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ASPECTS OF SELF-PRESENTATION IN THE SPEECHES OF ISOCRATES

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Abstract

This article, based on the paper presented at the *ISHR 2013 Conference* (July 24–27, 2013, Chicago), reconsiders the rhetorical image of Isocrates, preserved in his literary works and especially in three of the most prominent speeches, *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis*, and *Panathenaicus*, discusses certain controversies and difficulties of determining his public character and his attitude towards the audience and, basing on both empirically gathered data (references found in Isocrates' writings) and on the theoretical basement provided by the consideration of the classical rhetoric tradition and the modern communication science approach, reviews the main aspects of the speaker's self-presentational tactics as seen in his self-reflexive statements (found in the mentioned speeches), the examination of which could lead to a better comprehension of the otherwise obscure picture of this influential Athenian rhetorician.

Preliminary remarks on problems and tasks

In his discourses aimed at public reading, Isocrates created a certain picture of his literary or rhetorical "self". Such concept is only fractionally mentioned in ancient rhetorical treatises (among others in Aristotelian theory of ἦθος of speaker, audience and occasion)[1], but it is perhaps inherent in the long tradition of character-composition (ἠθοποιία) implicitly present both in oral speech-making practice and early written forensic discourses. The concept of the orator's activity, consisting of the displaying his own character and commending his

[1] E.g., in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.7 = 1408a10–b20 concerning the appropriateness (πρέπον) of style. This discussion includes observations about the manner the orator presents himself to the audience, which we could summarize as ἁρμονία ἐν λόγῳ, πάθει, ἤθει, καὶ εὐκαιρία. James Fredal in his article on Demosthenes' technique of character presentation ("The Language of Delivery and the Presentation of Character: Rhetorical Action in Demosthenes' against Meidias", *Rhetoric Review*, 20, No. 3/4 (Autumn), 2001, pp. 251–267) convincingly showed that by the 4th century BC the Greek oratory had been employing in speeches three strategies as described in Aristotelian theory of ἦθος (by referring to this article I, nevertheless, change the references to the Aristotle's text and include a parallel standard numbering of Immanuel Bekker's edition; for this purpose, I used the German edition by Adolphus Roemer, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*. […] Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914): construction of speaker's own *ēthos* (*Rhet*. 2.1.4–6 = 1377b29–1378a16), adaption of his speech to the *ēthos* of the audience (*Rhet*. 2.12.1–17.6 = 1388b30-1391b7) and construction of a more specific *ēthos* appropriate to the occasion (*Rhet*. 3.7.6–10 = 1408a25–b20).

good qualities (not just merely exhibiting his rhetorical skills), was associated with the realm of words and expressions denoting demonstration and exhibition (e.g. ἐπίδειξις, δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος, ἐμφανίζειν, ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι, φαίνεσθαι or ἀποφαίνειν ἑαυτόν)[2]. Nowadays, the same concept is an attractive topic for interdisciplinary research within communication studies (matching the subjects of rhetoric, literary theory, ethics, and psychology). In the course of these studies, various new concepts and terms dealing with the speaker–audience interaction and various constituents of rhetorical communication (such as *rhetorical image*, *self-presentation*, *impression management*, *strategies of intimidation, ingratiation* or *self-handicapping*)[3] have been coined or acquired new connotations[4]. Despite a somewhat loose relation among these concepts and the traditional terminology of classical rhetoric, certain attempts to match them up have already been made. At least in the case of the research on Isocrates, we find the term 'self-presentation' frequently employed[5]. Since, however, it is neither firmly established nor strictly defined, but, on the contrary, other synonyms (such as

[2] Beside the already mentioned Aristotelean theory which contains the concept expressed in the words „τὸ ποιόν τινα **φαίνεσθαι** τὸν λέγοντα" (Arist. *Rhet*. 2.1.3 = 1377b26–27; 2.1.4 = 1377b29; cf. 1366a10), the significant example could be drawn from the instruction present in the 4th-century BC manual of rhetoric by Anaximenes, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (14.8. = 1431b10–14), containg the majority of these key words (marked here in bold): „Ἡ μὲν οὖν **δόξα τοῦ λέγοντός** ἐστι τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν **ἐμφανίζειν** κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων. δεῖ δ' ἔμπειρον **ἀποφαίνειν σεαυτὸν** περὶ ὧν ἂν λέγῃς, καὶ **ἐπιδεικνύναι**, ὡς συμφέρει σοι τἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ τούτων, τὸν δ' ἀντιλέγοντα μάλιστα δεικνύναι μηδεμίαν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντα τὸν ἐναντίον περὶ ὧν ἀποφαίνεται {τήν τε δόξαν ὁμοίως}". The source of the quotation is *Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica Quae Vulgo Fertur Aristotelis Ad Alexandrum*, ed. Manfred Fuhrmann, Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1966. All the highlightings of the words occurring in this and other passages of this article are mine.

[3] Impression management is a term associated with sociology and social psychology, meaning a goal-directed process in which people, by controlling information in social interaction, attempt to affect the perceptions of other people about a person, object or event (cf. Barry R.Schlenker, *Impression Management: The Self-concept, Social Identity, and Interpersonal Relations*, Monterey (California): Brooks/Cole, 1980, p. x; Manfred Piwinger, Helmut Ebert, "Impression Management: Wie aus Niemand Jemand wird", *Bentele, Guenther et al. (Ed.), Kommunikationsmanagement: Strategien, Wissen, Lösungen*, hrsg. Günter Bentele, Manfred Piwinger, Gregor Schönborn, Neuwied/Kriftel: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 2001, pp. 1–2). It is usually used synonymously with the term "self-presentation" in which a person tries to protect self-image and/or influence the perception of it (Sandy J. Wayne, Robert C. Liden, "Effects of Impression Management on Performance Ratings: A Longitudinal Study", *The Academy of Management Journal*, 38, No. 1 (Feb.), 1995, p. 232). The notion of impression management also refers to practices in professional communication and public relations where the term is used to describe the process of formation of a public image of any organization or company. In the theory of impression management, various strategical aspects have been distinguished, usually acquiring a dyadic structure, e. g., defensive strategy (such as avoidance of threatening situations or means of self-handicapping) and the assertive one (verbal idealization of the self, the use of status symbols, and others) (cf. Piwinger, Ebert, *op. cit*., p. 26).

[4] In this respect, Joachim Knape's study *Modern Rhetoric in Culture, Arts, and Media* (transl. by Alan L. Fortuna), Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2013 is worth a mention, especially the essay No. 3: "The Modern Concepts of Image and Ethos as Found in Aristotle" pp. 51–68, dealing with the ‚rhetorical image' of the orator and his ‚expectations'.

[5] Cf. Yun Lee Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy***,** Cambridge Classical Press, 1995, p. 75; Josiah Ober, "I, Socrates... The Performative Audacity of Isocrates' *Antidosis*", in: *Isocrates and Civic Education*, p. 42, n. 24; Stephen Halliwell, "Philosophical Rhetoric or Rhetorical Philosophy? The Strange Case of Isocrates", *The Rhetoric Canon*, ed. Brenda Deen Schildgen, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997, p. 109; Håkan Kan Tell, *Plato's Counterfeit Sophists*, Washington: Center for Hellenic Sudies, 2011, p. 50.

self-characterization[6], self-display[7], self-portraiture[8], self-portrayal[9], self-description[10], or self-depiction[11]) are easily used, the same terminological flexibility is preferable for me in this paper.

In his works, written during his teaching career in Athens and his old years (ca. 392–338), Isocrates quite often speaks of himself (or his rhetorical self) and expresses his personal views on the rhetorical education, claims his originality and difference from other rhetoricians and philosophers[12]. On the other hand, in some places (most notably in *Phil*. 81, *Epist*. 8.7, and *Panath*. 9–10) he is unscrupulous to mention his weakness of voice and timidity to speak publicly (usually interpreted as stage fright). This controversial rhetorical image of creative and yet self-stigmatized (leptophonic[13] and glossophobic) speechwriter, thanks to Roman and Byzantine biographers, has been preserved to our days. I am not going to consider how much this literary portrait (or rhetorical picture)[14] of the rhetorician differs from the real person (such a distinction is hardly possible in the current state of our knowledge of the life of "real" Isocrates), but it is interesting to look deeper into the impression that the orator (or the literary representative of his person) creates of himself in his texts. Due to the abundance of material and time constraints, I will confine myself only with three discourses, namely, *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis* and *Panathenaicus*, linked together by common political, rhetorical and pedagogical topics, Athenocentric Panhellenism, complexity of an imaginary audience, the speaker's patriotic, independent (self-distancing), and self-reflexive (containing commemoration of individual qualities) posture.

The aim of this article, then, is to start elucidating multiple aspects of Isocratean self-display in these three speeches as certain conscious devices (with the possible effect parallel to that of the *captatio benevolentiae* technique, developed later by Roman rhetoricians)[15] and to share some

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[6] Cf. Too, *op. cit*., p. 79, 86 ("self-characterisation is analogous ... to the sort of 'self-fashioning' ... occurring in Renaissance authors") et alibi.

[7] Cf. Takis Poulakos, David J. Depew, "Introduction", in: *Isocrates and Civic Education*, ed. Takis Poulakos, David J. Depew, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004, p. 5-6; Niall Livingstone, *A Commentary on Isocrates'* Busiris (Mnemosyne. Supplementum 223), Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2001, p. 185; Irmgard Männlein-Robert,"The *Meditations* as a (Philosophical) Autobiography" in: *A Companion to Marcus Aurelius*, ed. Marcel van Ackeren, Oxford, Malden: Willey-Blackwell, 2012, p. 365: "[...] autobiographic writing (as in the *Antidosis*) for Isocrates is a vehicle of self-knowledge and **self-display** together".

[8] Cf. Too, *op. cit*., p. 75

[9] Cf. Too, *op. cit*., p. 117; Edward Schiappa, "Isocrates' *philosophia* and contemporary pragmatism", *Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism*, ed. Steven Mailloux, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 36.

[10] Cf. Ober, *op. cit*., p. 42, n. 18.

[11] Cf. Too, *op. cit*., p. 84; Ekaterina V. Haskins, "*Logos* and Power in Sophistical and Isocratean Rhetoric" in *Isocrates and Civic Education* (op. cit.), p. 90; eadem, *Logos and power in Isocrates and Aristotle*, University of South Carolina Press, 2004, p. 16.

[12] Isocrates depicts himself (or presents his rhetorical self) in most of his epideictic and political discourses, but this is not the case with the six extant forensic speeches; nevertheless, the activity of writing court speeches was probably a good practice on how to defend his own position and paint his own character and reputation with bright colors (on the basis of the examples of his clients' *ethopoeia*).

[13] Or "microphonic" (cf. the term *mikrophōnia* used by Y. L. Too, *op. cit*., p. 78 and 85)

[14] On which see the discussion in Too, *op. cit*., chapter 3.

[15] The conceptualization of this technique, consisting of a number of rules and recommendations for the speaker to follow in the course of the whole speech and especially in its initial part (Gr. προοίμιον, φροίμιον, Lat. *exordium*) in order to manage the disposition of

observations concerning their possible impact on the audience and the author himself.

There is not much direct research on Isocrates' self-presentation, save for a few paragraphs from Yun Lee Too books[16], and a certain number of hints in other works are taken into consideration (e.g., T. Poulakos, D. Depew, N. Livingstone, E. Haskins)[17]. The present work is largely based on the empirical analysis of Isocrates' texts, the results of which (i.e. the characteristics of Isocrates' self-display in a concise form) are attached to this article among the added materials.

