GLOBAL AND PERMANENT PEACE: ILLUSION OR REALITY?*

Vanja Borš

Suhopoljski put 7/1, 10 000 Zagreb, Croatia
E-mail: vanja.bors@gmail.com

Abstract. *The intention of this article is to problematize a possibility of establishing a global and permanent peace. As the basic starting point, that is, as the precondition of an achievement of such a form of human existence, I propose postconventional morality, which is reached by only a small number of people in their moral development. In that context, in this article, conditions and possibilities for stimulating a wider development, that is an achievement of such a form of morality, by the system of higher education will be considered. However, the starting point is that such an achievement is not possible with the form of education dominant today, but rather with the education that emphasizes some specific and unique value of philosophy, and anthropology as well. In any case, it is postconventional morality which is a precondition of a genuine (transcultural) understanding of the golden rule and the conduct in accordance with it, that is, being according to universal ethical principles.*

Keywords: global and permanent peace, higher education, moral development, postconventionality

In this article the intention is to problematize a possibility and conditions for establishing a global and permanent peace. Although such an issue may appear as pure illusion because through the previous history the humankind has spent more time in the state of warfare than the state of peace, that is, because man has proved to be the most destructive living being, my attitude is that we nevertheless may deliberate about some particular possibilities of establishing a global and permanent peace. Naturally, we can approach the mentioned issue in different ways, even through the war itself as merely the opposition of peace, that is,

through the war[1] as the absence of peace, but my intention is to approach that issue from a more universal and encompassing starting point.[2] Therefore, I am approaching the mentioned topic through human moral development (basically ontogenetic, but also indicating a phylogenetic dimension), i.e., with the help of the cognitive-developmental approach to morality, while

---

* This article is based on the presentation given at the Annual Symposium of the Croatian Philosophical Society *War and Peace*, on November 26, 2015 in Zagreb, Croatia.

---

[1] Basically here I have in mind an organized conflict between two or more armed societies.

[2] Namely, if we look only at the causes of wars, we must notice, no matter how current some functionalist (economic, political and religious) interpretations of the causes of contemporary wars are, they are nevertheless ethnocentric, that is, they are not universal. Because anthropological research around the world, by its ethnographic data, shows that the wars of numerous indigenous societies (which have not been affected by westernization) cannot be explained by an economic, a political or a religious function, that is, the wars in those societies sometimes do not have any goal, purpose or task, either for society or for the individuals (Hallpike 2011).

I propose postconventional moral reasoning as an origin of the achievement of the global and permanent peace. After all, development of a certain moral capacity is the necessary precondition for the genuine comprehension and conduct in accordance with ethical, legal and similar rules, which have often been cited and proposed as a guarantee of peace (e.g., Immanuel Kant, Hans Küng, Mario Kopić, etc.). In any case, in this article, as a basic starting point of the development of the mentioned postconventional morality, the focus will be directed toward higher education, but toward such a form of education in which a special role and importance has an authentic philosophical education, and anthropology as well, due to some of their unique values and particularities (which stimulate the development of postconventionality).

Therefore, in the text the thesis will be argued that stimulating a wider development of postconventional moral reasoning with the particular, and today not dominant, approach to education, which is immanent to authentic philosophy and exploits some unique values of anthropology, can provide a valuable origin to achieve a global and permanent peace.

Growth and Development as Declining Egocentrism

Contrary to, for example, Arthur Schopenhauer's (1902, 1969) convictions about the apriority, that is, unalterability of human moral character[3], morality, as well as all aspects of human thinking, shows the potential for growth and development, i.e., for change. As Kant states: "For a rational but finite being […] possible is an endless progress from the lower to higher degrees of moral perfection" (2008: 131). Of course, there are different approaches to mapping the stages of moral development, but in the context of this work my considerations will be, in general outline, based on the approach structured by the American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. After all, Kohlberg's approach[4] is even today considered as the most important starting point for the study of morality (e.g., Zizek et al. 2015), regardless of being criticized with the passage of time (sometimes unfoundedly), which led to its extension and adaptation, that is a formation of a more complete Neo-Kohlbergian approach.[5] In any case, Kohlberg's approach has been characterized by geographical and also temporal universality (it may be used not only in the context of ontogenesis, of course, in a general outline, but also in the context of phylogenesis), and it has been much tested (Hallpike 2004, 2011, Kohlberg 1984, Snarey 1985).

So, concisely, Kohlberg (1984) distinguished between the three main levels of moral development: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional, which are based on the human ability of moral reasoning on rights and justice.[6]

---

[3] Which, in the context of his own metaphysics, he ties to the will, not to the intellect. But with an indication that Schopenhauer (1969) admits a possibility of the existence of an acquired character, i.e., the possibility of learning, training and the like, but still does not admit the possibility of transcending an innate character, i.e., its change (an exception is the phenomenon of complete denial of the will-to-live, that is, self-renunciation, and which is in fact suppression of the character).

