FROM HUSSERL TO LEVINAS: THE ROLE OF HYLETIC DATA, AFFECTION, SENSATION AND THE OTHER IN TEMPORALITY

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This article discloses the question of the pre-giveness of the other and alterity by analyzing and comparing the temporality of consciousness and the role of affection and sensation in Husserl and Levinas. I argue that within the intentional flow of consciousness one can find non-intentional structures, i.e. affection and hyletic data which mark a passivity of consciousness, break intentional act and welcome the other. While discussing the temporal structure of consciousness the special attention is given to the discussion of pra-impression.

Keywords: Husserl, Levinas, temporality of consciousness, intentionality, affection, hyletic data, sensation.

Introduction

Husserl occupies a privileged position in two senses in Levinas’ writing: in relation to the question of the origin of the subject’s awareness of self, and secondly, in Husserl’s description of intersubjectivity, where Levinas finds reduction being provoked by the other (Levinas 1981: 44–45, 48). This reduction opens up a question as to how the subject awakens to itself in consciousness which is already grasped by the other.

Levinas considers the principal phenomenological method to be confronting the world by a radical questioning about the way the world is and exists:

A radical, obstinate reflection about itself, a cogito which speaks and describes itself without being duped by spontaneity or ready-made presence, in a major distrust toward what is thrust naturally onto knowledge, a cogito which constitutes the world and the object, but whose objectivity in reality occludes and encumbers the look that fixes it. […] It is the presence of the philosopher near to things, without illusion or rhetoric, in their true status, precisely clarifying this status, the meaning of their objectivity and their being, not answering only to the question of knowing ‘What is?’, but to the question ‘How is what is?’ (Levinas 1985: 30)

Addressing Levinas, I would ask similarly how the other manifests itself within the phenomenological context; or, what is this “how of the other”. It is on the axis of intentionality then, that the idea of the other finds its root and it is also intentionality that allows the other to appear without reducing its otherness. How does this happen if intentionality is understood by
Levinas as the totalizing cognitive power of consciousness?

In this article I will attempt to show that within the intentional flow of consciousness one can find non-intentional structures, i.e. affection and hyletic data which mark a passivity of consciousness, breaking the totalizing intentional act and welcoming the other.

The research is completed in three parts. In the first part of the article, I reconstruct an account of affection in phenomenology, detailing Husserl’s understanding of affection and its role in intentionality. In the second part, I argue that Levinas’ concept of sensation finds its root in Husserl’s theory of hyletic data and affection. The third part concerns mostly how the other appears within the temporality of consciousness.

1.1. The articulation of affection in phenomenology

In *Totality and Infinity* Levinas elaborates on a concept of responsibility which precedes any cognitive act of consciousness and even any formation of subjectivity. He defines a subject not as that which wishes to be free and constructs its freedom, but rather in terms of an always prior commitment. “To be responsible” is not understood in concepts or formed as judgment. Instead, Levinas speaks about subjectivity which is affected by meaning and held by an experience which comes before any representation: “The face, expression signifier, forms the first world, the face is the signifier which appears on the top of his sign, like eyes looking at you” (Levinas 2004: 180). The other gives a sense which precedes my own *Sinngebung*. The face appeals to me before and beyond my ability to express any meaning: “it brings us to a notion of meaning prior to my *Sinngebung* and thus independent of my initiative and my power” (Levinas 2004: 51). The emphasis Levinas places on consciousness articulates the alterity which affects consciousness from the outset, “the other in me” (Levinas 1981: 125).

I begin with an account of the role hyletic data and affection play in intentionality. In his structural analysis of subjectivity, the first elements Husserl describes are sensations and noesis. There are the ‘real’ components of intentionality, and there are components we find when simply reflecting on our acts. Husserl describes the latter as ‘hyletic data’, ‘material data’ or simply ‘hyle’ (Husserl 1970: 574). We typically have these experiences when our senses are affected. The intentional moment itself is now called ‘noesis’. Noesis animates the hyletic data by apprehension, that is, the subjective side of intentionality. Thus, the stream of consciousness has a noetic and a hyletic level.