Meanwhile, what follows further on is a review of the aspects of Isocrates' self-presentation according to the newly-created scheme (the principles of which will be also indicated below), and it starts from a brief survey of the rhetorician's public character and his attitude towards the audience. Three sections devoted to this issue roughly correspond to the three important questions (derived from the first reassessment of all the data gathered during my study of the texts of *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis*, and *Panathenaicus*), namely, 1) the difficulty of establishing the synthetical identity of Isocrates' (Isocratean speaker's) rhetorical personality due to the precautions to be made in view of the occasion-conditioned variations of the general setting of each speech and the writer's/speaker's position reliant on particularity time; 2) the contrastingness of the speaker's self-reflexion ranging from low to high self-esteem; 3) the consideration of the occasion-conditioned interplay between the speaker and his audience.

Isocrates' public character (*ēthos* of the speaker)

All three speeches chosen for the discussion, written in different periods, mark certain changes of Isocrates' public character[18] and reputation. The general outline of the external factors which should be considered when creating the syntethic picture of the orator for ourselves could be formulated in the following short but composite description: The speaker/writer of *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis* and *Panathenaicus*

- is in his 50ies, 80ies and 90ies, respectively
- represents different stages of his teaching carrier and reputation
- addresses the multifold Athenian audience at different times and occasions
- provides his listeners/readers with a different level of self-esteem.

the audience dates back at least to the earliest extant Greek manuals of rhetoric (Aristotle and Anaximenes), but the standard texts for references on *captatio benevolentiae* and its context (other requirements for the effective beginning of the speech) remain the texts of Latin rhetoricians such as Ps.-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (1.6–11), Cicero's *De inventione* (1.20–26), and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* (4.1.1–79). For the modern synthetic treatment of the topic see inter alia Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft* (ed. 3), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990, pp. 150–163 (§263–288).

[16] Cf. Too, *op. cit.*, 1995, esp. chapters 3 and 4; eadem (Too), "Introduction", *A Commentary on Isocrates'* Antidosis, ed. Y. L. Too, N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 8–11 (chapter name "Self-Presentation")

[17] For the titles of their works, look in the above footnotes.

[18] This term here could be interchangeably used with the terms like "Isocrates' literary self-portrait" or "Isocrates' rhetorical self", but has a slight shift of meaning to the realm of publicity (vs. privacy) implied by the titles of the speeches discussed.

Panegyricus, written by the 56-year-old man, is like an advertisement of a teacher's and politician's views promoting his distinctive rhetorical style and thematic preferences (ἔνδοξα, i.e. "things held in esteem", "deeds of high repute", "honorable things" rather than παράδοξα, "incredible things", "things contrary to expectation"or ἄδοξα, "disreputable topics")[19]. In Terry Papillon's words, it "stands as the best example of his ideas of political leadership and his role as a teacher of such leaderhip. But it also stands as the most prominent example of the Isocratean smooth style"[20]. *Antidosis*, written by the 82-year-old rhetorician, captures the moment soon after Isocrates' school's heyday, when the need to defend his views against the common prejudice and slanders by contemporary professionals emerged. This work restates and conceptualizes the main standpoints of Isocrates views on education and Athenocentric politics. *Panathenaicus* composed by a nonagenarian (97 years) reflects the further step in the decline of Isocrates' reputation and the end of the political domination of Athens[21]. If we apply the Aristotelian scheme of the three-fold age division (νεότης-ἀκμή-γῆρας) of a character (Arist. *Rhet*. 2.12-14 = 1388b30-1390b12) to the author of these works, then *Panegyricus* could be associated with a mature man in the peak of his wisdom, while *Antidosis* and *Panathenaicus* with an old man with certain declining abilities. This must have influenced the speaker's self-presentational tactics to a certain extent, and this factor should not be ignored when dealing with the rest of the aspects of Isocrates' rhetorical personality to which I now proceed.

First-sight picture of orator's image: between pride and humility

For a systematic picture of Isocrates' character, one should look in his most autobiographic-like works, *Antidosis* and *Panathenaicus*, and see him depicting himself as a lover of peaceful life and values of Periclean Athens. In regard of limits of time and space, the detailed characteristics of his rhetorical image will be postponed to some other occasion, while in the present one I will deal only with one important feature. Speeches of Isocrates express a certain duality of the orator's image: the reader is informed both about his distrust in his own performative qualities, on the one hand, and a not unnoticeable commendation of the speaker's (narrator's) mental abilities, on the other. The bold self-confidence of the speaker of *Panegyricus* and his expression of hope for a positive assessment by a group of intelli-

[19] Cf. Isocrates' direct attack against various writers on strange and absurd topics in *Hel*. 1: „**ὑπόθεσιν ἄτοπον** καὶ **παράδοξον** ποιησάμενοι" and his preference for the "noblest kind of oratory" which deals with the greatest affairs in *Panegyricus* 4: „προκρίνας τούτους καλλίστους εἶναι τῶν λόγων, οἵτινες **περὶ μεγίστων** τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες". On the difference between the concepts of ἔνδοξον and παράδοξον cf. Anaximenes *Rhet. Alex*. 11, 1–2 = 1430b1–8.This argument could be corroborated with the indirect evidence produced in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where, specifically in the passage devoted to one of 28 *topoi*, the *topos* of authoritative opinions (though not identified as ἔνδοξα), three references to Isocratean works as significant illustrations of this device are made (cf. Arist. *Rhet*. 1398b28–1399a6).

[20] Terry L. Papillon, "Isocrates", *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. by Ian Worthington, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007, p. 65.

[21] It stands in striking opposition to contemporary anti-Macedonian aspirations pronounced by Demosthenes.

gent listeners, reiterated in later discourses with a constant reminder of his services to Athenian public, gives the impression of a boastful stance, while his elsewhere declared self-image of a disabled speaker (unable to perform speeches orally) has a sign of a low self-esteem.

However, rhetorical art manages to veil this dual image. The delicate and inventive manner, in which orator praises himself, has attracted Aristotle's approbation (*Rhet*. 3.17.16 = 1418b23–27): Aristotle commends Isocrates' technique (such as present in his *Ad Philippum* and *Antidosis*) of indirect self-praise in words of another person; indirect portrayal of the self would allow the speaker to escape public's envy or reproaches for a long speech (μακρολογία) and thus to preserve his good image. On the other hand, the aspects of low self-esteem, present in all three speeches in different proportion, do not go further than the recognition of human weaknesses and mistakes, thus do not reach the level of self-hatred (μισαυτία) or self-loathing, the concept not unknown in the time of Aristotle[22]. Bearing in mind that specific hints at Isocrates' natural infirmities are not mentioned in *Panegyricus* and occur merely in texts written in his old age (the earliest of which dates back to 368 BC), in particular in private texts (chronologically: *Epist*. 1, 9; 8, 7; *Phil*. 81; *Panath*. 9–10), we can infer that the apparent shifting between pride and humility is not so much a matter of instability of character, but rather of changing tactics of one's literary self-presentation and impression management. This insight urges caution in dealing with Isocratean rhetorical image and his speaker's attitude towards the audience (regarding them as a certain part of fundamental strategy aimed at influencing hearers and improving his own reputation).

Attitude towards audience (*ēthos* of the audience and audience segregation)

The non-ephemeral performative situation of *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis* and *Panatenaicus*[23] – the nation's celebratory meeting[24] or court hearing public case, γραφή[25] – itself suggests that implied and intended readers were not only the orator's like-minded. Isocrates explicitly shows the mixed nature of his audience comprising individuals with different expectations and perception of the speaker, thus demanding an appropriate prudence of the latter, managing emotions and arguments. Accordingly, the speaker vividly exhibits his own presence: commends himself or makes excuses, expresses doubts or preferences to the audience, but is cautious in regard of ingratiation; he rather teaches his hearers (and readers)[26] and promotes

[22] Cf. Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1166b13–17: „ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, **ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν**· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες **οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς**". Cf. also commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* by 12th-century Byzantine philosopher Michael of Ephesus where the term "μισαυτία" is introduced, not attested in Aristotle's own writings: Michael Eph., *In ethica Nicomachea ix-x commentaria*, 502: „οὔκουν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἡ φιλαυτία, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ μισαυτία".

[23] For more information about each of these discourses, see the Appendix below.

[24] Which is the setting of πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι – *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus*.

[25] *Antidosis* belonged to the public cases and not to the private ones (δίκαι).

[26] On the contrast between giving advice and trying to please the audience see the insightful comment by N. Livingstone on *Busiris* (§3) (*op. cit*., pp. 101–102).

the ideal of good will, κοινὴ εὔνοια (most explicitly stated in *Antid*. 22–23)[27]. In all three speeches he mentions the presence of people who dislike him and mainly implies the **dyadic structure** of the audience (the elitist group of serious intelligent hearers in opposition to the inimical part), as is shown below (in the concluding scheme of this section). Dual division is found in *Panegyricus* 11–14 where Isocrates distances himself from the impatient narrow-minded public ignorant of the differences between the court speeches and political discourses, but expresses his trust only in attentive and educated hearers[28], and in *Panathenaicus* where he speaks of the majority (οἱ πολλοί) estimating him "in a confused and altogether irrational manner"[29] (ταραχωδῶς καὶ παντάπασιν ἀλογίστως) – praising (ἐπαινοῦντες) his discourses, but hating him personally (φθονοῦσι) (*Panath*. 15). In *Panathenaicus,* he separates admirers of the serious and the frivolous speeches: the former are interested in civic values and realities, and the latter prefer political quarrels and paradoxical encomia (*Panath*. 135–137). The audience of *Antidosis* is most elaborately depicted. Beside the fictional court members and accuser, the speaker enumerates the recipients of his discourses who ruined his reputation – slanderers and victims of their misinformation (πολὺ διεψευσμένους), inimical sophists and envious intelligent people (4–5)[30], as well as those who never provide any sign of favor (*Antid*. 153–154)[31] and "who are unable to create or say anything of value" (τινες τῶν εὑρεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' εἰπεῖν ἄξιον λόγου δυναμένων), but are good in criticizing and prejudicing the works of others (*Antid*. 62); on the other hand, he associates himself only with the decent (ἐπιεικεῖς) and wise listeners (*Antid*. 149, 170)[32].

Thus, the summary picture of the audience in the three discussed speeches could be outlined in the following way:

Two-fold division of the audience (present in all three speeches):

- the majority (οἱ πολλοί, τὸ πλῆθος)

[27] Which is "desirable in an impartial jury" (William W. Fortenbaugh, "Quintilian 6.2.8–9: *Ethos* and *Pathos* and the Ancient Tradition", *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh, David C. Mirhady, New Brunswick (U.S. A.), London: *Transaction Publishers***,** *1994,* p. 188). On the importance for Isocrates of the concept of εὔνοια (as – inter alia – a political instrument contrary to that of φόβος**)** and its relation to the people's judgment and orator's striving for good reputation, see Jacqueline de Romilly, "*Eunoia* in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will", *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 78 1958, pp. 92–101.

[28] NB: in the end of the speech (*Paneg*. 188) he makes another division of the audience into those who are able to act and those who claim for ability to speak well and urge the latter to follow his example of serious speech.

[29] The quotation is taken from G. Norlin's translation. For this and other English quotations of Isocrates' works, the edition of the series of Loeb Classical Library, *Isocrates in Three volumes* (Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd, 1961–1964, containing translations by George Norlin and Larue van Hook), is the preferable choice in this paper.

