an impotent and corrupt elite, but actually they want to become the new elite and consolidate a new elite position. Thus, "central European populism is a longing for *new elites*." (Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p. 10). Since populist parties also attract some traditional left-wing voters during periods of austerity, they have been very successful in ECE in gaining power with large-scale victories and have formed a new political elite.

From the late 2000s onward, the outbursts of populist protest and the rise of anomic movements have, more and more, taken the form of demonstrations led by extreme-right organizations. This negative tendency reached its peak in the 2010s with the emergence of all sorts of populist and extremist organizations and the volcanic appearance of protest parties. In the 2010s, the socio-economic shock of the global crisis contributed to a prolonged party-political crisis in ECE with these Golem-type parties. Under the pressure of crisis management the first party system eroded in the 2000s and due to the large popular dissatisfaction, it finally collapsed in the 2010s. But efforts to organize hegemonic, Golem parties have continued after ECE's critical elections, and the new, second party system emerged. This recent political crisis has been based on the worsening social crisis—impoverishment and social exclusion has led to social populism—from below and has culminated in the deepening identity crisis—renationalization

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[12]   The rankings of public trust in politicians in ECE are among the worst globally (of 144 countries): CZ: 138, HU: 113, PL: 101, SI: 133 and SK: 121 (WEF, 2015: 409). Accordingly, there was very low turnout in ECE at the 2004, 2009, and 2014 EP elections, the participation was 27.9-28.2-18.2; 38.4-36.2-28.9; 20.8-24.5-23.8; 28.3-28.3-20.9 and 16.9-19.6-13.0 per cent in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia respectively.

and xenophobia leading to national populism—from above. Indeed, the political science on ECE's party developments is a dismal science as this short overview of ECE's party systems clearly demonstrates.[13]

3. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO: THE HUNGARIAN DISEASE OR POPULISM FROM ABOVE

This course from aggressive opposition to a newly entrenched political elite is clearly demonstrated by the Hungarian case, in Hungary the global crisis led to a complete populist victory during the second and third Orbán governments. Hungary has been a worst case scenario, not only in illustrating democracy's decline in general, but particularly in establishing an enduring and fake populist democracy. Hungary's socio-economic crisis caused lagging confidence in the political elite and the mainstream's lack of trust in Hungary's democratic parties when these parties proved they were unable to manage neither the situation nor the global crisis and failed to deliver on their promises. Accordingly, Hungary's triple crisis brought three populist waves in Hungary. In the first period, in the 1990s, the transformation crisis produced widespread social shock and dissatisfaction with the new democracy, which—in the early years—resulted in only shy or marginal populism in Hungary. However, by the second period, at the end of the decade, Hungary's failure to achieve unrealistically high expectations brought the first Orbán government to power, resulting in an authoritarian attempt at light or soft populism. Because Orbán formed a coalition government, that from 1998 to 2002, had only a relative majority with limited power, he could not transform the constitutional order. In the 2000s, however, the post-accession crisis contributed to a much larger populist mobilization during the Socialist-Liberal coalition governments of 2002 to 2010. Fidesz was in opposition, but this stage of populist mass mobilization was a very important preparation period for a *complete* populist takeover orchestrated through both social referendum, street violence, and the organization of so-called civil circles as mobilization devices directed against the incumbent government.[14]

In the late 2000s, due to post-accession and the onset of the global economic crisis, Hungary's large, formally well-institutionalized, but socially weak, democratic parties collapsed. Thus, Hungary demonstrated clearly the ECE paradox: the most institutionalized party systems become the most destabilized political systems. On this period, Renata Uitz notes: "What makes the Hungarian case interesting is that populist devices are not used by newcomers or fringe parties to mobilize support in order to gain entry to mainstream politics. Rather, in the present day Hungary populist rhetoric is a means of communication for a large parliamentary party which resorts to this instrument not simply as a campaign device but also as a technique replacing—at least at one level of communication—the usual arsenal of opposition in everyday

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[13]   The cases of politics-centred hard populism in Poland and Hungary are parallel developments according to the international media. See the discussion on the Orbán-Kaczynski meeting and of a counter-cultural revolution against old Europe in *The Financial Times* (Foy and Buckley, 2016), or see Pytlas (2016) on Polish populism. I recently dealt with the parallel developments in Poland and Hungary (Ágh, 2016c,d).

[14]   Here I summarize briefly the Hungarian developments. It is not by chance that Pappas (2014, 2015) has made a parallel analysis of the Hungarian and Greek populism, both cases are outstanding. As I have mentioned in my former papers, many analysts consider Hungary the worst case of populism in ECE.

parliamentary parties" (Uitz, 2008, p. 69). In this decade of aggressive populist mobilization, Fidesz—as an allegedly centre-right party—embraced and supported Jobbik by absorbing the narratives and slogans of the extreme right. Characteristically, Viktor Orbán and Gábor Vona, the presidents of Fidesz and Jobbik, come from the same cradle, from the same civil circle of populist organizations of the 2000s.[15]

As a result, in the third period, the velvet dictatorship has emerged as a full-fledged, hard-populist democracy. Nowadays, Hungary has a quasi one-party system, and as Fidesz has over-institutionalized, its party institutions are almost direct state and government institutions. All of Hungary's other parties are weak and hardly institutionalized at all. The turning point for Hungarian populism occurred in 2010 when Fidesz received a two-thirds supermajority and the second Orbán government ruined democratic and constitutional checks and balances. This historical turning point can be modelled according to distinctions between soft and hard populism. Usually, the dividing line between soft and hard populism in ECE is rather fluid, but this transition between the second and third waves of populism in Hungary in 2010 destroyed the liberal democracy. Because Hungary experienced the region's deepest social crisis, which resulted in the largest populist victory in ECE, the Hungarian case demonstrates the strongest populist course to power. Fidesz controls a large part of the economy through voluntarist legislation and by increasing state property, Fidesz also controls the economy by wielding hard political power and by using soft power in the media. Orbán—and the Fidesz regime in general—claim to be centre-right national-conservatives, but these terms do not fit Orbán or his regime. In fact, centre-right conservatives, preferring some kind of the West's Christian-democratic line, were shocked by Orbán's second government in 2010. These centre-right conservatives, referred to in the Hungarian media as "orphaned conservatives" (Lantos, 2011), turned more and more against the Orbán regime before they finally publicly denounced Orbán's populism (Dull, 2016).[16]

The Hungarian population tolerates a high level of cognitive dissonance; Hungarians are proud of being European and support Hungary's EU membership, but they are also ready to blame the EU for the country's socio-economic and political malaise. Fidesz has produced Janus-faced narratives attacking the EU and defending Europe. Calls for a "freedom fight against the EU" defined populists' slogans in Hungary during the Orbán governments, which have become the model cases illustrating the increase in populism in ECE. In the speech Orbán delivered on Hungary's national holiday, 15 March 2016, Orbán—in the spirit of Eupopulism—extended

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[15]   Actually, in the 2000s Fidesz and Jobbik were close allies. Jobbik organized aggressive and violent street demonstrations, and Fidesz tacitly, behind the scenes, and indirectly supported them: "While street violence in the evenings was at its height in Budapest, Fidesz was calling mass demonstrations in Budapest during the afternoons . . . Throughout these days the reluctance of Fidesz to distance itself from rioters or from street riots was prevalent, with a well pronounced right-radical-right leaning" (Uitz, 2008, pp. 61-62).

[16]   Viktor Orbán has been the central figure of Hungarian populism and his most resonant declarations have voiced his support for "illiberal democracy" and "the decline of the West," (2014,2015). After autocracy was elected, there was a great deal of reflection on Orbán in the media, see for instance Benner and Reinicke (2014), Bouillette (2014), Müller (2015), Nowak (2014), and *The Economist* (2014b). Orbán has been presented in the international press as the most important anti-EU actor in the refugee crisis, as "dictator light", and as the model of divergence from European solidarity (on Orbán's role as a "troublemaker" in the refugee crisis see EPC, 2016).

a black-and-white populist model of the deep divide between the interests of the innocent people and the interests of the impotent elite, from the domestic level to the EU level. Orbán emphasized that the European population had fallen victim to the irresponsible EU elite's mishandling of the refugee crisis, and he offered himself as a protector of the victimised European population (Orbán, 2016).[17]

Populist strategies are working well in elections and usually opt for slogans over programs; for instance Fidesz's so-called electoral program, conceived in 2010, was a populist holy trinity: "work, family and order" (Fidesz, 2010). After winning the 2010 and 2014 elections, according to the operational logic of ruling populist elites, Fidesz drastically restricted the legitimate participation of political rivals in the public and political sectors by using legal-political, economic-financial, and media instruments to strictly limit the actions of other political parties, political actors, and civil organizations. After the "octroy," imposed upon the constitution in 2011—given manipulated electoral law and a captured media, Fidesz neglected to even concoct a populist electoral program. Instead, in 2014, the party simply declared "we continue." The soft power of populist narratives had worked very well during the party's governance. Fidesz's narrative technique served to deepen the polarization of society, in which the socio-cultural frames of identity issues have replaced or derailed economic arguments about the pauperization of Hungarian society in the early 2010s.[18]

In the Hungarian case, the traditional return-to-history scenario instead of a modern return-to-Europe scenario represents a basic populist soft-power narrative technique: reinventing the past. As the title of the article in the *Financial Times* by Norweigian minister Vidar Helgesen (2014), indicates, the Orbán government's rule is indeed "Hungary's journey back into past." ECE's common narratives are best illustrated by Fidesz's national-nativist and anti-European narratives. The narratives reveal how public discourse is blanketed in historical myths that point to Trianon (the peace treaty signed after WWI in which Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory) as the main source of Hungary's national trauma. Fidesz—and the even more the extreme-right Jobbik—is warning the people of a second Trianon, instigated by Hungary's domestic and international enemies in the EU. This age-old nativist narrative, retold by Fidesz, is a politicized myth—a fairy tale of *Great Hungary* and a history that never was—based on a nineteenth-century type of national mythology (Ádám and Bozóki, 2011). In the international arena, Fidesz's narratives try to create a nativist-nationalist collective identity of Hungarians countering their strong European identity. At the same time, Fidesz wages value wars domestically; by redefining

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[17]   In his speech on 15 March 2016, a national holiday celebrating the 1848 revolution, Orbán called Hungarians to defend the sovereignty of Hungary against the EU. Nonetheless, according to Eurobarometer, 69 per cent of Hungarians declare a European identity, a number above the EU average of 64 per cent (2015, p. 32).

[18]   There has been a strong continuity in Fidesz's political discourse since the 2000s: "The party which has consistently relied on populist rhetoric . . . is Fidesz . . . Hungarian public discourse has been captured by issues and rhetorical methods produced by populist-issue manufacturers. As a result, serious deliberation on other matters of public concern is replaced by rhetorical fireworks, display of symbols and empty slogans" (Uitz, 2008, p. 40). As an illustration of empty democracy, Fidesz has presented the results of the national consultations in the media as vox populi, although the return rate of letters has been very low and these processes have been neither transparent nor independently controlled.

social divisions as cultural divides, the party creates two groups: 1) loyal followers, cast as true believers and patriots and; 2) enemies and political opponents, cast as traitors.[19]

Within this polarized Orwellian world of simplistic answers, Fidesz has successfully staged a democracy capture, and to a great extent, a language capture, by dominating public discourse with its slogans and terms. All public institutions have been named *national* and fake so-called national consultations have replaced the democratic decision-making process. So far, the soft power of words—a childish, oversimplified language in politics such as "Only Fidesz," "One camp, one flag," "Hungary is successful," and "Hungary performs better"—and the soft power of manipulating or manufacturing data has worked well. The fragmented democratic parties have been unable to fight either the hard or soft power of Fidesz. Both mass intimidation, as a proxy for hard repression in an emptied democracy without checks and balances, and soft repression, with its aggressive agenda setting in the government-manipulated media, has worked well so far with the so-called Hungarian patient (Krasztev and van Til, 2015).

CONCLUSION: INCREASING POPULISM IN ECE POSES A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE EU

The present success of populist parties in ECE refutes the idea that populists can only be successful in opposition and refutes the notion that populists cannot govern and are bound to fail when they are in power and have to deliver. At least, in this transitory period of the EU's "polycrisis" (Juncker), ECE's populist governments are not only successful, they demonstrate the systemic failure of a cohesive Europe by highlighting Europe's increasing core-periphery divide. Orbán's populist regime has contaminated the EU and contributed to "the rise of dystopian nationalist regimes . . . The recent victory of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland confirms a recent trend in Europe, the rise of illiberal state capitalism led by populist right-wing authoritarians . . . the popularity of populist, anti-EU, anti-migrant right-wing parties is on the rise" (Roubini, 2015, pp. 1-3). In Hungary's latest wave of mass demonstrations, a popular student slogan announced on the molinos, "We are the first generation brought up in democracy. We do not want to be the last."

Former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton declared on 15 September 2011, the International Day of Democracy, "While democracy is the cornerstone of the European Union, it is clear that there is no single model for democratic government" (Ashton, 2011). But where are the borders of democracy's variations? Populist facades of democracy and their changing forms, from soft populism to hard populism with the emerging velvet dictatorships, certainly do not fit with any variation of European democracy. Just to the contrary, populism is the main enemy of European democracy and should be defeated in ECE.[20]

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[19]   The hegemonic position of Fidesz in the media has been one of the most discussed topics in Hungarian populism. According to experts' estimates, Fidesz controls about 90 per cent of the media, with some free islands in Budapest and other main cities, but it has complete control of the media where the large part of the population lives. In a 2015 special issue of *The Journal of Democracy*, Kagan makes a special reference to Hungarian leaders who "crack down on press and political freedom" (2015, p. 29).

[20]   The fact that after the failed catching-up process, and under the pressure of the refugee crisis, the Visegrád Four (V4) states united in an unholy alliance in the EU to form a new kind of regional cooperation in ECE could be the topic of another paper (see Ágh, 2016c,d).

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CONTEMPORARY POPULISM AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN WESTERN EUROPE[1]

Maria Daniela Poli

ABSTRACT

Given a threatening new wave of populism crossing Europe, this article examines the link between populism and crisis as a Gordian knot and explores the relationship between contemporary populism and the Great Recession in Western Europe by underscoring how the principal feature of this relationship is the perception of the European Union as a common enemy.

Key words: Populism, crisis, Great Recession, political crisis, European Union

INTRODUCTION

The current economic crisis in Europe has changed the traditional panorama of political parties in the European Union's member states. New formations have been forged and these new entities' declarations of their direct relationships with the people, are often based on "a thin-centred ideology," a contraposition between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Or, to put it more mildly, these groups are based on "an ideology claiming that the political class has lost contact with the real will of people and promising to give it voice," (Pinelli, 2011, p. 5). At the same time, older radical parties are being reinforced. Thus, it seems that a new spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of populism. The concerns this phenomenon raises—the dominant liberal approach consistently attaches a negative connotation to populism and regards it as a democratic pathology[2]—are quite evident. In 2010, in an interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, EU President Herman von Rompuy declared populism "the greatest danger for Europe" (Stabenow 2010). Rompuy's statement remains relevant today. More recently, in a September 13, 2015 interview with *Corriere della Sera*, President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies Laura Boldrini declared that "political integration is the only antidote to the populism" (Caprara 2015).

Hence, with some important exceptions like Italy,[3] populism has historically been a marginal political phenomenon in Western Europe since the Second World War (especially

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[1]　An earlier version of this paper was presented at the twentieth Annual Conference of the Central European Political Science Association. The conference, *Security Architecture in the CEE: Present Threats and Prospects for Cooperation*, was held September from 25 to 26, 2015 at the University of Vilnius.

[2]　As Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) explains, in evaluating the relationship between populism and democracy, the liberal approach considers populism a democratic pathology, the radical approach considers populism an essential element of democracy, and the minimal approach regards populism in relation to democracy with ambivalence.

[3]　Populists have been a permanent feature of Italian politics from Mussolini to Renzi, with many in between: Lauro, Craxi, Berlusconi, Bossi, Di Pietro, Salvini and Grillo. For more, see: Tranfaglia 2014. For populism in the current government of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, see: Revelli 2015.

in comparison with Latin America). Yet, recent elections clearly reveal the rapid development of populism in Western Europe, where gains have been made by the National Front (FN) in France,[4] the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany,[5] the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy,[6] the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) in Great Britain,[7] the Finns Party in Finland[8] and, above all, the January 2015 triumph and more muted September 2015 victory of Greece's Syriza (the Coalition of the Radical Left)[9]. The rise of populism is similarly evident in the success of Podemos in Spain[10] and Juntos-Podemos in Portugal.[11] The Brexit-referendum is also a clear sign of populism. The most cited significant cause of this wave of populism is the economic crisis spurred in 2009—a crisis that, by threatening the heart of constitutional state and the foundations of the European integration process, has also become an intense political crisis.

However, as Benjamin Moffitt (2015, p. 189 and p. 191) wrote, although "a focus on crisis is a mainstay of the literature on contemporary populism . . . the links between populism and crisis remain under-theorized and undeveloped . . . [and no journal article] directly addresses the relationship between populism and crisis as its central focus." Given this, what is the relation between populism and economic crisis today in Western Europe?

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[4]   In the 2012 presidential elections, the National Front achieved surprisingly good results with 17.9 per cent of the votes and two seats in the legislative elections held the same year. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, the National Front gained 24.86 per cent of the votes and shook the country by gaining 24 of France's 74 seats. In the first round of the departmental and regional elections, held in March and December 2015, respectively, the National Front's winnings exceeded 25 percent and 28 percent of the votes, respectively before failing in the second round due to a strategic alliance against the National Front forged between Republicans and Socialists. In fact, Socialists withdrew their candidates and endorsed the mainstream rivals, the Republican party candidates.

[5]   Although Alternative for Germany did not overcome the 5 per cent electoral threshold in the 2013 federal elections, it did win 4.7 per cent of the votes. It was certainly "a remarkable debut in the comparatively very stable party system in Germany," (Siemens 2013).

[6]   In the 2013 general elections, the Five Star Movement won 25.6 per cent of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies and 23.8 per cent for the Senate and, consequently, 109 deputies and 54 senators, earning the party the consent of the disillusioned left, the People of Freedom and Northern League voters.

[7]   In the 2015 general elections, UKIP won more than 1.3 million votes, becoming the third largest party in the United Kingdom. However, it gained only one seat in the House of Commons.

[8]   The Finns Party became the third largest party in the Finnish Parliament after the 2011 national elections and gained more ground in the 2015 elections when it became the second largest party and jointed the current government coalition formed solely of the Centre-Party, the Finns Party, and the National Coalition Party.

[9]   Syriza gained 36 per cent of the votes and 145 seats in January 2015; 35.5 per cent of the votes and 145 seats in September 2015.

[10]   In the national elections in December 2015, Podemos became the third largest party in the Spanish Parliament with 20.7 per cent of the votes and 69 seats. Although the results of the national election held on June 26, 2016 disappointed Podemos, they confirmed the political weight gained by this party: 21.1 per cent of the votes and 71 seats. Furthermore, the Brexit-effect played an important role on this election, voters preferred the "safe" traditional parties—the People'Party (PP) and the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)—over the "adventurous" Podemos actors. The need for a stable executive remains, since the People's Party did not obtain an absolute majority and building a government is proving to be very difficult.

[11]   Although the group has not developed into a party, in the October 2015 elections, Juntos-Podemos endorsed the Left Bloc (*Bloco de Esquerda*), which became the third strongest force in Spain's parliament with ten per cent of the votes, its biggest win in its sixteen years.

1. POPULISM AND CRISIS: A GORDIAN KNOT?

The correlation between populism and crisis seems to be intuitive: populism rises from crisis and populism stokes crisis. Yet, despite this common perception, this populism-crisis link is not, from a scientific point of view, so simple. Because both the concept of crisis and the concept of populism are nebulous and somewhat indeterminate, some scholars doubt or criticize any connection between them. In his book on Europe's populist radical right parties, Cas Mudde—despite recognizing the validity of some empirical studies—clearly reveals his scepticism of a crisis-populism connection because of the difficulty of defining *crisis*.[12] Furthermore, in his analysis on populism and neo-populism in Latin America, Alan Knight even denies that there is a nexus between populism and crisis, "Even more than 'populism', however, 'crisis', is a vague, promiscuously used, under-theorized concept which defies measurement and lacks explanatory power. To attribute 'populism' to 'crisis' may often be historically valid, but it does not afford a robust aetiology; and trying to explain one vague concept in terms of another is hardly a promising line of inquiry. Furthermore, this association is at best a rough tendency or correlation, *not* a definitional requirement or essential criterion. Populism, in short, can exist in 'normal', 'non critical' times," (1998, pp. 227-228).

Another general counterargument holds that in the modern era there is *always* a political crisis in progress: the end of ideology crisis of the 1950s and 1960s, the participation crisis of the 1970s, the party crisis of the 1980s (Mudde 2007, p. 207) and 1990s, the globalization crisis of the second millennium, and those due to the ongoing economic crisis.

Although these objections are appealing, they do not stand up to the evidence. The dimension and the complexity of the two concepts, as well as their multiple faces, do not make their link weaker. And, if the problem of defining a nexus is the lack of a clear definition or either populism or crisis, we could not talk in general about populism. In fact, Isaiah Berlin's so-called Cinderella complex,[13] in which a prince seeks the owner of a shoe called populism, is yet to be overcome. Furthermore, historical data showing that populism takes its strength

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[12]   "Emphasis on the vital role of 'crisis' is a constant in studies of both historical and contemporary nativism and populism ... So far, the term 'crisis' has proven of limited use analytically because, although intuitively it may be easy to comprehend, it proves quite difficult to specify. Most authors do not even bother to try to articulate what constitutes a crisis, they simply state that a certain process has led to one, assuming that both the meaning of the term and the existence of the crisis are self-evident. Others define the term so broadly that virtually every period can be interpreted through the lens of the crisis. Finally, a number of authors seem to determine the existence of a crisis largely on the basis of the success of populist actors, which makes the relationship tautological. The definitional and operationalizational deficiencies in the crisis literature should not led an a priori rejection of the whole research in this field. In fact, in many instances the empirical research itself is quite sound, focusing on statistically significant correlations between various economic and political independent variables and the dependent variable of populist radical parties electoral success. The key problem in this literature is the relationship between these variables and the overarching concept of crisis," (Mudde 2007, p. 205).