[4] Above all based or inspired by the works of Kant, John Dewey, James Mark Baldwin, George Herbert Mead, William McDougall, Jean Piaget, Richard Mervyn Hare, John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, etc.

[5] It integrates different approaches to the research of morality, that is, it is multidimensional.

[6] All of them contain also, at least (depending of the version, that is, the phase of Kohlberg's work) two intermediate levels or two stages, but this is not important for the purpose of this discussion.

At *the preconventional morality level* an individual bases his or her moral reasoning on avoiding punishment and obtaining reward, that is, on his or her own preferences, feelings, needs, etc. Therefore, here we are talking about a kind of egocentrism ("concrete individual perspective"), because the person still does not have cognitive possibilities to enter the perspective of others, nor the ability of understanding the rules and laws of a society (Kohlberg 1984).

Then, at *the conventional morality level* a person has an ability of sharing the perspective of others, but the others are only those who are members of his or her society (to which he or she belongs by birth or by own choice), so we are talking about a kind of ethnocentrism ("member-of-society perspective"). Here a person conformistically accepts all that which his or her society approves of, that is, what the most of society consider as correct and what they expect from him or her (e.g., stereotypical roles: a good disciple, a good mother, a good father, an exemplary citizen, etc.), i.e., the moral reasoning is based on the conventions and objectives of the person's society (Kohlberg 1984).

Lastly, at the least frequent form of morality, *the postconventional level*, a person truly comprehending the mutuality of humankind bases his or her moral judgement on the universal principles of justice, i.e., the right of each person, regardless of his or her attitudes, values, views and the like, to a dignified life. Therefore, at this level a person has the possibility for identification with all people, regardless of his or her colour (race), sex, age, national, religious and similar belonging, so that we may talk about a world-centricity. Of course, the person of postconventional morality acts on his or her own behalf and respects current laws and rules of the society in which he/she lives. But, the point is that he/she also has the possibility for taking a meta-perspective, that is, the person is ready to withdraw from his or her own behalf or pleasure as well as break the existing conventions if they jeopardize the rights of others (regardless of who they are). Hence, for a postconventional person the universal ethical principles are prior to the conventions of a society ("prior-to-society perspective") (Kohlberg 1984).

It can be concluded from the discussion above that the moral reasoning is based on the cognitive development, that is, that there is no characteristic moral reasoning without the development of a certain level of logical reasoning and an ability to take perspectives (roles), but although cognitive development is a precondition, it is not the guarantee of moral reasoning (Kohlberg 1984). Or, in Hegelian (1977) terms, cognitive development is a kind of form which allows certain moral content (that is, we have the necessity of a form for characteristic essence). In any case, to be able to catch only a glimpse of postconventional morality, at least the existence (by Piaget's discourse) of a complete (mature, high and similar) formal operational level of cognition[7] is necessary (Kohlberg 1984), and this level is, also, globally less frequent so that it has not been reached by all people in all societies (that level is mainly developed among formally educated people), but even those who have reached that level do not reason in formal operational way in all situations (Neimark 1979, Hallpike 2004, Piaget 1995, etc.). On the other hand, the mature

---

[7] The ability of logical reasoning not only about the concrete, but also about the abstract and hypothetical entities.

postconventionality implies as its origin, even less frequent, postformal cognition (cf. Sonnert and Commons 1994).[8] Anyhow, although the development of formal operational and postformal levels of cognition, as well as postconventional morality, exists as a potential in each human being, it is conditioned by socio-cultural factors (that is, by interaction between an individual and the environment), while formal education has a particularly important role (Hallpike 2004, Kohlberg 1984, Piaget 1995, etc.). Moreover, in the context of moral development, research clearly indicates a direct connection between moral reasoning and higher education itself, that is, the role of higher education in development of postconventional morality (see, e.g., King and Mayhew 2002).

Postconventionality and Higher Education

Precisely because of the previously stated, and especially because postconventional morality develops at the earliest in late adolescence and early adulthood (i.e., approximately between the ages of seventeen and twenty) (Kohlberg 1984, Sonnert and Commons 1994), I think that in the wider context of the achievement of such a form of moral reasoning, as the precondition[9] of

a global and permanent peace, the attention should be directed to higher education.

But, here I do not think of nowadays dominant form of education (of course, with full awareness of the existence of many differences, gradations and particularities), essentially based on mere imitation,[10] which is potentiated by the currently ruling market-based neoliberal paradigm (for the purposes of concretization it is enough to direct attention to, e.g., the countries subjected to the Bologna Process), because it needs, in principle, mere imitators, that is, people who may be easily manipulated by various promotional appeals, ultimately only for the achievement of commercial goals (cf., e.g., Liessmann 2006). Rather I think of the education which stimulates critical thinking, raising awareness, self-awareness, individualization, ability to take perspectives (roles), sensitize to the other, and so on.[11]

Indeed, the above mentioned currently dominant approach to education not only

---

[8] Basically characterized by multi(pluri)perspectivity, dialectical thinking and relativism (see Borš 2014).