[30] "Misperceptions about the rhetorician's character and his work contributed to a false public opinion of him (ψευδῆ περί μου δόξαν) and caused him to lose the historical liturgy trial" (Too, *A Commentary on Isocrates' Antidosis*, 2008, p. 93)

[31] Cf. *Antid*. 168, where Isocrates singles out two categories of citizens: „τοὺς εἰθισμένους ἅπασι χαλεπαίνειν" ("those who are churlish toward everyone") and „τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πολλοὺς".

[32] Stanley Wilcox in his article "Criticisms of Isocrates and His φιλοσοφία" (*Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 74, 1943, pp. 113–133) identifies two groups of listeners and readers ill-disposed against him in *Antidosis* – "those who are deceived and prone to believe the worst about him (4, 26, 28, 154); secondly, those who know the truth but envy him, feel as the sophists do about him, and rejoice to see the public deceived (4, 6, 142, 149, 153, 154)" (Wilcox, *op. cit*., p. 123).

- serious (fair and intelligent) listeners (ἐπιεικεῖς, νοῦν ἔχοντες)

Manifold division of the audience (implicit in *Antidosis*):

- implied by occasion
  - members of court (δικασταί) [never addressed in formal way]
  - accuser (κατήγορος)
- implied from the context
  - intolerant citizens got used to criticizing others (*Antid.* 62, 149, 168)
  - slanderers (συκοφάνται) and victims of their misinformation (*Antid.* 4)
  - envious private citizens (ἰδιῶται) and sophists (*Antid.* 4)
  - serious listeners (οἱ λογίζεσθαι δυνάμενοι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες, cf. *Antid*. 149, ἐπιεικεῖς, *Antid.* 170)
  - Isocrates' disciples (οἱ πλησιάσαντες, cf. *Antid.* 44).

Such picture of a multiple and chiefly hostile audience naturally creates an impression of the unstable reputation and psychological condition of the speaker (attempt to transcend the psychological barrier); on the other hand, such speaker's posture may be seen as a deliberate act, as anticipatory vindication of the written discourse from criticisms (like granting immunity), or a certain maneuver of *captatio benevolentiae* when claiming his specific identity (self-fashioning, to use a modern term)[33]: he strives to appear steady and devoted to his views similarly to his elitist audience.

Principles of the classification of Isocrates' self-presentation

Principles of the division of the aspects of Isocrates' self-presentation in this paper are based on the presumed connection between the speaker's activities in regard to the external targets (audience and the subject matter of the speech) and internal targets (his own personality, thoughts, beliefs). Rhetor's activities are delineated in the treatises of Isocrates' younger contemporaries (Aristotle and Anaximenes), more specifically in their division of the rhetorical material.

Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1.3.2 = 1358a36–1358b8) enumerates three types of rhetorical discourses according to three types of audience; audience is the addressee of orator's speech and the main constituent of the triad: orator (messenger, addresser) – the subject of the speech (message) – recipient of the speech (addressee). Listeners are either ordinary spectators or judges who deal with the past, or else judges who deal with the things to come. The example of the judges who focus on the future and imminent actions is found among the members of the ansembly (ἐκκλησία), of those who focus on the past events – among the dicasts, and the ordinary listeners/spectators are those who pay attention only to the evaluation of the skills (δύναμις) of the orator. From here, the ascription of

[33] Cf. the adversative posture of Isocrates qualified by Y. L. Too as "self-fashioning", the term having been used for the characterization of the process or art of creating oneself, constructing one's identity in the age of Renaissance (Too, 1995, 86–87). We should also keep in mind that the behaviour of each person is conditioned *inter alia* by the notion that he/she is watched and estimated (evaluated) by someone other: "the principle in Evaluation Apprehension Theory that a feeling of being under evaluative observation is enough to affect a person's behaviour" (Sasan Zarghooni, "A Study of Self-Presentation in Light of Facebook", [Oslo:] Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo, 2007, p. 9 (on-line access: http://zarghooni.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/zarghooni-2007-selfpresentation_on_facebook.pdf).

the types of the audience to the particular types of rhetorical discourses follows: the listeners of the political-deliberative speeches are competent in judging the upcoming realities, the listeners of court speeches – in judging the facts of the past, and the listeners of epideictic speeches are ordinary spectators of the present qualities. In regard to the orator's attitude towards the audience, Aristotle assigns a pair of opposite tasks to each type of the speech. The primary task (and certain stylistic "orientation") of the speaker delivering the deliberative speech is either to exhort or to dissuade (*Rhet*. 1.3.3. = 1358b8–10), the court speaker's task is either to accuse or to defend (1358b10–12), and the task of the deliverer of the epideictic speech is either to praise or to blame (1358b12–13). Anaximenes (or Ps.-Aristotle), representative of the older sophistical rhetoric, enumerates three types (γένη) of political discourses and seven forms (εἴδη) as the aspects of those three types (προτρεπτικόν, ἀποτρεπτικόν, ἐγκωμιαστικόν, ψεκτικόν, κατηγορικόν, ἀπολογικόν, ἐξεταστικόν) (*Rhet. Alex*. 1.1. = 1421b7–12).

Six Aristotelian forms (εἴδη) were virtually preserved (with certain modifications) in the subsequent Greek technical rhetoric[34], as, for example, the division by Byzantine sophist Troilus[35] shows (see also the table in the end of this article). The 7th form, present in the Anaximenean division (ἐξεταστικὸν εἶδος)[36], has no attribution to any specific type of speeches, but it features a universal applicability[37] and perhaps means the predecisional phase of deliberation. It might have a certain relation to the philosophical context and especially to the Socratic conception of the human soul as a conscious self and, consequently, of human life to be lived (and actions to be performed) in constant accordance to the awareness of the one's human condition contrasted to the bestial and negligent living (e.g., the famous dictum in Plato's *Apology of Socrates* 38a5: „ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ").

[34] The six-partite system is provided by Diogenes Laertius (3.93–94: „Τῆς ῥητορείας εἴδη ἐστὶν ἕξ· [...]τῆς ἄρα ῥητορείας ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἐγκώμιον, τὸ δὲ ψόγος, τὸ δὲ προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή, τὸ δὲ κατηγορία, τὸ δὲ ἀπολογία").

[35] Troilus Soph., *Prolegomena in Hermogenis artem rhetoricam* (*Rhetores Graeci,* vol. 6, ed. C. Walz), Stuttgart: Cotta, 1834, Repr. 1968. Troilus made one specific addition in the section of deliberative speeches: he inserted two parallel concepts – συμβολή and παραίνεσις, which, in my opinion, slightly differ from the concepts of exhortation and dissuasion; this insertion remains obscure in this context. Cf.: „διαιρεῖται δὲ τὸ δικανικὸν εἰς δύο, εἰς κατηγορίαν καὶ ἀπολογίαν, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν εἰς δύο, εἰς **προτροπὴν καὶ ἀποτροπὴν**, εἰς ὁμώνυμον, **συμβουλὴν καὶ παραίνεσιν**, τὸ δὲ πανηγυρικὸν εἰς ἐγκώμιον καὶ ψόγον" (53). His division of rhetorical activities is paralleled with analogous triadic subdivisions of time, place, public persona, purpose, and soul, cf. Troilus 53–54: „χαρακτηρίζονται δὲ τὰ τρία εἴδη ταῦτα ἀπὸ τριῶν τινων· ἀπὸ τόπου, ἀπὸ προσώπου καὶ ἀπὸ τέλους· τόπος γὰρ τοῦ δικανικοῦ τὸ δικαστήριον· πρόσωπον δὲ ὁ δικαστὴς, τέλος δὲ τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν εἰς τρία· τόπος τὸ συμβουλευτήριον, πρόσωπον ὁ βουλευτὴς, τέλος δὲ τὸ συμφέρον· [54] τοῦ δὲ πανηγυρικοῦ τόπος τὸ θέατρον, πρόσωπον ὁ πανηγυριστὴς, ἤτοι ὁ ἀκροατὴς, τέλος τὸ καλόν· τρία δέ εἰσιν εἴδη τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐπειδὴ τρία εἰσὶν εἴδη τῆς ψυχῆς, θυμικὸν, λογικὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, καὶ τῷ μὲν θυμικῷ ἀναλογεῖ τὸ δικανικὸν, τῷ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικῷ τὸ πανηγυρικὸν, τῷ δὲ λογικῷ τὸ συμβουλευτικόν".

[36] Cf. Isocrates' words in *Antidosis* (141): „Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀπήνεγκε τὴν γραφὴν, ἐσκόπουν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὥσπερ ἂν ὑμῶν ἕκαστος, καὶ **τόν τε βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐξήταζον** καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διέτριβον, ἐφ' αἷς ᾤμην ἐπαινεῖσθαί με προσήκειν".

[37] Anaximenes *Rhet. Alex*. 37: „Τὸ δ' ἐξεταστικὸν εἶδος αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ οὐ πολλάκις συνίσταται, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις εἴδεσι μίγνυται καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τὰς ἀντιλογίας χρήσιμόν ἐστιν".

All these seven forms constitute the basis of my hypothetical (and tentative so far) classification of the speaker's self-presentational aspects, which – in view of the terminological and cognitive difficulties of grasping the meaning of exact concepts and their functions – has to be supported by a number of substantial arguments. I have only two arguments at the moment; both are related to Isocrates' practice. On the one hand, he was well aware of the different topics and arguments proper to a particular situation and was practicing both pure and mixed types of speeches. For example, he criticized sophists for mixing arguments of jocular and serious discourses as well as the techniques of encomium and forensic speeches, so in response to Gorgias he wrote a model encomium of Helen[38], while in his composition *Busiris*, directed against Polycrates of Athens, he included both encomium and apology as separate parts of the whole. He also made distinction between topics of praise and accusation (*Busiris* 4–6), between accusation and admonition (*Panegyricus* 130), but he used praise and advice alternately (cf. Arist. *Rhet*. 1.9.36 = 1368a1–8)[39]. On the other hand, in a number of paraenetic works (such as *To Demonicus* or *To Nicocles*) we find Isocrates anticipating the idea of 'golden rule'[40], namely, instructing a young man to take care of his own character basing on empathic attitude towards others (treat others the same way you wish to be treated by others). This implies that the study of the soul and character was part of his teaching[41].

Basing on these considerations, it is possible to presume that the speaker who presents himself to listeners or readers as a target of the speech can engage in the same actions directed to himself as to the other targets of his speech[42]. In other words, he can apply all these seven forms to self-description.

Having examined Isocrates' discourses by raising the question of how the speaker depicts himself in the places where he directly refers to himself, I attempted to group the cases of self-presentation according to these seven aspects (self-praise, self-blame, self-defence, self-accusation, self-incitement, self-dissuasion, and self-advice), but some methodological difficulties, such as how to distinguish between pure accusation and dispraise, or how to decouple the self-incitement from the rhetorical expression of hopes, doubts, promises, have prevented me from accomplishing this task to a comprehensive systematic end (statistical data are not prepared to a publishable standard, either) [43]. Therefore,

[38] See esp. *Helen*, § 7–14.

[39] For the discussion concerning the identification and illustration of this device, see my paper "References to Isocrates in Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*", *Literatūra* 53 (3), 2011, p. 12 and 29.

[40] Cf. *Ad Dem*. 14; *Nic*. 61; *Ad Nic*. 24, 38; *Paneg* 81. In G. Norlin's words, "Isocrates anticipates the golden rule" (*Isocrates in Three Volumes...*, vol. 2, p. 11, n. c. (comm. in *Ad Dem*. 14).

