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Moralės ir teisės filosofija

ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP: HABITUS OF CARE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE*

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Abstract. *While scholars and popular writers often stress individual responsibility as a way of saving nature, there is a growing understanding that "doing one's bit" may not be enough to address local and global environmental issues. Focusing on the concept of ecological citizenship as a starting point, our paper seeks to explore the concept of ecological citizenship and show how individualized experiences and socially and culturally embedded practices of care for the environment relate to civic engagement. We connect ecological citizenship with the ethics of care and Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, which links individual experience of embodied care for environment with broader political and social issues. We argue that the perspective of the ethics of care informed by the concept of habitus broadens the concept of ecological citizenship by, on the one hand, highlighting the rational responsibility to care, and, on the other hand, by revealing how affect-based ties to the environment and established habits of caring are cultivated in local communities. Ecological citizenship based on the habitus of care can be seen as exercised in participation in the public sphere and also through caring practices where public and private fields overlap.*

Keywords: *ethics of care, ecological citizenship, practice, habitus, environment*

As a concept, ecological citizenship has been used by philosophers and sociologists to examine the ways in which society comes to terms with environmental issues it faces.[1] While scholars and popular writers often stress individual responsibility as a way of coping with different ecological threats, there is a growing understanding that "doing one's bit" may not be enough to address local and global environmental issues. As a number of scholars have argued, the emphasis on such activities as green shopping might, in fact, be quite

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[1] Some scholars distinguish between environmental and ecological citizenship, where the former is understood in terms of rights and entitlements based on the relationship between the state and its citizen, while the latter refers to social relationships emerging through the recognition of the ecological impact inflicted by modern society (Dobson 2003). In this paper, we chose not to distinguish between these two concepts in order to develop a more holistic approach to citizenship. For simplicity purposes, we will use the term of ecological citizenship.

problematic because it diminishes "the potential for citizenship to be positive force in counter-hegemonic green politics" when we need more "public spaces that enable citizen to act qua citizen, where they enact being a citizen as something distinct from being a parent, worker, and consumer" (MacGregor 2016: 620). A need to articulate the concept of environmental citizenship, which is closely tied to the ideas of public space and rational debates, brings us to the Habermasian discourse ethics, which could be seen as a viable tool to approach the formation of the ecologically sustainable society, although Jurgen Habermas himself has argued that environmental "challenges are largely abstract and require technical and economic solutions that must, in turn, be planed globally and implemented by administrative means" (Habermas 1981: 35). Drawing on critical theory, Robert J. Brulle stresses the role of a democratic public dialogue in the renewal of social institutions for dealing with the process of ecological degradation (Brulle 2000). Robyn Eckersley goes further by arguing that non-human communities have to be included into decision making processes, especially in the cases where those decisions put them at risk (Eckersley 2004). For this reason she reformulates tenets of the Habermasian discourse ethics and states that just those norms deserve to be valid that could meet the approval of those potentially affected by it, *as if* all those affected participate in rational discourses. According to her, "*as if* they were" is a mechanism that enables human agents to consider the well-being of nonhuman interests in ways that go beyond their service to humans (Eckersley 2004: 112). This approach to ecological citizenship is unsatisfactory because rational universalism is just one and not the most important factor in the practices of environmental care[2].

Recently Martha Nussbaum has demonstrated how emotions can be included into political theory of liberalism and what role they play or have to play in the public reasoning and civic engagement (Nussbaum 2013). Articulating her normative account she relies on public emotions which are mainly generated by leaders and governmental institutions and are expressed in public speeches, rituals, literature, music, architecture, etc. We go even further and argue that not just emotions, which Nussbaum understands as "forms of evaluative judgments that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person's own control great importance for the person's own flourishing" (Nussbaum 2001: 22), but such factors as affects, individualized corporeal experiences, routinized care practices play a crucial role for ecological civic engagement[3]. Defending the relevance of those factors to ecological citizenship we draw on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus which helps to link individual experience of embodied care for environment with broader political and social issues.