Also, discussing the emergence of postconventional moral reasoning, here I attempted to stay on Kohlberg's original claims, even though, according to the cited work of Sonnert and Commons, postconventional morality emerges only with postformal cognition (see also Markoulis 1989).

[9] Of course, a person may reason in a postconventional way, but various factors may influence whether he or she would also behave postconventionally in certain life situations (Kohlberg 1984). However, some rese-

arch confirms a close relationship between the level of moral development and moral behavior (see Lind 1997), while, on the other hand, to be capable of postconventional behavior at all, the existence of cognitive-moral preconditions is necessary (as indicated).

[10] Continuing on the indication of the existence of differences, gradations and particularities, it is known that the lack of discussions, critical thinking, perspective (role) taking and similar is more pronounced at technical, biomedical and similar faculties or departments, than at the faculties or departments of social sciences and humanities (see also footnote 20 below).

[11] As a positive example here I can mention the liberal arts colleges. Without going into a detailed explanation, I would only like to mention that those are institutions of higher education which, among other things, principally try to stimulate critical thinking and discussion (the Socratic dialogue method in teaching), they prefer smaller groups of students in a class, etc. Nay, continuing on the topic of morality, the research in the United States of America (see King and Mayhew 2002) shows that those particular institutions are a more suitable environment for stimulating development of moral reasoning than other colleges.

in its essence does not encourage, that is not only stifles critical thinking, raising of awareness, individualization, creativity, and so on, but it is also in some way archaic and retrograde, in the sense that it potentiates some patterns of the primary form of learning. Namely, in early societies, as well as in presently existing autochthonous tribal and similar societies, learning was based on mere observations and mechanical imitation, it was concrete and without abstract generalization, taxonomic classification and the like, with minimal verbal communication (Hallpike 2004), and therefore it did not stimulate the development of higher levels of cognition, moral reasoning and so on. Certainly, in the present day education, within industrial and postindustrial societies, an abstract aspect, verbal communication and the like are dominant, but in the end all these are still mostly reduced to mere imitation (although now it is the imitation of the abstract), and notably less focused on discussion, critical thinking, raising awareness, ability to take perspectives and creativity.

Of course, it is important to highlight that I do not intend to entirely depreciate learning based on imitation, but I only direct my criticism to the omnipresent potentiation of its dominance. Not only that such learning is inevitable for some knowledge areas (e.g., learning of anatomy), but I consider it fundamental. Namely, I think that such a form of education is necessary, but only for creating a base for further development, because, for the purpose of illustration, simplification and example, it is most meaningful to learn letters[12] and speech by

observation and imitation, but it is equally clear that it represents only a starting point for further creativity (e.g. prose, poetry), which is necessary to stimulate, and not to suppress. Respectively, and more concretely in the context of higher education, it is clear that a person must first sovereignly rule a specific area, that is all that what was created by others, before he/she starts with criticism[13] and creating his or her own ideas and approaches, because we cannot create anything from nothing. In any case, I think that education must include both approaches, considering the fundamentality of one and the importance of other, but with constant awareness that education, first of all, must mean "making creators, even if there aren't many of them, even if one's creations are limited by comparison with those others", so that we have as the result of the educational process "inventors, innovators, not conformists" (Piaget 1980: 132).

Exactly in that context I recognize a particular role and importance of philosophy, that is of philosophical education, but,

operational level of cognition, by itself is not sufficient for the development of the higher levels of cognition (thus neither for the development of the formal operational level) (Scribner and Cole 1999, also cf. Hallpike 2004), that is, with mere literacy training we are obtaining only imitators who have been adapted to the contemporary forms of manipulation. Nay, we should keep in mind that, in both the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic context, literacy appears prior to the formal operational (mental/rational) form of thinking, which is necessary for the appearance of philosophy, science, individualization, etc.

[13] Unfortunately, I encountered difficulties when trying to encourage critical discussion in Croatia and some people did not understand its point at all. Namely, even when I have been successful and induced a discussion, some persons considered that the point is mere criticism and expressing their opinions without any arguments, basing everything on the right of everyone to speak what he/she thinks; nay, if they have been offered counter-arguments, then they have felt attacked, insulted and the like.