[41] For the more detailed survey of Isocratean methods of teaching, see R. Johnson, "Isocrates' Methods of Teaching", *The American Journal of Philology*, 80, No. 1, 1959, pp. 25–36.

[42] This idea could be supported by the considerations expressed by Ekaterina V. Haskins (*Logos and power in Isocrates and Aristotle*, pp. 106–107) concerning the "speaker's *mimēsis* of the audience" which is more congruent to Isocratean, rather than Aristotelian conception of rhetorical education.

[43] These data could only be mentioned in a rough (as a sort of working hypothesis to be revised later) here without pretense at completeness: I found eight instances of self-praise or self-commendation, five of self-defence, three of self-criticism (self-accusation or self-blame) and one of self-deliberation/ self-counseling

I have simplified my task in the meanwhile by choosing only four aspects to address here: self-praise and self-defence remain as they are, while self-accusation and self-blame are merged into one unit of self-blame, and the aspects of self-incitement, self-dissuasion and self-guidance constitute the field of the 'self-advice' or 'self-deliberation' concept.

This system of self-presentational aspects is certainly by no means comprehensive, and the question of its relevance is open to discussion and revision (e.g., with more emphasis on the modern models of the classification of rhetorical material, such as those by James L. Kinneavy's *A Theory of Discourse* 1971, or Walter Beale's *Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric* 1987).

A concise survey of the aspects of self-presentation

All the three speeches can be characterized by a great variety of self-display tactics, but certain general patterns can already be revealed. Here, a general sketch of these tactics follows, and for a more detailed synthesis one can consult the corresponding section among the appended materials (section B).

Considering the field of self-praise, straightforward boasting is very rarely found in the discourses selected for this discussion, unless a few more direct expressions are extracted from the context (example 1.1 in the section C of the bulk of the references appended to this article). The Isocratean self-praise is primarily (and for the most part) indirect, although, despite its latent manner, sometimes it has a force of a rather bold boast, as, for instance, a detailed analysis of the opening of *Panegyricus* can show. The speaker of this discourse implies himself to be among "those who had toiled in private for the public good and trained their own minds so as to be able to help also their fellowmen" („**τοῖς ... ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἰδίᾳ πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ψυχὰς οὕτω παρασκευάσασιν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι**); he implies to be that "single man who attained wisdom" (**ἑνὸς δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ φρονήσαντος**) able to give benefit to those who are willing to share his insight (κοινωνεῖν τῆς **ἐκείνου διανοίας**). He is well disposed towards common custom, despite the latter being unfavourable to him (or his ἀρετή), and seeks not a material reward for his activity but a good fame or approbation for his speech (**τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γενησομένην**); he claims his competence (**οὐκ ἀγνοῶν**) in knowing the context of the subject he is going to deal with and claims his superiority (**ἐλπίζων** ... **διοίσειν**) over other men who claimed for wisdom before him (πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιησαμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν); finally, he praises his own insight in choosing the best kind of discourses (**προκρίνας τούτους καλλίστους εἶναι τῶν λόγων**) and points directly to *Panegyricus* as one of them. Hence, we have a picture of a man praising himself for being the wisest among Hellenes and able to perform excellent speech (cf. the 1st example in the table of subsection 1.2 of the section C).

(self-prevention or self-dissuasion) in *Panegyricus*; about 30 instances of self-defence, 22 of self-praise, 13 of self-criticism, about 15 of self-deliberation in Antidosis; 22 instances of self-praise, 11 of self-defence, 11 of self-criticism, about 10 of self-deliberation in *Panathenaicus*.

Self-defence in the examined speeches can be analysed according to one of the modern frameworks of apologia, stemming from the Robert Abelson's theory of belief-dilemma resolution[44]. If we choose the influential framework of Ware and Linkugel (1973)[45], it is not hard to find that all the four self-defence tactics described in their paper (denial, bolstering, differentiation, transcendence) are present in *Antidosis* (as examples in the whole subsection 2 of the section C in the Appendix show). Thus, for instance, when Isocrates says "no citizen has ever been harmed either by my 'cleverness' or by my writings" (*Antid.* 33), his tactics reminds a direct denial ("I didn't do it"), although not without a shade of indirectness (the shift is made from the conscious act of a person to his works and the effects of his actions). When the speaker of *Antidosis* expresses his acceptance of penalty in case it is proved that his disciples became base people (*Antid*. 99), he uses the strategy of bolstering, or mitigation of the negative effects and strengthening the positive image of himself. When in *Antid*. 40 he explicitly states: "So, from what my accuser has himself said, it is easy for you to conclude that I have nothing to do with litigation", he explicitly distances himself from the charge of gaining profit from teaching litigation, and this is an example of the tactics of differentiation. Finally, when Isocrates defends his reputation and explains his competence as the adviser of Timotheus and tries to minimize the ill fame of the latter by the reference to the general idea of the infirmity of human nature (*Antid*. 130), the tactics of transcendence or a broader contextualization could be recognized[46].

An even greater subtlety might be attained in this discussion of the self-defensive postures and tactics, if a more in-depth analysis is made, but the limitations of the materials gathered for the current moment prevent me from discussing the other models of apologia (such as Halford Ryan's[47], Sharon Downey's[48], William Benoit's[49], etc.). Meanwhile, when limiting myself to the Ware and Linkugel's scheme, it seems very probable that the aspect of bolstering (or self-enhancement) is a predominant one (see examples under subsection 2.2 of the section C in the Appendix below) and it has a very tight connection to self-praise (commending himself as positive and good person). This interlacement (or "symbiosis") of self-praise and self-defence is also present in *Panathenaicus* where new slanders against Isocrates (concerning his haughty character and hypercritical attitude towards admirers of poet-

[44] "Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3, 1959, 343–352.

[45] Bonnie L. Ware, Wil A. Linkugel, "They spoke in defense of themselves: On the generic criticism of apologia", *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* 59 (Issue 3), 1973, 273–283. This framework has a number of successive theoretical revisions and more elaborated modifications, of which one of the most recent is that of Edwin L. Battistella in his book *Sorry About That: The Language of Public Apology*, Oxford [et al.]: Oxford University Press, 2014.

[46] More examples of self-defensive tactics possibly (but by no way definitely and undoubtedly) congruent with the tetradic scheme are presented in the Appendix below.

[47] Halford Ross Ryan, "*Kategoria* and *Apologia*: On Their Rhetorical Criticism as a Speech Set", *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 68, 1982, 254–261.

[48] Sharon D. Downey, "The Evolution of the Rhetorical Genre of Apologia", *Western Journal of Communication*, 57, 1, 1993, 42–64.

[49] William L. Benoit, *Accounts, excuses and apologies: A theory of image restoration strategies*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.

ry) are to be resolved[50]. Self-blame is not clearly expressed and in most cases could be possibly confined to the tactics aimed at neutralization of self-praise (see example 3 of the section C in the Appendix). Other postures or stances of the orator (such as self-encouragement, self-correction, expressing doubts, hopes or providing himself and others with advice (should we categorize them as protreptic, apotreptic, aporetical, elpistic, paraenetic?) are present in all the speeches examined, too, as example No. 4 in the section C of the Appendix of this article shows. While in some cases their teaching-oriented function reduces self-praise (serving as if moderation of the expression of self-love), in other cases it creates the impression of the speaker's boastful or self-defensive stance being more evident.

Conclusions

To summarize, it may be said that autobiographical references are an important source for the investigation of Isocrates' rhetorical identity. This identity, as seen in his three major compositions (*Panegyricus*, *Antidosis*, *Panathenaicus*), features a certain instability of character, but we cannot take this image for granted. In my opinion, the apparent shifting between extremes (such as high and low self-esteem, or division of the audience in to two opposite sides according to its perception of Isocrates' reputation) is not so much the result of actual psychological condition of the author but rather a deliberate and purposeful act of self-depiction. In the process of self-display, the postures and tactics that the speaker of *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis* or *Panathenaicus* exhibits have something in common with the rhetorical εἴδη that are prescribed in handbooks of technical rhetoric, albeit neither systematically nor explicitly stated there. Basing on this intuition, we may distinguish among the variety of modes Isocrates' speaker addresses himself and, perhaps, later make certain characteristics of Isocrates' works in terms of the self-presentational tactics. The current hypothetical features of *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis*, *Panathenaicus* could be summarized in the following sequence:

- *Panegyricus* (390–380 BC) exhibits the image of a self-confident political orator who hopes to establish a better reputation using the tactics of crafty self-praise;
- *Antidosis* (354–353 BC) exhibits the image of a moderately self-confident rhetorician defending his reputation against slanders, using combined tactics of verbal self-defense and self-praise;
- *Panathenaicus* (342–339 BC) exhibits the image of a moderately self-confident rhetorician defending his reputation against new slanders, using mixed tactics of self-praise, self-defense, and self-criticism.

[50] Cf. especially his report about "three or four of the sophists of no repute" at *Panath*. 18–19, who during their discussion on the poetry of Homer and Hesiod slandered Isocrates of treating with contempt all discussions of poetry and even all the learning and teaching of others.

