TEXT TRADITION OF ARISTOTLE'S *ON RHETORIC*: FROM POST-ARISTOTELIAN ATHENS TO ROME

Vita Paparinska
Professor of the Department of Classical Philology, University of Latvia

Discussion of rhetoric is a common subject in Greek and Roman culture. Roman rhetoric developed when Greek rhetoric and oratory had flourished for some centuries. Chronological succession and discussion of the same subject matter in the framework of general influence of Greek ideas and practices on Roman culture suggest impact, possible reception and adoption of ideas in this field of research.

Study of the impact of ideas is bound to encounter reasonable difficulties. As so much of the ancient literary heritage is lost, oftentimes it is impossible to establish direct interconnection between the originator of the idea and its receptor. Conclusions may be subjective, although the link seems obvious.

Knowledge of ideas in most cases is impossible without availability of the text. Thus text tradition is essential for establishing interconnectedness and continuity of ideas in a culture.

Understanding of the impact of the major source of ancient rhetoric, Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* on Roman rhetorical culture starts with establishing availability of the text as a precondition for knowledge of the ideas. Two types of ancient sources provide information on this issue:

1. Ancient sources on the history of Aristotle's esoteric texts (Strabo's *Geography*, Plutarch's *Life of Sulla*, Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Aristotle*, Athenaeus' *Dinner-table Philosophers*).

These sources speak about the general history of Aristotle's esoteric writings. *Rhetoric* is not mentioned specifically. Still, as the *Rhetoric* is one of the esoteric texts, as there is no evidence that its text history is different from other esoteric texts and as there is no reason to suspect a different text history, for the purpose of the study of text reception the testimony of ancient sources pertaining to the esoteric texts is applied to the *Rhetoric*.

2. Ancient sources which speak of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or Aristotle in the context of rhetoric or show reception of Aristotle's rhetorical ideas (Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Theophrastus*, *Rhetoric for Herennius*, Cicero's *On the Orator*, *Orator, On invention*, Quintilian's *Education of an Orator*).

Most information on the text history of Aristotle's esoteric texts is supplied by *The Geography* (*Geographica* 13.1.54) of the late first century BC/ beginning of the first century AD Greek historian and geographer Strabo. His account of the relevant

events covers approximately 250 years. Another a hundred years later source – the biography of Sulla by the historian Plutarch (*Sulla* 26.1–2) – on general lines agrees with Strabo's information and provides specific details on a late episode of the text history.

About a century separates Strabo from the facts he describes. Although this time distance makes one question the reliability of the account, some facts seem to prove verity of the information, at least on the basic fact level. *First*, concerning Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*, testimony of the sources is confirmed by facts – till the middle of the first century BC there is no evidence in Roman rhetorical writings about direct knowledge of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*. *Secondly*, Strabo studied Aristotle's philosophy with Boethus of Sidon (Strabonis *Geographica* 16.24) whose teacher was Andronicus of Rhodes, the publisher of Aristotle's texts in Rome. Thus Strabo could have had insider's information on the major phases of the text history.

Strabo starts his account of the history of Aristotelian texts with the departure of Aristotle from Athens (323 BC). Aristotle bequeathed both his library and his school to his student Theophrastus. Diogenes Laertius mentions the same fact and adds that Theophrastus was the supervisor of the Lycaeum for 35 years and under Theophrastus' supervision the school flourished – it numbered about 2000 students (Diogenis Laertii *Vita Theophrasti* 5.36).

The text history of *On Rhetoric* after Aristotle's departure from Athens could be established from two facts: *first*, the adoption of Aristotelian ideas on rhetoric in his successors', especially in Theophrastus' writings and *secondly*, practical application of the text in the study process of the Lycaeum. There is very little information about both.