The concepts of ecological citizenship and the ethics of care have been evolving almost in parallel, but they converged only on two notable occasions. The first such

[2] Steve Vogel's Habermasian work that involves attention to practices "*Thinking like a Mall: Environmental Philosophy after the End of Nature*" could be elaborated here, but due to the lack of space we leave this line of reasoning for our future papers.

[3] Nussbaum's attempt to incorporate emotions into liberal political discourse, and the differences between her and our approaches will be further elaborated in our further study dedicated to environmental caring practices.

convergence took place in environmental philosophy through the work of Andrew Dobson, one of the key contributors to the development of ecological citizenship. Dobson developed the concept of post-cosmopolitan ecological citizenship as an alternative, or at least a necessary addition, to liberal and republican approaches (Dobson 2003). The second set of arguments have been developed by feminist philosopher Sherilyn MacGregor, who brought into conversation feminism and environmentalism as to avoid the perils of ecofeminism based on maternalistic interpretations of care (MacGregor 2006). Developing this line of inquiry in her subsequent articles, MacGregor argues for a repolitization of ecological citizenship. In this paper, we will examine these two cases in more detail to show that the ethics of care is either misunderstood by narrowing the scope of care to virtue, or that its potential to offer new insights to the old problems of environmental philosophy has been undervalued. The second part of the paper will develop the concept of habitus of care, which has already been elaborated in the context of medical ethics (Bartkienė et al. 2014) and is now applied to the issues of environmental philosophy. We argue that the perspective of the ethics of care broadens the concept of ecological citizenship by, on the one hand, highlighting the rational responsibility to care, and, on the other hand, revealing how affect-based ties to the environment and established habits of caring are cultivated in local communities.

Discourse of Ecological Citizenship and Care

In citizenship studies, liberal and republican models of citizenship are often considered as opposing each other: the former is based on rights, while the latter emphasizes responsibilities and obligations. In the liberal approach, different political, civic and social rights are considered as entitlements that citizens claim against the state. The republican approach stresses citizen's responsibilities to participate in promotion of the common good. These two models are often used when considering environmental issues. Environmental philosophers with a liberal bent often point to environmental rights as part of the traditional corpus of rights to argue that an adequate environmental life quality should be guaranteed by law (Hayward 2005; Bell 2005). The republican approach suggests that it is the duty of citizens to address environmental destruction and demand changes that would lead to more sustainable societies (Barry 2008).

Contrary to those two approaches, Andrew Dobson argues that ecological citizenship has to be understood as an encompassing non-contractual and non-reciprocal obligation grounded in relationships of injustice emerging from environmental impacts of one's actions. The ecological footprint that one makes in his daily life defines one's civic obligations to other human beings who may be distant in time and space.

Following the feminist idea that personal is political, Dobson argues that ecological citizen obligations are not limited to the public space, but extend to private lives. It is therefore not enough for ecological citizen to engage in traditional forms of civic activities such as protesting, voting, or debating, but they also have to lead sustainable lifestyles and ensure that their ecological footprint does not prevent others in the present and future generations

to live quality lives (2003: 119). Dobson maintains that the first virtue of ecological citizen is justice, which aims at ensuring a just distribution of ecological space (2003: 132). In this sense, Dobson "privatizes" environmental obligations to argue that a good citizen is not the one who participates in public actions for environmental causes, but the one who also lives sustainably. In short, by challenging the public-private divide, Dobson offers a view of citizenship that moves beyond classical liberal and republican definitions.

Furthermore, Dobson argues that care and compassion can be seen as auxiliary virtues which help ecological citizens to exercise the virtue of justice. Here he advocates a position associated with the ethics of care and argues that the republican list of virtues is limited, because those virtues refer to the dispositions needed in the public sphere and are based on relationships between citizens and some kind of political authority. According to Dobson, the idea of post-cosmopolitan ecological citizenship defines obligations as emerging through daily – private and public – environmental impact, and relying on relations *among* citizens. For this reason, Dobson embraces "feminine" virtues such as care, compassion, responsibility for the vulnerable, attentiveness, and responsiveness as part of the list of citizen virtues.