SAVĘS PATEIKIMO (SAVIVAIZDOS) ASPEKTAI ISOKRATO KALBOSE

Tomas Veteikis

S a n t r a u k a

Straipsnyje, kuris parengtas pagal pranešimą, skaitytą Tarptautinės retorikos istorijos asociacijos (ISHR) konferencijoje (Čikaga, 2013, liepos 24–27), pateikiama naujų idėjų apie žymaus Atikos oratoriaus Isokrato (436–338 m. pr. Kr.) savivaizdos (savęs pateikimo) aspektus, išryškėjančius atidžiau skaitant jo kalbas. Straipsnyje dėl medžiagos gausumo apsiribota trimis šio IV a. pr. Kr. retorikos mokytojo kūriniais, dažnai laikomais vienais iš geriausių ir reprezentatyviausių – *Panegiriku*, *Antidoze* (*Apie apsikeitimą*), *Panatenaiku*[51]. Isokrato literatūrinis portretas, perteiktas jo vėlyvose biografijose interpretuojant jo paties kūrinius, teikia įvadinių duomenų apie oratoriaus savirefleksiją, bet, neturint tikslesnių liudijimų apie tikrovėje gyvenusio asmens savybes, jis tegali būti tam tikro sąmoningai kurto savęs įvaizdžio atspindžiu. Nepaisant šio pamatinio neaiškumo, straipsnyje vis dėlto bandoma išskirti ir aptarti Isokrato retorinės personos (sąlygiškai tapatinamos su autoriumi, siekiant dėstymo glaustumo ir kartu apsidraudžiant nuo radikalaus tapatybių atskyrimo) savęs pateikimo aspektus, derinant Antikos retorikos teorijos ir šiuolaikinių komunikacijos mokslų suformuluotas kalbėtojo, kalbos objekto ir auditorijos santykio koncepcijas, daugiausia dėmesio skiriant kalbėtojo savęs ir auditorijos suvokimo bei atitinkamos strategijos pasirinkimo klausimams. Straipsnyje pateikiami samprotavimai apie Isokrato įvaizdžio dvilypumą: keliose jo tekstų vietose tiesiogiai minimi psichofiziologiniai kalbėtojo trūkumai (silpnas balsas, nedrąsa viešai kalbėti), implikuojantys atitinkamai neryžtingą ir nevertą pagyrimo poziciją Atėnų politinės sistemos kontekste, sudaro reikšmingą kontrastą kitur demonstruojamam kalbėtojo ryžtui imtis didingų (panatėniškų, panhelėniškų) temų ir gana aiškiai skelbiamam savo pranašumui prieš kitus oratorius ir mokytojus, kartais beveik atviram kvietimui jį pagerbti. Šis dvilypumas ir pastebėti kiti oratoriaus įvaizdžio pokyčiai, įvykstantys priklausomai nuo kalbos temos ir progos unikalumo ir paties kalbos kūrėjo amžiaus, verčia subtiliau ir atsargiau vertinti visą Isokrato literatūrinį palikimą, įžvelgiant autoriaus gebėjimą skirtingai save impersonuoti. Dvilypumas matomas ir oratoriaus ir auditorijos santykio perspektyvoje. Sau palankios klausytojų grupės išskyrimas rodo ne tik oratorių veikiančią psichologinę įtampą, stojant prieš minią (tai aktualu Isokrato kaip nedrąsaus kalbėtojo įvaizdžio šalininkams), bet ir sąmoningą savo neeilinės tapatybės įtvirtinimą, užsitikrinant dalies auditorijos (ar skaitytojų) palankumą (*captatio benevolentiae* manevras). Savęs pateikimo aspektų analizė straipsnyje pateikiama glaustai. Ji remiama medžiaga, gauta atlikus preliminarų empirinį trijų nagrinėjamų tekstų tyrimą – perskaičius ir išrinkus kalbėtojo / rašytojo tiesioginius ir netiesioginius pasisakymus apie save ir atlikus tam tikrą šios medžiagos grupavimą. Klasifikavimo principas (kuris taip pat aptartas straipsnyje) susijęs su pastebėjimu dėl retorinės medžiagos žanrinio skirstymo antikinės retorikos mokslo tradicijoje ir su įžvalga, kad tie teorinių nuostatų ir praktinių priemonių aspektai, kurie taikomi kalbėtojo dėmesį kreipiant į klausytojus, gali būti analogiškai taikomi ir pačiam kalbėtojui. Taigi straipsnyje išskiriami 7 kalbėtojo savęs pateikimo aspektai, apytikriai atitinkantys 7 retorinių kalbų (kaip skirtingas progas atitinkančių strategijų) „pavidalus“ (εἶδη). Jų glaustas aptarimas ekstensyviau yra pateikiamas straipsnio priede, kur, be kita ko, taip pat pateikiama ištraukų iš Isokrato kalbų, iliustruojančių kiekvieną savęs pateikimo taktikos aspektą. Aptariant savęs gynimo aspektą, straipsnyje pamėginta jį sugretinti taip pat su viena iš šiuolaikinių žodinės savigynos strategijų teorijų ir pritaikyti amerikiečių mokslininkų B. L. Ware’o ir W. A. Linkugel’o schemą.

[51] Lietuviškus Isokrato kūrinių pavadinimus linkstame rašyti, pagrindu imdami lotynizuotų pavadinimų šaknis, o tais atvejais, kai graikiškasis pavadinimas turi bendresnės realijos reikšmę ir aiškų lotynišką atitikmenį, tada parenkame lietuvišką žodį (pvz. *Κατὰ σοφιστῶν / Contra sophistas – Prieš sofistus*, *Περὶ εἰρήνης / De pace – Apie taiką* ir tt.). Dalis terminų dar nenusistovėję, tad juos pravartu žymėti dvejopai (taip, kaip ir darome, pavadindami kūrinį, lotyniškai įvardijamą žodžiais *Antidosis* ir *De permutatione*).

APPENDIX[52]

A. Brief characteristics of *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis*, and *Panathenaicus*

Panegyricus was written 390–380 BC, at the times of tension between the leading Hellenic states (Athens and Sparta) and Persia, which since King's Peace (387 BC) had been controlling Asian Greeks. The key idea of *Panegyricus* is the conciliation of claims by Sparta and Athens on the leadership among the Greeks with special attention to historical merits of Athens (by putting emphasis on equality of Athens, even superiority over the then-leading Sparta) and the necessity of organising a Pan-Hellenic expedition to Persia; the two-fold idea is represented in epideictic (23–132) and deliberative sections (133–186) respectively. The speaker of this discourse emphasizes both the thematic and stylistic novelty of his work and urges other orators to follow his example (*Paneg*. 188).

Antidosis, the longest work of Isocrates, written 354–353 BC, after an actual event, when 82-year-old Isocrates (being represented by his adopted son Aphareus) lost the case against Megacleides on property exchange and performed the court-appointed obligation (*Antid*. 5)[53]. While taking the name from the actual suit and sharing features of the judicial defence speech, *Antidosis* in fact transcends boundaries of apology and swings into autobiography with elements of epideictic discourse and philosophical essay on the essence of rhetorical education. Apologetic framework consists of numerous fictional elements: public prosecution on fictional charges (corrupting the young, receiving money for teaching to win the cases awry, cf. *Antid*. 15, 30, 56) brought by a fictional accuser (Lysimachus), fictional penalty (death), and fictional trial before a court. The speech abounds in parallels with Plato's *Apology of Socrates*, but Isocrates' apology "is ... more discursive" not only in comparison with the Socrates' speech, but also with the actual on-going judicial apologies[54]. In this particular speech Isocrates has the opportunity to present himself in most detailed characterization. According to Y. L. Too, "[i]n Greek antiquity, the dicanic speech was a privileged space for the depiction of one's civic "self" (Too, *Commentary...*, p. 8). But it is the "self-conscious innovative structure" of *Antidosis* that "allows the rhetorician the opportunity to identify and answer a wide range of accusers. Better yet, it allowed Isocrates to present himself in the role of (potential) martyr for the cause of philosophical rhetoric"[55].

Panathenaicus is the latest piece by Isocrates written 342–339 BC[56] when tension lingered in the air in Athens because of the domination of Philip of Macedon in northern Greece and activi-

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[52] This collection of the supplementary materials is based on the handouts presented at the *ISHR 2013 Conference*.

[53] 1200 wealthiest Athenian citizens (συντελεῖς) were obliged to pay war taxes (εἰσφοραί) and perform public duties (λειτουργίαι), such as superintendence of the equipment of a war ship or funding and training of dramatic χοροί, but the less wealthy citizen could offer this duty to the supposedly wealthier one at the moment or challenge the latter to exchange properties. "If the second citizen resisted this offer, the case would then be brought as diadikasia to a jury which assigned the liturgy to the individual it judged to be actually richer" (Yun Lee Too, *A Commentary on Isocrates' Antidosis*, 2008, p. 5)

[54] *Isocrates in Three Volumes,* with an English Translation by George Norlin and Larue van Hook (Loeb Classical Library), 3 vols., Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1961-1966, vol. 2, p. 182.

[55] Josiah Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 257.

[56] Projected for the Great Panathenaia of 342 BC, but accomplished only in 339 BC after 3 year period of illness.

ties in Thracian Chersonesus[57]. The discourse features unusual composition: although it was conceived as encomium to Athens, in fact it breaks down into three parts. The main theme (35–198) seems to be framed by additional narratives, such as apology to Isocrates' profession (7–34) and critique of the written work (199–270). The discourse actually has a two-fold purpose: to justify himself before the new dignity-hurting criticism and perpetuate written memory of the past Pan-Hellenism of Athens. The work, which was written by the 97-year-old elderly man, unveils "grasp of a trembling hand", "evidence of handicaps under which it was elaborated"[58].

B. A concise survey of the aspects of Isocrates' self-presentation (with an emphasis on self-praise, self-defence, self-blame and self-advice)

In his *Panegyricus* Isocrates praises himself for the novelty of his speeches (*Paneg*. 12)[59], for the quality acceptable to the group of intelligent listeners (12; 74), for his competence, ability to present a serious subject properly (14), for his ability to express thoughts in multiple ways (64–65) and implicitly assigns himself to the intelligent (εὖ φρονοῦντες) citizens useful for the state who are considered among the best in their profession (1–3, 9–10). He apologizes for the issues of speech content (familiar topic, the need to select the main arguments), devotes special attention to the anti-Spartan criticism episode: harsh words[60] are justified by the argument of purpose – he attempted not to defame, but to advice and discourage them from bad behaviour (129–130). Arguments of expediency associated with benefit prevail. Self-blame is rare. Beside the blunt criticism of Spartans, he subtly rebukes himself for insolence in face of careful listeners (*Paneg*. 12) and for miscounting the importance of the subject matter and the arguments of his speech (187). Self-incitement or self-advice appears in the beginning (17, 19) and in the middle (98) of the speech to remind himself the tasks of the speech.

In *Antidosis* the main focus is on self-defense with special emphasis on account of the defendant's life[61]. Isocrates defends himself against the fictional charges raised against him as a professional teacher (such as corrupting the young, teaching to win a case contrary to justice, unfair acquisition of income from speechwriting and teaching, attracting students of controversial reputation)[62] and answers to common prejudice (κοινὴ διαβολή) concerning his profession, rhetorical *paideia* (167–214, 243–269, 291–292). The arguments of his self-justification are basically of two kinds: quotations from his speeches (52–83) that serve as ʿwitnesses' (or documentary evidence) and his own words about his life, writings, profession, personal contacts; self-defensive description is seen in extemporal remarks, too: the limited quality of his performance, oddities

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[57] Demosthenes, the most prominent orator at that time, delivered in 341 BC his famous 3rd and 4th *Philippics*.

[58] *Isocrates in Three Volumes*..., vol. 2, p. 369.

[59] Cf. also *Paneg*. 82-83, where he says that „no one, either of the poets or of the sophists, has ever been able to (*mēdena pōpote dunēthēnai*) speak in a manner worthy of" the achievements of ancient Athenian good and noble men; and he commiserates with those composers andorators asserting that „there exist no fitting words" (οὐκ εἰσὶν ἁρμόττοντες λόγοι) to describe their excellent virtues.

[60] Cf. *Paneg*. 122: "ἄξιον ... μέμψασθαι ... Λακεδαιμονίους"

[61] Cf. *Antid*. 7: "εἰκὼν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμοὶ βεβιωμένων". Yun Lee Too (*A Commentary on Isocrates' Antidosis,* 2008, p. 8) rightly suggests that this work is similar to those forensic speeches, whose speakers give accounts of their life (τοῦ βίου λόγον), e.g., speeches 16 (*For Mantitheos*) and 24 from the *Corpus Lysiacum*.

[62] Cf. *Antid*. 5, 30. Charles Marsh in his *Classical Rhetoric and Modern Public Relations: An Isocratean Model*, 2012, p. 142 enumerates much greater number of accusations / reproaches addressed to Isocrates (from antiquity to present).

of arguments and style are justified by the reference to old age (59; 176), the peculiarity of occasion (1), belonging to common phenomenon (311), or the exclusivity of his own opinion (272). In *Antidosis* he praises himself with the aim to reveal his own fairness/equity (ἐπιείκεια) and confirm the probability of his innocence, so here self-defense and self-praise are organically related. He commends himself as a good citizen, beneficial to his country, as a teacher and orator/writer, commends the benefits of his teaching and good qualities of his discourses. Perhaps the highest degree of self-praise is attained in dramatized illustrations of his teaching activities, where he teaches young Timotheos about the power of goodwill of common people and their beloved leaders (132–137) and gets himself instruction from one of his associates (τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων) (141–149). Such episodes serve also as certain instigation to speak up and aprove of his idea of quietism (cf. 150–151)[63]. On the other hand, he does not shrink from reproaching himself. In *Antidosis,* he criticizes himself for natural infirmities (176), lack of logical strength (178, 215), feeble reputation (272, 297–298), oversights left in the speech (179, 243, 310, 320). Part of the criticism is expressed through the ethopoetic image of his opponent (26)[64] or reference to the charge (30–31). Unlike *Panegyricus*, speaker of *Antidosis* frequently ponders his arguments: is in doubt about self-characterization, speech strategies, effectiveness of arguments, expresses hopes, sets himself a task, gives promises, encourages himself or deters from inappropriate action: the episode of getting advice from anonymous friend urging him to abstain from self-praise (141–143) and self-refrain from criticism of opponents in order to escape reaching to the level of detractors (259) are among the most illustrative ones.