In *The Phenomenology of the consciousness of Internal Time* Husserl raises the question about the constitution of both acts and hyletic data regarded as immanent objects. The direct interest here lies in finding out how hyletic data and sensations bring a new development of intentionality into Husserl’s and Levinas’ interpretations. I will try to prove the fact that the non-intentional character of hyletic data allows us to find a new meaning for sensation and affection,
and provides a ground for alterity and the phenomenon of the other within intentionality.

Elaborating on the role and meaning of genetic phenomenology in Husserl’s *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Sokolowski accentuates that there is a certain facticity, a certain element which is not explained by subjectivity (Sokolowski 1964: 166). In other words, not everything is deduced from consciousness. Subjectivity is discovered to be a necessary condition for sense appearing, but it is not a sufficient ground. Therefore, a certain pre-giveness is to be found and explained by phenomenological analysis.

Indeed, by introducing genetic phenomenology Husserl inquires into the very beginning of meaning and, as a result, brings into relief the role of sensation as something from which the meaning should be preformed before it actually appears. Husserl is faced with a dilemma: if the intentional acts (noesis) that constitute noematic unities of meaning are themselves identifiable unities within the stream of consciousness, what constitutes them cannot have the character of intentional act. Husserl’s analysis thus presupposes an uncovering of an absolute self-constituting and pre-intentional matter of consciousness as the ultimate basis for genetic phenomenology.

This task is tightly connected with the notion of ‘passive synthesis’²: it is an account of those elements of intentional constitution that precede the explicit, or ‘active’ synthesis carried out in conceptual thinking³. Our perception rests upon a level of pre-predicative encounter where the object of the world is constituted as an identity of manifold changing aspects. These aspects comprise something which is pre-given to consciousness, i.e. hyletic data or the dimension of sensation. Husserl affirms that “which is first in se in a theory of evident judgment … is to lead predicative evidence genetically back into non-predicative evidence, which is called encounter”⁴. There is a meaning brought into light together with a sensation, which arises before the judgment is made. Before the conceptualization of perception happens in consciousness there is already an encounter with the world and this encounter has not yet been formed into knowledge.

Does Husserl really explain how the content-aspects of hyletic data are given? According to Donn Welton, “apperception is not just projective but it is ‘drawn’ or ‘pulled’ by the object, which means that its sense, brought into play by the retention of earlier experiences similar to this one, directed to the ongoing course of experience. The sense first acquired and only then it becomes habitual: “Habit” is the primordial source of every bestowal of objective sense, habit as induction, though, of course, accompanied by a corresponding fulfilment, which is the constant and

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primordial force constitutive of existence” (Welton 2000: 243). Mohanty gives an elaborated explanation of the role of habit in constructing meaning in our perception. Indeed, he agrees that every object carries a meaning which is already deposited by previous meaning-conferring acts, by our historical and cultural habit to see things in this way and not in that way. A thing is already constituted by intentionality. But, at the same time this meaning-conferring is not entirely formed by me at this moment of perception, I find a ready-made object constituted by intentional synthesis.

According to Mohanty’s interpretation, I do not necessarily find any thing new but I find something achieved (Mohanty 1972: 119–120). This means that in my perception I am brought back to the historical context and evolution of a thing in perception of which I can discover results of several stages of intentional modifications achieved through the history of human thought (civilization). Mohanty’s position is that whereas such a genetic analysis can be applied to our fundamental concepts, it would not work with the pre-given things themselves. Some objects of the world have an emotional or practical significance for me and they are inherited from the past. But, as Mohanty states, at the same time there is a different category of objects and phenomena which do not support this logic of thinking. Objects of nature, for example, are genetically constituted but they are not historical achievements, thus, they imply the affection within the structure of intentionality. There are objects and phenomena that can really astonish me, or ideas which I do not necessarily have from the past experience or perception which are not necessarily based upon my cultural or historical context. Such phenomenon can be something foreign which strikes the consciousness – an alterity, for instance.