[13]   "There exist a shoe—the word 'populism'—for which somewhere exists a foot. There are all kinds of feet, which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure populism," was pronounced in 1967, during the *Government and Opposition* conference organized by the review, at the London School of Economic and Political Science (LSE) and was later quoted by Canovan (1981, p. 7). For more on the difficulties of defining populism, starting from the Cinderella complex, see: Tarchi 2004 and 2013.

from crisis in all its various forms cannot be taken lightly or ignored. As Ernesto Laclau (2005, p. 177) recalls, "Without the slump of the 1930s, Hitler would have remained a vociferous fringe ringleader. Without the crisis of the Fourth Republic around the Algerian war, De Gaulle's appeal would have remained as unheard as it had been in 1946. And without the progressive erosion of the oligarchical system in the Argentina of the 1930s, the rise of Perón would have been unthinkable."

Hence, the imputation of populism to the crisis cannot merely be regarded as a tautological tendency, though some do (Knight 1998, p. 227 nt. 22). Rather, "some degree of crisis in the old structure is a necessary precondition of populism" (Laclau 2005, p. 177). As Paul Taggart (2004, p. 275; 2002, p. 69) has written, ". . . populism is a reaction to a sense of extreme crisis. Populism is not the politics of the stable, ordered polity but comes as an accompaniment to change, crisis and challenge." Very different experiences in diverse parts of the world clearly illustrate Taggart's observation: the development of populist movements in America at the time of the Revolutionary War, the success of populism in Latin America against the backdrop of a highly unequal society, the diffusion of populism in Eastern Europe after the 1989 transition to pluralism, and the rise of Berlusconi in Italy (a paradigmatic example of media populism) due to the end of the political ideologies that had characterized Italian history—the so-called crisis of the First Republic.

Moreover, the fact that crises are permanent fixtures of contemporary politics does not demonstrate the contrary; it means only that a certain dose of populism is an inevitable element of modern democracies. The same can be said with regard to the existence of other external factors—such as corruption, inequality, and disenchantment—and the difficulty of distinguishing the impact of these factors on the rise of populism. In addition, these factors are often so inextricable from a crisis that they cannot be evaluated or examined in isolation.

Therefore, the first link between crisis and populism is causal. However, as Moffitt (2015, pp. 194-195) suggests, the relationship between crises and populism is not a simple cause-and-effect relationship. What is important is not only the crisis itself, but perceptions of crisis, perceptions influenced by policy. Moffitt draws particular attention to this in his assertion that, "populist actors actively perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis, rather than simply reacting to external crisis," (2015, p. 195). As Taggart (2004, p. 275) writes, populists use the sense of a crisis "to inject an urgency and an importance to their message." They provide a particular interpretation of the causes of a crisis in order to distinguish the common people, whom they aspire to represent, from the elite whom they hold accountable for the status quo. The populist proposal is based on a mediation and internalization of the system's exaggerated weak points; hence, crises are fertile ground for populist discourses. This game plan relies heavily on manipulating citizens' feelings about the situation they live in to present a distorted reality. Racial discrimination provides an elementary example of this phenomena. In fact, racial discrimination is a permanent element of right-wing populism, which consistently scapegoats racial minorities. Today, populists campaign on strong anti-immigration platforms, scapegoating the influx of immigrants in much of Europe and relying on and perpetuating the perception that these newcomers are responsible for growing unemployment and increases in crime.

So, in addition to its role as an external input, crisis is also an internal feature of populism (Moffitt 2015). It follows that the relationship between populism and crisis is so intrinsically tangled that their nexus can only be regarded as a Gordian knot. In fact, the relationship is dual, because populism emerges from crisis and takes advantage of crisis in order to gain success. At the same time, the relationship between populism and crisis is circular in nature—and occurs in a cycle of crisis-populism-crisis—because populism both feeds and fuels crisis, so much so that it is sometimes impossible to identify the boundaries between one and the other.

2. CONTEMPORARY POPULISM AND THE GREAT RECESSION IN WESTERN EUROPE

Today, driven by the ongoing Great Recession, the new wave of populism that emerged in 2009 continues to cross Europe. According to the most recent and thorough study of this topic, Takis S. Pappas and Hanspeter Kriesi's empirical comparative analysis, *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession,*[14] "during the Great Recession populism in Europe increased notably by 4.1 per cent," (2015, p. 323). Is this 4.1 per cent increase a temporal coincidence or does it indicate a real connection between the rise of populism and the economic crisis?

Although isolating the economic factor is almost impossible, the direct relationship between populism and economic crisis is clearly illustrated in comparative analyses. The so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, and Great Britain—Great Britain is sometimes included in the acronym with the addition of a second *G* to form *PIIGGS*) are the states most heavily affected by the economic crisis; they have seen a rise in the popularity of their populist parties. In contrast, this trend towards populism is quite moderate or even declining in northern and central western Europe that was not greatly affected by the economic crisis—with the exceptions of France and Finland. The success of France's Marine Le Pen confirms the relationship between populism and the economic crisis, France suffered so seriously from the economic crisis that Patrick Allen suggested adding France to the PIIGS list (2012). Likewise, in Finland—a country that the economic crisis seems to have made into the "new sick man of Europe" (Rosendahl and Ercanbrack 2015; Khan 2015)—the populist Finns Party has fared well recently. In contrast, however, Poland is "a green island of stability in the EU economic crisis," (Faggiani 2015). The Polish case, as Ben Stanley observes, "lends support to the expectation that economic crisis would stimulate populism . . . Poland did not experience an economic crisis, and at the same time did not experience an increase of populism," (2015, p. 268).

The populism-crisis link is also sustained by the fact that the number and variety of contemporary populist parties has grown during the years of crisis. The National Front in France, the UKIP in Great Britain, the Northern League (LN) in Italy, and the Finns Party in Finland have

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[14]   The study—based on three variables: 1) GDP growth, 2) unemployment rates, and 3) national gross debt—examines twenty-five populist parties in seventeen countries. Pappas and Kriesi divide the European political arena into five regions and identify each with degrees of crisis and populism: 1) the Nordic group (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland)—incidental crisis, moderate populism; 2) the Western group (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland)—modest crisis, declining populism; 3) the Southern group (Italy and Greece)—strong populism fueled by grave crisis; 4) the CEE group (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary)—varying crises, disparate populism; and 5) the Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom, Ireland)—similar crisis, contrasting outcomes. For more, see: Pappas and Kriesi 2015, pp. 303-325.

even gained consensus thanks to the crisis. Not only do parties like these continue to exist, but new formations were born such as:

- The Five Star Movement in Italy, a party launched by comedian Beppe Grillo in 2009;[15]
- The Alternative for Germany in Germany, founded in 2012 by publicists Konrad Adam and Alexander Gauland and economist Bernd Lucke;[16]
- Syriza in Greece—in 2013 the party united what had been a coalition of the left wing and the radical left parties since 2004;[17]
- Podemos in Spain, developed from the aftermath of the *Indignados* movement and instituted in 2014 by Complutense University of Madrid Political Science lecturer Pablo Iglesias.[18]
- Juntos Podemos in Portugal, a political movement led by psychologist Joana Amaral Freitas that has still not developed into a party, but supported the Left Bloc (*Bloco de Esquerda*) during the October 2015 election.

The exception of Ireland—where a new populist party did *not* emerge despite the severity of crisis there—does not really constitute a contradiction in terms as populism is diffuse across all of Ireland's opposition parties. O' Malley and FitzGibbon note that "while Ireland after the crisis lacks a classic populist party, the political system is in fact resplendent with populist actors and rhetoric," (2015, p. 288).

Obviously, another relevant aspect of the link between populism and economic crisis is the recurring use of the economic crisis in political discourse: all of the newly formed populist political groups exploit public perceptions of the economic crisis and frequently blame the European Union for their country's economic woes.

Contemporary populism in Western Europe, however, is not just a product of the ongoing economic, financial, and sovereign debt crisis (Pappas 2015). True, populism has grown in the shadow of the Great Recession, but it rides not only the recent wave of economic problems, but also travels on the backs of other crises such as the crisis of representation and the failures of the European welfare state, which the economic problems of the Great Recession brought to light. Populism's intensity would be otherwise inexplicable, as would be the rise of populism in northern Europe and even Germany—countries that have suffered less of an impact during the economic crisis.

If, as Ernesto Laclau (2005, p. 137) remarks, the root of populism is a crisis of representation, this current root of populism has gained strength and depth due to dysfunctional representative mechanisms at two levels: the national level and the European level. In fact, on one hand, distrust of political parties (which the Germans refer to with their own efficacious word, *Parteiverdrossenheit*) and the decline of party democracies have become ever stronger. On the other hand, though the national parliaments ceded their decision-making power when they

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[15] For more about the Five Star Movement, see: Corbetta and Gualmini 2013; Bartlett, Froio, Littler and McDonnell 2013; Diamanti 2014; Natale 2014; Biorcio 2014; Bordignon and Ceccarini 2014.
[16] For more about the Alternative for Germany, see: Niedermayer 2014; Bebnowsky 2015.
[17] Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014.
[18] For more about about Podemos, see: Gomez-Reino and Llamazares 2015.

transferred it to supranational institutions, the European Union still lacks democratic legitimation and a balance sheet of a suitable dimension. As a consequence, the most important decisions on controversial issues are made by the central banks and by the governments of economically stronger member states—a situation that Ulrich Beck's appellation, *German Europe*, describes very well, (2012). Moreover, the European Union, which Laurent Baumel terms "the Trojan Horse of neoliberalism" (2014), is so unable to protect the middle and lower classes that, under the pressure of their worsening standards of living, these classes are supporting the charismatic populist leaders who position themselves as spokespeople ready to voice the people's demands.

Moreover, in some countries, such as Greece and Italy, the economic crisis escalated internal and already severe political crises.[19] As Takis S. Pappas and Hanspeter Kriesi confirm in their analyses (2015, p. 324), this tandem between economic and internal political crises intensified populism in these countries.

3. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A COMMON ENEMY

Generated in this framework, the contemporary relationship between populism and crisis in Western Europe is built on the endemic weaknesses of the European integration project. In effect, the crisis has been exploited by a rash of finger pointing at the EU's primary institutions in Luxembourg and Brussels and at European Central Bank in Frankfurt, accusing them for spawning the Great Recession or of simply leading the popular dissatisfaction with these institutions.

This strategy of blaming the EU has been employed by all of the current populist parties, both old and new. As Matthew Goodwin points out, "ever since the arrival of the crisis in 2008, UKIP has moved to address public anxieties about the recession and its effects by framing the Eurozone crisis as validating its long tradition of hard Euroscepticism," (2015, p. 282); this move supported UKIP's principal goal of withdrawing the UK from the EU. According to Farage, the crisis makes the anti-democratic credentials of the EU more evident, as demonstrated by Greece and Italy's puppet technocratic governments of Papademos and Monti (*Ibid.*, p. 283). Similarly, in France, Marine Le Pen took advantage of the economic crisis to reinvent herself as "an uncompromising promoter of French sovereignty" poised to initiate "France's exit from the Eurozone and the reintroduction of the franc [as] the cornerstone of her economic program," (Betz 2015, p. 76 and p. 83). LePen proclaimed that "the euro was not only responsible for asphyxiating French economic growth and destroying whole industries; it was also the cause of the explosion of mass unemployment in France and elsewhere in the EU," (*Ibid.*, p. 83). At the same time, LePen, riding on English Euroscepticism, approves of the British *referendum* on EU membership, condemns the European Union as undemocratic, and wishes for France's departure from the EU. LePen overtly presents herself as Madame Frexit: "I will be Madame Frexit if the European Union doesn't give us back our monetary, legislative, territorial, and budget sovereignty. I believe that sovereignty is the twin sister of democracy. If there's no sovereignty, there's no democracy. I'm a democrat, I will fight until the end to defend democracy

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[19]   For more about Greece, see: Pappas and Aslanidis 2015. For more about Italy, see: Bobba and McDonnell 2015, p. 170.

and the will of the people. If I don't manage to negotiate with the European Union, something I wish, then I will ask the French to leave the European Union. And then you'll be able to call me Madame Frexit," (Holehouse and Riley-Smith 2015). The Finns Party in Finland echoes this same rhetoric; they are also advocating for a "minimal EU" (Ylä-Anttila and Ylä-Anttila 2015, pp. 61-62). Although the Finns Party has not explicitly called for Finland's secession from the EU, the party opposes federal development of the European Union and fights against any mention of the country's EU membership in the Finnish Constitution as such a mention would lead to a constitutional protection of Finland's EU membership. Not surprisingly, the Finns Party—with a platform that criticizes technocratic European governance and the cost of EU membership—also demands a reduction in *European interference* and calls for measures to safeguard national sovereignty.[20] The situation is not very different in Germany and Italy. Both the Alternative for Germany[21] and the Five Star Movement[22] consider abolishing the euro an essential step towards overcoming the crisis and returning competence to member states. Both groups question the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. Both movements blame the European elite and

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[20]   On the English-language version of the party's website, under the heading "The Party's EU Politics," the position is synthesized as, "The Finns Party is a leading EU-skeptic party in Finland. The Party argues that the European Union is working far below its capability and much could be done for improvement. Its opinion is that the EU meddles too much into citizens' everyday affairs and is creating excessive central governance in Brussels. The Party does not accept the over-centralisation of power to unelected technocrats and commissioners who are too distant from the citizens in the EU countries. Possibilities have to be increased for the people's voice in local areas to reach the decision-makers. The Party also believes that the EU membership costs for Finland are too high and the calculation process needs re-evaluation and correction. The Party is committed to a continuous revision and renewal process for the EU – the dynamism of such a diverse community and a corresponding need for change must be recognized. The Party believes Finland should renegotiate its membership in the Union, transfer more power back to Finland from Brussels, reduce the power of the EU Commission, and diminish common responsibility in economic affairs. The latter is very important with regard to respecting the no-bailout clause of the Maastricht Treaty. The Party believes that distributing existing bank debt across Europe will result in an even wider crisis. It is NOT the function of the EU to rescue the financial disasters of the investment bankers! Other solutions must be found. With respect to the Euro single currency, the Party wishes to open and encourage discussion about various options. The current financial crisis has shown that the Euro is not only a financial project but also a political one. The Euro members differ too much with each other for the Euro to function properly without some kind of integrated financial framework. Any integration requires extremely creative solutions – taking into account both areas for common responsibility as well as the preservation of the members' own economic environments" (Perussuomalaiset 2016).

[21]   On the website of Alternative for Germany, under the heading "Program and Background, Questions and Answers, EU and Europe", it is written that: "The social upheaval in South Europe has never been worse; unemployment in the Eurozone, especially among the young, has never been higher, the state debt has never been more alarming, and the state governments have never been less inhibited to break treaties and to put into question the criteria of stability. The old parties have sacrificed the future of Europe to rescue the Euro and the banks. The Alternative for Germany calls for a departure from a policy of centralism toward a process as close as possible to the citizenry. The principle of subsidiarity must be re-established. The Alternative for Germany is committed to review the division of powers between the EU and the Member States in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and, wherever possible, to enforce a return of powers to the individual countries. In addition, as an expression of the weight of Germany in the EU, the German language must be practiced as a language of equal value for negotiation and procedure. As a party committed to democracy, we reject that essentially democratic decisions are made in bodies that are not legitimised democratically. At the EU level, the shortcomings in this regard are obvious", (Alternative für Deutschland 2016).

[22]   For more on the position of the Five Star Movement see, Beppe Grillo's interview with Reuters, see: Casilli 2015.

the "old parties" that support it for playing significant roles in the decline of the economy and for contributing to what they believe are dysfunctional democracies. Demands for greater participation in European decisions and for censuring the European and international financial elite are also expressed by Syriza, Podemos, and Juntos Podemos. Their criticisms, however, do not extend to European currency; instead, they focus on Troika and the austerity policies imposed by the European Union and Germany. As Takis P. Pappas and Paris Aslanidis observe, the populist discourse of Syriza is "couched in battle terms . . . the party identifies itself at the forefront of a struggle against the German order in Europe," (2015, p. 194). According to the programme presented at Greece's Thessaloniki International Fair in September 2014,[23] Syriza would have led the country to recovery by gradually reversing all of the EU Memorandum injustice in three steps: 1) writing off the greater part of the public debt—as was done for Germany in 1953; 2) launching a so-called European New Deal; and 3) rebuilding the welfare state. The position of Podemos is very close to that of Syriza, since Podemos aims to renegotiate the country's debt with its international creditors in the same way Syriza promised. Within Podemos's party program, available on its website (Podemos, 2016), two key goals stand out: reforming statutes of the European Central Bank and other EU institutions in order to democratize political and economic decisions in the Eurozone and establishing a European conference in order to discuss coordinated public debt restructuring within the Eurozone.

Therefore, there are two distinguishable populist movements.

- **The anti-European movement** includes the so-called right-wing populist parties (FN, UKIP, AfD, LN) but also encompasses groups like the Finns Party and the Five Star Movement that evade the traditional classification of right-wing populism or leftist populism.[24] All of the anti-European movement actors seek a drastic reduction in the European Union's influence or advocate that their state leave the Eurozone and return to a national currency. Some of them also wish to leave the European Union.
- **The movement for a different Europe** includes the so-called leftist populist parties and groups represented by Syriza, Podemos, and Juntos-Podemos. Unlike the Eurosceptic parties in the anti-European movement, populist actors in the movement for a different Europe do not blame the euro, but—as these groups were born in countries more afflicted by the economic crisis—they are fighting against austerity policies and ask that these measures be renegotiated in the name of solidarity among European people and in order to create a more balanced European Union.

Despite the differences between these two types of populist movements, and among the various populist movements spread across the whole of Europe, it is possible to identify

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[23] Syriza 2014.

[24] As Bobba and McDonnel (2015, pp. 173-174) underscore, "The M5S is hard to classify ideologically due its short history, its eclectic mix of policies and its unique organisational characteristics . . . Nonetheless, there has already been broad agreement among scholars that M5S discourse – and particularly the statements of its founder, Beppe Grillo, both before and after the movement's foundation – is classifiable as populist . . . The M5S is not, however, a case of right-wing populism: in its policies it combines a range of themes from different ideologies (left, right, environmental) and there is no clear identification—and denigration—of 'the other' in its discourse."

some common features among them. The first common feature they share is a demand for greater national sovereignty. One expression of this claim for greater sovereignty is the call for national referendums concerning their member state's participation in the Eurozone and in the European Union (as required by anti-European populists) or concerning other important issues, as happened in Greece with the referendum held on July 5, 2015 on the bailout conditions in the austerity policies imposed by EU institutions.[25] Another significant common feature shared among Europe's populist movements is an aspiration to change the Eurozone and the European Union's structure: anti-European movement actors seek to dissolve the Eurozone and the EU, while the movement for a different Europe actors advocate renegotiations. Both movements reject the dominant European dogma of neoliberalism, perceiving it as a barrier to social justice or to introducing protectionist measures. Additionally, both movements identify a corrupt elite in the traditional parties and in the European bureaucracy and technocracy and they frequently refuse to cooperate with other political forces—as illustrated in the behaviour of the Five Star Movement in Italy.

So, from the perspective of Europe's contemporary populism, the European Union is a common enemy (Diamanti 2015). Indeed, in the view of these populist actors, "Europe is against the people's will," (Pinelli 2011, p. 14). These movements have acquired force as opposition parties, they hold the power to blackmail the majority and to influence the government. It is clear that UKIP pressured Cameron's government to hold a referendum on the continued membership of the United Kingdom within the European Union (the so-called Brexit). The negative consequences of this political choice are currently unfolding. The unexpected June 23, 2016 victory of the 51.89 per cent of Britons who voted to leave the EU (over the 48.11 per cent who voted to remain) demonstrates the dangers of direct democracy during such critical phases—a danger Italian constitutionalist Gustavo Zagrebelsky explains so very well in his discussion of the trial of Jesus and the people's decision to save Barabbas in his book *Il «crucifige!» e la democrazia* (1995). Some of these populist parties have even managed to steer the state: Greece's Syriza made the whole European establishment shiver with its *OKI* in the July 5, 2015 referendum and the Finns Party is participating for the first time in the governmental coalition. The serious problem with populist party influence on government is that the populist parties agitate the people, but instead of putting forth a clear and efficacious program, they present an idea to destroy something (in the case of the first group) or with promises that they are not able to keep (in the case of the second group). In fact, with regard to anti-European populism, leaving the Eurozone or the European Union will not restore an ailing economy and will not isolate the economy of one state from another; the market is global. With regard to the populist movement for a different Europe, Syriza is once again paradigmatic. Despite its clamour, the *OKI* vote victory in the Greek referendum did not result in any changes, and the leader of Syriza was aware of the impotency of that outcome before holding the referendum. The will of one state's people could never have prevailed on the will of the other EU member states. The Greek government, in order to remain in the Eurozone,

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25   For a critical analysis of this referendum, see: Sygkelos 2015.

was forced to accept a bailout package that contained deeper pension cuts and greater tax increases than the package rejected by Greek voters in the referendum—a demonstration of the voice of the people going unheeded. Nevertheless, the failure of the program is proven by the resignations of Gianīs Varoufakīs on July, 6 2015 and of Alexīs Tsipras on August 20, 2015. Though their resignations were tactical moves to maintain party power, this failure is further evidenced in the inauguration of a more moderate position that could be defined as deferential to European guidelines. The voter turnout in the subsequent September 20, 2015 election—a mere 56.57 per cent—was the lowest in Greek history and shows that the principal effect of the Syriza experiment in government was an increase in political disaffection.

5. CONCLUSION

While the development of the European Union is experiencing deadlock for many reasons, contemporary populism encourages further depoliticizing the integration process and depriving the dream of the European Fathers of any meaning—a path that leads to widespread populism.[26] Yet, to solve Europe's issues—a failing economy, social inequality, immigration, etc.—*more* Europe is needed in the form of a common political project, not less Europe, reduced to an empty container of rules.

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[26]   André Gerrits argues, "The strategy of de-politicization confirms the populists' critique of the European Union as a conspiracy in power, controlled by technocrats, devoid of transparency and legitimacy, and endangering the interests of the nation and state," (2014, p. 7).