In *Panathenaicus* Isocrates mostly praises his strengths as a teacher and writer, identifies himself as "leader of speeches" (λόγων ἡγεμόνα) on Panhellenic matters (13), considers himself to be more serious than other orators, despite the assessment of the multitude, and superior because of financial independence (12–15). He praises his spiritual qualities, especially wisdom, insight, common sense, fairness, justice (9; 21; 62-65), stability of moral principles (87–88), altruism and usefulness for the other teachers (16–17); once he mentions his 'the greatest gifts' of fortune – health, living resources, good reputation (7–8). An interesting impression is created by an indirect boast while comparing himself to Agamemnon in connection to failure to receive the deserved glory for his activities useful to the whole world (74–75); the reason of this failure is ἀτυχία, named at the beginning of the speech, which brought him lies, slander and envy (8–9, 21). The final part of the speech, a sort of "addendum" on the writer's doubts concerning the publication of the work and consultation with students, serves as new opportunity to praise himself indirectly: in fictional pupil's words he praises his own wisdom (248), his freshly written speech which is useful even for the Spartans (253–254), his talent (φύσιν) that used to be shining brightly, lifestyle (τὴν τοῦ βίου τάξιν), industry (φιλοπονίαν), veracity of his philosophy (τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς φιλοσοφίας) in particular, and current happiness (εὐδαιμονία); he predicts himself a great glory and immortal memory that is left behind heroes (ἀθανασίας ... τῆς τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις... τῶν καλῶν ἔργων μνήμην ἐμποιούσης) as well as fame among other writers like that of Homer among other poets (*Panath*. 260–263).

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[63] "The rhetorician presents himself as a 'quiet Athenian', the sort of individual, usually of privileged means, who withdraws from the verbal jostling and meddling of the democratic city, in this case to turn his attention to teaching and the composition of political speeches" (Too, *A Commentary on Isocrates' Antidosis*, 2008, p. 10)

[64] His accuser, Lysimachus, according to Isocrates description, expects to win the case easily, seeing the rest of the citizens' gullibility and Isocrates' own inexperience to litigate.

The cases of the speaker's apology in *Panathenaicus* are two-fold: he justifies himself either for the manner of speaking, style and composition or for his views on education (25–32), moral priorities (relation between benefit and justice, 86–87) and on the reliability of the sources for historical facts (authoritative writings and stories are more reliable than eyewitnessed things) (149–150). Arguments worth to be mentioned are as follow: fear of tarnishing his own reputation and presenting himself foolish or boastful to the listeners (if he ignorantly dismisses the digression, if having remarked positively about Agamemnon, he gives no example of his deeds, if he fails to give an adequate response to slanders), referring to the occasion which requires to emphasize different things, sacrificing formal rules for content's sake, expressing educational views in the form of confession, referring to the tradition and authorities (concerning the bold depiction of events unseen with his own eyes). It is in *Panathenaicus* that Isocrates criticizes himself and identifies errors more than elsewhere. Two groups of reproaches can be distinguished: he criticizes his physical and spiritual weaknesses (weak voice, timidity, sadness, confusion, arrogance, aggression, indelicacy, negligence) or recognizes shortcomings of style, composition, structural proportions of his work (55, 74–75, 88–89). *Panathenaicus* also contains a lot of aspects of deliberation – doubts about the strategy of speech exposition (22, 88, 175–176), explicit refraining from the discussion about poets (33), self-exhortations (6, 7, 36–38) and tips for himself (24, 34, 152).

C. Selected examples of self-presentation in Isocrates *Panegyricus*, *Antidosis*, *Panathenaicus*

1. Examples of direct and indirect self-praise

1.1. Examples of straightforward self-praise (very rare, unless a few more direct expressions are extracted from the context)

Antid. 84: (self-praise through a comparison with other teachers of eristics and ethics) Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπειν **ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθέστεροι καὶ χρησιμώτεροι φανεῖμεν ὄντες**. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἀγνοουμένην, ὑπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἀντιλεγομένην, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην· [85] κἀκείνοις μὲν ἀπόχρη τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τινὰς τῇ δόξῃ τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνηθῶσιν εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν ὁμιλίαν, **ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδένα πώποτε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ' ἐμαυτόν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅλην πειρῶμαι πείθειν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐξ ὧν αὐτοί τ' εὐδαιμονήσουσιν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλάξουσιν.**
Panath. 9 (having enumerated the advantages and disadvantages of his nature and fortune, Isocrates inserts self-praise concerning one particularity of his nature – his ability to discern the thruth and to express it in words better than others who make clames for their knowledge of it) [...] **τὴν δὲ φύσιν εἰδὼς** πρὸς μὲν τὰς πράξεις ἀρρωστοτέραν οὖσαν καὶ μαλακωτέραν τοῦ δέοντος, **πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λόγους** οὔτε τελείαν οὔτε πανταχῇ χρησίμην, ἀλλὰ **δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων**, εἰπεῖν δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἐν συλλόγῳ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁπασῶν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπολελειμμένην.

1.2. Examples of indirect self-praise (predominant self-praise aspect in all three discourses)

*Paneg.*1–4: (cunningly concealed self-praise in a long period sentence)
[1] Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων εὐτυχίας οὕτω μεγάλων δωρεῶν ἠξίωσαν, **τοῖς δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἰδίᾳ πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ψυχὰς οὕτω παρασκευάσασιν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι**, τούτοις δ' οὐδεμίαν τιμὴν ἀπένειμαν, [2] ὧν εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ποιήσασ-θαι πρόνοιαν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀθλητῶν δὶς τοσαύτην ῥώμην λαβόντων οὐδὲν ἂν πλέον γένοιτο τοῖς ἄλλοις, **ἑνὸς δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ φρονήσαντος** ἅπαντες ἂν ἀπολαύσειαν οἱ βουλόμενοι κοινωνεῖν τῆς **ἐκείνου διανοίας**. [3] Οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀθυμήσας εἰλόμην ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν **νομίσας ἆθλον ἔσεσθαί μοι τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γενησομένην** ἥκω συμβουλεύσων περί τε τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τῆς ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, **οὐκ ἀγνοῶν** ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιησαμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὥρμησαν, [4] ἀλλ' ἅμα μὲν **ἐλπίζων** τοσοῦτον **διοίσειν** ὥστε τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν πώποτε δοκεῖν εἰρῆσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἅμα δὲ **προκρίνας τούτους καλλίστους εἶναι τῶν λόγων**, οἵτινες περὶ μεγίστων τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες καὶ τούς τε λέγοντας μάλιστ' ἐπιδεικνύουσι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας πλεῖστ' ὠφελοῦσιν· **ὧν εἷς οὗτός ἐστιν**.

Commentary. The speaker of the *Panegyricus* implies himself to be among "those who had toiled in private for the public good and trained their own minds so as to be able to help also their fellow-men" (**τοῖς ... ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἰδίᾳ πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ψυχὰς οὕτω παρασκευάσασιν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι**), he implies to be that "single man who attained wisdom" (**ἑνὸς δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ φρονήσαντος**) able to give benefit to those who are willing to share his insight (κοινωνεῖν τῆς **ἐκείνου διανοίας**). He is well disposed towards common custom, although not favourable to him (his aretē), and seeks not material reward for his activity – good fame or approbation for his speech (**τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γενησομένην**); he claims his competence (**οὐκ ἀγνοῶν**) in knowing the context of the subject he is going to deal with and claims his superiority (**ἐλπίζων** ... **διοίσειν**) over other men who claimed for wisdom before him (πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιησαμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν); finally, he praises his own insight in choosing the best kind of discourses (**προκρίνας τούτους καλλίστους εἶναι τῶν λόγων**) and points directly to *Panegyricus* as one of them. Hence, we have a picture of a man praising himself for being the wisest among Hellenes and able to perform an excellent speech.

Paneg. 13–14 (self-praise covered by a provocative proposition (*proklēsis*) to accept the punishment (derision) in case of his failure to demonstrate his superiority in oratory):
[13] Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις ὁρῶ καταπραΰνοντας τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ προφασιζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι καὶ λέγοντας, τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἐξ ὑπογυίου γέγονεν αὐτοῖς ἡ παρασκευὴ, τοὺς δ' ὡς χαλεπόν ἐστιν ἴσους τοὺς λόγους τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἔργων ἐξευρεῖν. [14] **Ἐγὼ δ' ἦν μὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίως εἴπω καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ χρόνου**, μὴ μόνον τοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν διατριφθέντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντος οὗ βεβίωκα, **παρακελεύομαι μηδεμίαν μοι συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καταγελᾶν καὶ καταφρονεῖν·** οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅ τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἄξιός εἰμι πάσχειν, εἴπερ μηδὲν διαφέρων οὕτω μεγάλας ποιοῦμαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις.

Antid. 151–152: (self-praise through the description of his peaceful way of life, beneficial to other citizens, with the concluding claim for public recognition)
Ταῦτα γὰρ συνεταξάμην **οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον οὐδὲ δι' ὑπερηφανίαν οὐδὲ καταφρονῶν τῶν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐμοὶ ζώντων, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν, μάλιστα δ' ὁρῶν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας**, ἔπειτα τὸν βίον ἡδίω νομίσας εἶναι τοῦτον ἢ τὸν τῶν πολλὰ πραττόντων, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς διατριβαῖς ταῖς ἐμαῖς πρεπωδέστερον αἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεστησάμην. [152] Τούτων μὲν ἕνεκα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζῆν προειλόμην· **τῶν δὲ λημμάτων τῶν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεσχόμην, δεινὸν ἡγησάμενος εἰ δυνάμενος ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τρέφειν ἐμαυτὸν ἐμποδὼν τῳ γενήσομαι τῶν ἐντεῦθεν ζῆν ἠναγκασμένων** [λαβεῖν τὸ διδόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως], **καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν παρουσίαν ἐνδεής τις γενήσεται τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπαίνου τυγχάνειν ἄξιος ἦν μᾶλλον ἢ διαβολῆς**.

Panath. 172–173: (self-praise in combination with self-defence through appealing to his own and his readers' cosciousness and wisdom (**μηδεὶς οἰέσθω μ' ἀγνοεῖν,** οὐδένα νομίζω ... ἀμαθίας εἶναι καὶ φθόνου μεστὸν) and goodwill (**ὅστις οὐκ ἂν ἐπαινέσειέ με καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡγήσαιτο**) and directly commending probity of his speeches)
Καὶ μηδεὶς οἰέσθω μ' ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τἀναντία τυγχάνω λέγων οἷς ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ λόγῳ φανείην ἂν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γεγραφώς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδένα νομίζω τῶν ταῦτα συνιδεῖν ἂν δυνηθέντων τοσαύτης ἀμαθίας εἶναι καὶ φθόνου μεστὸν, **ὅστις οὐκ ἂν ἐπαινέσειέ με καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡγήσαιτο τότε μὲν ἐκείνως, νῦν δ' οὕτω διαλεχθέντα περὶ αὐτῶν**. [173] Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων **οἶδ' ὅτι καλῶς γέγραφα καὶ συμφερόντως**· [...]