While Dobson does not elaborate much on what would care, compassion, responsiveness, attentiveness look like in the context of environmental responsibilities, his concept of ecological citizenship is susceptible to what is called "gender blindness." Dobson emphasizes personal responsibility and obligation to exercise environmental justice, and in so doing, delegates agency to private life. Based on the assumption of equality among citizens and a fair division of labor, Dobson's approach obscures the fact that women perform a disproportionate amount of unpaid care work. In this sense, the privatization of citizenly responsibilities adds the burden of environmental responsibilities to recycle, save energy, or grow ecological food on women.

In contrast to Dobson, MacGregor offers a different view on care and citizenship by arguing that "ecopolitical thinkers must begin to see care not only as an ethic or virtue that can inform citizenship but also as a set of time-consuming practices that make citizenship possible" (2006: 220). While MacGregor does not dismiss the ethics of care, she argues that the concept of citizenship that combines the liberal approach to duties, republican emphasis on responsibilities, and a critical feminist view on structural inequalities is more suitable for understanding and theorizing women's engagement in ecopolitics, than the ethics of care that relies on traditional feminine activities and attitudes as normative guidelines.

MacGregor equates the ethical content of care with maternalism and insists that ecomaternalism uncritically accepts women's practices of care and, instead of emancipating, leads to the oppression of women. Similarly, by fostering identity of women as mothers and carers, ecomaternalism supports the harmful idea that "civic virtue" might be enough to bring about necessary ecopolitical change (2006: 79). In efforts to develop feminist ecological citizenship, MacGregor rejects the maternalistic approach to environmental issues as oppressive and harmful to women, but with that she also dismisses the entire ethical content of care. The following section

seeks to reconcile MacGregor's political understanding of citizenship with the ethical issues surrounding environmental care by focusing on practice and embodied experiences of care.

Beyond Dispositions: Embodied Care

In her explanation of why she turns to citizenship, MacGregor claims that there is a need for a different approach to environmental policies that "can best be realized through acting in public, in local political spaces, as citizens" (2014: 630). Eckersley, building on the Habermasian perspective, argues that "public spirited deliberation is the process by which we learn of our dependence on others and the process by which we learn to recognize and respect differently situated others " (2004: 115). Furthermore, according MacGregor, "it is the activity through which citizens consciously create a common life and a common future together, including the ecosystem health and integrity that literally sustain us all" (2014: 630). In their analysis, however, they do not investigate relationality and its role in ethics which occurs not only when exercising conscious deliberation, but is also based on affective ties with other fellow beings. Habermas thinks that human responsibility for plants and animals cannot be derived from duties of interaction, as members of ecosystems cannot participate in moral deliberation, therefore, deliberations carried in public space by rational, equal and free agents do not exhaust the ethical vocabulary of ecological citizenship. Both reason and affect, according to Habermas's rational universalism, are molded in agreement with ubiquitous rules of however manifold communicative performance thus forcing more or less reliable discrimination between the emotional and the rational, irreducibly affective care and epistemic knowledge, egalitarian emancipation and oppressive restraint. And all of those are "softly", "tacitly" or implicitly backed by "Habermasian rationalism which presumes a transparency of intention in the speech act that is itself symptomatic of a refusal of the psyche, the unconscious, that which resists and yet structures language prior to and beyond any 'intention'" (Butler 1993: 192). It is important to open the conceptual space for those factors to be included. On these grounds we make a case that Habermasian approaches do not quite enable us to appreciate the affective side of caring practices while connecting it to the ethical theory. Habermasian rational universalism, in a word of Gamwell, shares "with Kant a universal understanding of rationality, what Habermas typically calls universal or formal pragmatics", so that "the subject-matter of moral theory is the regulation of social interaction, and moral theory is properly universal precisely because the standard for critical validation of social norms has this same character" (Gamwell 1997: 23-24).