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POPULIST DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: A CASE STUDY OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN LITHUANIA

Jogilė Stašienė

ABSTRACT

Today's party democracy crisis coincides with an increasing influence of populist political actors. This article— prompted by notions of populist understandings of politics as expressions of the people's will and of the populist idea of an antagonism between the people and the elite—explores whether populism and party democracies are compatible. Assertions, that populism contradicts party democracies, should rest on research of populist understandings of political representation. This case study, of the populist discourse of Lithuania's anti-establishment organizations, fills this research gap in the literature on populism's compatibility with party democracies. The qualitative analysis of this case study focuses on how political representation is perceived and presented. The study provides new insights for theoretical debate on the compatibility of populism and party democracy and also presents a nuanced picture of populist perceptions of political representation.

Keywords: *party democracy, political representation, populism, framing.*

INTRODUCTION

The crisis of representative democracy has been acknowledged many times (Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Rosanvallon, 2008). Trends cited as evidence of this crisis often include citizens' declining confidence in parliament (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Catterberg and Moreno, 2006) and decreases in voter turnout (Gray and Caul, 2000; Blais, Gidengil and Nevitte, 2004). However, in discussing the crisis of representative democracy, many scholars are most concerned with the diminishing position of political parties (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Dalton, 2004). Some observers note that political parties may no longer be serving as mediators between a nation's government and its citizens (Poguntke, 1996; Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004), while others describe a shift in political parties' functions—from representing to governing (Mair, 2006; Katz and Mair, 1995). It has even been claimed that political parties no longer represent citizens, but act as representatives of the state (Mair, 2011, p. 8). Moreover, Bernard Manin, in his review of the condition of representative democracy, concludes that there is "a crisis of a particular form of representation, namely the one established in the

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wake of mass parties," (1997, p. 196). If party democracy is not in crisis, then it is undergoing a transformation.

These changes to the party democracy model go along with a growing number of populist political actors who are exerting greater influence (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). This rise in populism is especially evident in the prevalence of radical right-wing parties in Western Europe (Mudde, 2007, 2013; Norris, 2005). The results of the 2014 European Parliament election confirm a trend towards populism (Mudde, 2014). Although only three Eurosceptic parties achieved a "reasonable share of the vote" in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the last European Parliament election (Savage, 2014), these countries are not necessarily resistant to this populist trend. Political party systems in CEE are often challenged by anti-establishment populist parties (Učeň, 2007), unorthodox, new, or centrist populist parties (Pop-Eleches, 2010), and anti-establishment reform parties (Hanley and Sikk, 2014). New or centrist populist actors mainly campaign against "under-performing and morally failing established parties" (Učeň, 2007, p. 54). They base their election campaigns on demands for more open and accountable policies and plan projects imbued with "newness" (Sikk, 2009) to counter voters' disappointment with the mainstream parties' governance (Pop-Eleches, 2010). Hence—whereas in Western Europe populist actors rise because political parties are not able to represent the citizens any longer—in CEE, populist challengers rise due to the poor institutionalization of the party system (Kriesi, 2014) and disappointment with mainstream political parties.

So far, many studies have researched populist parties' features (De Lange and Art, 2011) and common characteristics of populist actors (Pauwels, 2011, Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn, 2013). Because the implications of populist politics for the party democracy model should be researched more thoroughly, this article analyses how political representation is perceived and presented by activists by studying populist ideas and discourse.

This research is especially relevant for two additional reasons. Firstly, the theoretical question of whether (and if so, how) populist ideas are compatible with the principles of party democracy has not been resolved. One group of scholars considers populism and populist movements dangerous to democracy (Pasquino, 2007; Urbinati, 2014). Other researchers conceive populism as a part of representative democracy—possible only in representative democracies—and as a tool for improving democracy (Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2000; 2004). Secondly, the ideas of populist actors in CEE are especially worth examining. The assumption that the populist actors (and anti-establishment actors in general) in CEE have the same ideas as their counterparts in Western Europe has not been justified.

This article introduces theoretical debate on the compatibility between populist ideas and the principles of party democracy before presenting empirical qualitative research on the discourse of Lithuanian populist organizations—research which provides new insights on the theoretical debate regarding the populism's compatibility with party democracies.

1. THEORY: POPULISM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

In this article, representative democracy is regarded as party democracy[1]. A classic party democracy, as described by Bernard Manin (1997), has at least four distinct features. First, in a party democracy, society is seen as divided into different groups according to socio-economic features. These groups have different—and often contradicting—interests that provide the basis for political parties. Second, political parties mobilize voters during elections. Voting expresses a citizen's trust in a party; it is not necessarily an expression of trust in the particular policies promoted by a party. Third, political parties express public opinion by denouncing the political decisions of their opponents and by organizing protests. Finally, party position is first deliberated among the party members and then implemented during the decision-making process in accordance with party discipline. Consequently, the most important discussions take place prior to parliamentary debates. To sum up, political parties act as the main organizers of representation in a party democracy (Manin, 1997).

Populism seems to contradict this set of representative democracy features. Populism not only acquires different shapes in different contexts, but definitions of the very concept of populism vary. Populism has been defined as a style (Canovan, 1999; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014), as a strategy (Weyland, 2001; Jansen, 2011), and as a thin-centred ideology (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004). In this article, populism is understood according to Cas Mudde's definition of populism as a set of ideas "that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (2004, p. 543). As far as populism in party democracies is concerned— according to populist actors—there is a tension between the general will of the people and the interests of different groups within a society (as in a party democracy). Respectively, the idea of a homogeneous elite, as seen by populists, contradicts having different political parties representing separate groups' interests in a party democracy.

According to Gianfranco Pasquino (2007), populism ignores the inner divisions of a homogeneous unit of the people while it simultaneously objects to political parties' political and institutional mediation. Instead, leaders are presented as inadequate in their ability to make decisions for the people. While representative democracy is based on compromise, populism expresses such strong opposition to *the other*—to the political elite—that compromise becomes impossible (Pasquino, 2007). Likewise, Nadia Urbinati (2014, pp. 128-170) claims that populism is dangerous for democracy because it attempts to centralize power and rejects democratic procedure. The procedure of holding an election and the procedure of engaging in discussion offered by political forums are necessary components of representative democracies as these procedures provide opportunities for voters to reflect on and choose among competing ideas. Populism opposes a pluralism of opinion in that it perceives the people as a whole as the only "part" that should be represented. Even more than it opposes a pluralism of opinion, populism

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[1]   " . . . the literary theory or the dominant ideal-type or myth of democratic government in Western Europe has been the model of party government," (Katz, 1986, p. 32); and " . . . modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties," (Schattschneider, 1941, p. 1).

rejects democratic procedures and the institutions that serve to separate as well as connect a government with its citizens. Instead, populism requires implementing a majority rule—the rule of the people—via the direct rule of the leader. As populism objects both to mediation and institutions, scholars argue, populism rejects representation (Urbinati, 2014, p. 128-170).

Others claim that populism is not simply a danger for representative democracy but has emerged *because* of democracy or at least because of how representative democracies function today. Margaret Canovan (1999) claims that democracy can be understood as having two sides or two styles of politics – redemptive (popular power) and pragmatic (rules and institutions). Ideally, these two sides should be in a balance. However, when pragmatic politics trump redemptive politics, populism appears. The appearance of populism is a turn towards a redemptive style of politics, a reaction to unsuccessful representation (Canovan, 1999). On one hand, populism has positive aspects, when it expresses a primary concern with the common people. On the other hand, populism harbours anti-institutional impulses, encourages a break with the pragmatic side of democracy, and seeks to position the people as the only legitimate source of power (Canovan, 1999). Populism's suggestions that a democracy give up on its institutions, rules, principles, and decision-making processes render populism a threat to democracy. Populism can, though, function as a self-regulatory mechanism of democracy when new institutions change or improve former institutions. Moreover, Paul A. Taggart (2000, p. 115) notes that "populism is a gauge by which we can measure the health of representative political systems." According to Taggart, populism can gain strength only in representative democracies (2004). The main object of populist critiques are political parties—the essence of representative politics. Thus, populist actors express anti-institutionalist positions and attempt to create organizations which are different from the democracy's political parties (Taggart, 2000). It follows that populism opposes dividing the people into groups, organizing on the basis of interests, and associational politics in general. However, populist actors must become institutionalized to participate in the political process and—as a result of this participation—transform into political parties (Taggart, 2000). Instead of forming a political party, populist actors often opt for strong leadership or use the tools of direct democracy—in addition to representative politics (Taggart, 2000).

To sum up, there is no simple way to determine the implications populism holds for party democracies. Populism can be seen as an attempt to unite the people into one body through a strong leader, or it can be understood as a demand for politics based on idealism. Academic debates on the subject assert that populism is seen as contradicting with party democracy not simply because populism rejects political parties, but because populism rejects a particular type of representation—party representation—and consequently, representation as such. This assertion, however, requires further research of populist understandings and perspectives of representation. Hence, the empirical analysis in this case study focuses on conceptions of political representation in the populist discourse of anti-establishment organizations in Lithuania.

2. ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT ACTIVISM IN LITHUANIA

Lithuanian society has been described as distrustful and passive; Lithuania's levels of political trust, civic engagement, and political participation are low (Imbrasaitė, 2004, Žiliukaitė,

2006). Political representation in Lithuania also faces some issues because of weak ideological congruence between voters and political parties (Ramonaitė, 2009). Since 2000, a fragmentation of Lithuania's political party system has been observed: new political parties successfully participated in every parliamentary election (Jastramskis, 2010). These emerging parties avoided declaring their ideological positions, and consequently, they were often regarded as populist (Ramonaitė, 2009). Lately, even though there are no strong radical right-wing parties in Lithuania (Zaremba, 2013), two parties with populist ideologies—the Order and Justice Party and the Way of Courage Party—have entered the national parliament since the 2012 elections (Pabiržis, 2013).

Since 2011, a new wave of anti-establishment activism appeared in Lithuania. Firstly, public protests took place due to two political scandals. The protests evolved into two non-traditional political parties (The List of Lithuania and The Way of Courage), and The Way of Courage Party was able to win seven seats in the parliamentary elections of 2012 (The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2012). Many of the protesters active in 2011 and 2012 later organized a citizen initiated mandatory referendum on three constitutional amendments.[2] The referendum had two primary goals: 1) to restrict the sale of agricultural land to foreigners; and 2) to make it easier for Lithuanian citizens to initiate referendums. The referendum, held in June 2014, failed due to low voter turnout (The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014a). Afterwards, an anti-establishment candidate, supported by activists and former protesters, won 9.32 per cent of the vote in the 2014 presidential election (The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014b). Finally, in the 2015 municipal council elections, non-partisan electoral committees (public election committees) garnered 10.71 per cent of the vote, 118 of Lithuania's municipal council seats, and mayoral positions in four of Lithuania's ten largest cities. It should be noted that the municipal elections of 2015 were the first direct mayoral elections in Lithuania. This institutional change stimulated debates on self-government and encouraged non-partisan candidates to run for office.

During the five-year period of 2011 to 2015, several anti-establishment organizations emerged and some existing organizations became involved in anti-establishment activism. These anti-establishment organizations varied from less formal groups like the For Justice movement to proper political parties such as The Way of Courage and The List of Lithuania. As it is often noted, anti-establishment actors are spontaneous, poorly institutionalized, and exist only for a short term, characteristics that usually complicate research on these actors (Schedler, 1996). While some of Lithuania's anti-establishment organizations withdrew from the political arena after the 2012 parliamentary elections, others persisted by supporting or participating in the referendum initiative, endorsing the anti-establishment candidate in the 2014 presidential elections, and participating in the 2015 municipal council elections.

For this case study, three organizations, that have existed for at least two years and have continued their activity until today, have been selected for research: the United Democratic

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[2]   At least 300,000 signatures—equivalent to ten per cent of Lithuania's eligible voters—must be collected within a three-month period in order to initiate a referendum (Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania). This referendum was only the second citizens' initiated referendum since the restoration of Lithuania's independence in 1990.

Movement, Movement TOGETHER, and the List of Lithuania Party. Each of these three groups is formally registered and has a formal statute to set the organization's goals and regulate internal decision making processes. These three organizations also host communication portals such as websites[3] and Facebook profiles. The organizations are based in Lithuania's largest cities: the United Democratic Movement is based in Kaunas, the Movement TOGETHER in Panevėžys, and the List of Lithuania in Vilnius. Two of the researched organizations, the United Democratic Movement and the List of Lithuania, have branches in other regions as well[4]. All three organizations have expressed strong anti-establishment positions and supported an anti-establishment presidential candidate, while two, the United Democratic Movement and the List of Lithuania, were active initiators of the aforementioned referendum.

All three organizations participated in Lithuania's 2015 municipal council elections. The List of Lithuania won four seats in Vilnius's municipal council and is now part of the city's governing coalition. Movement TOGETHER won the majority of the votes and the mayoral office in Panevėžys. The United Democratic Movement did not win any seats in the 2015 municipal elections. It should be taken into consideration that participation in the municipal elections could have directed the focus of each organization.

According to the definition of populism presented earlier, populist discourse is based on the following set of ideas: 1) society is divided into two homogeneous groups—the people and the elite; 2) the relationship between people and the elite is antagonistic; and 3) politics should be based on the general will of the people (Mudde, 2004). The organizations examined in this study employ all three of these tenants of populist discourse. First, they demand for a wider inclusion of the people in decision-making processes.[5] Each of the three organizations identifies themselves as of the people and as representatives of the interests of the people as a whole.[6] Second, these three organizations take anti-establishment positions and reject the political elite. Third—and this characteristic separates these three organizations from those of previous waves of populism—they express strong anti-party sentiments and call for a return to morality and principles. They embrace principled politics over pragmatic politics.[7] Hence

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[3]   United Democratic Movement: <http://www.judejimas.eu> [Accessed on 15 January 2016]; "The List of Lithuania": <http://lietuvossarasas.lt/apie/> [Accessed on 15 January 2016]; Movement TOGETHER <http://www.judejimaskartu.lt/> [Accessed on 15 January 2016].

[4]   See <http://www.judejimas.eu/kontaktai.html>, <http://lietuvossarasas.lt/apie/> [Accessed on 14 January 2016].

[5]   "Since its founding the movement declared the importance of returning governing power to the people" (Račkauskas, Navickas, 2015); "The List of Lithuania Party offers, in these elections, a unique alternative to politics which is cynical and has lost moral sensitivity. Instead of rushing to govern, the [List of Lithuania] party is trying to restore the power of the citizens," (Kuolys, 2012).

[6]   " . . . real, bottom-up, self-government . . . the voice of the common people would always be heard, and government would serve the people, would be responsible and accountable for their promises to voters," (Zabielienė, 2015); " . . . ensure a real citizens' right of self-government—as the natural right of people to create and manage their daily lives, to unite positive people seeking to change society irrespective of their ideological, political, religious, or cultural beliefs," (Movement TOGETHER, 2014);

[7]   "Parties, which have trampled the principle of politics–justice–act like a gang of robbers plundering the city (state) budget," (Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015a); "The first round results reflected the desire to get rid of the parties' dictate, the necessity of positive changes," (Račkauskas, 2015).

these organizations promise to address what they claim is a malfunctioning representative democracy, reject political parties, and present themselves as movements or non-party political organizations. (The List of Lithuania, for example, is formally registered as a political party but presents itself as a movement, not as a party.)

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In this case study, the goal of the empirical data analysis was twofold. The first aim of the study was to show how the analysed organizations understand and discuss representation. Second, the study aimed to apply framing theory to the collected data. Framing theory was deemed very suitable, because this theory provides tools for understanding how particular ideas are configured.

The first step of the case study was qualitative content analysis. To determine populist understandings of representation, articles from the three organizations' websites were analysed.[8] The underlying assumption in this approach is that the members of organizations treat their websites as important communication and information channels and that they regard their websites as alternatives to Lithuania's mainstream media. Therefore, the messages and articles posted online reflect the understandings and ideas of the organizations hosting the website (unless the organization has stated otherwise). After the first overview of the posts on each of the organizations' websites, articles with in-depth information about the ideas behind the organizations' activism were selected for deeper qualitative analysis. Authorship of these articles was taken into the consideration during the selection process. Some of the articles were written by supporters (not members) of the organizations. To ensure that only the ideas posted by the activists of the case study's three organizations were examined, articles on the organizations' websites authored by those who are not members of the organization were eliminated from the pool of articles selected for further analysis.

The selected articles were coded with a start list of codes using qualitative analysis software, MAXQDA. Fragments of text, from one sentence to a whole paragraph, were coded. For the purpose of this study, three general and broad coding categories related to representation were used: representation, representatives, and election. The goal was to identify the particular text fragments that addressed representation. Therefore, arguments concerning who or what should be represented, who the representatives should be, and how representation should be implemented were coded. Then, the text fragments were coded again to identify each fragment's specific theme. The secondary coding revealed descriptions of: the government (and political parties), of the ideas and actors that should be represented, of legitimate representatives, of what the procedure for choosing representatives should look like, and of how representation should be implemented.

"Yes, The List of Lithuania has correctly criticized and criticizes all political parties, which in recent years have been in power, for the party nomenclature's behavior, their moral insensitivity, indifference to civil rights violations, authoritarian tendencies, [and for] their conformism and dependency," (Bingelienė, 2015).

[8]   See Annex.

In the second step of the analysis, the tools of framing theory were applied. Framing theory provides a means for understanding the selected organizations' ideas and the configurations of these ideas underlying the text. Oliver and Johnston (2000, p. 45), define framing as "the cognitive process wherein people bring to bear background knowledge to interpret an event or circumstance and to locate it in a larger system of meaning." Framing is understood as a purposeful—and intentional rather than manipulative—way to structure ideas according to a particular intention or task. The core tasks of framing Snow and Benford (1988) identify are: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing refers to the identification of a problem and the actors responsible for it. Prognostic framing, on the other hand, articulates a solution to a problem. Finally, motivational framing outlines why a particular group of people should engage in collective action. In this case, motivational framing is understood as an explanation as to why the case study organizations, or members of these organizations, believe they are better representatives than other political actors.

4. RESULTS

In this section of the article, framing of the selected organizations' discourse and ideas is presented. The data and analysis are presented by framing task—diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational. Insights into the organizations discourse regarding representation are substantiated by the organizations' published website text.

4.1. Diagnostic framing

The task of diagnostic framing is to identify the main problems with political representation in Lithuania. This involves framing general and specific problems as well as identifying the primary actors responsible for these problems.

To begin with, the researched organizations' website publications express disappointment with the government. Movement TOGETHER asserts that "The wall of impunity isolates the government from the citizens who elected it," (2013a). The United Democratic Movement website declares, "Kaunas residents are once again frustrated with the government's actions," (Zabielienė and Žiliukas, 2012). The organizations' complaints about the national or municipal government are rather general and abstract: the government either has not kept election promises or has made poor decisions. Though dissatisfaction with specific government institutions is expressed, this was not within the scope of this analysis.

On the other hand, the organizations in this study frame Lithuania's political parties as the most prominent source of Lithuania's problems. The organizations present Lithuania's political parties as embodiments of power and as the main source of their grievances. This could be because political parties are less abstract and easier to imagine and conceive than the government, thus the organizations associate political parties with a place of power. The organizations expressions of abstract disappointment with the government differ from the more tangible grievances the organizations direct at Lithuania's political parties. When the organizations studied frame political parties as embodiments of political power, they present Lithuania's political parties in two main ways. First, they describe the political party structure

as a stagnated bureaucracy. The List of Lithuania Party writes: "Yes, The List of Lithuania has correctly criticized and criticizes all political parties, which in recent years have been in power, for party nomenclature behaviour, for their moral insensitivity, for their indifference to civil rights violations, for their authoritarian tendencies, and for their conformism and dependency," (Bingelienė, 2015). In a similar vein, according to Movement TOGETHER, "Nothing will ever change as long as politics is perceived as an exclusive space of political parties' power, and self-government—as the area of business actors only," (Urbšys, 2015).

When political parties are framed as closed bureaucratic organizations, they acquire an almost material form as a defined, structured system. Framed as such, the parties are presented as a stagnated system of power, which acts and makes decisions as a united body. The selected organizations present political parties as controllers of decision making processes who converged with the government and consequently become a part of the system of power. This presentation is related to political parties being rather closed organizations in the party democracy. Without being a member of a political party, grasping the internal decision making processes and logic of party discipline is difficult (Manin, 1997). Therefore, political parties appear to be well organized structures that are not recognizably related to the people or to the electorate.

A second way of framing political parties noted in the study was anthropomorphizing them, giving political parties human form. When the selected organizations frame political parties in this manner, political parties are presented as having undesirable human characteristics; they are arrogant, sarcastic, and hypocritical. Moreover, the organizations argue that Lithuania's political parties lack clear political and moral principles and are bereft of political ideologies. In the website discourse published by the organizations, these undesirable characteristics and immorality make all the political parties appear to be the same. The power political parties are capable of wielding, as depicted on the organizations' websites, seems unlimited; the organizations even used *authoritarian* or *dictatorial* to describe political parties. The organizations argue that instead of following moral and ideational grounds, political parties pursue their own interests—money and power. The organizations' website publications contend that even though political parties are expected to defend the interest of all, they use their power to act against the general interest, and, therefore against the people. Examples of such discourse include the United Democratic Movement's claim that: "Their [the Conservatives'] arrogance, sarcasm, and primitive intimidation by external enemies often transcend (sane) limits," (Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015a). The United Democratic Movement also holds that, "Greed for money is common to all of the 'traditional' parties . . . because they are primarily money parties, rather than the representatives and defenders of the general interest. (As they are supposed to be.) Such parties have one goal—to take the city's economy, its businesses and finances, and all [of] the [city's] inhabitants into their own hands, to ensure themselves a saturated life and to convert the city's residents into hostages of their aspirations for years," (Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015b). And, on their own website, Movement TOGETHER writes of the political parties, "For a long time the ideological differences [between the parties] have not been followed, after every election [the parties] gather and share 'warm seats [of power]'" (Maskoliūnienė, 2015a).