The theoretical writings of Aristotle's closest successor, Theophrastus, are lost. Diogenes Laertius in the biographical sketch of Theophrastus enumerates more than twenty of his works, including a *On Rhetoric*. The titles of Theophrastus' writings show that he wrote on the three kinds of speeches, enthymemes, proof, paradeigmata, maxims, narration, style, delivery. Theophrastus seems both to have followed Aristotle's views on rhetoric and worked out in more detail some themes Aristotle had briefly outlined, e.g. style. Aristotle in the third book of *On Rhetoric* had indicated that style should be clear, appropriate, neither high nor low, but Theophrastus was the first, as Cicero argues, to speak of four virtues of style – correctness, clarity, propriety, ornamentation (Ciceronis *Orator* 79).

As to the application of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* in study process, there is no evidence that it was used in the Lycaeum either during Aristotle's lifetime or later[1]. Certainly, *argumentum a silentio* is not a proof of the opposite. In 1888 the English scholar Richard Shute expressed an opinion which is nowadays generally accepted. Namely, during Aristotle's lifetime his ideas reached the Lycaeum audience in verbal form. After Aristotle's departure, at least during Theophrastus' supervision, studies

[1] G. A. Kennedy, „The Composition and Influence of Aristotle's Rhetoric", *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric,* Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1996, 417–418.

continued along Aristotelian lines. R. Shute argues that both Aristotle's own notes and the notes of his students were made use of. Probably these materials were explained and commented upon, but the lecturer did not always distinguish his own ideas from those of Aristotle in a sufficiently clear way or the students failed to comprehend it. Thus every new recording of Aristotelian ideas included subjective interpretation[2].

Strabo writes that Theophrastus bequeathed his own and Aristotle's library to a certain Neleus[3], a former pupil of his and Aristotle's (Quintiliani *Institutio oratoria* 12.2.25) who transported the collection to Scepsis in Asia Minor. Plutarch (*Sulla* 26.2) and Diogenes Laertius (5.42–50) are in agreement with him.

Strabo points out that the loss of Aristotelian texts was destructive for the Lycaeum. Only some of Aristotle's exoteric writings had survived. Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric gradually subsided. Thus the Peripatetics were unable to philosophize according to the principles of the system and primarily engaged in dialectical debate on general issues. Quintilian argues that this was some sort of rhetorical exercise (Quintiliani *Institutio oratoria* 12.2.25). In the second century BC all the philosophical schools show a reaction against rhetoric (Ciceronis *De oratore* 1.46–47). Quintilian mentions Critolaus, a second century BC head of the Peripatetic school who denied that rhetoric was a faculty (*vis*), science (*scientia*) or art (*ars*) and considered it to be merely a skill (*usus*), and a certain Athenaeus[4] who called rhetoric the art of deceit (*ars fallendi*) (Quintiliani *Institutio oratoria* 2.15.23). With the publication of Aristotelian writings in the first century BC the Peripatetics resumed interest in Aristotle's theories. One of them, name unknown, even argued that Demosthenes had learned the art of oratory from Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*[5]. Strabo points out that with Aristotelian texts available, the Peripatetics propounded the doctrine of Aristotle more successfully than their predecessors, but had to treat many issues only as probabilities as the available copies of the texts abounded in mistakes.

More fortunate was the fate of Aristotelian writings in Asia Minor.

The most dramatic phase was when after Neleus' death the texts were inherited by his descendants, uneducated individuals who hid the books under the ground in order to save the collection from being seized for the needs of the Pergamon library. Eventually the texts were sold to a certain Apellicon, a book collector from Athens. This individual, more a book lover than a philosopher, made an attempt to restore the damaged manuscripts, but the restoration, text correctness-wise, was of low quality. After the capture of Athens Apellicon's book collection was seized by Sulla and transported to Rome (after 86 BC) – Strabo and Plutarch agree on this. In Rome Apellicon's collection was "arranged" by the grammarian Tyrannion,

[2] R. Shute, *On the History of the Process by Which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at Their Present Form*, New York: Arno Press, 1976.