[12] Here is an opportunity to indicate that literacy (as the skill of reading and writing), regardless of how much it has been important and specific to the formal

clearly, not as mere factography, history, ideologization and the like, i.e., not as the simplest copying, but as a manner of stimulation of dialogue, critical thinking, perspective (role) taking, knowing, self-realization, dealienation, inspiration, creativity,[14] etc., which are in the very philosophical essence. That is, as a manner of philosophical education, fundamentally, as stimulating questions, and not as merely giving or instilling answers, because, after all, "answers prior to questions are sophistry, by no means philosophy" (Kopić 2013: 10). Therefore, I recognize a particular role and importance of philosophy for the development of such a way of cognition (philosophical) that does not only include the existence (outer properties), but also the essence (inner nature) of a phenomenon (Hegel 1977).

Only such an approach leads to self-construction, that is, individualization which is necessary for postconventional moral reasoning. Therefore, it leads to the individualization in the sense of non-conformity and autonomy of thinking and acting, that is in Kantian (2006a) terms, in the sense of rejection of the yoke of *immaturity*.[15] Because postconventional thinking, as in the very philosophical meaning of the term *thinking* (which clearly points to the importance and role of authentic philosophical education for development of postconventional morality) "means thinking by one's own head, thinking independently of different ideologies, collective representations and traditional thought patterns" (Kopić 2013: 12). Ultimately, in the context

of postconventional moral reasoning, that means thinking guided above all by self-esteem and conscience, and not by the fear of punishment, mere pragmatics, and so on. After all, only with the existence of self-esteem we may expect genuine respect for others, and that regardless of who these others are. So, as Friedrich Nietzsche advises: "go ahead and love your neighbors as you love yourselves – but first be the kind of people *who love themselves*" (2006: 137), because otherwise "loving" and "respect", that is, pseudo-altruism, are not only false, and therefore dangerous, but very often represent a kind of escapism.[16]

The aforementioned in the context of the higher education-level courses of ethics (as the most widespread modes of philosophical education, but also the one that directly deals with the issues of rights and justice) means avoiding merely learning (imitation of) ethical norms, rules and the like, but primarily implies critical thinking, questioning and argumentative discussion about certain ethical cases, problems, dilemmas, etc., that is, immersing yourself in (identification with) the role of a moral decision-maker. In fact, simulation, that is an attempt to take the perspective (role) of a moral decision-maker, regardless of his or her sex, gender, race, religious, political and similar affiliation, etc., may not only significantly facilitate understanding of certain ethical problems, as well as increase the moral sensibility, but it is also necessary for moral development (Kohlberg 1984). Of course, such active educational encountering and dealing with certain moral dilemmas and ethical problems should not stop on

[14] Nietzsche highlights: "you should learn *only* for creating!" (2006: 165).
[15] "*Immaturity* is the inability to make use of one's intellect without the direction of another." (Kant 2006a: 17).

[16] "You flee to your neighbor to escape yourself and you want to make a virtue of it: but I see through your 'selflessness'." (Nietzsche 2006: 44)

the examples from everyday life only, but it must also include specific problems and dilemmas of particular professions (health care, journalism, politics, etc.). In any case, in the context of postconventional morality, Kohlberg states that "one cannot follow moral principles (Stages 5 and 6)[17] if one does not understand or believe in them" (1984: 172), which clearly indicates the importance of raising awareness as opposed to mere imitation.

After all, not only examples from ordinary life, but also worldwide scientific research point to the results of ineffectiveness of imitation, that is, of merely learning and memorizing ethical norms (codices).[18] For example, research among the students of medicine[19] shows a significant decline (backsliding) or stagnation of moral reasoning in the later years of study (e.g., Self and Baldwin 1994, Lind 1997, 2000), that is, after their attending of ethics courses, which has been explained properly by a lack of discussions about ethical issues, problems, and so on, and by mere adoption (imitation) of ethical norms and relevant laws (see, e.g., Gross 1999; Slováčková and Slováček 2007). On the other hand, the research clearly indicates that the course of medical ethics, conceptualized so that it

includes discussion (especially in smaller groups) about specific moral dilemmas, ethical issues, etc., encourages development of students' moral reasoning (see, e.g., Self and Baldwin 1994; Self, Olivarez, and Baldwin 1998).

In any case, not only in the context of stimulating a wider development of postconventional morality but, generally, with the goal of attaining all that has been mentioned herein as the very essence of philosophy, I argue for the necessity of an authentic philosophical education at all higher education institutions, and as a kind of propaedeutics. Besides, Piaget also states the following:

> If the principal aim of intellectual education is the training of the mind, then it follows automatically that philosophical reflection constitutes an essential objective both for those students one wishes to initiate particularly into mathematical deduction and experimental method and also for those who are oriented toward the humanities and the historical disciplines. (1995: 706)

On the other hand, and with the same aim, I consider worthy utilizing also some unique values of anthropology, that is, anthropological education. Namely, regardless of anthropology being, in principle, in large part a "child of colonialism" (e.g., Gough 1968, Asad 1973, Lewis 1973), so that it has still often been used in the field-work for the realization of a sort of colonialist aims (now no longer in the service of nations, but of corporations) (cf. Borš 2013), anthropology has been, through education also, providing a wonderful opportunity for encountering diversity and becoming sensitized to it, that is to different and exotic people, traditions, institutions, etc. (for more see, e.g., Shunk and Goldstein 1964, Mandelbaum et al.