Since practices of caring for the environment are grounded in one's worldview and material environment, we would like to come back to the ethical question and explore what it means to take care or be caring for, and how this relates to the environment on a moral and material rather than political level. In other words, although MacGregor (2006) has taken political aspects of care into account, she has not explored the performative and practice dimensions of caring in depth. It might be argued that political dimension is inescapable, especially

when talking about environment, when "dissensus" or "disagreement" takes place: "democracy is the community of sharing, in both senses of the term: a membership in a single world, which can only be expressed in adversarial terms, and a coming together which can only occur in conflict" (Ranciere 1995: 49). It must be said that political aspects of caring are important on their own terms, but, in our opinion, there is a deeper level of caring, which takes place in casual and routinely performed actions and which needs to be explored in more detail. Rancier himself notices the importance of the displacement of existing division of the sensible and the need for new articulations of possible directions (Kompridis 2014: 203)[4]. In this respect, Pierre Bourdieu's (1990) notion of habitus helps to clarify this issue by offering a theory that considers tastes, emotions, pre-reflexive knowledge, routines and embodied practices as *inseparable from one's disposition*. An important insight from cultural theorists, including Bourdieu (1990), was that the knowledge of how to act that we acquire through education and family interaction, is deeply shaped by one's social class position and local values. Bourdieu claims that practices are often reproduced unreflectively: they are inscribed in our bodies through dispositions and, therefore, we rarely question particular ways of acting (Bourdieu 1990: 54). To paraphrase Bourdieu, we learn not only what ways of caring for others are accepted in local society in the form of habitus, but also what kind of needs should be considered as important, which might leave us with blind spots or lead to "pathologies of care". In so doing, the caring habitus perspective offers a productive extension to the current debates in ecological citizenship by deepening the understanding of care about others and the environment and how it is related to the social context, acquired dispositions, and incarnated ways of acting. The question of justice is, of course, central in understanding citizenship, but physical bodies and human embeddedness invarious social and natural contexts should also be taken into account. The concept of caring as a habitus that we develop focuses on practice and affect surrounding the care for others, while recognizing the importance of reflexivity towards practices that are embedded in various fields of power and also highlights the ways through which these practices are inscribed in our bodies. Looking from this perspective, habitus of care, given the empirical research orientation, is posited as instrumental concept, as we intend to apply it while studying embodied local care practices[5].

There is an emerging body of literature focusing on promoting embodied forms of caring for the environment in projects like urban gardening (Turner 2011; Certoma 2011; Adams et al. 2014; Mincyte et al. 2016). These approaches invite us to re-

[4] It is worth noticing that Jacques Rancière's works, such as *The Politics of Aesthetics. The Distribution of the Sensible* (2004) and *Ten Theses on Politics* (2001) deeply resonate with Pierre Bourdieu's work on habitus and how it relates to the power relations. Yet, given the limited space, we felt that developing this argument would divert us from the main focus of the paper.

[5] This paper is part of a larger project that includes both philosophical studies and empirical research, particularly ethnographic field research on community gardening practices in Vilnius. It is in the context of this empirical study that we conceived of the concept of caring as habitus to describe the farmers' practices and engagement with the land and plants. The paper is our first attempt to link this concept to the broader discussions about environmental citizenship.

think what Dobson and MacGregor define as ecological citizenship by emphasizing experiential – as both ethical and embodied – dimensions of one's engagement with nature. Dobson's and MacGregor's definition of ecological citizenship is rooted in a rational discursive paradigm, which undervalues bodily and relational practices and the affect that surrounds caring for the environment and plays an important part in civic engagement.

Environmental Ethics and Relational Care

The argument that the moral sphere should encompass all members of the ecosystem have been advanced by the adherents of the deep ecology and "land ethic" approaches, including Arne Naess (2008, 1993, 1986), Aldo Leopold (1949) and Baird Callicott (2013, 1989, 1985), and more recently by Warwick Fox (2006). They claim that a relational perspective helps to understand moral commitments more adequately and broadens the scope of morality to include non-human nature. Although these theories have important differences, they also share the idea that humans are part of a wide web of relations and that people should be accountable not just to humanity but also to all living creatures. These theories have sought to rethink how we value all living beings and what *rights* they have, and argued that some new *principles* should be offered – the ones that could help to take a better care of the environment.