[3] The only information on Neleus in ancient sources relates to his connection with Aristotle's and Theophrastus' libraries.

[4] Probably head of the Peripatetics' school in the time of Augustus.

[5] This view is refuted on chronological grounds by Dionysius of Halicarnasus in his *First Letter to Ammaeus*.

a contemporary of Strabo. Plutarch states that Andronicus of Rhodes, who revived the Peripatetic philosophy in Rome, had Tyrannion's edition published.

The 3rd century Greek rhetorician and grammarian Athenaeus mentions two variants of the text history of Aristotle's writings. One of them complies with the information of Strabo and Plutarch that Sulla seized Apellicon's book collection. The other variant of the text history tells that Neleus sold Aristotle' manuscripts to the rulers of Egypt to be kept in the library of Alexandria (*Deipnosophistae* 1.3; 5.214).

Although there have been attempts to harmonize these two variants, i.e., that Neleus' descendants sold to the rulers of Egypt the publicly available Aristotelian texts, but later the unique Aristotelian manuscripts were sold to Apellicon[6], the need for such reconciliation is questionable. Athenaeus in his fifteen books of *Dinner-table Philosophers* mentions about 800 authors and 2000 texts. He has, most probably, made use of secondary sources, thus singular discrepancies are understandable. Besides, in establishing a link between Aristotle and the library of Alexandria, Athenaeus is not unique. Other sources uphold this tradition as well. Strabo writes that Aristotle helped the rulers of Egypt to organize the library of Alexandria (*Geographica* 13.54). The pseudo-epigraphic *Letter of Aristeas*[7], the earliest source which mentions the library of Alexandria, provides an indirect link between Aristotle and the library, saying that the library was organized by a follower of Aristotle, Demetrius of Phaleron.

Although the ancient sources show concern with the text history of Aristotelian writings, obviously even in antiquity it was not clear. Maybe the reason for concern was the existence of several variants of Aristotelian texts – a fact which is purported by Strabo's account. Evidence of this is provided by other ancient sources. There is no unanimity regarding the structure of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*. Diogenes Laertius mentions Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* in two books and a treatise on style. Demetrius, when referring to Aristotle's treatise *On Style* (*Peri hermeneias* 116), seems to mean an independent work. Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* 2.17.14) knows Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* in three books.

Anyway, once the edition of Andronicus of Rhodes had been published, the Roman world had access to Aristotle'. Nevertheless, there seems to have been some limited knowledge of Aristotelian ideas (if not the text) already before. Two texts of the first half of the first century BC – *Rhetoric for Herennius* and Cicero's *On Invention* – imply this.

Although Aristotle is not mentioned in the practice-oriented *Rhetoric for Herennius,* one of the delivery components – voice – is discussed in terms of volume, stability and flexibility (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.20–22) which are adaptations of the Aristotelian system (*Ars Rhetorica* 3.1).

Cicero's *On Invention*, written in early youth, maybe at the age of sixteen or eigh-

---

[6] P. D. Brandes, *A History of Aristotle's Rhetoric, With a Bibliography of Early Printings,* Metuchen, N.Y. & London: The Scarecrow Press, 1989, 5.

[7] The so-called *Letter of Aristeas* is a pseudo-epigraphic text of the Hellenistic age. Iosephus Flavius in his *Antiquities of the Jews* (XII: ii) mentions a letter by a certain Aristeas to Philocrates, describing the Greek translation of the Hebrew Law by seventy-two interpreters sent into Egypt from Jerusalem at the request of the librarian of Alexandria.

teen (90-ties BC) with a young person's self-confidence, is different as for references to Aristotle and his ideas. Cicero declares himself to be a follower of Aristotle and like Aristotle he considers rhetoric to be an art (*De inventione* (1.7)). When Cicero explains the three areas of oratorical activity – demonstrative (*genus demonstrativum*), deliberative (*genus deliberativum*) and judicial (*genus iudicale*) (1.7) – he refers to Aristotle. Yet this is not what Aristotle has said. Aristotle speaks of three types of oratory (*Ars Rhetorica* 1.4), not three areas of oratorical activity.