To sum up, the selected organizations applied two frames to present the political parties as embodiments of political power as a closed system of power or as poorly behaved individuals who wield power immorally. The organizations in this study perceive political parties as a homogeneous unit lacking the differences between them that a party democracy requires to function. Moreover, these organizations write that the political parties use their power to pursue their own selfish interests, not the common interest of the people. It follows that the organizations conclude that the people have common interests that need to be defended and that as the political parties are not pursuing the interests of the people as a whole, the parties are in opposition with the people. As a result, political representation is framed as dysfunctional because the current representatives (the political parties) have failed to act as proper intermediaries and have monopolized decision making.

4.2. Prognostic framing

The researched organizations express disappointment with the governing elite in general and the political parties in particular. According to the discourse of the organizations, the current model of representation is not functioning properly because unsatisfactory representatives have seized decision-making power. Therefore, the roles of both the representatives and the people are framed as problematic; prognostic framing offers solutions.

To begin with, the organizations in this study frame the role of the government clearly: to serve the people. They explain that the government, as a representative of the people, should serve and act in the interests of the people. Furthermore, they believe that governmental discretion should be limited and guided by decisions made by the people. For example, the United Democratic Movement provides a framing of the role of government in asserting that in a "One of the fundamental principles of the Constitution—the government must serve the people—has been betrayed this way," (2010).

In addition, the organizations in this case study framed successful representation as a restored relationship between the government and the people. The government should be closer to the people and should know and understand the issues in a particular place. In their websites, the organizations relay a shared belief: that the link between the government and the people should be grounded in partnership and trust and developed through frequent contact. This prognostic framing advocating restoring relations between the government and the people is evident in Movement TOGETHER's claim that ". . . to pursue effective communication between citizens and institutions of local and central government that would help to identify, to coordinate, and to respond to different citizens' interests, needs and development visions," (Movement TOGETHER, 2013b). This framing is seen again in their assertion that the relationship between the people and their representatives would be restored if "the elected municipal council members would get closer, [and attend] directly to the problems of particular residential area," (Urbšys, 2014). These sentiments are also echoed in the prognostic framing the List of Lithuania Party offers: "Let's get the democratic state back, let's restore the moral contract between the citizens and the government . . . We understand that this idea requires different political behaviour— not a brutal struggle for power, but building confidence and certainly a shared concern for the destiny of the nation," (Molytė, 2013).

Given that the organizations frame the purpose of the government as serving the people, and assuring this service though frequent contact, adequate representation—as framed by the organizations—cannot be achieved through elections alone as the government should, throughout the governing term, constantly refer to the preferences of the people. This framing of representation resembles the classic conception of representation, which Hanna F. Pitkin (1967) calls substantive. According to Pitkin, substantive representation occurs when representatives act on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented. This conception implies that representatives are obliged to act according to the preferences of the citizens. In addition, the representatives also have a duty to explain their decisions when the constituency is dissatisfied. The representatives have to persuade the people that the representatives' decisions were based on the interests of the represented (Pitkin, 1967). However, this requirement to explain decisions and the obligation to act according to the interests of the citizens should not be equated with acting according to the decisions made by the people. In the party democracy model, presented by Bernard Manin (1997), political parties maintain independence from the represented. Party democracies are not based on a congruence between the preferences of the voters and the policies implemented. Instead, voters express their trust in political parties, which—after an election—have full discretion to implement policies. Thus, once in power, the parties are independent from the voters and the decisions of the elected are only constrained by party discipline (Manin, 1997).

Moreover, according to the conception of substantive representation, voters hold their representatives accountable by either re-electing them or by punishing them by voting for other candidates. Therefore, voting decisions are based on the previous behaviours of the representatives, on whether the people feel the elected representatives have represented them successfully or not (Pitkin, 1967). In the discourse of the organizations in this case study, it seems that accountability can only be assured through a constant relationship between the elected and the voters in the interim between elections. Given this, the time between elections is a very important time for voters to get to know representatives, to choose appropriate representatives, and to develop trust in their representatives. Nadia Urbinati (2006) states that election does not guarantee fair representation. Representation in its different forms during the governing term is much more related to deliberation than to the simple act of voting (Urbinati, 2006). Deliberative representation—representation undertaken in constant communication with the electorate—ensures that a link will develop between the people and the government; it also builds trust and allows the electorate to get to know the appropriate representatives. This deliberative side of representation acquires a specific form in the party democracy model, where most discussions take place within political parties (Manin, 1997); it seems that an additional place for communication, deliberation, and trust building is required for successful representation.

Furthermore, not only do the organizations studied suggest the need for a very communicative government, they also frame a better organized self-government as a necessary attribute of a highly-functioning democratic government. Self-government is a sphere of daily life which is close to the people. Movement TOGETHER even calls self-government "the natural right

of [the] people to create and manage their daily lives," (2013b). In this self-government sphere, decisions relevant to the people are made. In their analysed website text, the organizations framed a model self-government as one in which people can and should be consulted on relevant issues. This framing implies that the decision-making power should to be returned to the people. Self-government is presented as a means for providing the people with the power to make their own decisions on matters that are their own affairs. Even though governance by the political parties is highly resisted in the analysed populist discourse, the organizations in this case study do not object to representation in general. In fact, their websites reveal that they prefer representatives to the direct rule of the people, even in the sphere of self-governing. On their page, the United Democratic Movement writes, "The next step in strengthening real self-government is electing elders and local community councils directly from people living nearby" (Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015b). Similar sentiments can be found on the List of Lithuania's page, " . . . to restore the first commercially autonomous self-government level in Lithuania as it is in Europe . . . the municipal council should be elected not according to party lists, but directly, in single-member constituencies," (The List of Lithuania, 2015).

The organizations' websites framed fair representation as representation offered by familiar, trustworthy representatives elected on the basis of their personal qualities. In this framing, trust in the government can be developed through voters getting to know their representatives as individuals. Moreover, according to the organizations' websites, representatives should identify with the people, not with a political party. In the organizations' discourse, it seems a person can be either from the people or be a member of a political party; belonging to both groups appears to be impossible. According to Bernard Manin (1997), the relationship between political parties and the electorate is based on trust and loyalty in party democracy. The principle of trust is maintained in the case study organizations' discourse, but trust is developed with familiar individuals instead of with political parties as collective organizations. While the government sphere is framed as being controlled by the political parties, the sphere of the self-government belongs to the people. Therefore, respected people should be elected as representatives not from party lists, but from single-member constituencies. As long as good representatives are framed as being from the people, democratic representation is more about seeing the people's own representatives in power than it is about opposing representation in general (Kaltwasser, 2013).

The demand to expand self-government is not unusual, especially regarding the context these organizations are emerging from. Each of the three researched organizations participated in municipal elections, which partially explains their common focus on self-governance; the debate on the character of local government has been stimulated by the introduction of direct mayoral elections in Lithuania. It is interesting, though, that these organizations frame self-government as something more substantial than simply expanding institutionalized participation in municipal government. Self-government is framed as a decision-making process that increases the people's responsibility not only for a particular district or a city, but for the whole country. For example, the United Democratic Movement writes, " . . . real, bottom-up, self-government . . . [the] voice of the common people would always be heard, and government would serve

the people, would be responsible and accountable for their promises to voters," (Zabielienė, 2015). This framing of self-government as a promotion of the people's responsibility for their country can also be read in Movement TOGETHERS words: "Only a citizens' self-government can create the political leaders who represent the interests of the people," (Urbšys, 2014). Finally, the List of Lithuania Party is even more explicit in this framing, stating, " . . . Lithuanian citizens would become the owners of their locality and their Homeland," (The List of Lithuania, 2012).

All three organizations share a belief that the people should not only be responsible for decision making, but should also be encouraged, supported, and nurtured. Self-government is framed as a sphere in which future national leaders should be nurtured and the power of the nation should be strengthened.

Given this, how do these organizations envision the role of representatives? The deliberative aspect of representation and of responding to the wishes of the constituency leads to a question, if representatives do not start manipulating their supporters and the people. Jane Mansbridge (2003) assesses democratic representation by the representatives' interactions with those they represent. Representatives, she argues, can either manipulate or educate their constituency. When representatives intend to deceive the constituency, they resort to manipulation. Representatives who opt to educate voters seek to make constituents' interests more understandable and visible (Mansbridge, 2003). Education, in this case, is framed not only as a means of revealing the true interests of the people, but also as a way to encourage constituents to take responsibility for their own governance; it also implies that representatives are responsible for making decisions in the peoples' interests as well. Even though the representatives make their decisions based on the preferences of the people, the constituency is also responsible for representatives' decisions.

To summarize, in the discourse of the organizations examined, self-government does not mean rejecting representation in general. The three organizations' websites frame self-government as a sphere that provides the people with the power to make decisions about their own affairs. Furthermore, the people in this self-government sphere can be educated to be responsible for themselves and for the whole country. While the organizations reject party representation, they frame successful representation as a trusting relationship between the people and the government. This relationship is supposed to be developed through constant communication and through the election of familiar individuals. These prognostic frames, indicating how representation should be organized, contradict several aspects of party democracy Bernard Manin presents (1997). The preferred organization of representation that the analysed websites frame is based on a trust between the people and known representatives who have emerged from the people. In the populist framework, as long as political parties are perceived as not of the people, they cannot be successful representatives and a relationship of trust cannot be developed between political parties and the people; in fact, it does not seem that trust can be established with any collective organization. In addition, when representation is framed as based on a representative engaging in constant communication and continually referencing the peoples' decisions, the independence of political parties in the party democracy cannot be maintained. Finally, the organizations, in their discourse, have required constant

communication and deliberation to ensure representatives' accountability to the people. This requirement, however, implies introducing additional places for deliberation (probably at the local self-government level) in addition to the political parties.

4.3. Motivational framing

Finally, the motivational framing in the three organizations' discourse evident on their respective websites was also analysed. All three framing tasks—diagnostic, prognostic and motivational—interconnect. Framing problems often goes hand-in-hand with framing solutions. Therefore, on their websites, the activists frame themselves as good representatives because they have diagnosed problems, suggested solutions, and are willing to take up the task of solving the indicated problems. In doing this, Movement TOGETHER announces, "Since its founding the movement declared the importance of returning governing power to the people," (Račkauskas, Navickas, 2015) Likewise, the List of Lithuania Party states, "In these elections the List of Lithuania Party offers a unique alternative to politics that are cynical and have lost moral sensitivity. Instead of rushing to govern, the party is trying to restore the power of the citizens," (Kuolys, 2012). Finally, the United Democratic Movement writes, "It is gratifying to still have civic-minded and unselfish people in Lithuania, who work for the benefit of society; it is a delight to interact and to share information with them," (Zabielienė, 2014).

The activists propose a twofold alternative: political and moral and their suggested reforms make them similar to anti-establishment reform parties (Hanley and Sikk, 2014), which ground their political platforms on newness and reforms. However, the researched organizations in Lithuania frame newness as a moral renewal—it does not imply that the entire political elite should be replaced by new and unknown actors. On the contrary, the activists express trust in the people they personally know, people with known personal characteristics and former activities are their proposed representatives. In the populist discourse analysed, being part of the people is what makes a particular actor a good representative; thus, to ensure adequate representation the activists intend to be a voice for the people and to maintain constant communication with the people.

In addition to these qualities, the organizations' websites revealed that being a former member of Lithuania's independence movement, *Sąjūdis,* is a very desirable, if not necessary, trait for a representative to have. Each organization touted a connection to *Sąjūdis*. The United Democratic Movement does so: " . . . is known as a very sensitive and responsible fighter of *Sąjūdis,*" (Zabielienė, 2015) A reference to *Sąjūdis* can also be found on Movement TOGETHER's website: "I was [a member] of the initiative group [of Sąjūdis], a city council member of Sąjūdis, a chairman of organizational committee from the beginning," (Maskoliūnienė, 2015b). Finally, the List of Lithuania party also mentions *Sąjūdis* in endorsing a representative as, ". . . the son of a deportee, a man of the *Sąjūdis*, an underground *Sietynas* publisher, a Šėpa theatre creator, Citizens Charter unifier, an honest citizen, and an ironic analyst of the Lithuanian political spectacle," (Kuolys, 2012).

The moral alternative the three organizations suggest includes a turning back to the moral values of the Lithuanian independence movement *Sąjūdis.* This suggestion of a moral renewal

in the form of returning to the values of the *Sąjūdis* movement resembles what Paul Taggart termed "heartland," an idealized community populist actors refer to when they discuss the people and the morals they serve (2002). *Sąjūdis* was a time of moral politics in Lithuania's history, a time that represents a strong link between the people and their representatives. It is a time, when representation was implemented successfully. The organization's references to *Sąjūdis* are a call to return to idealism. By moving away from the pragmatic and cynical, these organizations suggest politics should be conducted by moral representatives with good characteristics, proven intentions, and positions grounded in the *Sąjūdis*. The organizations in this study interconnect the previous independence movement's idealistic and moral politics with an idea of the people as a unit. The rise of political parties since Lithuania's independence was restored seems to have brought pragmatism to politics and separated politicians from the people as a whole. The political parties, instead of being connected to the main principles of a party democracy, a plurality of interests, and political actors (Manin, 1997), are presented by the organizations in the case study as symbols of political decline in Lithuania. Therefore, these organizations suggest that the only trustworthy path is a return to the heartland.

CONCLUSIONS

Today's party democracy crisis coincides with the growth of populist democracy in the form of an emerging radical right in Western Europe and populist challengers of another kind in CEE. Since 2011, a wave of anti-establishment activism has appeared in Lithuania. Even though populist parties are not new to Lithuania's political arena, this recent swell of anti-establishment activism is much more focused on anti-party politics and the moral renewal of politics than Lithuania's previous populist actors. The ideas of populism—such as politics as an expression of the will of *the people* and of an antagonism between *the people* and the elite—leads to the question of whether populism and the party democracy model are compatible. On one hand, populism can be considered a pathology, or a dark side of democracy. On the other hand, populism can be perceived as a tool for improving democracy. This case study was conducted to shed new light on this sort of theoretical debate and to obtain needed empirical research on the perspectives of populist political actors. The study reveals how anti-establishment organizations in Lithuania understand representation. The study also identifies both the actors' populist discourse on problems with the party democracy model and the solutions they offer. The study applies framing analysis to focus on how the case study's selected organizations perceive and present political representation and whether their conceptions of representation actually contradict the principles of party democracy.

As far as the results are concerned, diagnostic framing expresses a populist perception of political parties as the embodiment of political power. The first frame defined political parties as a closed system of power. In the second frame, the case study organizations regard political parties as immoral and poorly behaved persons. In both frames, the organizations perceive political parties as a homogeneous unit, lacking differences between them. Analysis of the organizations websites has revealed a belief that, as long as the political parties do not pursue the general interest of the people as a whole, they are in opposition to the people.

The organizations frame political representation as dysfunctional because the political parties have seized decision-making power. The research reveals that the organizations analysed do not consider the logic of party discipline or internal decision-making processes democratic strengths. After analysing the organizations' discourse and applying the first two frames, it is clear that: 1) the organizations perceive political parties as a homogeneous unit lacking the internal differences necessary for the functioning of party democracy (Manin, 1997); and 2) the organizations believe political parties stand in a strict opposition to the people.

Prognostic framing revealed that the organizations believe the relationship between political actors and the people should be restored by changing the role of representatives. The decision-making power, these organizations argue, should belong to the people and representatives should serve the interests of the people. The organizations suggest that a link between the people and their representatives should be established through constant communication in order to allow the people to know and build trust in their representatives-to-be. Furthermore, the organizations suggest that this arrangement could be created through self-government—as long as political actors do not assume full responsibility as the people should be given the responsibility to make decisions regarding their own matters. The organizations studied write that the sphere of self-government is where political communication and deliberation should take place. As long as a democracy's main deliberations take place within political parties in a party democracy (Manin, 1997), additional deliberation forums at the local level would only supplement the party democracy model. The analysis of organizations' prognostic framing reveals that this deliberative aspect of representation might improve party democracy. Deliberation also involves educating the people to take up political responsibility. However, strong opposition to political parties suggests replacing them with individual representatives. When the representatives are from the people, mediation through ideas or other collective organizations becomes unnecessary. According to the organizations in this case study, only knowing and trusting—as well as controlling—a particular representative can guarantee fair representation and proper decision making. Such a perspective *does* contradict with the party democracy model and could only lead to local level governance when nation-wide ideas and ideologies (as well as national political parties) become unnecessary. It should be noted that this kind of discourse could be at least partially related to the debate surrounding the recent introduction of direct mayoral elections in Lithuania. Therefore, an analysis of populist discourse, regarding national elections in particular, requires further research.

Finally, motivational framing interrelates with the previous framing tasks: the activists present themselves as the ones to take up the responsibility of representation for the benefit of all. In addition, the organizations studied base the ability to be good representatives on positive individual characteristics and on participating in Lithuania's independence movement. Therefore, in the discourse of these organizations, *Sąjūdis* is cast in the role of a heartland (Taggart, 2002) and represents the ideal community that Lithuania should return to. This return to idealistic politics signalled by the groups' adoption of the values of Lithuania's former independence movement *Sąjūdis* implies a turning back to the redemptive side of democracy (Canovan, 1999). The role that the collective memory of a national independence movement plays in

anti-establishment activities in post-communist countries should be explored in future research.

The discourse of the researched organizations provides a complicated picture of populist ideas. While political parties are framed as closed and inaccessible, the activists suggest turning from pragmatic and well-institutionalized politics back to politics based on idealism—a redemptive side of the democracy. In addition, the political tools the organizations propose wielding, such as local level deliberation, could supplement party democracy. However, if political representation is understood as implemented by familiar individuals, and if mediation through ideas or other collective organizations is rejected, this could lead to setting aside party democracy and concentrating only on local level issues—the issues that really matter.

ANNEX

Source of data

Name of the organization	Website of organization	Time period covered by the articles	Last accessed on
Movement TOGETHER	www.judejimaskartu.lt/	11/2013 - 03/2015	15-01-2016
The List of Lithuania	http://lietuvossarasas.lt/	02/2012 - 03/2015	15-01-2016
United Democratic Movement	http://www.judejimas.eu/	02/2011 - 03/2015	15-01-2016

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CYBERSECURITY IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE: FROM IDENTIFYING RISKS TO COUNTERING THREATS

Agnija Tumkevič

ABSTRACT

Today, ensuring security in cyberspace is a top priority of national security policy for most states. States' approaches to cybersecurity can be divided into two categories: those that regard cybersecurity as a civilian task; and those that involve their militaries in creating or implementing cybersecurity policies. Those states that have incorporated cyberwarfare into their military planning and organization perceive cyberattacks as a threat to their national security, while states that charge their civilian agencies with domestic cybersecurity missions classify cyber intrusions as security risks for only particular sectors. Adopting the framework of securitization theory, this article theorizes both civil and military approaches to cybersecurity and threat perceptions and their sources. The theoretical framework is then applied to a study of the cybersecurity policies of Central European countries and the Baltic States.
Keywords*: cybersecurity policy, civil-military approach, securitization, militarization, criminalization.*

INTRODUCTION

Today, cybersecurity is increasingly regarded as a national issue affecting all levels of society (ENISA, 2012). Consequently, securing cyberspace has become an integral part of states' national security policies. Cyberthreats have revolutionised the way people think about security and the rules and methods for safeguarding national security (Świątkowska, 2012). Although, defining cyberthreats seems to be problematic, almost all states agree that cyberspace threats and risks need to be specifically addressed in their national security policies. Countries around the world are, therefore, formulating cybersecurity strategies, usually by devising some kind of national legal act or programme to respond to cyberthreats and protect critical networks (The Cyber Index, UNIDIR, 2013). However, priorities for national cybersecurity policies vary by country. Some countries have a very clear vision of the cyber environment and its main referent objects such as critical infrastructure (*CI*), have formulated a comprehensive perception of issues that pose threats to cybersecurity and national security, and have identified the most dangerous source of cyberthreats. As a result, in these countries, tasking government agencies with cybersecurity management is a key condition for implementing effective cybersecurity policies. In contrast, states with a prevailing civil approach to cybersecurity are mainly concerned with

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cybercrime. The potential sources of cybercrime risks are more diffused and primarily related to private property and the proper functioning of the economic sector.

The roots of states' different approaches to cybersecurity can be analysed from a theoretical point of view. There are competing doctrines for viewing cybersecurity issues. The so-called national security paradigm reflects the traditional role of the state in securing countries' borders and enforcing the rule of law (Newmeyer, 2015). According to Harknett and Stever (2009), the cybersecurity issue is unique multifaceted, establishing cybersecurity requires states to secure public, private, and economic cyber activities. Cybersecurity is considered fundamental to a state's military and economic security and as such is approached with traditional national security arguments based on protecting the homeland (Harnett and Stever, 2009). In other words, this approach emphasizes the link between the protection of critical infrastructure and those public and private systems that are important to the operation of the government. The national security paradigm refers to the top-down approach of managing and securing cyberspace risks in a manner that may result in increasing the military's influence on cyberspace policies (Dunn Cavelty,2013). Therefore, the concept of cyberspace militarization can be analysed through the national security paradigm.

In contrast to the military approach, the civil approach can be analysed through an economic lens. In this regard, the economic paradigm reflects the growing influence of the internet on the state's economic well-being (Newmeyer, 2015). While the national security paradigm excludes all other sectors but the military from the processes of formulating cyberspace policies, the economic perspective emphasizes the importance of the participation of other sectors and institutions in the formulation of cybersecurity policies. According to Moore (2010), from the economic perspective, there are two necessary conditions to implementing a national cybersecurity strategy: 1) internet service providers should be held accountable for eliminating malware-infected computers on their systems; and 2) companies and other agencies should be required to disclose data breeches and control system intrusions. The economic paradigm refers to a decentralized approach among a group of agencies and actors responsible for cybersecurity management. In this approach, the burden of taking measures to protect systems as a whole is shared by the individual, service providers and the government.

Both paradigms, national security and economic, suggest frameworks for a theoretical analysis of the process of creating and implementing cybersecurity policies. A variety of optional theoretical approaches could still be highlighted. The framework used in this paper is the securitization framework of the Copenhagen school. As Hansen and Nissenbaum note (2009), the understanding of security as a discursive modality with a particular rhetorical structure and political effect renders the Copenhagen school's framework well suited to a study of the formation and evolution of cybersecurity discourse. Therefore, this article—based on the results of a qualitative study of the four Visegrad states (Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) and the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia)—aims to: 1) investigate how the civil and military approaches correlate to securitization processes; and 2) contribute to understandings of differences in states's cyberspace behaviours and cooperation patterns in cyberspace.

1. THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL AND CYBERSECURITY

In the 1990s, securitization theorists such as Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde did not perceive cybersecurity as an existential threat to states. However, as a consequence of the growing dependence of human societies on cyber networks, cybernetic issues are now securitized, suggesting that the materialization of this process is highlighted through an analysis of policies, institutional and strategic responses (Lobato, 2015). Thus, it is important to analyse, how states, acting as securitizing actors, become alert to the risks of cyberattacks and then establish a specific agenda to deal with threats. In this context, maintaining a secure cyberspace legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures.   The ability of an actor to successfully securitize an issue is highly dependent on their position. According to Buzan, security has, to some degree, been institutionalized and, therefore, "some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security." (Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, 1998). A government's cybersecurity policy would therefore seem to be an ideal vehicle for mobilizing, and perhaps also legitimizing, a securitizing move. A policy represents an administration's official stance on an issue understood to be a problem and proposes solutions based on technical knowledge and research. In this regard, cybersecurity policies reflect in strategic documents, such as the national and cybersecurity strategies, the processes of defining cyberspace as a realm requiring security measures.

Given this, I operationalize both military and civil approaches of cybersecurity in order to apply the Copenhagen school's theoretical framework to my cybersecurity analysis. Thus, in countries with a military approach, the referent object is the protection of critical infrastructures and of governmental digital resources. Countries implementing this approach are usually technologically advanced, have larger economies, and rely heavily on cyberspace. With this dependency comes vulnerability and maintaining critical cyber infrastructure is considered the main condition for maintaining national security. Conversely, there is no specific referent object identified by civil-oriented countries. These countries believe that cyberattackers are seeking immediate financial gain or seek to steal sensitive or provocative information. Since cyberthreats are closely linked to criminal acts, the main referent object varies from personal information to the proper functioning of information, economic, and social spheres, and other so-called soft sectors.

The second point made by the Copenhagen school is that the concept of security encompasses not only military, but also political, economic, and social aspects. Consequently, the *perception of threats* has also been expanded. Hence, in this article, it is important to analyse how countries perceive potential cyberattacks. Thus, states with a prevailing military approach—due to their heavy dependence on their *CI*—view cyber issues as matters of national security and include cyberwarfare in their military planning and organization. It is worth mentioning that dimensions of national cybersecurity were established when computer intrusions (a criminal act) were clustered together with more traditional and well-established espionage discourse. In this regard, civil-oriented countries perceive particular cyber issues as security risks for only a particular sector, such as financial, social, or private spheres.

According to the Copenhagen school, security discourse refers to the identification of the main *source of threat*. Although, the architecture of cyberspace makes it difficult to clearly

determine who initiated a cyberattack, the military approach usually focuses on foreign governments and rogue non-state actors as the sources of threat, while the civil approach concentrates on hacktivism and cybercrimes as the main sources of threat. Consequently, countries with a prevailing civil approach are less likely to envision external threats to cybersecurity. The actors posing the greatest threats in countries with a civil approach may be in the business of stealing personal identities to commit fraud, a crime that in the inter-connected world of cyberspace, renders everyone a potential victim.

Another stage of the securitization process is the acceptance and legitimization of the *extraordinary measures* offered by the securitizing actor. Therefore, based on this logic, the active engagement of military institutions in cybersecurity policy creation and implementation could be seen as one such extraordinary measure undertaken by countries with a prevailing military approach. The so-called militarization of cyberspace refers to the growing pressures on governments to develop the capacity to fight and win wars in this domain (Deibert, 2011). Therefore, the militarization of cyber space shall be considered a result of the securitization process. When cyber space is perceived as a source of threats to national security, governments strengthen their capabilities to offensively fight these threats. Meanwhile, civil-oriented countries are more likely to respond to perceived cybersecurity threats with civilian capacities, structures, and instruments as cybersecurity issues ultimately fall within the remit of interior ministries and civilian agencies.

While cyberspace is not specifically addressed by Buzan, Weaver, et al., the securitization theory could serve as the theoretical framework for the analysis of civil and military approaches to cybersecurity, their relevant premises are demonstrated in Table 1.

TABLE 1. Presumptions of military and civil approaches

	Civil Approach	Military Approach
Referent security object	Private security, information and communications technology (ICT)	Critical infrastructure, ICT
Cyberattack perception	Criminal acts, security risks	National security threats
Sources of cyberthreats	Non-state actors, cybercriminals, hacktivists	Rogue states and non-state actors, cybercriminals, hacktivists
Institutions responsible for cybersecurity management	Interior ministries and civil agencies, etc.	Ministries of defence, other military agencies

2. OVERVIEW OF CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES AND THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURING OF CYBERSECURITY POLICIES

In the hierarchy of strategic documents, cybersecurity strategies are part of the national security or defence strategies and are connected to several other institutions' strategies due to the all-encompassing impact of cybersecurity on society as a whole. The main goal of this section is to provide an overview of cybersecurity strategies of seven selected countries and the institutions engaged in the implementation of cyber policy objectives.

2.1 Estonia

Estonia's strategic documents on cybersecurity and its institutional structures for maintaining cybersecurity have contributed to its mature and comprehensive cybersecurity culture and policies. This is a country where strategic planning comes first, ensuring the cohesion of the entire cybersecurity architecture. In response to a series of extensive hacking attacks in 2007, Estonia, in 2008, became one of the first countries in the world to adopt a national cybersecurity strategy. The hacking episode Estonia faced in 2007 has been called the first cyberwar, raged as a politically motivated assault, on a country's digital infrastructure. After this "Cyber War I," Estonia's Ministry of Defence drafted a national cybersecurity strategy. Estonia has also published and launched *Digital Agenda 2020* to create an environment facilitating the use of ICT and the development of smart solutions (Digital Agenda 2020 for Estonia, 2013).

Estonia has the most extensive range of institutional cybersecurity policies in the Baltics. The responsibility for coordinating Estonia's cybersecurity policies overall was transferred from Estonia's Ministry of Defence (MOD) to its Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications in 2011. As an interagency body, Estonia's Cyber Security Council of the Security Committee of the Government has been supporting strategic level interagency cooperation and overseeing the implementation of the country's cybersecurity strategy objectives. The Ministry of Defence is the coordinating authority for cyber defence in the area of national defence. In addition to the MOD, national cyber defence is supported by the Estonian Defence League's Cyber Defence Unit that includes cybersecurity professionals from both the public and private entities. Since 2008, Estonia's defence forces have also hosted the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence—an international military organisation focusing on enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of NATO and its sponsoring nations.

2.2 Latvia

The *Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia for 2014-2018* was adopted in 2014 (Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia 2014-2018, 2014). The strategy highlights the ICT security incidents in Latvian cyberspace and predicts that the country may be subject to increased cybersecurity risks in the future (Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia 2014-2018: 2014). The strategy also appeals to the *Law on the Security of Information Technology* which determines basic security requirements for state, municipal institutions, and providers of public electronic communications services, as well as supervisors of critical ICT infrastructure. Both documents reflect an integrated approach to the protection of Latvia's cybersecurity and national security that prioritizes critical infrastructure and public services.

Latvia's elaborate and efficient institutionalization of its cybersecurity policies is well on the way to becoming a model system. Latvia's National Information Technology Security Council coordinates the development of national cybersecurity policies and the implementation of the policies' objectives and measures. The Council is the central national authority for the exchange of information and cooperation between the public and private sector and the Ministry of Defence coordinates the development and implementation of information technology security

and cyberspace protection policies. Naturally, there are some other entities—such as other ministries and a computer emergency response team (CERT)—that also implement Latvia's cybersecurity policies.

2.3 Lithuania

Lithuania's management of cybersecurity threats has gone through a long evolution, starting from the creation of Lithuania's first institutions for dealing with cybersecurity, to the recent passing of an overarching law on cybersecurity (Butrimas, 2015). Lithuania is the only country in the Baltic region that has not approved a national cybersecurity strategy. However, Lithuania's Seimas (parliament) approved a national security strategy, which declared cybersecurity a priority of national interest. In order to ensure the security of Lithuania's cyberspace, the Lithuanian government approved *The Programme for the Development of Electronic Information Security for 2011-2019*. The programme has three main objectives: 1) to strengthen the security of state-owned information resources; 20 to ensure that critical information infrastructure functions efficiently; and 3) to ensure the cybersecurity of Lithuania's citizens and residents and persons staying in Lithuania (Resolution Nr. 796, 2011). These objectives have been carried over to and further developed by Lithuania's law on cybersecurity, approved in 2014. The significant outcomes of this law include transferring of coordinating national cybersecurity policies to the Ministry of National Defence (MoND), the establishment of a new operational National Cybersecurity Centre (NCC) and the creation of an Advisory Council on Cybersecurity chaired by the MoND (Law on Cyber Security of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014).

2.4 Poland

Poland enacted a long list of comprehensive changes to its cyberspace defence system Poland and managed to publish and implement a cybersecurity strategy. Furthermore, cybersecurity also became an integral part of Poland's national security efforts and is frequently mentioned in other national strategic documents.

The cybersecurity issue in Poland's strategic documents was first mentioned in the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* in 2007. The document noted a direct relationship between cybersecurity and the country's ability to function properly (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2007). Later, the *Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2011-2022* detailed and developed the issues related to cyberspace protection in Poland (The Strategy of National Security of Poland, 2012). However, the first document dedicated solely to cybersecurity, *Cyberspace Protection Policy*, was not published until 2013 (Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, 2013). In 2015, Poland's National Security Bureau (BBN) published a cybersecurity doctrine (Świątkowska, 2012). The document further lays out work to be completed in order to improve national security in the realm of cyberspace. The doctrine also maps out tasks for state institutions, notably for security agencies, the armed forces, the private sector, and NGOs (Doctrine of Cybersecurity of Poland, 2015). The National Security Bureau, functions as the main entity—together with the

Ministry of Administration and Digitisation, the Internal Security Agency, and CERT—responsible for achieving cybersecurity objectives.

2.5 The Czech Republic

The Czech National Strategy for Information Security approved in 2005 marks the Czech Republic's first attempt to regulate its national cyberspace (National Strategy for Information Security in the Slovak Republic, 2005). In 2011, the National Security Strategy identified cybersecurity as one of the main priorities of the Czech government and placed cyberthreats on the same security-threat level as regional conflicts, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2011). In 2011 the Czech Republic approved its cyber security strategy and action plan for 2011 to 2015. The strategy primarily aimed to protect ICT systems in the Czech Republic and mitigate damage caused by cyberattacks (Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2011-2015, 2011). In 2015, the Czech government approved its updated national cybersecurity strategy for 2015 to 2020. This strategy for the latter half of the decade includes a comprehensive set of measures that for achieving the highest possible level of cybersecurity (National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic for the Period from 2015 to 2020, 2015).

In the Czech Republic, civilian agencies are charged with implementing cybersecurity policy. The overall responsibility for national cybersecurity rests with the country's National Security Authority. The National Cyber Security Centre, an agency within the National Security Authority, is part of the country's national and international early warning system. Additionally, The Ministry of the Interior promotes cybersecurity issues at the political level while the Ministry of Defence only addresses cybersecurity issues cooperatively with NATO.

2.6 Slovakia

Slovakia developed a legal framework for cybersecurity in 2008 by adopting the *National Strategy for Information Security of the Slovak Republic* (NSIS) for 2009 to 2013. The strategy was drafted by the Ministry of Finance, Slovakia's agency responsible for securing unclassified public administration information. In 2012, Slovakia launched its *National Cybersecurity Strategy*. The strategy was accompanied by the Action Plan, a report on the tasks of the NSIS. Slovakia issued an information security plan for each year from 2009 to 2013.

Slovakia's National Security Authority manages classified information, while the Ministry of Finance manages the rest. Mutual communication is facilitated by the Ministry of Finance's Committee for Information Security, which has an advisory and coordinating role, preparing strategic and technical materials on information security. Some specific topics are supervised by the Security Council, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence. Thus, the Ministry of Defence does not have a direct role in national cybersecurity management.

2.7 Hungary

In 2013, Hungary adopted a national cybersecurity strategy which expressly states that protecting Hungary's sovereignty in Hungarian cyberspace is a national interest (Government Decision on

the National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary, 2013). Being aware of the fact that threats and attacks emerging in cyberspace may escalate to a level requiring allied cooperation, Hungary considers it highly important that cybersecurity has become an issue for a collective defence under Article 5 of the founding treaty of NATO. It is also worthwhile to note that cyberthreats are also prioritized in Hungary's national security strategy adopted in 2012 (Government Decree on the Hungary's National Security Strategy, 2012).

The main agency responsible for the coordination and implementation of cyber-related policies in Hungary is the National Cybersecurity Coordination Council. Additional institutions charged with aspects of cybersecurity: the Cybersecurity Authority (an agency within the Ministry of National Development), The National Security Office (an agency within) the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, and CERT (an agency within).

2.8 Cybersecurity strategies in the region overall

This overview of the national cybersecurity strategies in the seven countries examined reveals that the region's cybersecurity strategies are becoming integrated and comprehensive. The strategies approach cybersecurity in a holistic manner and encompass economic, social, legal, law-enforcement, military, and intelligence-related aspects of cybersecurity. Some strategies, such as those implemented in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, support a more flexible approach and emphasize the economic and personal (individual) dimensions of cybersecurity policy. Moreover, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary belong to a group of countries where civilian agencies are mainly in charge of ensuring cybersecurity. In this regard, cybersecurity in these countries can be described as civil-oriented. Military agencies are more active in coordinating and implementing cybersecurity policies in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.

3. CYBERSECURITY AND ITS REFERENT OBJECTS

When using a securitization framework to analyse cyberspace defence, the referent object—that which is existentially threatened—is critical infrastructure. However, as Deibert and Saco have argued, cybersecurity is a terrain on which multiple discourses and (in)securities compete (Deibert, 2002; Saco, 1999). Therefore, discussions of cybersecurity hinge on competing ideas regarding cybersecurity's referent objects (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). According to Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009: 1161), the key to understanding the potential magnitude of cyberthreats lies in acknowledging and understanding just how highly networked and integrated computer systems have become. These networks provide critical digital infrastructure: they regulate electricity, financial activities, energy use and even traffic patterns. These networks are identified as a collective referent object and are usually securitized first, since their damage would present a threat to national security.

The economic sector is also rich in referent objects including the private sector's fear of hackers' abilities to steal large sums of money and intellectual property owners' worries that file sharing compromises their rights and revenues (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). In this regard, an individual approach to cybersecurity—stemming from cyber-libertarianism

prioritizing personal (or individual) security—prevails.[1] As Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009: 1163) have argued, in private security discourse the individual is not a referent object, instead the individual is linked to societal and political referent objects. In other words, cyber privacy defence has to be mediated through a collective referent object, either a political-ideological one—prompting questions regarding an appropriate individual-state balance—or a national-societal one, which would mobilize values core to community identity. Similarly, securing critical infrastructure cannot stop at the infrastructure itself: the implications of a network breakdown imply other referent objects: society, the regime, and the economy (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). In order to link a theoretical perspective on the variety of referent objects with a study of cybersecurity in the Baltic states and Visegrad countries, requires an analysis of the referent objects identified by the states themselves.

All seven countries acknowledge a link between the cyber- and national security sectors and are aware that cybersecurity issues—such as the destruction of the ICT system or critical infrastructure—can damage national security, adversely impact citizens' lives, and threaten the assets and the proper functioning of the national economy and public services. Consequently, a collective security discourse prevails in all seven countries' strategic documents. However, the countries—such as Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and to some degree, the Czech Republic—that articulate a strong need to intensively defend their cyberspaces also present, as reflected in their strategic documents, more comprehensive and clearer visions of their main referent objects. For instance, Lithuania's national security strategy emphasizes the importance of ensuring the security of informational, economic, and social infrastructure as the key objective of national security policy (National security strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, 2012). Meanwhile, the national cybersecurity strategy of the Czech Republic mainly prioritizes the protection of information infrastructure essential to Czech economic and social interests (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2011-2015, 2011); it also focuses on the protection of rights of internet users. However, the Czech Republic's national security strategy presents a more comprehensive concept of critical infrastructure and its vulnerabilities coming from cyberspace than its national cybersecurity strategy does. The national security document states that critical infrastructure as a whole is exposed to a number of threats with natural, technological, and asymmetric aspects. Examples of such threats include cyberattacks, economic crime, and sabotage among others (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2011-2015, 2011). In other words, countries which are keen on securitizing their cyberspace, are more likely to prioritize the safety of critical infrastructure as a key condition of national security. Because national security is linked to critical infrastructure as the referent object, the actors with power to identify objects that require security and defence may claim the right to use extraordinary means in the name of security. For example, Poland's cybersecurity doctrine emphasizes the importance of critical infrastructure and a direct relationship between

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[1]   More information on cyber-libertarianism can be found for example here: Hofman, J.,''The Libertarian Origins of Cybercrime: Unintended Side-Effects of a Political Utopia''. Centre for analysis of risk and regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010. http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/dps/disspaper62.pdf

cybersecurity and the country's proper functioning, including its economic development and the ability to operate effectively in the military sphere (Cyber security doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015). What is more, Poland is the only country which is willing to develop not only defensive but also offensive cyber capabilities in order to deter potential opponents in cyberspace (National security strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2012). Thus, Poland's approach reveals that the more articulated the process of identifying and defending against cyberthreats is, the more militarized it becomes.

On the other hand, countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, also mention critical digital infrastructure as a referent object. However, these countries do not view potential attacks on critical infrastructure as a threat to national survival, as cybersecurity in these two countries is thought to be just one of several national security sectors. Hungary and Slovakia focus mainly on information security. The objectives of Slovakia's information security strategy focus on protecting human rights and freedom, improving information security management, and defending state ICT in order to support the state's critical infrastructure (National strategy for information security in the Slovak Republic, 2008). The concept of referent objects in Hungary's cybersecurity strategy remains even more ambivalent, it lacks any direct reference to primary referent objects. The strategy only mentions protecting national data assets and the "operational safety of the parts of its critical infrastructures linked to cyberspace." (Government decision on the National cyber security strategy of Hungary, 2013). Neither Slovakia nor Hungary identify a specific referent object that should be protected first within cybersecurity, as a consequence both countries have a decidedly civil approach to cybersecurity.

4. PERCEPTIONS OF CYBERTHREATS

The securitization of cyber issues is based on different discourses, most commonly in national security discourse. Therefore, cyber issues usually arise when agents, such as foreign governments or non-state actors, with rogue intentions attempt to gain access to financial, energy, or public-safety systems and the prospect of cyberattacks is presented as a threat that requires an urgent response. Perceiving and presenting cyberattacks in this manner leads to intense security measures. Consequently, in countries where a national security discourse prevails, the threat of cyberattacks are regarded as a top priority and there is a military approach to cybersecurity.

However, threats to cyber- and national security do not arise from external sources alone. Hence, cyberattacks can also arise from systematic threats. These systemic threats, defined by Hundley as ''cyberspace safety'' stem from the inherent unpredictability of computers and information systems, which ''create unintended (potentially or actually) dangerous situations for themselves or for the physical and human environments in which they are embedded'' (Anderson and Hearn, 1996). A more common issue, however, is intentionally provoked systematic threat invoked by criminal syndicates or individuals. In this regard, technical discourse is accompanied with a criminal one and is linked to cybersecurity discourse. In this discourse, cybersecurity can, in short, be seen as safeguarding computers from criminal activity and cyberattacks are perceived not as national security threats, but as common risks in the cyber

sector. Consequently, countries that perceive potential cyberattacks as a risk for a particular sector are less keen to define cyber issues as issues of national security and can be identified as civil-oriented states.

Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the Czech Republic have a multi-layered approach to cyberattacks. First, they evaluate risks to their national security and task state institutions with preventing cyberattacks. Secondly, they identify cyber-related challenges to the integral components of their national security: the economic, financial, and private sectors. This comprehensive approach to cyberattacks is reflected in Estonia's cybersecurity strategy. Estonia claims that it has a growing number of state actors tasked with countering cyber espionage and protecting both internet-connected and closed networks, with the additional aim of collecting information on security and economic interests (Cyber Security Strategy of Estonia 2014–2017, 2014). National security is also the prevailing discourse in Poland's cybersecurity doctrine. The cyberthreats identified in Poland's doctrine include attacks against telecommunications systems important to national security, and cybercrime—specific cybercrimes mentioned in the doctrine include "cyber violence, destructive cyber protests and cyber demonstrations," data and identity theft, and private computer hijacks (Cyber Security Doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015). The same discourse is seen in Lithuania and Latvia's strategic documents. For example, Lithuania's state defence concept groups cyberattacks as a national threat together with terrorism and organised criminal activities (The State Defence Concept of the Republic of Latvia, 2012). It is worth mentioning that Latvia's newest national security concept highlights cyberattacks as one of eight primary national security threats (Press release, 2015).

The four countries mentioned above have a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity based on precise evaluations of the potential impact of cyberattacks on different sectors and on national security overall. Since the cyberattacks are perceived mainly as threats to national security, these countries have responded with a military approach.

Slovakia's updated cybersecurity concept for 2015 to 2020 also presents a complex perception of cybersecurity. Slovakia claims that cybersecurity should not be seen as an isolated problem of the Slovak Republic or as an issue isolated to one or even several sectors and that, due to its global nature, cybersecurity is a society-wide phenomenon (Cyber Security Concept of Slovak Republic for 2015–2020, 2015). The document also identifies the core problem of Slovakia's cybersecurity policy: that cyberthreats are not generally seen as a sufficiently urgent problem and are not explicitly or validly addressed in Slovak law (Cyber Security Concept of Slovak Republic for 2015–2020, 2015). While this document is instrumental in its nature, as it offers a model for managing cybersecurity policies, it lacks a complete vision of cybersecurity challenges. As a result, potential cyberattacks are seen mainly as risks to unnamed targets.