---

[17] These are the stages of the post-conventional level of morality.

[18] As it has unfortunately often been practiced in Croatia as well (especially in the context of ethics courses for specific professions).

[19] The example of the study of medicine I consider most evident, because, on the one hand, it is to be expected, and the research confirms that the students initially already possess more humanness, moral sensitivity and ability for moral reasoning, while, on the other hand, they are mainly exposed to the teaching which is based on imitation" (e.g., learning anatomy, internal medicine, pathology, etc.), that is, there is a lack of, or it is very rare, critical questioning and discussion, but also role-taking (cf. Lind 1997; 2000).

1967). Certainly, again I do not mean education in terms of a mere gathering of data and imitation, neither of the potentiation of an extreme, i.e., uncritical relativism (so frequent in some contemporary of anthropology, as well as cultural studies), which leads to a mere and often very aggressive ideologization. Rather I mean the education which will sensitize, but also stimulate critical thinking about differences. That is, I mean the education which will stimulate one's perception, raising the awareness of, understanding and respect for certain phenomena strange or unknown to him or her, and also development of critical thinking about them.

Accordingly, under respect and understanding I do not mean absolute acceptance and relativization of all that exists, that is, I do not mean that a person needs to get along with all the differences and blindly accept them or, even worse, to imagine that all people are the same,[20] as extreme relativists often potentiate, but I mean just raising the awareness that different cultures and societies have different (intersubjective) truths (on the basis of which they operate successfully for thousands of years), and therefore they deserve a certain respect. Such an anthropological education is especially worthy in the present age of globalization, that is of westernization, when many people, thanks to the development of microelectronic material basis, very easily, if only indirectly, and very often superficially encounter to them unknown and often repulsive and unacceptable traditions, opinions, behaviours, etc., sometimes stimulating in them an unease, fear, and even a feeling of hatred. That

actually means, for example, an awareness that specific genital mutilations have been an element of tradition of particular societies, that is, they represent something about which there exists an agreement in certain societies, something to which has been attached a positive meaning for centuries, and with which those societies function successfully for a long time, but that awareness must come at the same time, without suppressing one's own critical thinking, that is the objective truth that genital mutilations inflict cruel, painful, and life-threatening damages.

Of course, only expert information (imitation) about differences may represent a good start of an anthropological education. That is, that may be helpful for the weakening of cultural limitations, ethnocentrism and for the increase in sensitivity, accessibility and adaptability to the other, while only an active education, that is critical thinking, dialogue, perspective (role) taking, and similar surely open a greater possibility for deeper understanding, breaking some specific stereotypes, taboos, hatred and the like toward particular nations, races, religions, etc., as well as for a development of own critical and argumentative thinking.

Toward Global and Permanent Peace

As can be seen from the above, in my reflections about the global and permanent peace I do not start from a presupposition that humans are by their nature good (e.g., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Abraham Maslow) or bad (e.g., Thomas Hobbes, Kant). Rather, I start from the assumption that in each person exist the potentials to become better, that is, the potentials for development

---

[20] After all, the beauty and attractiveness are in differences, and not in uniformity!

of postconventional moral reasoning exist in each person. Therefore, it is a certain development process, but, here is the opportunity to indicate, not only in the context of ontogenesis, but of phylogenesis as well.

Namely, in the course of human phylogenesis there is also cognitive development, that is, the development of logical reasoning and possibility for identification with more and more entities (development from egocentricity to worldcentricity). Thus, there is also the development of ever greater morality and consequently a possibility to establish a more long-term and wider peace. In support of that are also Steven Pinker's (2011) data, which show that through the history in general there is a decrease in violence and violent mortality, and an increase in rights (civil rights, rights of women, homosexuals, animals).[21]

Therefore, against specific retro-romantic illusions that is merely metaphysics about the former golden age of an uncorrupted and sinless man (e.g. Augustine of Hippo, Rousseau), one should be aware (following the thoughts of Piaget, Kohlberg, Hallpike and similar) that, in the very dawn of humanity, people, besides everything else, did not have cognitive preconditions for all-embracing, unselfish and universal love, that is postconventional morality, either. Thus, in Hegelian (1977) terms, it was the time of sensory consciousness (*sinnliche Bewußtsein*) without spirit. In fact, to that primary period of human development, in a particular aspect, would rather correspond the Kantian (2006b) statement that the natural state (*status naturalis*) among human beings is not peace but war, because only the appearance of laws (in the first cities and states) had succeeded to secure some coexistence and peace among those who were not in blood relations. In that context it is also worth mentioning Pinker's (2011) summing of different sources from which it is noticeable that throughout the history the higher percentage of violent mortality was present in societies without state control,[22] and the same applies to the comparisons within the concrete societies (e.g., !Kung) before and after the introduction of such control. After all, besides what was stated in footnote 2, i.e., that the ethnographic research shows that acephalous indigenous societies (at the preconventional morality level) sometimes wage war without any aim, and do so to the extreme exhaustion, it should also be said that wars are very common in those societies (65 to 70 percent of hunter-gatherer societies are at war at least every two years, while 90 percent of them are at war at least once a generation (Pinker 2011: 52)), while in some of them (e.g., among Tauade people on New Guinea) there is no word for peace (Hallpike 2011).[23]