It is evident that Cicero knew something of Aristotle and of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*, but he had not read the text. There is no evidence that *On Rhetoric* was available in Rome till Andonicus' edition was published[8]. An early Roman reference to Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* which conveys knowledge of the text is the *First Letter to Ammaeus* by the Greek rhetorician of the second half of the first century BC Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Still this does not exclude the possibility that some individuals were familiar with Aristotelian texts or were in possession of them. Probably Roman rhetoricians were aware that Aristotle had written on rhetoric and they had some knowledge of the relevant Aristotelian ideas, as the case of Cicero shows. Cicero's inaccurate rendering of Aristotle's statements suggests mediated information.

Cicero wrote his second discussion of rhetoric, the treatise *On the Orator*, in 55 BC[9]. Although the earliest direct Cicero's reference to Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* appears only in 46 BC[10], in *On the Orator* Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* is irrefutable. *On the Orator* contains numerous references to Aristotle's views on rhetoric and to Cicero's adoption of Aristotelian ideas[11]. This evidence is supported by some facts Cicero mentions in his letters, although they relate to Aristotle's texts in general, not to *On Rhetoric* specifically. Cicero knew people who had or could have first-hand contact with Aristotelian writings. So in a letter written in 55 BC Cicero refers to working in the library of Sulla's son Faustus (*Ad Atticum* 4.10) – most probably the library contained the Aristotelian esoteric texts, confiscated by Sulla from Apellicon. Besides, Cicero may have acquired and read Aristotle's works even earlier – in a letter of 56 BC he refers to the services of Tyrannion, the editor of Aristotelian texts,

[8] G. A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 62–63; G. A. Kennedy, *Aristotle. On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse*, Oxford: OUP, 2007, 308. This traditional assumption is questioned by J. Barnes ("Roman Aristotle", *Philosophia Togata* ii, Oxford: OUP, 1997, 16–17). He argues that the idea of the singularity of Andronicus' published Aristotelian texts was artificially cultivated in order to stress closeness to the originals and thus increase the value of the publication. J. Barnes considers that Aristotle's texts were available in Rome much earlier.

[9] The earliest known reference to the completed *De oratore* is a letter written in 54 BC to Lentulus Spinther (*Ad familiares* 1.9).

[10] In the *Orator* (*Orator* 114) Cicero translates a sentence from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

[11] These references are expressed by a participant in the discussion. Thus a question arises whether the speaker pronounces Cicero's views. The answer is provided by another letter in which Cicero states that Aristotle expresses his ideas through the speeches of the discussion participants (*Ad Atticum* 13.19). As Cicero himself has remarked on the closeness of *On the Orator* to Aristotle's dialogues, presentation of a theme in *On the Orator* is Cicero's own viewpoint. So the words of Antonius, the protagonist of the second book (*De oratore* 2.160), that he does not deviate far from Aristotle in fact refer to Cicero himself.

in arranging his own library in Antium (*Ad Atticum* 4.8). More specific, unquestionable information regarding Cicero's knowledge of Aristotelian writings appears in a letter addressed to Lentulus Spinther (*Ad Familiares* 1.9.) Cicero argues that he has written *On the Orator* in the "Aristotelian manner" (*Aristotelio more*). Certainly Cicero with the "Aristotelian manner" does not mean Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*, as this text is a discussion in the form of a narrative, while Cicero's relevant text is a dialogue. In *On the Orator* Cicero characterizes "Aristotelian manner" as presentation of the views of a dialogue participants in the form of a substantiated exposition, so he obviously considers his treatise to be similar in form to the lost Aristotelian philosophical dialogues.