Yet, a relational approach based on the premise that all living creatures are valuable has its own limitations. First, the principle of equality is undetermined: are oysters as valuable as humans, and if so, should they be given the same rights? (Naess 1986; Brennan 1999). Furthermore, Callicott has been accused of ecofascism: in his theory, humans could be considered as parasites and might be subject to elimination. At the same time, the deep ecology approach echoes an imperialist agenda: the application of ecological principles overlooks global inequalities (Guha 1999). Finally, ecofeminists argue that these theories did not take into account the shared structures of exploitation of women and nature (Plumwood 1993; Warren 2009, 1999).

In light of these critiques, the perspective offered by the care ethics (Noddings 2010, 2002; Tronto 2013) presents an alternative framework, where the *emphasis on rights and principles is replaced with the focus on needs and practices*. The ethics of care criticizes the premise of utilitarian and deontological theories of ethics that assume moral agents to be fully rational and autonomous. Rather, as Noddings and Tronto suggest, emotions play a central role in moral action. Relatedly, Fox contends that the foundation of our values is the relation existing between living organisms and the environment that surrounds them. Being ecological, according to Jeremy Bendik-Keymer "is being in healthy relationship with the natural world" (Bendik-Keymer 2006: 17). Relation with environment, according to Fox, can be harmonious only when it is based on one's responses to the needs of members of the ecosystem, or what Fox defines as responsive cohesion (Fox 2006: 59). For Noddings too, the desire to respond is a central tenet in the ethics of care. Relying on empirical studies conducted by psychologists and anthropologists, Noddings claims that the universal need of living organisms to be cared for triggers responsive behaviour. It is

this kind of desire – or the need to respond to – that forms the foundation of human morality (2002: 189).

This, of course, begs further question: what kind of a response is a person able to offer? Noddings seems to suggest that the response to the needs of others is dependent on one's ability and skill to listen and react. The practice of caring for others and the environment, according to her, is an acquirable skill that relies not only on personal attitudes but also on the current social policy. Here political level could come into further examination as according to Rancier "politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak" (Rancier 2005: 13), but we will refrain from going forward to this direction and will focus on analyzing what care is and what forms it can possess.

Before we go any further, we should present a brief explanation of what care is. According to Noddings, care "is attention focused on receiving what is there in the other so that a caring response can be generated" (2002: 178). While in the first of her books, Noddings has focused on the direct form of care that she called *caring-for*, that was related to particular humans or objects in the immediate environment, in her later books, she captured a wider range of care in the concept of *caring-about*. While a direct form of care (caring-for) is mainly driven by emotion or affect, according to Noddings, a wider range of care is called "caring-about" and rests on justice (2002: 22-24). In this sense, caring for environment comes as a basic feature we learn while growing up and depends on our family values, which, in turn, partly depend on the values existing in particular societies which, in turn, are shaped by policy makers.

But this is not a one way street – environmental groups can use discursive power to shape environmental legislation. This could be an example of what care theorists call caring-about. If caring-for is related to particular objects in our environment, then caring-about refers to a wider domain: we can care about starving children in Africa, global warming, or the consequences of fracking. The main task of the moral practice in the care theory then is "to act so as to establish, maintain or enhance caring relations" (Noddings 2002: 30). These caring relations are supposed to be balanced and harmonious when the caring one is attentive and meets the needs of the cared-for. In our paper we understand care as a practice of the embodied responsive relation to the world which focuses on the needs of human and nonhuman entities around us.