Despite the influence of habit on our perception is still always “situational”, which means it is influenced by the object perceived. Our experience implies so called circular intentionality: it is not merely a matter of mastering but is also mastered. It is not an intentionality of invading but also of being invaded. As Welton puts it: “In the case of perception I not only act but I am acted upon, I not only effect but I am caught up in a larger realm of affectivity” (Welton 2000: 243–244). Subjectivity does not only intend objects but they at the same time draw me to them; objects are capturing our acts. Thus, hyletic data points to a double character of intentionality: it is affecting and it is affected. In Husserl’s words:

We understand this (what we call affection) to be a conscious impulse, a peculiar drive, which a conscious object spells on the I – a drive (or appeal), which slackens through the attention (or devotion) of the I, and from which follows a longing for selfgiven, the objective self more and more revealing perception – that is noticing. A longing for closer contemplation of the object.

Here the effect or the attraction that comes from the object is described as

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“bewüstenmaßig”, which clarifies the role of affection: it is an essential moment of consciousness. Montavont defines this affection as passivity of the subject which is affected. But, this “being affected” motivates active tendency towards the object (Montavont 1994: 122). This is exactly what Levinas charges Husserl’s notion of intentionality with: intentional consciousness is a consciousness which grasps its object depriving it of alterity. I emphasize here the importance of being affected. My interest in affection lies in its conceptual role in questioning this total power of intentionality: first, intentionality is affected and only after the sensual data affect the subject do they bear a minimal meaning because of the active intention of consciousness.

According to Husserl, affection has a double dimension – passive and active. Affection is passive in the sense that it precedes the cogito (in Ideen I) and it is active inasmuch as it is already a tendency towards: consciousness is provoked by hyletic matter. Again, the special emphasis lies in the double function of affection: to master, or to act and to be mastered, to be cognized.

Montavont notices that affection is characterized by its movement, or to be more precise, by “by its power of awaking”\(^6\). As Husserl clarifies, it is an awakening of intention towards the object\(^7\). Affection invites me to react, however, this reaction can be different: ethical, which welcomes the alterity, or cognitive, which reduces alterity. For Husserl, affection is the original genetic moment in the constitution of consciousness since the object also forces consciousness to feel. In other words, sensation is already meaningful, that is, consciousness endows affection with meaning. Thus, affection is a structural moment which is, in general, motivated by pre-given hyletic data.

A few important theses issue from this discussion. First, from Husserl’s later writing it is possible to uncover the level of affection in consciousness which opens subjectivity towards alterity before consciousness generates any totalizing intention. Affection makes subjectivity responsive, that is, leads it to intend. Second, it marks a structural moment of consciousness, and finally, following some later interpretations (Welton, Mohanty and Montavont) there is also an affected intentionality, the purpose of which, I would say, is to allow the presence of alterity. All these aspects prepare a ground for the ethical encounter with the Other.

Does affection disturb or break the intentional flow of consciousness? Does this pre-given hyle indicate the so-called opaque stratum of consciousness or something which escapes the cognitive power of consciousness? I will consider these questions in the following parts of this article.

1.2. Hyle, urhyle and sensation

Husserl defines Urhyle as a foreign core in me (Ichfremdekeim) (Depraz 1994: 72) Introducing Urhyle he methodologically questions the temporality of intentional

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\(^6\) Ibid., p. 123: “l’affection se caractérise donc avant tout par son movement, ou plus exactement par sa mise en movement”.