Cicero follows Aristotelian tradition in the discussion of invention (2.114–306), and especially – in characterizing the three objectives of the speaker. Both Aristotle and Cicero agree that the objective of the speaker is persuasion of the audience. Aristotle indicates the applicable non-rhetorical means of persuasion – those that exist objectively – and rhetorical means of persuasion – those that the speaker has to find or arouse. He divides the rhetorical means of persuasion into three groups: arguments (*logos*), moral characteristics of the speaker (*ethos*) and attitude of the audience (*pathos*) (*Ars rhetorica* 1.2). Cicero for his speaker defines three objectives: to prove (*probare*), to conciliate (*conciliare*) and to sway to emotion (*movere*) (*De oratore* 2.115, 121, 128). For Cicero proving requires the use of Aristotle's objective proofs and arguments, conciliating echoes Aristotle's moral characteristics of the speaker and swaying to emotion – Aristotle's attitude of the audience.

Cicero's and Aristotle's systems are basically uniform, but the content of the system components is different. These differences are significant enough and show that in different cultures an absolutely uniform system is impossible.

In discussing the function of proving, Cicero more than Aristotle focuses on the objectively existing proofs. He supplements the five Aristotelian non-rhetorical proofs with different legislative norms and various types of contracts (*De oratore* 2.100, 116). This is due to the fact that in comparison with Athens of Aristotle's times, Roman system of civil law was much more developed. Contrariwise Roman culture was not concerned with the elaborate Aristotelian discussion of argument from the perspective of logics (*Ars rhetorica* 2.23–25), thus Cicero adopts only a small part of it – the idea of topics suitable for multiple cases of argumentation (*loci*) (*De oratore* 2.163–173).

Although the Ciceronian idea of conciliating the audience interacts with the Aristotelian concept of *ethos*, the moral characteristics of the speaker which create a favourable impression on the audience, Cicero's perspective is different. Aristotle has a mental picture of a speaker in a public assembly or at a court of justice who represents his own interests and strives to create a good impression of himself. Cicero's speaker is an advocate, and for him it is essential to project a likeable image not only of himself, but also of his client (*De oratore* 2.182–185), as both of them by conciliating the audience promote persuasion. Therefore for Cicero the Aristotelian idea of *ethos* ap-

plies also to the client, although the focus of his discussion is on the speaker.

The Ciceronian idea of a prepossessing speaker is somewhat different from that of Aristotle. Aristotle outlines those projected qualities of the speaker that will conciliate the audience – reason (*phronesis*), virtue (*arete*) and benevolence (*eunoia*) (*Ars rhetorica* 2.1.). Cicero argues that the speaker should create the impression of himself as being a decent (*probus*), virtuous (*bene moratus*) and a good (*bonus*) person (*De oratore* 184).

The different projected qualities required for a prepossessing speaker are entailed by the different target audiences of the Aristotelian and Ciceronian speakers. Cicero's and Aristotle's texts offer enough evidence that in Athens and in Rome the speaker addressed different target audiences. In Athens the target audience were several thousands of people from different social ranks, and the speaker in his image projected compliance to common values – reason, virtue and benevolence. Therefore Aristotle stresses that the speaker must know how to speak with different people, and he characterizes types of individuals in accordance with their age, social rank, wealth and power (*Ars rhetorica* 2.12–17). Cicero does not delve into such a discussion. In Rome, although the audience could be quite heterogeneous, the real target audience were decision makers, and the speaker addressed homogenous audience, a comparatively small group of social elite. As the speaker habitually belonged to this social group, his reason and benevolence were a matter of course and he could concentrate on his self-image of *vir bonus*[12].

[12] E. Fantham, *The Roman World of Cicero's De oratore*, Oxford: OUP, 2006, 174–175.