Antid. 35–36 (self-praise in combination with self-defence tactics (see esp. examples 2.3, 2.4 on differentiation and transcendence) through *reductio ad absurdum* (εἰς ἄτοπον ἐπαγωγή) of the accuser's argument)
[35] Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε νῦν οὐδείς μοι φανήσεται τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ἐγκαλέσας. Ὥστ' εἰ συγχωρήσαιμι τῷ κατηγόρῳ καὶ **προσομολογήσαιμι πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δεινότατος** καὶ συγγραφεὺς τῶν λόγων τῶν λυπούντων ὑμᾶς τοιοῦτος **οἷος οὐδεὶς ἄλλος γέγονεν, πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκοίην ἢ ζημιωθείην**. [36] Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ γενέσθαι προέχοντα τῶν ἄλλων ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις εἰκότως ἄν τις τὴν τύχην αἰτιάσαιτο, **τοῦ δὲ καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κεχρῆσθαι τῇ φύσει δικαίως ἂν ἅπαντες τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἐμὸν ἐπαινέσειαν.**

Panath. 260–263 (indirect self-praise through imaginary words of the interlocutor):
[260] Οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ γνώμην ἔχω περὶ σοῦ νῦν καὶ πρότερον. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς παρελθοῦσι χρόνοις **ἐθαύμαζόν σου τήν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου τάξιν καὶ τὴν φιλοπονίαν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, νῦν δὲ ζηλῶ σε καὶ μακαρίζω τῆς εὐδαιμονίας**· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι **ζῶν μὲν λήψεσθαι δόξαν οὐ μείζω μὲν ἧς ἄξιος εἶ**, – χαλεπὸν γὰρ, – παρὰ πλείοσιν δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ὁμολογουμένην τῆς νῦν ὑπαρχούσης, **τελευτήσας δὲ τὸν βίον μεθέξειν ἀθανασίας, οὐ τῆς τοῖς θεοῖς παρούσης, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν διενεγκόντων ἐπί τινι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων μνήμην ἐμποιούσης**. [262] [...] Συμβουλεύω γάρ σοι μήτε κατακάειν τὸν λόγον μήτ' ἀφανί-ζειν, ἀλλ' εἴ τινος ἐνδεής ἐστιν, διορθώσαντα καὶ προσγράψαντα πάσας τὰς διατριβὰς τὰς περὶ αὐτὸν γεγενημένας διαδιδόναι τοῖς βουλομένοις λαμβάνειν, [263] **εἴπερ βούλει χαρίσασθαι μὲν τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσποιουμένοις,** λυπῆσαι δὲ τοὺς θαυμάζοντας μὲν τὰ σὰ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, λοιδορουμένους δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς σοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις τοῖς πανηγυρικοῖς, ἐν οἷς πλείους εἰσὶν οἱ καθεύδοντες τῶν ἀκροωμένων, καὶ προσδοκῶντας, ἢν παρακρούσωνται τοὺς τοιούτους, ἐναμίλλους τοὺς αὐτῶν γενήσεσθαι τοῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ γεγραμμένοις, **κακῶς εἰδότες ὅτι πλέον ἀπολελειμμένοι τῶν σῶν εἰσιν ἢ τῆς Ὁμήρου δόξης οἱ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκείνῳ ποίησιν γεγονότες**.

2. Examples of self-defence (four strategies from the Ware and Linkugel's framework: denial, bolstering, differentiation, transcendence)

2.1. Denial ("I didn't do it"; this strategy is usually accompanied by bolstering, or differentiation in the discussed speeches)

Antid. 33: (denial of the alleged harm to citizens made by Isocrates' *deinotēs*): Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδεὶς οὔθ' ὑπὸ τῆς δεινότητος τῆς ἐμῆς οὔθ' ὑπὸ τῶν συγγραμμάτων βέβλαπται τῶν πολιτῶν, τὸν ἐνεστῶτα κίνδυνον ἡγοῦμαι μέγιστον εἶναι τεκμήριον. Εἰ γάρ τις ἦν ἠδικημένος, εἰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν, οὐκ ἂν ἠμέλησε τοῦ καιροῦ τοῦ παρόντος, ἀλλ' ἦλθεν ἂν ἤτοι κατηγορήσων ἢ καταμαρτυρήσων. Ὅπου γὰρ ὁ μηδ' ἀκηκοὼς μηδὲν πώποτε φλαῦρον εἰς ἀγῶνά με τηλικουτονὶ κατέστησεν, ἦ που σφόδρ' ἂν οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἐπειρῶντ' ἂν δίκην παρ' ἐμοῦ λαμβάνειν. [34] Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐστιν οὔτ' εἰκὸς οὔτε δυνατὸν, ἐμὲ μὲν περὶ πολλοὺς ἡμαρτηκέναι, τοὺς δὲ ταῖς συμφοραῖς δι' ἐμὲ περιπεπτωκότας ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν καὶ μὴ τολμᾶν ἐγκαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ πραοτέρους ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς εἶναι κινδύνοις τῶν μηδὲν ἠδικημένων, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς δηλώσασιν ἃ πεπόνθασιν τὴν μεγίστην παρ' ἐμοῦ λαβεῖν τιμωρίαν.

2.2. Bolstering ("I'm a nice person. I can't have done it"; connecting oneself to some positive reality)

Antid. 164–165 (comparison to a sycophant: his fairness, *epieikeia*, against Lysimachus' *ponēria*):
Οὕτω γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι **χαίρει τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς πιέζουσα καὶ ταπεινοὺς ποιοῦσα, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς ἐξουσίαν διδοῦσα καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βουληθῶσιν**, ὥστε Λυσίμαχος μὲν ὁ προῃρημένος ζῆν ἐκ τοῦ συκοφαντεῖν καὶ κακῶς ἀεί τινα ποιεῖν τῶν πολιτῶν κατηγορήσων ἡμῶν ἀναβέβηκεν, ἐγὼ δ' ὃς οὐδὲ περὶ ἕνα πώποτ' ἐξήμαρτον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἐνθένδε λημμάτων ἀπεσχόμην, παρὰ ξένων δὲ καὶ νομιζόντων εὖ πάσχειν ἐπορισάμην τὰς ὠφελείας, ὡς δεινὰ ποιῶν εἰς τηλικουτονὶ καθέστηκα κίνδυνον. [165] **Καίτοι προσῆκε τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας εὔχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς ὡς πλείστοις τῶν πολιτῶν παραγενέσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην, δι' ἣν ἔμελλον παρ' ἑτέρων λαμβάνοντες χρησίμους αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ, τῇ πόλει παρέξειν**.

Antid. 76–77 (arguments of probability commending excellent qualities of his speech in the shape of rhetorical questions; these serve as enhancement of his fairness and truthfulness of his words):
[76] Βούλομαι δ' ὑμῖν διὰ βραχέων ἀπολογήσασθαι περὶ ἑκάστου καὶ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον ἔτι καταφανὲς, ὡς ἀληθῆ καὶ τότε προεῖπον καὶ νῦν λέγω περὶ αὐτῶν. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν **ποῖος γένοιτ' ἂν λόγος ὁσιώτερος ἢ δικαιότερος** τοῦ τοὺς προγόνους ἐγκωμιάζοντος ἀξίως τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς; [77] Ἔπειτα **τίς ἂν πολιτικώτερος καὶ μᾶλλον πρέπων τῇ πόλει** τοῦ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀποφαίνοντος ἔκ τε τῶν ἄλλων εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ τῶν κινδύνων ἡμετέραν οὖσαν μᾶλλον ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων; Ἔτι δὲ **τίς ἂν περὶ καλλιόνων καὶ μειζόνων πραγμάτων** τοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπί τε τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων στρατείαν παρακαλοῦντος καὶ περὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοίας συμβουλεύοντος;

Antid. 165–166 (probability arguments in the shape of pathetic parallels between Isocrates' grateful disciples and ungrateful Athenians, between Isocrates and Pindar):
Πολλῆς δ' ἀλογίας περί με γεγενημένης πάντων ἂν συμβαίη δεινότατον, εἰ οἱ μὲν δεδωκότες μοι χρήματα τοσαύτην ἔχοιεν χάριν ὥστ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν με θεραπεύειν, ὑμεῖς δ' εἰς οὓς ἀνήλωκα τἀμαυτοῦ, δίκην ἐπιθυμήσαιτε παρ' ἐμοῦ λαβεῖν. [166] Ἔτι δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ Πίνδαρον μὲν τὸν ποιητὴν οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν γεγονότες ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς μόνον ῥήματος, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν ἔρεισμα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὠνόμασεν, οὕτως ἐτίμησαν ὥστε καὶ πρόξενον ποιήσασθαι καὶ δωρεὰν μυρίας αὐτῷ δοῦναι δραχμὰς, ἐμοὶ δὲ πολὺ πλείω καὶ κάλλιον ἐγκεκωμιακότι καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς προγόνους μηδ' ἀσφαλῶς ἐγγένοιτο καταβιῶναι τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον.

Antid. 99–100 (*proklēsis* in combination with the offer to yield the floor to his opponents as a means of claiming for fairness and self-responsibility):
[99] Ἀξιῶ γὰρ, εἰ μέν τινες τῶν ἐμοὶ συγγεγενημένων ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον, **ἐκείνους ὑμᾶς ἐπαινεῖν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μηδεμίαν ὑπὲρ τούτων χάριν ἔχειν**, εἰ δὲ πονηροὶ καὶ τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις οἷοι φαίνειν καὶ γράφεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμεῖν, **παρ' ἐμοῦ δίκην λαμβάνειν**. [100] Καίτοι τίς ἂν πρόκλησις γένοιτο ταύτης ἀνεπιφθονωτέρα καὶ ταπεινοτέρα τῆς τῶν μὲν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀμφισβητούσης, εἰ δέ τινες πονηροὶ γεγόνασιν, ὑπὲρ τούτων δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἐθελούσης; Καὶ ταῦτ' οὐ λόγος μάτην εἰρημένος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ παραχωρῶ καὶ τῷ κατηγόρῳ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν ἄλλων, εἴ τις ἔχει τινὰ φράσαι τοιοῦτον, οὐχ ὡς οὐχ ἡδέως ἄν τινών μου καταψευσομένων, ἀλλ' ὡς εὐθὺς φανερῶν ἐσομένων ὑμῖν καὶ τῆς ζημίας ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμοὶ γενησομένης.