The strategy of the Czech Republic mentions risks such as cyberespionage (industrial, military, political, or other), organized crime in cyberspace, hacktivism, intentional disinformation campaigns with political or military objectives, and even—in the future—cyberterrorism (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for the 2011-2015 period, 2011). These risks are seen mainly as dangerous tendencies in the global cyberspace that have not yet threatened Czech society. The security discourse that prevails in the strategic documents of the Czech Republic

mainly refers to systematic threats and "computer safety." In this regard, the Czech Republic's cybersecurity strategy focuses mainly on building a credible information society by safeguarding access to services, protecting data integrity, and promoting the confidentiality of the Czech Republic's cyberspaces (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for the 2011-2015 period, 2011). Meanwhile, Hungary also emphasizes the criminal element of cyberattacks. Thus, Hungary claims that dynamically developing new technologies, like cloud computing and mobile internet, lead to the continuous emergence of new security risks, such as illegal acquisitions of critical information and personal data (Government decision on National cyber security strategy of Hungary, 2013). Moreover, Hungary avoids identifying cybersecurity challenges with threats. It prefers to name cyberthreats as risks to the cyber sector.

The perceptions of cyberthreats and cybersecurity in general, determine the civil approach to cybersecurity management that prevails in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.

5. SOURCES OF CYBERTHREATS

The cyberspace's architecture facilitates anonymity and hinders attempts to track the sources of cyberattacks, constituting an additional factor of insecurity. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyse the sources of cyberattacks and cyberattackers, who may operate as functional actors. The logic of such analysis would be similar to what representatives of the Copenhagen school sketch out in analysing the pollution of the environment: these actors directly influence the dynamic of the cyber sector, but they are neither referent objects nor securitizing actors, though they may contribute to actions that impact the perception of the threat (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998). In a civil-military dichotomy, external cyberthreats such as foreign states or non-state actors, including cyberterrorists and cyberespionage agents, clash with internal actors: hacktivists,cybercriminals, malware authors, cyber scammers and corporations. As mentioned previously, countries that are actively securing their cyberspaces, emphasize the political motivation of cyberattacks and external cyberthreats. This attitude dictates a military approach to cybersecurity management as the most effective. Conversely, focusing mainly on internal cybersecurity threats means that the main referent object is the economic sector or private data. To fight these threats, a civil approach to cybersecurity policy is thought to be sufficient.

Further analysis of how the sources of cyberthreats are understood by particular countries brings us to the conclusion that all countries acknowledge that there are many actors in cyberspace; however, only a few states make a distinction between nature, objectives, and methods of these actors. For example, Estonia's cybersecurity strategy claims that national cybersecurity is affected by the actors operating in cyberspace with various skills, targets, and motivations and that cybersespionage—with the intent to collect national security and economic information—is increasing. Estonia's strategy also emphasizes that the number of states capable of and actually initiating cyberattacks is increasing (Cyber security strategy of Estonia 2014-2017, 2014). This distinction between internal and external threats is also made in the Polish doctrine. External threats listed by the doctrine include cyber crises, cyber conflicts, cyberwar, and cyberespionage involving states and other entities, "threats (for Poland) coming from cyberspace include extremist, terrorist and international criminal organizations whose

attacks in cyberspace can have ideological, political, religious, business or criminal motivations." (Cyber security doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015).

Lithuania and Latvia, in contrast, haven't identified specific cyberattackers, but their strategic documents refer primarily to external threats, such as neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, both Slovakia and Hungary have quite a blurred and fragmental vision on the sources of cyberthreats. For example, Hungary focuses on technological (internal) vulnerabilities and their effects to the proper functioning of the state's economy without any deeper analysis of their causes and actors engaged into the process. The cybersecurity strategy of Hungary states that in addition to the damage caused by external factors, the inadequate regulation of the operational security of the information and communication systems constituting cyberspace poses a further risk. „Dynamic emerging new technologies, such as cloud computing or mobile Internet, lead to the continuous evolution of new security risks." (Government decision on National cyber security strategy of Hungary, 2013). The civil approach to the sources of cyber threats is also common to the Czech Republic. The National Security Strategy of the Czech Republic identifies a wide range of potential cyber challenges, however, almost all of them are criminal or technological in nature. These are hackers stealing personal or sensitive data, technological failures, botnets and DDoS/DoS attacks etc.

The perception of cyber threats is closely linked to the sources of the perceived threats. The more securitized a view of cyber threat prevails, the more precisely the source of a threat is identified. What is more, countries that securitize cyber threats, such as Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, make a distinction between external and internal cyberspace actors. Meanwhile, countries that emphasize the criminal element of cyberthreats think about them as internal challenges and limitations of cyberspace. It is noteworthy that almost all of the analysed countries make a distinction between internal and external sources of cyber threats in their strategic documents. However, the countries that are described as civil-oriented are not keen on elaborating this distinction further and focus mainly on internal threat sources as the most common and probable in their security environment.

CONCLUSIONS

The qualitative analysis of the cybersecurity policies of the four Visegrad countries and the three Baltic states shows that each of these countries have cybersecurity strategies and corresponding laws to address cybersecurity issues. All of the documents analysed refer to higher-level national security or defence strategies and present the legislative environment, although there are significant differences in their profundity. Different cyberspace entities and the potential threats these entities generate are also addressed in the documents. In most national cyberspace security strategies, threats to critical infrastructure and cybercrime play a prominent role and indicate increasing economic damage wrought by cyberattacks. In the formal sense, the domain of cyberspace is already included in the security agendas of all states and could be called "securitized."

However, there are differences of securitization among countries. Cybersecurity differs by how countries: 1) define a referent object (what should be protected); 2) perceive primary

threats and risks; and 3) identify the sources of threats and risks. In accordance with these differences, countries can be classified into two categories. The first category, that of countries that militarize cybersecurity issues, includes Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and, to some degree, Latvia. These countries that have militarized cybersecurity discourse are more precise in identifying specific referent objects and in articulating the defence of these objects as national priorities. This tendency elevates cybersecurity to the highest national security level and focuses on safeguarding ICT and governmental information resources. Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania tend to identify cybersecurity challenges as threats to the proper functioning of the state, and identify attacks from foreign states as the most dangerous sources of such threats. Consequently, in these states, the responsibility of responding to cyberthreats is handed over to military and defence institutions (Table 2).

The second category of securitization discourse refers to the criminalization of cybersecurity issues. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary rely on a civil approach to maintain cybersecurity. Their referent objects are diffused and mainly related to the proper functioning of the state's economic system and private property. The ICT and governmental digital resources have no priority over other legitimate referent objects. As a result, countries with a prevailing

TABLE 2. Civil and military approaches in the states' cybersecurity policies

	Referent Object	Cyber Attack Perception	Threat Source	Institutions	Militarization/ Criminalization
Hungary	Digital informational infrastructure	Risk to national cybersecurity	Internal technological vulnerabilities	Civil	Criminalization approach prevails
Czech Republic	Critical & informational infrastructure; rights of internet users	General risk of a global cyberspace	Internal technological vulnerabilities	Civil	Criminalization approach prevails with military elements
Slovakia	Digital informational infrastructure, human Rights & freedoms	Risk to the national cybersecurity	Internal technological vulnerabilities	Civil	Criminalization approach prevails
Poland	Critical & informational infrastructure	National threat	External & internal actors	Military	Militarization approach prevails
Lithuania	Informational, Economic & Social/ Critical Infrastructure	National threat	Usually external actors	Military	Militarization approach prevails
Latvia	Critical & Informational Infrastructure	National Threat	Usually external actors, neighbouring countries	Military	Militarization approach prevails with criminal elements
Estonia	Critical & Informational Infrastructure	Threat to economic, political & other sectors	E External & internal actors	Extensively militarized	Militarization approach prevails

civil approach are mostly concerned with criminal activity conducted in cyberspace and describe cybersecurity issues as "risks". Potential sources of such risks are also fragmented and include not only external international actors, but also internal actors such as hackers, hacktivists, criminal organisations, and even the unintentional disruption of networks. Civil institutions in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are charged with monitoring cybersecurity risks and coordinating state response to cyber incidents (Table 2).

The conclusions of this article, the categorisation of cybersecurity approaches as civil or militarized may lead to a better understanding of cybersecurity as a phenomenon. It could contribute to the explanation of obstacles for cooperation between states dealing with cybersecurity issues on the international level. Furthermore, the identification of different approaches to cybersecurity could explain specific state's actions in cyberspace. Understanding states' differences in perceiving cyberthreats, referent objects, and potential adversaries constitutes a background to discussions of the so-called cyber-identities of states and non-governmental actors. This could be a useful theoretical tool for analysing potential cyber conflicts and cooperation patterns in further studies.

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ANTIDIPLOMACY IN RUSSIA'S POLICIES REGARDING RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN THE BALTIC STATES[1]

Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik

ABSTRACT

Though Russia is a classic realist power, Russia, as its recent actions in Ukraine reveal, frequently prefers hard power to powers of attraction. In addition to traditional economic pressure and military policy, Russia also employs antidiplomatic tools to influence the Baltic states. Though Russia officially proclaims itself a democratic state, it has been developing a broad spectrum of antidiplomatic methods to legitimise Russia's interests in post-Soviet spaces inhabited by large numbers of Russian-speakers. The clearest example of these methods appears in Russia's use of international and regional organizations' conferences to express and articulate its interests in protecting Russian diasporas—a phenomenon that first appeared in the Vladimir Putin's foreign policy as part of his efforts to construct a negative image of the Baltic states, affect the Baltic states' domestic policies, and subtly discredit their governments. Russia is positioning itself as the protector of a Russian diaspora wounded by the Baltic states' anti-Russian policies.
Keywords: *Antidiplomacy, Russia, Baltic States, Russian-speakers.*

INTRODUCTION

Exploring the concept of antidiplomacy in social history and in the history of theology and philosophy, where it appears explicitly, is a valuable heuristic exercise. Although the ontology and etymology of *antidiplomacy* derive from the French Revolution (as the notion of antidiplomacy appeared in modern history simultaneously with diplomacy), references to antidiplomacy in its early metaphysical conceptions can be found in Christian and Islamic theologies. Furthermore, a secularized reformulation of antidiplomacy was put forth by classic utopian thinkers and antidiplomacy has been examined by philosophers from Hegel to Marx (Cornago, 2013). Antidiplomacy is traditionally defined by contrasting it with diplomacy. James Der Derian defines diplomacy as the "negotiation between states while antidiplomacy is propaganda among people" (1987). In other words, "the purpose of diplomacy is to mediate estranged relations:

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antidiplomacy's aim is to transcend all estranged relations" (Der Derian, 1987). This plurality of meanings, and the opposition between diplomacy and antidiplomacy, impedes consensus on the definition of antidiplomacy. Because of this flexibility in defining antidiplomacy, antidiplomacy is used time and again in diplomatic statements, journalists' articles, political experts' discourse, academic papers and internet discussion groups.

In this article, Russia's foreign policy methods used in its relations with the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—presented by Russia as advocacy for Russian-speakers residing in these three states, will be considered antidiplomatic. In Russian studies, with few exceptions, the concept of antidiplomacy has hardly been used to interpret Russia's foreign policy. Łukasz Adamski offers one such exception; he notes Russia's extremely emotional and audacious attitude towards Poland, where Soviet monuments of gratitude to the Red Army have been dismantled (2015). In contrast, most analysts invoke soft power and public diplomacy approaches as they explore the relationships between Russia and its compatriots abroad (Grigas, 2012; Maliukevičius, 2013; Russkaya Soft Power analysis, 2014; Simons, 2014; Panova, 2015; Rostoks & Sprūds, 2015; Kuczyńska-Zonik, 2016). According to Joseph S. Nye (2014), however, Russia compels others to advance its interests through coercion and payment rather than attraction. Thus, Russia strategically combines soft power resources with hard power assets such as economic and military power, as was exemplified in Ukraine. Additionally, a few years ago, Russian military operations along the Baltic borders were viewed as insignificant (Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2011), whereas today they are deemed as potential threats to the governments of the Baltic states. Currently, Russia seems to be developing an alternative model of conduct in international relations and appears to be applying the concept of antidiplomacy. Russia's relations with its compatriots abroad in the Baltic states indicate Russia's intentions: to exert pressure on post-Soviet spaces.

Russia's policies regarding Russian-speakers in the Baltic states are neither complex nor ambiguous. The Baltic states' historic memories and regional interests render their relationships with Russia neutral at best and occasionally hostile. The great number of Russian-speakers residing in the Baltic states complicate Russia's relations with its Baltic neighbours. Russia has never fully abandoned the idea of bringing the Baltic states back into its sphere of "privileged interest" (Auers, 2015). Hence Russia's policy towards the Russian diasporas in the Baltic states is motivated by a Russian nostalgia for the USSR and a longing to build a historical, cultural, and linguistic transnational community—essentially, a longing to create a Russian world (or as this concept of a Russian world is known in Russian, а русский мир) (Laruelle, 2015). From the Russian perspective, this idea of building a Russian world justifies Russia's antidiplomatic engagement in post-Soviet regions as the concept reconnects Russia's Soviet past with the Russian diaspora's current situation. The Russian diaspora is a crucial instrument in Russia's articulation of its interests in international forums. In this paper, I cite examples of Russia's international and regional activities that confirm Russia's strategies are pursued an effort to destabilize the Baltic region. I apply content analysis method to these examples to examine the meanings, contexts, intentions, and influences of Russia's messages to the Baltics in order to identify and analyse Russia's: 1) techniques and antidiplomatic methods; 2) goals; and 3) relationships with the Baltic states and the international community.

1. ANTIDIPLOMACY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The definition of antidiplomacy used in this paper is grounded in Corneliu Bjola and Markus Komprobst's (2013) representational perspectives for examining antidiplomacy. In this paper, antidiplomacy is defined as a set of practices, instruments, and processes that significantly challenge diplomatic competences in communication, legitimate representation, the management of public goods, and international cooperation, which implies the erosion of dialogical diplomacy. In other words, antidiplomacy aims to subvert or even delegitimize the sovereignty of political communities and may also challenge the security of these communities (Bjola, 2011).

While there is no consistent definition for the term *antidiplomacy*, it is usually recognized as an ideological and practical counterforce to diplomacy. In most common contexts, antidiplomacy is understood as a lack of cooperation and dialogue, a disrespect for other voices, or even aggression. *Antidiplomacy* can also be used to negatively qualify a government's foreign policy. Because of the term's plurality of meanings, it is difficult to objectively designate it. Der Derian (1987), instead of suggesting any straightforward definition of antidiplomacy, briefly compares diplomacy and antidiplomacy (Table 1). While diplomacy describes interactions among (more or less) equal states, antidiplomacy seems to recognize reciprocity among non-state entities. Der Derian treats states' foreign relations as relations of estrangement, expressed in cultural and linguistic differences. In contrast, antidiplomacy rejects any forms of distinction, as in Christian universalism and various utopian writings (Warren, 1989).

TABLE 1. Der Derian's comparison of diplomacy and antidiplomacy

	Diplomacy	Antidiplomacy
Relationship between subjects	Horizontal	Vertical
The nature of relationships	Between states	Between strata within states
Interaction conditions	Particular political entities—states—are estranged but mutually equal	Idealistic, utopian ideas—state boundaries and differences among entities are rejected
Aim	To mediate foreign relations	The destruction of segmentation

Source: Der Derian, 1987.

Der Derian adds an additional term, *paradiplomacy*, a form of antidiplomacy that can easily fall into the perversions of the revolutionary or even *terror diplomacy*, the latter being either the diplomatic practices of terrorist organizations or the endeavours of diplomats to destabilize countries or overthrow governments. Additionally, he points out that given new technological conditions, the old rules of the diplomatic game have changed and a new antidiplomacy has been generated (Der Derian, 1992).

For Martin Wight, antidiplomacy is not a political doctrine compatible with the realities of international politics, but a moral ideological attitude that could even bring about the abolition of diplomacy itself. Diplomacy can easily and peacefully transform into a dangerous antidiplomacy. The value of Wight's work lies is his recognition of the theoretical and practical

fluidity between some forms of utopian political doctrines and their possible effects, such as fascism and communism (Wight, 1991).

In his article, Noe Cornago (2013) circumscribes antidiplomacy's ambiguity by citing and examining various diplomatic notes, memories, historical narratives, literature, political papers, intelligence reports, academic writings, and internet discussions before concluding that the various meaning of *antidiplomacy* can be understood as complex connections between political beliefs, actions, and actual historical events. In tracing the use and meanings of *antidiplomacy*, Cornago refernces Polish writer and diplomat Jan Potocki's 1805 use of *antidiplomacy* concerning the reinforcement of Russia's diplomatic mission along the eastern borders of its empire; Potocki used the phrase "antidiplomatic manners," to describe Russia's progressive political force (Cornago, 2013:204). Cornago also cites Juan Valera's—former Spanish Ambassador to Portugal, Belgium, Austria, and the United States—use of the term in a diplomatic note in 1897. Valera referred to the evolution of events in Cuba as *antidiplomatic* and incompatible with some aspects of diplomatic culture (Cornago, 2013, pp. 195-196). Although a positive connotation of antidiplomacy emerged in 1840 when a patriotic people's movement was recognized as an "antidiplomatic congress" (Cornago, 2013, pp. 2015-206), the term *antidiplomacy* has been regarded as a criticism implying imperialism or foreign interventionism since the mid-nineteenth century. This negative connotation of *antidiplomacy* remains relevant to the United States, as the US's antidiplomacy negates governments' foreign policies towards powerless states (Cornago, 2013, pp. 206-209).

Perceptions of current international relations, however, suggest a clear opposition between diplomacy and antidiplomacy will no longer be observed. Despite their asymmetrical character, both notions will be frequently exchanged—or even reversed despite their seemingly distinct positive and negative connotations. For example, Michael Stohl (1984) uses the term *coercive diplomacy* and refers to elements of the "diplomacy of violence." Similarly, Noemi Gal-Or (1993), in her analysis of terrorist diplomacy as a special form of diplomacy consisting of elements of deterrence and coercion, assumes that limited political violence has become, at least, tolerable. She claims diplomatic methods are ambivalent as they are evolving into permissible antidiplomatic instruments of political activity.

Gal-Or's arguments about the contradictory nature of antidiplomacy are echoed on popular news websites. For website commentator Fiona Clark (2016), *antidiplomacy* is a synonym for the militarization of NATO-Russian relations. Yet Marc Owen Jones (2014) calls attention to another phenomena, *celebrity antidiplomacy*, or the immoral encouragement of human rights violations supported by actors, athletes, and musicians visiting authoritarian regimes.

2. THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA'S POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS

It wasn't until the 1980s that the compatriots issue appeared in Russia's political discourse. Launched in 1989, the so-called Russian card was played to prevent the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For Gorbachev, guaranteeing protection to Russian diasporas, diasporas created with the collapse of the USSR, was a significant but difficult to implement priority. In contrast, the diaspora issue was, at least initially, less important to Yeltsin. During his first term as president

he only signed bilateral agreements, including the protection of the Russian diaspora's rights and freedoms in post-Soviet spaces. Later, in response to the military conflict in the Republic of Moldova and the Baltic states issuing their naturalization policies[2], Yeltsin's position changed and he sought to protect the Russian diasporas' rights (Horska, 2009). One of the first documents concerning this issue of the dispersion of Russian compatriots residing in what were now post-Soviet spaces was Russia's Compatriot Policy Act, issued under Yeltsin in 1994. In the act, Russia expressed support for Russians who wished to return to their motherland or obtain Russian citizenship. Further, the decree offered the Russian diaspora protections of their national identity by legal, political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural instruments (Compatriot Policy Act of the Russian Federation, 1994). By 1995, Yeltsin had founded the Council of Compatriots. However, Russia's productive actions were not justified as an extension of Russia's policies in favour of Russian-speaking diasporas until Vladimir Putin's presidential period; Putin achieved this by joining hard and soft powers with elements of Soviet style propaganda (Conley and Gerber, 2011). The diaspora has become a convenient tool for promoting a positive image of the Russian state and for articulating its interests in the international arena, particularly in Russia's areas of historic interests.

The current situation of the Russian-speaking diasporas in the Baltic states has been formed by cultural, historical, and political factors—the most important of these factors are associated with the Baltic states' Soviet periods and the Baltic states' naturalization policies. All of the factors have influenced the educations and the political, linguistic, and social statuses of Russian-speakers in the Baltics and are regarded as discriminatory and humiliating by Russia. Though Russia has not accepted its loss of the Baltic region, it has had to formulate a new foreign policy towards Russian-speaking residents in the region's three independent countries.

Russia primarily uses language to identify its diasporas in the Baltic states. Russian is the mother tongue of 8 per cent of the residents of Lithuania, 33.8 per cent of the residents in Latvia, and 29.6 per cent of the residents in Estonia (CIA, 2015). Although Russia is associated with tragic episodes of history in the Baltic states, Russian is still the most popular second language in Lithuania according to the Lithuanian Department of Statistics (True Lithuania, 2015). Likewise, in Latvia and Estonia, (Centrālā Statistikas Pārvalde, 2011; Eesti kultuurministeerium, 2015), most of the older generations are fluent in Russian because of its ubiquity and obligatory use during the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. Nowadays, the use of Russian is decreasing. Today English is the most popular foreign language to learn (Eurostat, 2015). While private hotels and restaurants still offer menus in Russian and employ Russian-speakers, this is largely to accommodate the large number of Russian tourists who visit the Baltic states, a number that statistics reveal is declining (Lithuanian State Department of Tourism, 2016; BBN, 2016; BNN-NEWS, 2015).

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[2]   Latvia and Estonia granted citizenship only to those who had been citizens before June 1940 and to their descendants. As a result, a third of residents in Latvia and Estonia became non-citizens in the early 1990s (Smith, Aasland&Mole, 1994). While naturalization processes was introduced in the 1990s and prior to EU accession, it remains a very slow process.

3. RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN THE BALTIC STATES AND RUSSIA'S ANTIDIPLOMATIC TECHNIQUES IN THE BALTIC STATES

Though Russia is a classic realist power, Russia, as its recent actions in Ukraine reveal, frequently prefers hard power to powers of attraction. However, recent research (Grigas, 2012; Maliukevičius, 2013; Simons, 2014; Panova, 2015; Rostoks & Sprūds, 2015) has shown that in addition to applying traditional economic pressure and military policies, Russia has extended various instruments of influence in the Baltic states and has justified its interests in post-Soviet spaces as due to its advocacy for the Russian diasporas living there.