The differing target audiences of Aristotle and Cicero in order to be swayed to emotion require different approaches. As Aristotle's audience is heterogeneous, arousal of the desired attitude is difficult. The speaker must have knowledge of emotions, as well as possess skills of creating and placating them. Therefore Aristotle provides detailed discussion of nine types of emotions (*Ars rhetorica* 2.2–11). Cicero looks at emotions from the viewpoint of an advocate. The advocate must perceive the attitude of the decision makers – whether they are benevolent or their benevolence has to be gained. Detailed discussion of emotions is not pertinent (*De oratore* 2.206).

Significantly enough, Aristotelian influence in the rhetorical handbooks of the Roman imperial period covers persuasion of the audience. The *Anonymous Seguerianus*[13], probably an epitome of a second century text, and the rhetorical handbook of Valerius Apsines, a third century sophist in Athens, follow the Aristotelian approach to means of persuasion, dividing them into non-rhetorical and rhetorical, the latter being divided into *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos*[14].

Thus circulation of the "arranged" Apellicon's book collection in Rome from the first century onward ensured availability of Aristotelian writings in Rome. References to Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* and to Aristotle's rhetorical ideas bear witness to this fact. Aristotelian doctrine of three types of oratory – deliberative, judicial and epideictic – and the theory of means of persuasion was

[13] The text is named for Seguier de St. Brisson who in 1843 discovered it in a Paris manuscript.

[14] *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. E. Spengel, Leipzig: Teubner, 1853, 427–460, 331–414.

generally accepted. Otherwise the influence of Aristotelian ideas on Roman rhetorical culture was insignificant[15].

This apparent incongruity – availability and knowledge of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* and its slight impact on Roman rhetoric can be explained by the non-compliance of Aristotle's text to the orientation of Roman rhetorical culture. Roman rhetoric was mainly concerned with two areas of research which had originated after Aristotle – *stasis* theory, a systematic way to determine the central question in a speech, and studies of tropes and figures of speech.

Stasis theory was developed by Hermagoras of Temnos in the second century BC[16]. In the *Rhetoric for Herennius* and Cicero's *On Invention* the discussion of invention is based on *stasis* theory. *Stasis* remained a major issue of study in the rhetorical writings of the Roman imperial period (Quintilian, Hermogenes). As to Aristotle, he had outlined the issue of *stasis* in judicial speeches (1.13.9–10; 3.17.1), acknowledging the necessity of establishing the question at issue, but did not discuss the ways and means of doing it. Thus from the perspective of a substantial aspect of Roman rhetoric Aristotle's text was of no interest.

Tropes and figures of speech were the other major area of Roman rhetorical studies. Beginnings of research in this field are obscure, but ancient testimony suggests Stoics' grammar studies in the second century BC[17]. Style is the subject matter of the Greek treatise *On Style*, attributed to the otherwise unknown Demetrius and dated probably with the early first century BC. The major Roman rhetorical studies deal with tropes and figures as ornamentation of style. Discussion of this subject matter reveals the practice-oriented and didactic character of Roman rhetoric. So *Rhetoric for Herennius* within the framework of noble style discusses 64 tropes and figures, defining and exemplifying them. Cicero in his treatises *The Orator* (75–121) and *On the Orator* (3.149–181) examines style and means of expression at theoretical and practical level. Quintilian in his *Education of an Orator* discusses tropes and figures in much detail (8, 9). Ornamentation of style was explicated also in the Greek treatises of the Roman imperial period – the most significant being Ps. Longinus' *On Sublimity* and Hermoges' *On Types of Style*. As to Aristotle, although he discusses style in the *On Rhetoric*, he does not do this in the terms of figures of speech and tropes, but for a brief outline of metaphor. Already the first century BC Roman rhetorical tradition would consider it inadequate.

Other major themes of Roman rhetorical theory were delivery (Quintiliani *Institutio oratoria* 11), memory (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.28–40) and arrangement of the speech (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.16–18). Aristotle's text in this respect also was of

[15] G. A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 63; G. A. Kennedy, *Aristotle. On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse*, Oxford: OUP, 2007, 308.