2.3. Differentiation (distancing oneself from the event, separation of the fact/sentiment from a suspicious context)

Antid. 40–41 (distancing himself from the charge of gaining profit from teaching litigation):
Ἠκούσατε δὲ καὶ τοῦ κατηγόρου λέγοντος ὅτι παρὰ Νικοκλέους τοῦ Σαλαμινίων βασιλέως πολλὰς ἔλαβον καὶ μεγάλας δωρεάς. Καίτοι τίνι πιστὸν ὑμῶν ἐστιν ὡς Νικοκλῆς ἔδωκέ μοι ταύτας ἵνα δίκας μανθάνῃ λέγειν, ὃς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ὥσπερ δεσπότης ἐδίκαζεν; Ὥστ' ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς οὗτος εἴρηκεν, ῥᾴδιον καταμαθεῖν ὅτι πόρρω τῶν πραγματειῶν εἰμι τῶν περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια γιγνομένων. [41] Ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνο πᾶσι φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι παμπληθεῖς εἰσιν οἱ παρασκευάζοντες τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀγωνιζομένοις. Τούτων μὲν τοίνυν τοσούτων ὄντων οὐδεὶς πώποτε φανήσεται μαθητῶν ἠξιωμένος, ἐγὼ δὲ πλείους εἰληφὼς, ὥς φησιν ὁ κατήγορος, ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν [διατρίβοντες]. Καίτοι πῶς εἰκὸς τοὺς τοσοῦτον τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἀλλήλων ἀφεστῶτας περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις ἡγεῖσθαι διατρίβειν;

Antid. 230–231: (distinction between the good and bad issues of the "cleverness in speech" and self-attribution to the former)
[230] Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, **εἴπερ ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπιβουλεύειν, προσῆκεν ἅπαντας τοὺς δυναμένους εἰπεῖν πολυπράγμονας καὶ συκοφάντας εἶναι**· ταὐτὸ γὰρ αἴτιον ἐν ἅπασιν ταὐτὸν πέφυκεν ἐνεργάζεσθαι. [231] Νῦν δ' εὑρήσετε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πολιτευομένων καὶ τῶν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότων **τοὺς πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν λόγων ποιουμένους βελτίστους ὄντας τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παριόντων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ῥήτορας καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν λαβόντας πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους τῇ πόλει γεγενημένους, ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ Σόλωνος.**

2.4. Transcendence (legitimization of the act by connecting it with a greater meaning)

Antid. 130–131 and 138 (Isocrates defends his reputation as the adviser of Timotheus not only by praising the latter as a general but also minimizing the ill fame of the latter by reference to the idea of the weakness of human nature):
[130] ἢν δ' ἀναλογίσησθε τὴν **ἄγνοιαν ὅσην ἔχομεν πάντες ἄνθρωποι**, καὶ τοὺς φθόνους τοὺς ἐγγιγνομένους ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς ταραχὰς καὶ τὴν τύρβην ἐν ᾗ ζῶμεν, οὐδὲν τούτων ἀλόγως οὐδ' ἔξω **τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως** εὑρεθήσεται γεγενημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Τιμόθεος μέρος τι συμβεβλημένος τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον γνωσθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν. [131] [...] οὕτω γὰρ ἀφυὴς ἦν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεραπείαν ὥσπερ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν. [...] [138] Ταῦτα δ' ἀκούων ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔφασκέν με λέγειν, οὐ μὴν οἷός τ' ἦν τὴν φύσιν μεταβαλεῖν, ἀλλ' ἦν καλὸς μὲν κἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄξιος, οὐ μὴν σύμμετρός γε τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσοι τοῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς πεφυκόσιν ἀχθόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν.

Panath. 86–87: (approval of digression by making reference to the idea of higher moral standarts: the speaker's profit, i.e. good reputation, is sacrificed for the sake of truth): Ὤιμην δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς χαριεστάτοις τῶν ἀκροατῶν εὐδοκιμήσειν, ἢν φαίνωμαι περὶ ἀρετῆς μὲν τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενος, ὅπως δὲ ταύτης ἀξίως ἐρῶ μᾶλλον σπουδάζων ἢ περὶ τὴν τοῦ λόγου συμμετρίαν, καὶ ταῦτα σαφῶς εἰδὼς τὴν μὲν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἀκαιρίαν ἀδοξότερον ἐμὲ ποιήσουσαν, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὰς πράξεις εὐβουλίαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους ὠφελήσουσαν· **ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ τὸ λυσιτελὲς ἐάσας τὸ δίκαιον εἱλόμην**. [87] Οὐ μόνον δ' ἂν εὑρεθείην ἐπὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις ταύτην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν πεπλησιακότων μοι φανείην ἂν μᾶλλον χαίρων τοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν εὐδοκιμοῦσιν ἢ τοῖς περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.

3. Self-blame

Paneg. 187 (recognition of his human infirmity when applying arguments to the topic; this disadvantage serves as a transition to the exhortation addressed to his hearers)
Οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου. Τότε μὲν γὰρ ᾤμην ἀξίως δυνήσεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπεῖν· **νῦν δ' οὐκ ἐφικνοῦμαι τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πολλά με διαπέφευγεν ὧν διενοήθην.** Αὐτοὺς οὖν χρὴ συνδιορᾶν, ὅσης ἂν εὐδαιμονίας τύχοιμεν εἰ τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν νῦν ὄντα περὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ἠπειρώτας ποιησαίμεθα, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διακομίσαιμεν [...]

Panath. 88 (apologizing for disadvantages of senility)
[88] Ἀλλὰ γὰρ **οὐκ οἶδ' ὅποι τυγχάνω φερόμενος**· ἀεὶ γὰρ οἰόμενος δεῖν προστιθέναι τὸ τῶν προειρημένων ἐχόμενον, παντάπασι πόρρω γέγονα τῆς ὑποθέσεως. **Λοιπὸν οὖν ἐστιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν αἰτησάμενον τῷ γήρᾳ συγγνώμην ὑπὲρ τῆς λήθης καὶ τῆς μακρολογίας, τῶν εἰθισμένων παραγίγνεσθαι τοῖς τηλικούτοις**, ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὸν τόπον ἐκεῖνον ἐξ οὗπερ εἰσέπεσον εἰς τὴν περιττολογίαν ταύτην.

Panath. 230 (Isocrates criticizes himself for the undue behaviour in the discussion with one of his associates who maintained the merits of Lacedemonians):
Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπῄει φρονιμώτερος γεγενημένος καὶ συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥσπερ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, καὶ πεπονθὼς τὸ γεγραμμένον ἐν Δελφοῖς, αὐτόν τ' ἐγνωκὼς καὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων φύσιν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον· **ἐγὼ δ'** ὑπελειπόμην ἐπιτυχῶς μὲν ἴσως διειλεγμένος, **ἀνοητότερος δὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο γεγενημένος καὶ φρονῶν μεῖζον ἢ προσήκει τοὺς τηλικούτους καὶ ταραχῆς μειρακιώδους μεστὸς ὤν**.

4. Self-advice (self-encouragement, self-incitement, self-exhortation, or self-refrain, self-dissuasion) and other aspects of deliberation

Paneg. 97–98 (self-correction after an important message about Athenian advantages against Peloponnesians in the context of the prelude to the battle of Salamis; a kind of *praeteritio*)
[97] Καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτ' ἀπέχρησεν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς χιλίας καὶ διακοσίας τριήρεις μόνοι διαναυμαχεῖν ἐμέλλησαν. Οὐ μὴν εἰάθησαν· καταισχυνθέντες γὰρ Πελοποννήσιοι τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν, καὶ νομίσαντες προδιαφθαρέντων μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων οὐδ' αὐτοὶ σωθήσεσθαι, κατορθωσάντων δ' εἰς ἀτιμίαν τὰς αὐτῶν πόλεις καταστήσειν, ἠναγκάσθησαν μετασχεῖν τῶν κινδύνων. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν θορύβους τοὺς ἐν τῷ πράγματι γενομένους καὶ τὰς κραυγὰς καὶ τὰς παρακελεύσεις, ἃ κοινὰ πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν ναυμαχούντων, **οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι δεῖ λέγοντα διατρίβειν**· [98] **ἃ δ' ἐστὶν ἴδια καὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἄξια καὶ τοῖς προειρημένοις ὁμολογούμενα, ταῦτα δ' ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν.**

Panath. 36–37 (self-exhortation)
[36] Οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δ' ἡλίκος ὢν ὅσον ἔργον ἐνίσταμαι τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ' ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς καὶ πολλάκις εἰρηκὼς ὅτι τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ῥᾴδιον τοῖς λόγοις αὐξῆσαι, τοῖς δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει χαλεπὸν ἐξισῶσαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους. [37] **Ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀποστατέον αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐπιτελεστέον, ἤν περ ἔτι ζῆν δυνηθῶμεν** [...]

Panath. 34 (self-advice, self-incitement)
[34] Ἔστι δ' ἀνδρὸς νοῦν ἔχοντος μὴ τὴν εὐπορίαν ἀγαπᾶν, ἣν ἔχῃ τις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ **τὴν εὐκαιρίαν διαφυλάττειν**, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ τυγχάνῃ διαλεγόμενος· **ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ποιητέον ἐστίν**.

Antid. 153 (*aporia*)
Νῦν δ' **εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν καθέστηκα** τί δρῶν ἀρέσαι δυνηθείην ἂν τοῖς τοιούτοις. Εἰ γὰρ ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ἔργον ποιούμενος ὅπως μηδένα μήτ' ἀδικήσω μήτ' ἐνοχλήσω μήτε λυπήσω, δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα λυπῶ τινάς, τί ποιῶν ἂν χαριζοίμην; Ἢ τί λοιπόν ἐστιν πλὴν ἐμὲ μὲν ἀτυχῆ, τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους ἀμαθεῖς δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ δυσκόλους τοῖς συμπολιτευομένοις;

Antid. 310–311 (*aporia* in combination with *gnōmē* and the expression of desire)
[310] Πολλῶν δ' ἐφεστώτων μοι λόγων **ἀπορῶ πῶς αὐτοὺς διαθῶμαι**· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἕκαστον ὧν διανοοῦμαι ῥηθὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἂν φανῆναι, πάντα δὲ νυνὶ λεγόμενα πολὺν ἂν ὄχλον ἐμοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν παρασχεῖν. Ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἤδη προειρημένων δέδοικα μὴ τοιοῦτόν τι πάθος αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τυγχάνῃ συμβεβηκός. [311] **Οὕτω γὰρ ἁπλήστως ἅπαντες ἔχομεν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὥστ' ἐπαινοῦμεν μὲν τὴν εὐκαιρίαν καὶ φαμὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὰν δ' οἰηθῶμεν ὡς ἔχομέν τι λέγειν, ἀμελήσαντες τοῦ μετριάζειν, κατὰ μικρὸν ἀεὶ προστιθέντες εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας ἀκαιρίας ἐμβάλλομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ὅπου γε καὶ λέγων ἐγὼ ταῦτα καὶ γιγνώσκων, ὅμως ἔτι βούλομαι διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.**

Division of rhetorical material in the Greek rhetorical tradition							
	γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν (ἐγκωμιαστικόν, πανηγυρικόν)		γένος δικανικόν		γένος συμβουλευτικόν (δημηγορικόν)		
Aristotle (4 cent. BC)	ἔπαινος	ψόγος	κατηγορία	ἀπολογία	προτροπή	ἀποτροπή	
Anaxi-menes (4 cent. BC)	ἐγκωμιαστικὸν εἶδος	ψεκτικὸν εἶδος	κατηγορικὸν εἶδος	ἀπολογικὸν εἶδος	προτρεπτι-κὸν εἶδος	ἀποτρεπτικὸν εἶδος	ἐξεταστικὸν εἶδος
Troilus (5 cent. AD)	ἐγκώμιον	ψόγος	κατηγορία	ἀπολογία	προτροπή συμβουλή	ἀποτροπή παραίνεσις	
Hypothetical division of speaker's attitudes towards self							
(Veteikis) (21 cent. AD)	self-praise	self-blame	self-accusation	self-defence	self-incitement	self-dissuasion	self-exami-nation
Simplified four-fold division of speaker's attitudes towards self							
Self-praise		Self-blame/accusation		Self-defense	Self-advice (?)		

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