\(^7\) Husserl, E. In Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926 in Hua XI, p. 151: “Für den Gegenstand können wir die Affektion auch bezeichnen als Weckung einer auf ihn gerichteten Intention.”
consciousness, i.e., the original moment of present. Being something foreign within consciousness the Urhyle indicates a core within consciousness which leads to a constitutive bifurcation of the self and of the non-self. The appearance of it is indirect: it is not constitutive, it does not constitute itself but it structures the constitution of the self. How can it be shown? Affected consciousness, or sensible data is the first strange or alien content within the self. It affects and excites the self as non-consciousness (Unbewüßtsein) on the level of original hyletic (Urhyle) pre-consciousness (Husserl 1973: 44a–45b). Consciousness is, first of all, aware of something foreign striking it. In these – affection and tension – the affected self constitutes itself first passively: it is aware, though it does not yet react to this foreign core, i.e., sensation has not yet appeared, because, I should add, sensation is already a meaning and is constitutive activity of consciousness.

Affection appears in consciousness before being-for consciousness: I am affected before I know that I am affected. A similar interpretation of Husserl’s notion of affection can be found in the article by Natalie Depraz: “Temporalité et affection dans les manuscripts Tardifs sur la temporalité (1929–1935) de Husserl”1. Depraz claims that the understanding of being affected comes, in a way, retrospectively and the articulation of sensation, which makes me aware of affection and able to localize it in consciousness, becomes possible thanks to a preliminary passive synthesis (in Cartesiansische Meditationen, § 38) (Depraz 1994: 75). There is a stage of consciousness when it has not yet generated itself as a full inten-
tional act: I am affected before I understand it. I emphasize here one again that Urhyle is not constitutive. It indicates the difference between the self and the non-self, or the ego and alterity which affects the ego.

In Husserl’s Introduction to Phenomenology McKenna gives a very interesting example of how the sense data function. He describes his experience of smell: “The various courses of the meal were passed from the kitchen through an opening in the wall some distance to my right to one or two us who served the rest. I was engrossed in talking with a friend when I began to experience a smell to which I paid hardly any attention and which I in no way connected with what we were all there for – to eat. Moments later my friend announced: “Here comes the spaghetti.” At that moment the smell I was experiencing “turns into” the smell of spaghetti, the smell which then seemed to be beginning to fill the room from its source at my right” (McKenna 1982: 53). I distinguish here few important points: the subject is exposed to the smell, it is not fully aware of it, there is a first moment when the smell is but it is not yet a smell of something and there is a second moment when the smell is turned into the smell of spaghetti.

It is interesting, that McKenna strengthens his certitude that before the smell became a concrete smell of spaghetti “it was in no way the smell-experience of anything” (McKenna 1982: 53). The smell did not pertain to the object and it was not even located in the room. Here, I mean it was not attached to anything particular. It was an experience which he did not identify and recognize and I would assume it was
an experience of alterity (but not of alteri-
ty of an object) on a basis of hyletic data. Yet, these hyletic data are non-intentional; before McKenna turned them into concrete spaghetti’s smell they are under the power of constitutive consciousness: “It seemed to simply have been something I was undergoing, and a non-intentional one” (McKen-
na 1982: 54). I find one important issue in McKenna description – the openness of the subject towards the otherness.

It is exactly this understanding of hyle and affection that Levinas takes up in Total-
ity and Infinity while developing his original view of sensation. For Levinas the state of being affected when consciousness has not objectified it, is grasped in the notion of en-
joyment: “enjoyment, by essence satisfied, characterizes all sensation whose representa-
tional content dissolves into their affective content”. Indeed, Levinas maintains the fact that we are able to distinguish between “representational” and “affective” content in enjoyment shows a relation different from that which characterizes our sensible experience. I can distinguish sound after having felt sound, that is, there is affection before I am aware of being affected; or, the so-called pure sensation in which “one has bathed”: “in other words, sensation recovers a ‘real-
ity’ when we see in it not the subjective counterpart of objective qualities, but an enjoyment ‘anterior’ to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject and object” (Levinas 2004: 188).