---

[21] Set aside that Pinker does not explain the mentioned decline in violence by the development of moral reasoning, but basically by the development of the state, commerce (primarily as a gentle commerce – *doux commerce*), empathy, etc., and also by development of reason.

[22] "States are far less violent than traditional bands and tribes. Modern Western countries, even in their most war-torn centuries, suffered no more than around a quarter of the average death rate of nonstate societies, and less than a tenth of that for the most violent one" (Pinker 2011: 52). Of course, here Pinker deals with relative, and not with absolute numbers.

[23] Of course, it is not my intention to say with this that nowadays indigenous societies are a perfect representation, that is, a sort of conserves of primordial humans, rather the point is that these are the so called cold societies, that is societies in which "ideal would be to remain as, according to their myths, the gods created them at the dawn of time" (Lévi-Strauss 1992: 276).

However, if the mentioned emergence of specific laws and ethical rules within some societies, that is, the development of conventional moral reasoning, reduced the level of violence, i.e., if it solved many problems and ensured more peace, history and contemporaneity show us that this is not sufficient for the establishment of permanent and global peace. Namely, on the one hand, these were mainly the laws and ethical rules (I think of those arising from the conventional level of moral reasoning) which were strictly related only to a certain ("chosen") nation, religion, group and so on, that is the laws and ethical rules about something which is in conflict with others or different, or which simply diminishes or marginalizes them, and therefore those laws and ethical rules are not the guarantee of quality relations and long-term peace. On the other hand, basing moral judgments on mere conformism and conventions (here I also think of interstate laws) is a kind of coercion rather than a true activity, so it is not surprising that discontent often accumulates in that way (sometimes leading to neurosis), while some use the first opportunity to cheat and break such conventions. Nay, because laws are mainly based on punishment, it should be also indicated that "on the whole, punishment makes men harder and colder, it concentrates, it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power to resist" (Nietzsche 2008: 54). That is, "we must certainly seek the actual *effect* of punishment primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in a lengthening of the memory, in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go about things more circumspectly from now on" (*ibid.*: 56). In any case, "punishment *tames* man in this way but does not make him 'better'" (*ibid.*).

Hence, instead of a "domestication" and creation of calculative persons,[24] I find the main point in encouraging development of postconventional morality, as a precondition of spontaneous being in accordance to the universal ethical principles. That is, contrary to mere conventions, I think that by the outlined higher education, which is based on philosophical reflection, postconventional moral reasoning should be developed in a wider context, which is (as described) a precondition of a true (transcultural) understanding of the golden rule and of an acting according to it, and consequently is an origin for the realization of global and permanent peace.

After all, one should be aware that many important postconventional ethical writings and principles (various derivatives of the golden rule, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by UN, Project World Ethos (*Projekt Weltethos*), etc.) as well as constitutions, remain (as history also shows) only a dead letter on paper for all those who do not have mental preconditions or capacities for their true understanding,[25] and such are still in the majority and often on the positions of responsibility. Therefore, I think that the fundamental problems for the realization of global peace are not, in principle, authentic religions, philosophies, ethics, etc. (because many of them also contain postconventional ideas), as it has often been emphasized.

---

[24] And which in its extreme leads to the situation that, instead of the so called silver rule "*Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself*", the fundamental principle becomes "*What you wouldn't like done to yourself, do to others*" (Schopenhauer 1902: 42).

[25] That is, figuratively and simplistically speaking, a book is worthless for all those who do not know to read, a bike is worthless for all those who do not know to ride it, a musical instrument is worthless for all those who do not know to play it, etc.

Rather the problems are the people who do not understand them or abuse them. That is, for a concrete example, unlike Hans Küng (1991), I think that the crisis of contemporaneity is not the crisis of ethics, but the crisis comes from its wider non-acceptance, that is, lack of understanding. Nay, all that highlighting the importance of ethically responsible science, ethically responsible economy, ethically responsible politics, etc. (*ibid.*), in fact remains at the level of mere slogans, that is, worthless, without people with developed adequate moral capacities. In that context, continuing on the presented role and importance of (philosophically based) higher education for the development of postconventional moral reasoning, I would say that the crisis of contemporaneity is in fact largely the crisis of education.