[16] Hermagoras' works are lost, but his theory can be reconstructed from Cicero's *De inventione*, in which the author makes numerous references to Hermagoras' teachings (*De inventione* 1.8, 12, 16, 97).

[17] Tropes were considered to be part of grammar (Dionysii Thracis *Ars grammatica* 1). The earliest known discussion of tropes is the one by Tauriscus, a student of the second century BC Stoic philosopher and grammarian Crates (Sexti Empirici *Adversus mathematicos* 1.249). The second century Roman grammarian Fronto ennumerates figures of thought and refers his list to the second century BC Stoic Chrysippus (Frontonis *De eloquentia* 1.15).

little interest. In Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* delivery is mentioned but not discussed (3.1–7), arrangement of the speech is brief and inconsequential (3.13, 3.14, 3.16–19), memory is not mentioned at all.

Thus, although Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* was available in Rome since the middle of the first century BC, it did not influence Roman rhetoric much. Second century BC developments of rhetoric made Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* an obsolete text. It could stimulate but academic interest. Besides Roman rhetoric more than the Greek counterpart was didactic and oriented to practical application. The author would try to present and explain the available means and the correct application of rhetorical "tools" which would ensure successful oratorical activity. Aristotle's text would seem too much concerned with logics, not suitable for instruction and providing insufficient practical advice.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnes, J. "Roman Aristotle", *Philosophia Togata* ii, Oxford: OUP, 1997.

Brandes, P. D., *A History of Aristotle's Rhetoric, With a Bibliography of Early Printings,* Metuchen, N.Y. & London: The Scarecrow Press, 1989.

Clarke, M. L., *Rhetoric at Rome. A Historical Survey*, London: Routledge, 1996.

Fantham, E., *The Roman World of Cicero's De oratore*, Oxford: OUP, 2006.

Kennedy, G. A., *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Kennedy, G. A., *Aristotle. On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse*, Oxford: OUP, 2007.

Kennedy, G. A., "The Composition and Influence of Aristotle's Rhetoric", *Essays on Aristotle's* Rhetoric, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1996.

Russell, D. A., *Criticism in Antiquity*, Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 2001.

Shute, R., *On the History of the Process by Which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at Their Present Form*, New York: Arno Press, 1976.

ARISTOTELIO *RETORIKOS* TEKSTO TRADICIJA PO ARISTOTELIO: NUO ATĖNŲ IKI ROMOS

Vita Paparinska

S a n t r a u k a

Šio straipsnio tikslas – ištirti Aristotelio *Retorikos* recepciją romėnų retorinėje kultūroje. Kultūrinių idėjų recepcija paprastai remiasi tekstais. Todėl Aristotelio *Retorikos* teksto istorija vėlesniais laikais padeda atskleisti idėjų perimamumą.

Tyrimas remiasi antikiniais šaltiniais, kuriuose pateikiama informacija apie Aristotelio ezoterinių veikalų istoriją, taip pat antikinės retorikos šaltiniais, kuriuose Aristotelio *Retorika* nagrinėjama bendrame retoriniame kontekste ir kurie atspindi Aristotelio retorinių idėjų recepciją. Šiuo požiūriu ypač svarbūs tekstai yra du Cicerono traktatai (*De oratore*, *De inventione*) ir *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Aristotelio įtakos romėnų retorikai (ypač Cicerono traktatui *De oratore*) aptarimas koncentruojasi į koreliuojančių sąvokų suvokimo bei interpretavimo graikų ir romėnų kultūrose panašumus bei skirtumus, kurie gali duoti atsakymą, kodėl Aristotelio *Retorikos* įtaka romėnų retorinei tradicijai buvo palyginti nedidelė.

Gauta 2009 09 20

Autorės adresas:
Klasikinės filologijos katedra
Latvijos universitetas
Visvalža g. 4 a, LV-1050 Riga
El. paštas: vita.paparinska@lu.lv