Caring as a *Habitus*

Looking from a relational point of view, environmental theories of citizenship (Brulle 2000; Dobson 2003; Eckersley 2004), undervalue the impact of such factors as emotions, habits, practices, relationality and corporeality. Bourdieu's concept of habitus is helpful to address this issue because it links embodied experiences with broader political and social issues. According to Bourdieu, habitus is "a system of lasting, transportable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes

permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems" (Bourdieu 1977: 82-83). Although it is often argued that the notion of habitus cannot be understood without two adjacent concepts in Bourdieu's theory – the field and non-financial forms of capital – we suggest that social influences covered by these other concepts are so closely intertwined with one's moral development, that highlighting the importance of the bodily-rooted knowledge of how to act morally, captured in the concept of habitus, justifies its use. Although habitus carries with itself connotations to regimes of political power and could be further developed in line with the argument offered by Rancière, which reveals the implications of "division of the sensible" for those who cannot take part in political acts of caring for environment, as they have no voice, we refrain from going further into the political context and use this concept instrumentally for highlighting the importance of daily caring practices. Here our analysis dwells more on the private level of ecological citizenship advanced by Dobson. In this respect, we suggest that we should always have in mind that a local understanding of what is appropriate relates deeply to practices like parenting, gardening or waste sorting, that are performed quite routinely, and that these routines contain affect in themselves: "the social order inscribes itself in bodies through this permanent confrontation, which may be more or less dramatic but is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the environment" (Bourdieu 2000: 141).

The idea that the social order can be inscribed in our bodies and is routinely reproduced without rational deliberation can help to clarify Noddings' argument that relational understanding of morality is a key for incorporating the emotional and affective dimensions in ethics. Yet, a closer look at the overlap between Bourdieu's theory of habitus and the ethics of care that puts a strong emphasis on social relations, pre-reflexive knowledge, and an embodied reaction to the moral practice suggest that there is an organic connection between the two. Bourdieu offers the concept of habitus as a means to overcome a dichotomy between individualistic and holistic approaches and to find a way between voluntarist and deterministic interpretations of human behaviour, while emphasizing the importance of bodily practices. For Bourdieu, routines, practices, and bodily dispositions are more important than reflexivity for understanding of human behaviour: "using the language of habitus serves as a reminder that practical, not theoretical knowledge guides human action. It reminds us to take care to avoid the 'scholastic fallacy' of mistakenly thinking that human action follows directly our rational theoretical models of human action" (Gorski 2013: 24).

We hope that by now we have been able to show that both concepts – caring and habitus – highlight the importance of relations in moral and social development. Caring for the environment – or what Noddings calls as cultivating biophilia – is to be learned at home: "it is at home that we learn (of fail to learn) to care for people, animals, plants, objects and ideas" (2002: 165). Noddings stresses the importance of everyday relationships, early experiences, and the affect that they generate for understanding what an adequate response to the need of others would look like. While Dobson tries to explain how environmental justice operates in educating citizens to understand respon-

sibility to other fellow beings for equal accessibility to the clean environment, the ethics of care suggests that environmental practices are a product of appreciation of the need of others to flourish. In this sense, the most important aspect of relations and political life is caring that "includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our world so that we can live in it as well as possible" (Tronto 2013: 19).

When we interpret caring as a habitus or as an acquired, partly automatic and socially affected way of dealing with others – be it human or non-human – the normative guides proposed by classical ethics seem insufficient: they rely on the premise of an individual who is choosing how to act freely and rationally. At the same time, taking a relational perspective, we can face the classical problem of determinism. To put it simply: how much responsibility do we bear for insufficient caring for humans and the environment? Considering that "natural" caring in Noddings' theory and habitus in Bourdieu's sociology are understood as routinized actions which, under ordinary circumstances, do not require much reflection, we are faced with the question of whether and how routinized actions can change.

Before trying to answer this question we need to indicate that Noddings separates two modes of caring: natural and ethical. She acknowledges that it is not always possible to be a naturally caring person, and here is where the questions of classical ethics re-surface: how can we know and motivate ourselves to treat others well when the desire to care is absent? According to Noddings, we need to reflect and try to remember "the ethical ideal" from our experience of being cared for. We argue that caring as habitus addresses this issue, as it includes an explanation of how unconscious habits can inform one's practices. In such an approach, citizenship is exercised not only through participation in public sphere, but it is manifested in various caring practices that occupy the space between the public and the private (e.g., urban gardens).