Of course, highlighting the importance of the mentioned education, I do not think that it should be practiced throughout the whole world in a "missionary" way, that is even in the indigenous societies in which preconventional and conventional levels of morality prevail, rather it should be practiced only where higher education already exists, that is, where people already, very often in vain, spend a lot of time and money on education. Namely, the mentioned autochthonous societies do not represent a threat to global peace, whereas the so-called civilized societies do, because it is in the latter that a strong discrepancy between moral and technological development exists. Therefore, many of the highly valuable technological achievements (nuclear reactors, computers, robots, etc.) are abused, that is, used to realize destructive goals, which represents, or may represent, not only a local and a regional, but also a global problem. In other words, a lot of the valuable material achievements, that is, the products of the high levels of technological development in the hands of preconventional and conventional morality not only lose their original purpose, but represent an ever-present global danger of the highest sort.

Conclusions

As it has been demonstrated, one of the possible approaches to establishing a global and permanent peace can be a wider development of postconventional morality, i.e., a development of capacities (which not only exist as potentials in every person, but which also become more and more widespread through phylogenesis) for genuine understanding and action in accordance with highly important postconventional ethical rules and principles. As a starting point and possibility for the achievement of such morality, and thus of the true global human mutuality, the higher education has been indicated, not only because the preconditions of postconventionality develop, in principle, in late adolescence and early adulthood, but also because of its role in moral development. But, as it was elaborated, this cannot be achieved by the form of education dominating today, as a mere instilment of currently dominant conventions, that is, as moulding and manipulation (since that form of education do not stimulate postconventional moral development), but by education as the stimulation of critical thinking, raising awareness, self-awareness, individualizing, ability to take perspectives (roles), sensitize to the other, etc. In other words, this is not meant in the sense of education as a technique (τέχνη) of producing (according to the current model) perfect

imitators (because such approach potentiates conventional morality), but in the sense of education as steerage (*kybernētikē*), by which we encourage and direct self-birth, that is self-development. Precisely because such an approach is not only immanent to the authentic philosophy, i.e., philosophical education, but because it has also been proven that it stimulates development of postconventionality, it has been indicated that such authentic philosophy itself should be the basic bearer of the mentioned educational process, while anthropology (above all with its worldcentricity) can provide the added value to the process in a unique way.

Of course, as I already indicated in this article, the ability for postconventional moral reasoning, that is the true understanding of postconventional ethical writings, principles, constitutions, and similar is not a guarantee that a person will behave postconventionally in all situations, but it is certainly a necessary precondition for such behavior. Moreover, without the ability for postconventional reasoning, all highly important universal (worldcentric) ethical sources remain for him or her only a dead letter on paper. As it has also been indicated in the preceding section, that encouraging of development of postconventionality by the described authentic philosophical (especially in the context of the ethics course) and anthropological education I do not direct at all people of the world, but basically at those who have already been subjected to higher education, that is at the people in societies in which there is a strong discrepancy between moral and technological development, and which are a fundamental threat to global and permanent peace.

From all of the mentioned one may ultimately see the origin of my thought that global and permanent peace does not represent a mere illusion, but that it exists as the real potential, which, I think, presents a sort of a human aim and task, that is, which, finally, constitutes the only precondition of his or her further survival.

REFERENCES

Asad, T. (ed.), 1973. *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*. London: Ithaca Press.

Borš, V., 2013. Uvodna riječ urednika. *Holon* e-journal 3(2): 100–105. Retrieved from http://hdi.hr/wp-content/uploads/sites/171/2013/12/Holon-322013_Uvodna_rijec_urednika.pdf (31/07/2017).

Borš, V., 2014. Integralni aperspektivizam ili konstruktivni postmodernizam. *Filozofska istraživanja* 34 (4): 521–527.

Gough, K., 1968. New Proposals for Anthropologists. *Current Anthropology* 9 (5): 403–435.

Gross, M. L., 1999. Ethics Education and Physician Morality. *Social Science & Medicine* 49 (3): 329–342.

Hallpike, C. R., 2004. *The Evolution of Moral Understanding*. Alton: Prometheus Research Group.

Hallpike, C. R., 2011. *On Primitive Society and Other Forbidden Topics*. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.

Hegel, G. W. F., 1977. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I., 2006a. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? In I. Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. by P. Kleingeld, trans. by D.L. Colclasure, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 17–23.

Kant, I., 2006b. Toward perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch. In I. Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. by P. Kleingeld, trans. by D. L. Colclasure. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 67–109.

Kant, I., 2008. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Translated by T.K. Abbott. New York, NY: Cosimo Classics.

King, P.M., and Mayhew, M.J., 2002. Moral Judgement Development in Higher Education: Insights from the Defining Issues Test. *Journal of Moral Education* 31 (3): 247–270.