Russia uses international and regional organizations and conferences, appropriate forums for Russia to articulate its interests regarding Russian-speaking communities, to sway public opinion in its favour. In such forums, Russia portrays itself as the protector of a diaspora wounded by the anti-Russian policies of the Baltic states. In this context, Russia's statements to the international arenas regarding Russian-speakers in the Baltic states subtly discredit the governments of the Baltic states. This phenomenon has appeared simultaneously with Vladimir Putin's construction of negative images of the Baltic states intended to affect their domestic policies (Denisenko, 2015). Russian attempts to undermine the integration and adaptation of Russian-speaking diasporas in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia indicates that Russia prefers for these states to continue to grapple with internal national divides (Saari, 2014).

3.1. Accusations of human rights violations and ethnic discrimination

In the early 1990s, Latvia and Estonia's citizenship policies were met with particularly strong criticism from the OSCE, the EU, and the Council of Europe (Auers, 2015). The Russian government also actively participated in debates regarding the citizenship policies of the Baltic states and repeatedly accused the Baltic states of committing human rights violations. In 1999, after Tatyana Ždanoka's disqualification[3] from running in Latvia's 1998 parliamentary and municipal elections, Russia's State Duma cited Ždanoka's exclusion as a human rights violation committed by the Latvian government (Russian Parliament in case of Ždanok Act, 1999). Russia made an international appeal for the condemnation of the Latvian government (European Court of Human Rights, 2006; Lich, 2008). The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Ždanoka's human rights were not violated (European Court of Human Rights, 2006).

The rights of Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia were among the most contentious issues the two countries faced during their ascensions to the EU. For instance, the EU recommended that Latvia and Estonia consider changing the minimum language requirements for elderly people and granting citizenship to children born in the independent states. Eventually, the governments of both countries were forced to accept a few EU institutions' demands, which made the EU less popular in Latvia and Estonia than it was in Lithuania. Russia's constant criticism of Latvia and Estonia's relationships with their Russian-speakers can be interpreted as a way to

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[3]   Ždanoka was ruled ineligible to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections. Her exclusion was based on her former membership of the Communist Party of Latvia. She complained that her right to stand for election had been infringed upon.

question the effectiveness of the European institutions to ensure democracy and rule of law. An adaptation of Edward Lucas's whataboutism[4] (2008) seems to be an element of Russia's broader public diplomacy strategy of trying to counter criticism of its increasingly authoritarian political system by deflecting attention to allegedly undemocratic practices within the EU.

However neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the UN Human Rights Council has found evidence of the systematic abuse of human rights or ethnic discrimination in the Baltic states (Conley and Gerber, 2011). Amnesty International (AI), which due to its non-government status may more independently observe Russian-speakers in the Baltic states, has criticized the citizenship policies of the Baltic states as discriminatory. AI has also criticized the three countries' language and education policies as restrictive for Russian-speakers. Finally, AI pointed to the unfavourable economic situation of Russian-speakers in the Baltic states caused by limited political rights and social factors—such as the Russian-speakers lacking the ability to speak the national language of the particular Baltic country they reside in (Amnesty International, 2006). In a 2009 report, AI condemned the Estonian government force used to quell demonstrations in the capital in April 2007 (Amnesty International, 2009). Although the number of Russian-speakers in Estonia lacking Estonian citizenship has decreased, thanks to the Estonian government's effective policy of adaptation, in February 2011, Russia criticized an Estonian citizenship policy as discriminatory at a meeting of the UN Human Rights Council. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov described designating Russian-speakers as non-citizens in Estonia as a "shameful phenomenon" that "demands greater attention"[5] (NEWS ERR EE, 2011).

In February 2012, Latvia held a referendum on whether to amend the Latvian constitution—which held that the only official state language was Latvian—to adopt Russian as the country' second official language. Seventy per cent of Latvian citizens participated in the referendum and almost seventy-five percent voted against making Russian Latvia's second official language. According to the representatives of the Russian-speakers in Latvia, the referendum's outcome did not reflect the actual situation as Latvia's almost 300,000 Russian-speaking residents (non-citizens of Latvia) did not have the right to vote. The Russian Federation's delegation did not have observer status at the referendum, which the Russian government qualified as Latvian ignorance of international law (TVP.INFO, 2012; Gazeta Prawna, 2012). Russian-speakers accuse the Baltic governments of implementing anti-minority education policies that reduce the availability of instruction in the minority language (Buzayev, 2013). While bilingual instruction was offered at every level of education when the Baltic countries were part of the Soviet Union (Batelaan, 2002), almost all subjects are taught in the national language in public schools (and private municipal schools in Lithuania and Estonia as well) (The Baltic Times, 2015a; Zarenkov, 2013).

In Riga in September 2014, Konstantin Dolgov, the Russian foreign ministry's commissioner for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, took part in a conference of Russian-speaking

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[4]   The concept defines a Soviet tactic: when being criticized by the West for Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, imprisonment of dissidents, or censorship, the Soviet Union answered "What about..." (apartheid South Africa, jailed trade-unionists, the Contras in Nicaragua) (Lucas, 2008).

[5]   Non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia are not defined as stateless according to the national legal definitions, and their rights and obligations significantly exceed the minimum rights set by 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (Jeffries, 2004).

communities from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Dolgov criticized the Baltic states' treatment of Russian-speaking groups as that of second-class citizens. Specifically, he criticized Estonia and Latvia, where it is difficult for Russian-speakers to attain citizenship (Pravfond, 2014). Accusing the governments of Latvia and Estonia of adopting regulations that denigrate the status of the Russian language, Dolgov pointed out that Russian-speakers in the Baltic states cannot communicate with state officials in Russian (The Baltic Times, 2015b).[6] Ukrainian journalists noted that Dolgov's 2014 statements during the Baltic conference of Russian diasporas were eerily reminiscent of speeches he made regarding minorities in Crimea before Russia's 2014 occupation of the region. "This is the latest indication that Moscow may be planning an invasion into the Baltics in the near future" Centore and Babiak said (Centore and Babiak, 2014).

Dolgov has repeatedly called attention to human rights violations committed against Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states (Russian MFA, 2012). He called the situation faced by Russian-speakers residing in Latvia and Estonia "absolutely intolerable" (Dolgov, 2012). Dolgov indicated that he believed some Latvian and Estonian documents aimed to fully and unconditionally assimilate the Russian-speaking population (Dolgov, 2012). He also warned that the policies of the Baltic states were driven by extremist sentiments such as nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, racial and religious intolerance, and neo-Nazi ideas propaganda (Dolgov, 2012).

3.2. Russian propaganda in the media

Russian-speaking media is one of the most influential Russian instrument in the Baltic states. Table 2 shows the reach of TV channels in the Baltic states. The fourth position of Russian-speaking PBK in Latvia and Estonia indicates both its popularity and the size of the Russian-speaking television audiences in Latvia and Estonia (*MAVISE*, 2013). Russian-speaking channels are less popular in Lithuania. In fact, Lithuania banned the Russian RTR Planeta broadcast in 2015; Lithuania accused the broadcasters of inciting hatred between the Russia and Ukraine, of encouraging violence, and of violating Ukraine's territorial integrity. Lithuania's ban was precedential in the EU,(Lapėnienė, 2015; Reuters, 2014). Later, Latvia and Ukraine's instituted bans to counter risks to their national and informational security (OSCE, 2015). Similarly, Gazprom-owned NTV Mir was banned in Lithuania in 2014 for three months for broadcasting a documentary, *The Damned: Trap for the Alpha Group*, on the eve of the anniversary of Lithuania's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union. The documentary falsely reported that Lithuanian civilians killed by Soviet troops during the country's struggle to attain independence were actually killed by undercover Lithuanians, not Soviet troops. In response to Lithuania's bans on Russian media, Russia turned to the EU and OSCE. Dunja Mijatović, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, responded by cautioning governments from responding to Russian propaganda by banning or blocking Russian radio and television signals, denying entry to Russian

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6   A recent statement from Latvia's State Language Centre urging the use Latvian at work was portrayed in the Russian media as a ban on speaking Russian in workplaces in Latvia. According to the centre, the initial statement was made in response to customers' complaints about overhearing Russian in personal communications between service personnel (The Baltic Times, 2015b).

journalists or evicting Russian journalists from governmental press centres in Ukraine (OSCE, 2015). She made it very clear to all OSCE members that propaganda should not be countered with censorship, "Only a well-functioning open, diverse and dynamic media environment can effectively neutralize the effect of propaganda" (OSCE, 2015).

TABLE 2. Television channels' daily reach, per cent

Lithuania (% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%)

Channel	%
TV3	44
LNK	42
LTV	34
BTV	26
Lietuvos rytas TV	20
TV6	15
TV1	14
PBK	12
REN TV Baltija	9
RTR Planeta	8
LTV2	7
Liuks!	4
Info TV	4
Sport1	3
MTV Europe	2
Viasat Sport Baltic	2
NTV Mir***	1
TV8**	1
Video & DVD	3
Other Channels	38

Latvia (% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%)

Channel	%
LNT	35
TV3	35
LTV1	28
PBK	27
LTV7	23
3+	21
TV5	19
RTR Planeta Baltija*	19
REN Baltija	19
NTV Mir Latvija	18
TV6	14
1BM	5
Video & DVD	4
Other Channels	47

Estonia (% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%)

Channel	%
Kanal2	38
ETV	36
TV 3	35
PBK	20
ETV 2	19
Kanal 11	15
TV 6	15
3+	12
Ren TV Estonia	12
RTR Planeta Baltic	12
NTV Mir	12
Fox Life	6
Sony Entertainment TV	6
Kanal 12	5
Video/DVD	5
Fox Crime	5
National Geographics	4
Seitse	3
Other Channels	45

Source: TNS, Baltic Media Overview, 2011.

3.3. Accusations of Nazism and fascism levied by Russia against the Baltic states

Russia has been keenly and officially focused on anti-Nazism since 2005, when Russia began submitting an anti-Nazism resolution—a resolution firmly against pro-Nazi demonstrations and the glorification of Nazism—to the UN General Assembly. However, the motion did not receive support from the other member states. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov specifically accused Latvia and Estonia of frequently allowing parades in honour of Waffen-SS veterans in their celebrations of veterans from the Latvian Legion and the 20th Estonian SS Division (RT, 2012).

A World Without Nazism (WWN), the Russian political organization founded in 2010 that presents itself as an international human rights protection movement is another means for the Russian state to present its values and interests in the international forum. A Word Without Nazism got its start at two international conferences—in 2009 in Berlin, and in 2010 in Riga—in which the members of veteran organizations as well as youth and regional associations, including several dozen from the Baltic states participated. The conferences were attended by over 360 members from 136 organizations in 28 countries (WWN, 2015). The organization's title and motto, "A world without Nazism" refers to its work to halt the "false assessment" that the organization argues is the appropriation of WWII ideologies that render Nazism as heroic and restrict the cultural and religious rights of national minority groups. The idea of preventing the danger of ideological emptiness after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the need for protection from the harmful liberal policies of the West was supported by the Russian-speaking

national groups, extreme leftist and communist groups, and their affiliated youth and veteran organizations. WWN's stated mission is to counter threats of Nazi and fascist forces in central and eastern Europe, threats supported by the governments of the countries in the region. There is no doubt the WWN's creation was motivated by a Russian vision of the past, including the Third Reich's responsibility for the outbreak of WWII and false accusations of the Soviet Union's collaboration in these events. The symbolic date of the organization's establishment— June 22—is recognized by the Russian government as the anniversary of the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. The organization provides Russia with opportunities to bring charges of discrimination against national minorities, especially in the Baltic states, to the attention of the Council of Europe, the UN, and other international institutions. The pseudo-independent institution often provides ways for Russia to pursue its own interests and to influence other countries (Kirchick, 2015). As the so-called war against terrorism served Russia's actions in Chechnya, the WWN is another of Russia's instruments of disinformation, propaganda, and falsification of history employed to convince international institutions that Russia must take radical action to protect security, stability, and peace in Europe.

3.4. Russia accuses the Baltic states of spreading disinformation about Russia's intervention in the Baltic states

The protection of the rights of Russian compatriots residing in Ukraine was the legal basis for deploying the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the Ukraine "in connection with the extraordinary situation" and due to "the threat to citizens of the Russian Federation" (Kremlin, 2014). Fears of a Russian military intervention in the Baltics are frequently based on analogies to the conflict in Ukraine (Person, 2015). However these fears are also based more firmly in populist rhetoric than in a realistic threat. So far, there is no evidence that Russia will soon target the Baltic states to protect its diaspora. Former Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov—who served from 2011 to 2016—has described the threat of Russian military interventions in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as "nothing but raving nonsense" (The Financial Times, 2015). In an interview with *The Financial Times*, Ivanov suggested that only those with "a psychological disorder" would say that Russia will invade the Baltic states (The Financial Times, 2015). Expressing concern over the NATO activities near Russian borders and denying claims of involvement in Ukraine's internal affairs, Ivanov accused the Baltic states' governments of overplaying the threat of Russian intervention for their own financial benefit—to elicit money from NATO member states. According to Moscow, the Baltic states' governments have been increasing defence spending and asking NATO members for assistance in response to an alleged "Russian threat".

3.5. Undermining the legal sovereignty of the Baltic states

At the end of June 2015, two Russian parliamentary deputies— Evgeniy Fedorov and Anton Romanov, both members of the ruling political party, Yedinaya Rossiya—asked the Russian prosecutor general's office (the Genprocuratura) to review the legality of the State Council of the USSR's recognition of the three Baltic states. In their point of view, recognizing the legality of independence of the Baltic states the State Council "violated the sovereignty of the vast

country" and "launched a mechanism for the collapse of the state" by its decision (Petrov, 2015). According to the deputies , the State Council's rejection of a large and strategically important territory from the Soviet Union carried weighty consequences for the Soviet state, including the loss of seaports and the severing of economic ties with the former Baltic republics.

Lithuania's foreign ministers described the Russian deputies' request as an "absurd provocation" (BBC, 2015). Earlier, in late June 2015, the Genprocuratura announced that the transfer, within the Soviet Union, of Crimea and Sevastopol from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 had been illegal. The announcement was made in response to a query posed by Sergei Mironov, leader of the Russian political party, Spravedlivaya Rossiya (A Just Russia) (Mironov, 2015). It was admitted that the transfer had been unconstitutional and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR had not had permission to transfer territories that were part of the RSFSR (Mironov, 2015). The Genprocuratura's decision has a significant impact on Russia and Ukraine's relations because it provided a legal basis for annexation. In other words, the Genprocuratura's ruling legalized and legitimized Crimea's current status, based on the referendum of 16 March 2014, when the peninsula became a part of the Russia Federation.

The Russian deputies' arguments against recognizing the Baltic states' independence are based on the State Council of the USSR not abiding by the Constitution of the USSR. At the first meeting, the State Council acknowledged the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, but noted that the constitution had not officially been amended to reflect their independent status. Moreover, the deputies claim that referendums over the union republics' secession from the USSR have not been held in the Baltic states, as they should have, according to Soviet law in 1990 (USSR Act, 1990). Given that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were occupied by the Soviet Union from 1940 until its collapse in 1991, it is not unreasonable for the residents of these countries to ask, "Will Russia view and act in the Baltic states in the same way that it has in Crimea?" Investigating the legalities of past events may show unexpected, astonishing, or inconvenient results. Likely, the Baltic states' independence would also be declared illegal. Although the Russia's authorities officially undermined the Baltic states' independence, explaining that they does not support the deputies, the Genprocuratura started to investigate the issue (Petrov, 2015), but later dropped the investigation.

3.6 Official protest against domestic policies in the Baltic states

Despite the fact that Russia claims it has a friendly relationship with the Baltic states, Russia has engaged in supporting Russian-speaking diasporas, even in opposition to the Baltic governments. In 2000, Putin sent a letter to Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga to protest the Latvian court's decision to convict a former Soviet partisan, Vasily Kononov, as a war criminal. On January 21, the Riga District Court sentenced seventy-seven-year-old Kononov to six years in prison. In Putin's response to Kononov's conviction on his official website, he writes, "I have received numerous messages from human rights and veteran organizations, as well as individuals, asking me to intervene on the side of justice and prevent a person from being convicted for fighting Nazism. This is the first time such an event takes place in world practice" (Official

Internet Resources of the President of Russia, 2000). Moreover, in 2003, Putin sent a letter to a schoolboy from Riga after the child asked Putin to help him receive an education in Russian (Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, 2003). Putin's interventions favour and encourage division in the Baltic states and reflect Russia's desire to undermine the integration and acculturation of Russian-speaking communities in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. In fact, the idea of protecting the rights of Russian-speaking groups in the Baltic states, as articulated by Russia in the international arena, subtly discredits the governments of the Baltic states.

CONCLUSION

Russia's policies towards Russian-speaking communities in post-Soviet spaces are complex and frequently unclear. Is Russia's support for its diaspora just a propaganda technique to divert attention from Russia's foreign policy and actions—like the 2014 attack on Ukraine? Does Russia's focus on Russian-speakers in the Baltic states indicate that Russia cannot forgive and reconcile with the Baltic states now that they have regained their independence? A "Ukrainian scenario" in the Baltic states seems improbable, however, it is hard to predict what the consequences of Russia's actions in Ukraine will be in the near future because Russia's compatriot policy is inconsistent and contradictory. However, the research has revealed the following conclusions:

1. Russia uses antidiplomatic methods and instruments to significantly challenge diplomatic communication among states. These methods include, but are not limited to: criticizing, levying accusations against, negating the legitimacy of, undermining the rule of law in, and staging or supporting protests in post-Soviet states. Though Russia will use diplomatic instruments, like international organizations rooted in democratic values, it does not apply or abide by democratic rules. Russia's antidiplomatic strategies contradict Joseph Nye's (2004) concept of soft power, because it relies on disinformation, falsification of history, and the devaluation of Western values.

2. In its relationships with the Baltic countries, Russia executes an antidiplomatic political strategy that is designed to: a) subvert the power of the Baltic states in the international arena; b) delegitimize the sovereignty of the Baltic states; c) undermine the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonians' perceptions of their respective government's authority; and d) destabilize the Baltic information space to generate division and promote misunderstandings.

3. Russia's antidiplomacy has influenced international relations in the Baltic region. As Russia intensifies its use of authoritarian strategies, its relationships with the three Baltic states deteriorate. Yet, according to Russia's prime minister, the hostile relations between Russia and the Baltic states have not improved since the USSR collapsed because the governments of the Baltic countries continue to promote images of Russia as an enemy (RG, 2015). However antidiplomatic strategy is not as effective as Russia wants it to be; Russia's antidiplomacy impacts on the Baltics states, but not on international area.

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REVIEWS

Jan-Erik Lane

Olof Petersson, The Ordinarius: Herbert Tingsten[1] and Jörgen Westerståhl[2]

INTRODUCTION

Swedish political scientist Olof Petersson has recently published two remarkable biographies, of Herbert Tingsten and Jörgen Westerståhl, two professors who dominated political science in Sweden during the twentieth century.

In 2011, Petersson introduced his biography of Jörgen Westerståhl, *Statsvetaren: Jörgen Westerståhl och demokratins århundrade*, (*Political Scientist Jörgen Westerståhl and the Democratic Century*). In 2013 Petersson presented yet another biography, *Herbert Tingsten, vetenskapsmannen* (Herbert Tingsten, Scientist).

Though these well-written books would interest political scientists all over Europe and America, I believe Petersson's analysis of these two men—of Westerståhl in Gothenburg and Tingsten in Stockholm—has a wider bearing on the structure of academia in Sweden, which is definitely more German than Anglo-Saxon, despite the Swedish government's frenetic reform efforts during the 1960s and 1970s. Petersson entices the reader to ask: What does it mean to be a full professor in a completely hierarchical academic structure? The answer: Power.

These two examples of an ordinarius—Tingsten and Westerståhl—are interesting from several perspectives. Petersson's works invite comparisons between the two men's personal lives, (Westerståhl was Tingsten's pupil), their intellectual achievements (Tingsten outdistanced Westerståhl) and their academic influences (Westerståhl was regarded as having reached the top of the ranks in his discipline in Scandinavia, alongside Stein Rokkan in Bergen). Yet when it comes to access to political power, there is no comparison. Tingsten does not begin to compare with Westerståhl. In making my own remarks on these two major volumes in Nordic political science, I argue that the Anglo-Saxon model of professors as a community of equals limits the dysfunctional excesses of the Swedish model of ordinarien.

Petersson's two books differ by content. Petersson's biography of Westerståhl offers a fascinating life story, whereas his book on Tingsten is a penetrating intellectual biography, examining first and foremost Tingsten's main books.

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[1]   Petersson, O., 2013. *Herbert Tingsten, Vetenskapsmannen* [Herbet Tingsten, Scientist]. Atlantis Bokförlag.
[2]   Petersson, O., 2011. *Statsvetaren: Jörgen Westerståhl och demokratins århundrade* [Political Scientist: Jörgen Westerståhl and the democratic century]. SNS Förlag.

1. TINGSTEN (1896-1973): THE PROFESSOR AS MASTER—OF WHAT?

Being professor for only eleven years at Stockholm University College (1935 to 1946), Tingsten was the political analyst as academic professor. Everything he wrote had a political overtone. Tingsten was an intellectual giant, an equilibrist, and a *besserwisser*, whose basic aim was to prevail in intellectual debates on politics and culture. As chief editor of the largest newspaper in Norden, *Dagens Nyheter*, Tingsten authored a mass of articles in the same style he used in his academic publications.