Returning to the question of change, a routinized behaviour changes when it gets "out of sync" with the social and moral organization or becomes harmful. To adopt environmentally friendly behaviours would require to understand the threat of the global warming as a social and moral problem. Additionally, when care theorists talk about changing non-caring behaviour to a caring one, they, as Bourdieu, highlight the importance of reflexivity and critical thinking. Together with Dobson, we could add that critical thinking can lead to changes in habituated way of acting and result in ecological citizenship. In a different way than Dobson, however, we believe that it results in embodied way of caring for environment, not through the exercise of abstract justice.

Concluding Reflections

The purpose of this analysis was to explore ecological citizenship in relation to the questions of ethical considerations and embodied practices. To do so, we turned to the ethics of care and Bourdieu's theory of social practice. In deontological and utilitarian perspective it is assumed that it is enough to indicate rational principles or rules of moral behaviour and proper caring would emerge. Looking from the perspective of the ethics of care, Habermasian rational universalism seems, insufficient because its claims to universality are limited. Rational

agreement, as it is proposed by Habermas, is impossible here as the practice of caring for the environment may be driven not only by universal principles rationally agreed in discourse but also by irreducible factors such as emotions, affects, and embodied engagements that have been studied by relational theories. The concept of caring as habitus, based on relational theories of Noddings and Bourdieu, suggests a different approach: the adequate practice of caring depends on the needs of the cared-for and constantly cultivated ability to care, or the caring habitus. This led us to argue that, on the one hand, caring as habitus can change depending on personal efforts to reflect on one's caring behaviour when others in our surrounding do not feel being cared for (e.g., a child is neglected, a patient is discontented, a garden is unmaintained, or a dog is not looked after). On the other hand, it can also depend on the social influence when certain care practices are no longer regarded as adequate and the new environmental practices are developed (e.g., emerging new ways of parenting, waste sorting or energy saving). From such a perspective, civic engagement in environmental practices depends on personally and politically assumed responsibility to care for the environment and constantly cultivated caring practices that are understood as incarnated ways of acting. The relational view of the concept of ecological citizenship invites to appreciate the affective dimension and deepens our understanding that environmental care is constituted by rational and non-rational ties with the environment, and by so doing, stresses the importance of social and individual footprints in forming environment-friendly ways of acting.

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EKOLOGINIS PILIETIŠKUMAS: RŪPESČIO *HABITUS* VIEŠOJOJE SFEROJE

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Santrauka. Aplinkosauginiame diskurse kalbant apie aplinkos saugojimą, dalis autorių vis dar pabrėžia asmeninės atsakomybės svarbą, tačiau kiti tvirtina, kad vien jos nepakanka, kai kalbama apie poreikį adekvačiai reaguoti į globalias ekologines problemas. Šiame straipsnyje išryškinama prieštara, glūdinti ekologinio pilietiškumo sampratoje, ir parodoma, kad ne tik individuali kiekvieno patirtis, bet ir socialiai bei kultūriškai susiklosčiusios rūpesčio aplinka praktikos siejasi su piliečių pasiryžimu rūpintis. Ekologinį pilietiškumą mes interpretuojame pasitelkdami Pierre'o Bourdieu *habitus* konceptą, kuris individualias įkūnyto rūpesčio aplinka praktikas sieja su platesniu socialiniu ir politiniu kontekstu. Teigiame, kad rūpesčio etikoje suformuluota rūpesčio paradigma, papildyta Bourdieu įžvalgomis, leidžia išplėsti ekologinio pilietiškumo konceptą, tiek atsižvelgiant į racionalaus įsipareigojimo rūpintis svarbą, tiek įvertinant afektyvių ryšių su aplinka bei vietinėse bendruomenėse vyraujančių rūpesčio praktikų svarbą. Ekologinis pilietiškumas, paremtas rūpesčio *habitus* konceptu, gali reikštis ne tik dalyvavimu viešojoje sferoje, bet ir įsitraukiant į konkrečias rūpinimosi praktikas, kur viešoji ir privati sferos persidengia.

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: ekologinis pilietiškumas, rūpesčio etika, *habitus*, rūpesčio praktikos

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