Kohlberg, L., 1984. *Essays on Moral Development, Vol. II: The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages*. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row.

Kopić, M., 2013. *Otkucaji drugoga*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

Küng, H., 1991. *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic*. Translated by J. Bowden. London: SCM Press.

Lévi-Strauss, C., 1992. *The View from Afar*. Translated by J. Neugroschel and P. Hoss. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lewis, D., 1973. Anthropology and Colonialism. *Current Anthropology* 14 (5): 581–602.

Liessmann, K. P., 2006. *Theorie der Unbildung: Die Irrtümer der Wissensgesellschaft*. Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag.

Lind, G., 1997. *Are Helpers Always Moral? Empirical Findings from a Longitudinal Study of Medical Students in Germany*. Retrieved from https://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/pdf/Lind-2000_Are-helpers-always-moral.pdf (12/07/2017).

Lind, G., 2000. Moral Regression in Medical Students and Their Learning Environment. *Revista Brasileira de Educacao Médica* 24 (3): 24–33.

Mandelbaum, D. G., Lasker, G. W.; and Albert, E. M. (eds.), 1967. *The Teaching of Anthropology*. Abr. ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Markoulis, D., 1989. Postformal and Postconventional Reasoning in Educationally Advanced Adults. *The Journal of Genetic Psychology: Research and Theory on Human Development* 150 (4): 427–439.

Neimark, E. D., 1979. Current Status of Formal Operation Research. *Human Development* 22 (1): 60–67.

Nietzsche, F., 2006. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*. Ed. by A. Del Caro, and R. B. Pippin, trans. by A. Del Caro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F., 2008. *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. by C. Diethe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Piaget, J., 1980. Concerning Creativity: The Three Methods. In J-C. Bringuier (ed.), *Conversations with Jean Piaget*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 26–31.

Piaget, J., 1995. *The Essential Piaget: An Interpretive Reference and Guide*. Ed. by H. E. Gruber and J. J. Vonèche. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Pinker, S., 2011. *The Better Angles of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Schopenhauer, A., 1902. *On Human Nature*. Select. and trans. by T. B. Saunders. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

Schopenhauer, A., 1969. *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I. Trans. by E. F. J. Payne. New York, NY: Dover Publications.

Scribner, S., and Cole, M., 1999. *The Psychology of Literacy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Self, D. J., and Baldwin, D. C., 1994. Moral Reasoning in Medicine. In J. R. Rest, and D. Narváez (eds.), *Moral Development in the Professions: Psychology and Applied Ethics*, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 147–162.

Self, D. J., Olivarez, M., and Baldwin, D. C., 1988. The Amount of Small-Group Case-Study Discussion Needed to Improve Moral Reasoning Skills of Medical Students. *Academic Medicine* 73 (5): 521–523.

Shunk, W. R., and Goldstein, B. Z., 1964. Anthropology and Education. *Review of Educational Research* 34 (1): 71–84.

Slováčková, B., and Slováček, L., 2007. Moral Judgement Competence and Moral Attitudes of Medical Students. *Nursing Ethics* 14 (3): 320–328.

Snarey, J. R., 1985. Cross-Cultural Universality of Social-Moral Development: A Critical Review of Kohlbergian Research. *Psychological Bulletin* 97 (2): 202–232.

Sonnert, G., and Commons, M. L., 1994. Society and the Highest Stages of Moral Development. *Politics and the Individual* 4 (1): 31–55.

Zizek, B., Garz, D., and Nowak, E. (eds.), 2015. *Kohlberg Revisited*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

GLOBALI IR NUOLATINĖ TAIKA: ILIUZIJA AR REALYBĖ?

Vanja Borš

Santrauka. Šio straipsnio tikslas yra suprobleminti globalios ir nuolatinės taikos galimybę. Kaip atspirties tašką, t. y. kaip tokios žmogiškosios egzistencijos formos sąlygą, autorius siūlo postkonvencinę moralę, kurią savo dorovinėje raidoje pasiekia tik nedaugelis žmonių. Tokiame kontekste šiame straipsnyje svarstomos platesnės šios moralės formos sklaidos per auštojo mokslo sistemą sąlygos ir galimybės. Tačiau pradinė nuostata yra ta, kad to neįmanoma pasiekti šiandieną vyraujančia ugdymo forma, o veikiau ugdymu, kuris pabrėžia specifinę ir unikalią filosofijos ir antropologijos vertę. Šiaip ar taip, būtent postkonvencinė moralė yra tikrojo (transkultūrinio) auksinės taisyklės supratimo ir elgesio pagal ją, t. y. buvimo sulig universaliaisiais etikos principais, sąlyga.

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: globali ir nuolatinė taika, aukštasis mokslas, dorovinė raida, postkonvencionalumas