1.1 The Negative Message

Following his political convictions already laid down in his academic books, he tried endlessly to propagate his political views against his opponents. Chiefly, his opponents were:

a) **Enemies of democracy:** Tingsten was an acute observer of political events and trends and often grasped the essence of things before anyone else. As a young man in central Europe, he saw democracy win an institutional fight, but he predicted democracy's fragility. Tingsten emphasized that democracy is a political regime, not a social or economic one.

b) **Fascism:** In response to developments in central Europe, Italy and Spain, Tingsten presented a profound analysis of the fascist mind, linking it to the worship of violence.

c) **Conservatism:** Tingsten was a member of the Swedish Social Democratic Party until the mid 1940s, participating in its meetings about the party program. He rejected conservatism and wrote a major book analysing conservatism's evolution from Burke onwards, the key idea of which was that conservatism entailed an unwarranted suspicion of reason and of the place of reason in political argument.

d) **Communism:** Tingsten slowly developed a hatred for communism. When he pursued his *Dagens Nyheter* campaigns against the Soviet Union and left-wing radicalism in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, Tingsten was merely drawing from the conclusions of his two-volume study of the ideas of the Swedish *Arbeiterbewegung*, a study in which he discovered the contradictions of Marxism and the faulty reasoning of continental Europe's great ideologues.

Tingsten wanted to intellectually defeat and even humiliate his opponents and often did so by linking them with the great creators of ideologies or systems of political ideas from the history of political thought. No one could disclose the flaws of these giants better than Tingsten who called his method *"the critique of ideas."* With almost whatever he produced, social science or propaganda, for Tingsten there was a porous border between *what is* and *what ought to be*.

Petersson gives a brilliant recap of Tingsten's books and of his rebuttals to his critiques— but Petersson fails to mention a major rejection of Tingsten's work. Economic historian Kurt Samuelson saw clear weaknesses in Tingsten's conception of an ideology as merely a set of falsifiable hypotheses (Samuelson, 1973). No doubt, Tingsten was a master of finding errors, disclosing mistakes, and pointing out lacunas in the political thought of the great masters of political philosophy and the history of ideas. Tingsten even went so far as to state that political

ideologies were fundamentally statements about reality and thus falsifiable, as these basic statements were not value premises, neither moral convictions nor material self-interests. Very questionable indeed!

Tingsten became illustrious around 1940 when his major studies of the ideological development of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) were published by the second wing of the *Arbeiterbewegung*, the central trade union organization, *Landsorganisationen* (LO)! Tingsten's work was hardly what the socialists in power since 1932 had expected, namely a frontal attack against the strong Marxist element in the SAP's party programs. Tingsten used the distinction between the long-run perspective (revolution) and the short-run perspective (parliamentary democracy) to claim that the ideology of the SAP contained a major contradiction, and that it was time for the SAP to scrap their long-run perspective. In doing so, Tingsten emphasized Bernstein's basic message from 1899, " . . . turn social reform from a means of the class struggle into its final aim." The only Social Democrat to uphold the long-run perspective was Ernst Wigforss, Sweden's so-called last socialist.

The best chapter in Petersson's volume on Tingsten deals with Tingsten's own theory about mature democracies in Western Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), namely with his hypothesis about the "end of ideologies." Here, Petersson draws upon his profound knowledge about Swedish politics after the Second World War to make a balanced assessment of the pros and cons of Tingsten's own message.

"Democracy can only survive when the ideologies die," Tingsten proclaimed, which led to a large public debate that included, among other politicians, Prime Minister Tage Erlander and Olof Palme. The *New Left* rejected Tingsten's proclamation outright, pointing to the Paris events and student uproars. Tingsten had combined two of his most essential ideas, namely: 1) that the ideologies from the French revolution had been criticized and falsified—they consisted of flawed theories, not values; and 2) a democratic system of government can only survive if the central political parties *share* a conviction about the ends and means of democracy—a set of meta-beliefs.

After he left his professorship at Stockholm University Tingsten lived as a man of letters and as a public intellectual; he kept publishing up until he went blind. Petersson mentions that Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius, famous due to his virulent attacks on Christian theology and Paulus, designated Tingsten's distinction between the short-run and long-run perspectives in the ideological development of Swedish Social Democracy as his most prominent achievement from a scientific point of view. This is hardly accurate, as the strategic tension between these two concepts was much debated in the Marxist circles in Western and central Europe. In Sweden, only Wigforss kept dreaming of the idea long-term idea socialist society—of a *foeretag utan aegare*, firms without owners.

Now, Tingsten's main scientific achievement is no doubt his pronounced and very original early thesis about the end of ideology, presented internationally in 1955. His argument has the following structure:

(1) Ideologies were all created in the wake of the French Rev0lution

(2) Ideologies are essentially systems of theoretical propositions about the future, the good, and the right for mankind

(3) Ideologies contain grave intellectual errors

(4) Ideologies are actually dying and will die out soon.

Tingsten's conclusion seems highly logical, as nobody would cherish incorrect ideas. Yet, his concluding prediction was shocking in 1955.

The first three assumptions though are too restrictive for critical scrutiny. Samuelson (who was grossly underestimated in Swedish academia) successfully attacked Tingsten's second assumption by making the case for ideologies including values *or subjective evaluations* in Uppsala School's Haegerstroem's terminology. Furthermore, Tingsten's first assumption appears arbitrary. Today we have great ideological debates between environmentalists and cornucopians as well as between neo-liberalism and liberal egalitarianism.

Tingsten died before the emergence of the great debates among liberal egalitarians (Rawls, Dworkin, Barry) and among neo-liberals (Nozick, Chicago School). These debates largely focused on real equality versus liberty. Ideological confrontation may not need the old faulty masters of the nineteenth century! And this dominant political debate today includes both theories and values!

Petersson finishes his masterful biography with an overview of Tingsten's foreign contacts. Like Westerståhl, he did not participate much in international conferences. However, he is mentioned in the colloquium on *The End of Ideology* in 1955 with Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell.

1.2 The Positive Argument

It is true that Tingsten changed his political position several times, but a core focus evolved in both his research and his politics—namely the neo-liberalism of the Mont Pelerin Society, of which he was a founding member in 1947. He was attracted by its civilisation creeds: individualism, anti-authoritarianism, and market economics. In 1944, Tingsten replaced socialism with libertarianism, as the famous Swedish economist Ingemar Stahl did in the 1970s. By then, Tingsten had turned into a pure political propagandist, proclaiming: Sweden must enter NATO—there is no *third* position; Sweden must have nuclear weapons; Sweden must seek allies in the West to stand strong against Stalin; the welfare state must be shrunk; only a republic is a true democratic regime; and the state and religion must be separated.

As an outspoken atheist, Tingsten strongly supported his close friend (Uppsala University philosophy professor) Ingemar Hedenius's, attack on the church and Christianity. Tingsten was also extremely negative towards the Soviet Regime and Stalin, he even succeeded in taking Gunnar Myrdal out of the government for his Soviet sympathies. It seems to me that Petersson does not fully realize how ideological Tingsten's commitment was to neo-liberalism, or to Hayekianism; he anticipated much of what was to come in the 1980s (Hayek, Kirzner, Buchanan). Why could neo-liberalism not be critiqued with the approach used in the negative argument above? Is Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* (1944) really so good as Tingsten believed?

Yet, Tingsten was a man of contradictions, despite his ambition to disclose the mistakes of the greats: Smith, Bentham, Burke, Marx, de Maistre, Tolstoy, and Hegel among others. When the big political issue in post-war politics surfaced in Sweden—the A*llman Tjanstepension* (ATP)

pension question—Tingsten turned around for a final time, he abandoned his liberal stance and *Dagens Nyheter*, advocating the state solution of the socialists—not a road to serfdom? As a matter of fact, the ATP reform that consolidated the power in government for the socialists for almost twenty years has not turned out to be an economic success.

In his youth, Tingsten mastered much of political science. It was only after he had chosen his newspaper career that he focused exclusively upon the analysis of ideas. Thus, Tingsten made very interesting contributions to electoral enquiry and the study of constitutional law. After leaving *Dagens Nyheter*, Tingsten lived long enough to understand that he had understood little about the political attraction of the "great faulty thinkers," or of the emotions and values of systems of political ideas. The 1960s corrected Tingsten and he saw radical socialism and anti-Americanism coming back in Sweden, and at *Dagens Nyheter*. Perhaps it is fair to conclude that today Tingsten is *less* out of tune with politics than he was in the 1960s as Sweden is now considering a NATO alliance and emphasizes allocation instead of redistribution.

What is stunning in Tingsten's academic achievement is the speed with which he perceived how political events would combine to form major changes. He anticipated not only Popper, Berlin, and Avineri but also neo-liberalism—though his impatience and nervousness precluded profundity. One of Tingsten's best acts was his fiercely attack against the government's expulsion of war refugees from the Baltic States to Russia. His socialist opponent and Minister of Finance, the ideologue Ernst Wigforss, supported this shameful act; this decision to send the Baltics refugees back to Russia often resulted in tragedy as gulags awaited these people from the countries Sweden had once ruled. While Tingsten was an ordinarius in spirit with his arrogant and dominating demeanour, Westerståhl was an ordinarius in action. Westerståhl and his associates alone almost constituted a think tank.

2. JÖRGEN WESTERSTÅHL (1916-2006): THE PROFESSOR AS A RESEARCH ENTREPRENEUR

A Swedish ordinarius is not only the representative of a discipline at the university, but an ordinarius may act as an administrative officer in charge of all personnel and contracts. Ordinarien have less teaching duties than other professors as they often concentrate their instruction on PhD guidance. This provides ample time for taking various duties inside or outside academia. Often, ordinarien participate in research bodies or research councils to procure money for the department or for themselves. Ordinarien have a very strong influence over the selection of other ordinarien, including their successors.

This hierarchical system originated in the period of the elite model university which typically had one chair, surrounded by assistants and clerks, in each discipline. When Swedish higher education was adapted to a mass model university, the role of ordinarius was maintained though modified slightly into the central role in a large department with many scholars, research personnel, and clerks. The socialist government no doubt wanted to limit the power of the ordinarien, but despite many top-down reforms, the government failed utterly in this regard. The transformation from elite to mass higher education changed the universities and colleges in all but one aspect, the prevailing prerogatives of the ordinarien. The Swedish full

professor combined two roles—that of a single representative of a discipline with the head of a department. The full professor became a large-scale entrepreneur managing research contracts in the millions with contract responsibilities for between fifty and up to one-hundred individuals on the department staff. No one personifies this transformation of Swedish academic departments more than Westerståhl. Westerståhl built up the now dominant political science establishment in Gothenburg, anchoring almost everything in politics.

Westerståhl worked under Tingsten for a time as his assistant when Tingsten did electoral enquiry work. Coming from the larger family of Hjalmar Branting—the first Socialist premier, Westerståhl had a social democratic identity that he never abandoned. Teaching political thought from Tingsten's approach, Westerståhl was somewhat unoriginal until he set out on his own and explored in great detail the virtues of empiricism and how data collection could be combined with the enormous intelligence needs of the growing welfare state and of the expanding ministries and agencies' thirst for knowledge.

Westerståhl re-educated himself around 1950 when he went to the US to pick up the tools of survey research and the spirit of behaviourism, there he spent time with the leading researchers of the 1950s. This was something new, something other than criticizing Hegel with Tingsten's method of the critique of ideas. Westerståhl transferred the new methods in social science to his department in Gothenburg and started to take on huge data projects from various funding sources. Thus, electoral research, newspaper studies, and enquiries into government agencies were initiated on a long-term basis by Westerståhl and his brilliant new staff. Petersson knows all about this Gothenburg revolution, Petersson was one of its new scholars moving Swedish political science forward in the scientific world and endorsing behaviourism. The list of studies emerging from the constantly swelling Gothenburg institutes of politics and administration testifies to Westerståhl's capacity and skill. Several PhD candidates guided by Westerståhl are now professors who continue to pursue his empiricist ideal within now institutionalized research programs such as electoral studies. As a matter of fact, Westerståhl became an almost recurrent figure in mass media; his large scale studies of objectivity, his neutrality, and the informative content of his contributions to news media drew much interest. The general public, newspapers, radio broadcasters, and television producers read his conclusions over the years.

Yet, Westerståhl became so successful in attracting funds for new research and so esteemed by the social democratic government for his capacity to conduct applied research that he somehow forgot his limitations. When this happened, none other than Tingsten was there to point out to these limitations in a most forceful manner that seriously hurt Westerståhl's reputation. This occurred around 1960, when Tingsten was still vigorous enough to conduct a scientific attack of great amplitude. Westerståhl had accepted the responsibility of giving Sweden a new and updated constitution, as the famous 1809 dispensation was considered obsolete. But Westerståhl did not take the task with the seriousness required to become the reformer of the Swedish state. Perhaps it was just another contract to him? In any case, after Westerståhl had presented his proposal, Tingsten entered the scene with a booklet, *Should the Role of the King be Reinforced?* Tingsten's assessment that Westerståhl had failed miserably in rewriting the 1809 constitution was a shock to all, not least to Westerståhl himself.

This time, the government listened to Tingsten in spite of his socialist attacks launched from *Dagens Nyheter*. To redo Westerståhl's failed job of rewriting the 1809 constitution, a new committee, headed by the best Swedish expert on constitutional law, ordinarius Nils Stiernquist. Stiernquist succeeded in transforming a constitutional monarchy into a real republican dispensation, headed by a completely powerless national symbol: the king. Why did Westerståhl accept this assignment? Late professor Par-Erik Back, another ordinarius once told me that Westerståhl had written an unpublished analysis of Hans Kelsen's legal theory, adding that it was a masterpiece, inspired by the legal realism of Uppsala genius, philosopher Axel Hagerstrom. I have never seen it, but Westerståhl's constitutional outline for Sweden was not inspired by Kelsen's 1920 constitution for Austria—pure republicanism of course.

Westerståhl's personality was different from Tingsten's. Unlike Tingsten, he was rather timid or shy and attuned to details. He concentrated all of his efforts on empirical research, often on applied empirical research. By participating in the efforts after the Second World War, he came to know all of the key scholars in political science in Europe and in American election studies. However, he was to present a second great disappointment when he failed to support the Norwegian genius Stein Rokkan for a professorship at the national university in Oslo. Westerståhl knew Rokkan well from international conferences, but he forced him to go to Bergen University, which Rokkan made world famous for political science—sad for Oslo!

CONCLUSION

The Swedish ordinarius is a most prestigious figure who can speak truth to power. But, ordinarien can also conduct their own self-seeking agendas, as ordinarius Bo Rothstein did. It could be argued that this institution should be abolished entirely and that Sweden should move to the Anglo-Saxon model of professors as a community of equals with a rotating department chair. The most dismal aspect of the ordinarius's role is the compulsory duty to write evaluations of ordinarien candidates. As these evaluations are published in the journal *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, they provide a golden opportunity for crushing critiques and the settling of old scores. This practice, *sakkunnigutlatande* (expert statement), exists only in Swedish academia as an officially published document within political science. When an ordinarius opening comes up, then the only relevant question is: Who will the three experts be? It becomes a true game with lots of manoeuvring nationwide!

Petersson has done a great service to Swedish political science, not only by conducting a huge power investigation in the 1980s, but also by writing these two portraits of two dominant personalities. Tingsten wrote several books on the history of political thought at the highest international level, while Westerståhl concentrated on empire building in Gothenburg. The extraordinary influence they wielded upon Swedish society stemmed from the ordinarius position, a relic from the time when Sweden belonged under German culture and university ideals.

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Ainius Lašas

Klaudijus Maniokas, ed., Lithuania's First Decade in the EU Transformation or Imitation?[1]

For those who want to better grasp the political and socio-economic trajectory of Lithuania since its accession to the EU, this edited volume provides a wealth of information and insights. It touches upon a variety of themes ranging from the politicization of LGBT rights to Lithuania's bumpy road to the eurozone. While this constitutes an interesting and informative read, the book sometimes struggles to maintain theoretical and conceptual cohesion throughout all chapters.

As specified in the opening theoretical chapter by Klaudijus Maniokas, the volume sets three principal objectives. It seeks 1) to sketch a trajectory of Lithuania's development since 2004; 2) to determine the role of the EU in shaping the course of this trajectory and; 3) to analyse the extent to which Lithuania has developed, to use North, Wallis, and Weingast's (2009) terminology, an "open access social order." The transformation from limited to open access order serves as the principal macro-theoretical lens of the volume. However, the volume's theoretical section also draws heavily on Europeanization literature to conceptualize the nature of the EU's influence on national politics. The focus of the volume is exclusively on the downloading dynamics of Europeanization. While this combination of grand- and medium-range theories is intriguing, their interaction deserves closer critical attention. Does the European Union only limit or also open up domestic opportunities for patronage and corruption? Why do south European countries such as Greece or Italy show no progress towards attaining greater transparency—based on transparency indicators (CPI)—for years? Furthermore, given the limited temporal scope of this volume, is it reasonable to expect social order shifts in such a short period of time?

In line with the work's first objective, the second chapter—by Sabina Karmazinaitė, Klaudijus Maniokas and Darius Žeruolis—assesses Lithuania's performance according to a wide range of quantitative indicators linked to the country's national strategy paper, *Lithuania 2030*. These indicators include not only the typical international indices (e.g. World Governance Indicators), but also information on emigration flows, electricity and gas prices, the number of NGOs, and the differences between popular and elite perceptions of Lithuania's progress over the last decade. Based on this plethora of data, the authors of the chapter conclude that Lithuania has made noticeable progress in its economic convergence with richer European countries, but achieved little in terms of structural indicators (e.g. income equality). These results fell well short of popular expectations, which resulted in high emigration flows and the public's general scepticism.

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[1]   Maniokas, K., ed., 2015. *Pirmasis Lietuvos dešimtmetis Europos Sąjungoje: transformacija ar imitacija?* [Lithuania's first decade in the European Union: Transformation or imitation?]. Vilnius: Vilnius University Press.

This causal linkage between EU membership-related expectations and emigration appears to be problematic. Given the fact that 2010 to 2011 figures are heavily skewed upwards by a newly introduced law requiring residents to pay mandatory health insurance fees, the highest emigration flows most likely occurred in 2004 and 2005. Thus, emigration during Lithuania's initial years as an EU member had little to do with membership expectations, which should have been projected further into the future.

The next chapter, by Vytautas Kuokštis, provides another bird's-eye view, this time of Lithuania's political economy. Kuokštis's findings are largely in line with the Maniokas and Žeruolis's previous assessment. On the one hand, these findings highlight evidence of rapid economic growth facilitated in part by EU structural funds. On the other hand, they point to the limited political will to implement painful structural reforms after Lithuania's EU accession.

In his unique contribution, a chapter on the development of Lithuania's welfare state, Liutauras Gudžinskas's engages the topic of Europeanization in a more systematic way. Gudžinskas presents a discourse analysis of the governments' annual reports to the parliament in order to determine whether more attention has been paid to social policy since EU membership. His findings do not support initial expectations, but do show clear links to partisan ideologies: left-leaning governments tended to pay more attention to social policy. In general, according to Gudžinskas, economic and energy security have become the dominant topics of discourse in Lithuania's public sphere. The economic crisis further emphasized these issues.

Although analysing Europeanization is a stated objective of this volume, the chapter on the Europeanization of public administration, by Vitalis Nakrošis and Sabina Bankauskaitė-Grigaliūnienė, is by far the most systematic and comprehensive in addressing this topic. The authors seek to determine to what extent and how the EU contributed to the agencification (proliferation of public agencies) and depoliticization of the public sector. Their results demonstrate that the EU has played a noticeable, but limited role in both processes. While the EU contributed to the proliferation of Lithuania's new public agencies, Europeanized agencies managed to maintain a degree of autonomy and avoid politicization. Thus, while the public sector as a whole remained highly vulnerable to political pressures and exhibited limited levels of professionalization, Europeanized agencies bucked this trend.

Next, the volume turns to the topic of Lithuania's entry into the eurozone. In this chapter, Vilpišauskas looks at Lithuania's monetary and fiscal policies since 2004 and identifies the reasons for Lithuania's adoption of the euro. Perceived economic benefits played the most important role in political elites' determination to adopt the euro followed by national security concerns. However, Lithuania's first attempt to adopt the euro (in 2007) was unsuccessful due to elites' lack of attention and understanding of how changes in fiscal policy related to the convergence criteria. In contrast, eight years later, both internal and external factors favoured Lithuania's entry. While this chapter provides interesting analysis and relates to the book's first objective, it feels detached from the initial theoretical discussions. How is Lithuania's adoption of the euro related to Europeanization debates? What does the failed attempt to change the commission's negative assessment indicate about Lithuania's uploading capabilities? Should Lithuania's accession to the eurozone be interpreted as yet another step towards open access

order in Lithuania? Answers to these and related questions would better integrate this chapter.

The book concludes with a case study of LGBT rights in Lithuania. Specifically, it looks at how and why this issue became increasingly politicized. Somewhat surprisingly, Liutauras Gudžinskas demonstrates that during EU accession negotiations surrounding LGBT-related issues generated little public attention and controversy in Lithuania. Growing politicization and polarization of LGBT issues came in 2008 with a new government, led by the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats party. Despite EU pressure, especially from the European Parliament, there is limited evidence of Europeanization in this policy area. While Lithuania has implemented some legal provisions against LGBT employment discrimination and provided guarantees of basic civil rights, the current political and popular climate is highly antagonistic toward the issue of LGBT rights. According to the author, there is little willingness to enact laws as practice and, at the same time, this is a great deal of political support for imposing further restrictions on the LGBT community. As in the case of public administration reforms, the role of the EU in influencing Lithuania's domestic political agenda appears to be quite limited.

The case studies of Lithuania presented in this volume demonstrates that the effects of Europeanization on Lithuania after its EU accession have been complex and uneven. As response modes to EU policies and demands, transformation and retrenchment are largely absent. Instead, the authors often observe absorption or partial accommodation. These baby steps must accumulate substantially before they can produce meaningful changes in Lithuania's social order. However, by that time, the causal structure becomes much more complex and the isolation of Europeanization factors even more challenging. But to quote T.S. Eliot, "If you aren't in over your head, how do you know how tall you are?"

CORRIGENDA

In the previous issue of *The Baltic Journal of Political Science* (no. 4, 2015), Kamil Ławniczak, co-author of the article *Poland's International Relations Scholarly Community and its Distinguishing Features According to the 2014 TRIP Survey of International Relations Scholars*, was misidentified as a "PhD student" in a footnote of page 94. Kamil Ławniczak possesses a PhD degree. We apologise to the author for this regrettable error.

Liutauras Gudžinskas,
editor-in-chief of *The Baltic Journal of Political Science*

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Baltic Journal
of Political Science

December 2016
No 5