Another proof of a non-intentional strata within experience can be found in Husserl’s account of time. Acts and hyletic data are temporal unities and in fact belong to what Husserl would call immanent, preobjective time. With the flow of hyletic data my con-
sciousness extends itself into a retention and a protention of that flow, turning that flow into a series of experiences or events.

If a piece of primordial succession (Urfol-
ge) of hyletic data (and then form all other primordial experiences) run off, then a reten-
tional connection must create itself, but just that – Hume already saw this – consciousness remains in its procession and anticipates what comes further, namely, protention “directs” itself towards the continuation of the row in the same style, and that is protention regarding the course of the primordial data which function as core data, and the same goes for the course of the retentions with their adumbrations that function in them (Husserl, E: Mans., L I 16, 8a).

This quotation allows us to examine the relation between hyletic flow and the structure of temporality. By introducing the primordial succession of hyletic data Husserl shows the source of the relation between the ego and the world through an addressing of unconstituted hyle (Urfol-
ge) and constituting temporality. I should mention that this relation does not indicate two separate things, primordial hyletic data and temporal structure. The structure of temporality exists by virtue of the hyletic flow, where the dynamic relation results in the constitution of objects. However, the intentionality of the hyletic datum does not mean that the datum is of something. The hyletic data is intentional in a quite different sense, namely in the sense that it points beyond itself to the past and the present: its intentionality is its temporality. To put it differently, hyletic data remain non-intentional. Husserl writes:

When we characterized the stream of li-
ed-experiences as a unity of conscious-

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ness, that intentionality, disregarding its enigmatic forms and levels, is also like a universal medium which bears in itself all lived-experiences, even those which are not themselves characterized as intensive (Husserl 1950: 203).

This enigmatic comment shows that within the structure of our lived-experience there are non-intentional components. There is a dangerous point here: non-intentional hyletic data can frustrate the true intentionality of consciousness: consciousness is not wholly transparent to itself.

Reflections upon affectivity and hyletic data help indeed to understand the ambiguity of the constitutional movement of consciousness. In “La ruine de la représentation” Levinas points out that “every object appeals and creates consciousness by which its being shines and appears” (Levinas 1974: 134). This being-affected-with reveals itself to the subject before being opposed to the world in objective representation. Beyond all debates on the status of affection, hyletic data and sensation, it is possible to state one certain thesis: being affected, I am already in the world and I am already participating in the world. This goes for Husserl as well as for Levinas.

I will now turn to the problem of sensation. In Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy II Husserl claims that sensation affects consciousness as something foreign and that is why it can be described as a pre-given component. At the same time, sensation is disclosed as a specific intentional mode of the animation of hyletic data in which it is taken as “analogous” to sensible qualities. Asemissen points out that Husserl defines sensation as those sensuous components of experience by which an objectifying apprehension comes to correspond with an objective appearance (Asemissen 1957: 23–34). That practically means that intentionality is conceived according to the following schemata: sense data are given as real elements in subjectivity, and they are animated by noeses. By virtue of such ‘apprehension’, the sense data, which in themselves are non-intentional, are objectivated; that is, through them we are able to encounter something objective and transcendent to the flux of immanent sensations and acts. But in this situation the otherness loses its radicality. Levinas proposes a different approach.

In The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology Levinas gives a clear conceptual distinction to hyletic data and sensation. Sensations are not identical to hyletic data. As Levinas puts it: “there is a difference of nature between red as a subjective and experienced sensation and red as objective and represented” (Levinas 1973: 39). Hyletic data go beyond the sense data to the sphere of affectivity and of will, while an experienced sensation is constituted by subjective performance. The same position can we found in Husserl’s Idea: “data of colour, sound, and tactile feeling, etc, must not be confused with such elements of things as colour, roughness, etc. which are represented in conscious life through these data” (Husserl 1983: 172). What Levinas emphasises is the transcendent meaning which the hyletic stratum gives us. Being removed from intentionality, hyletic

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8 Levinas (1974), 134: “tout objet appelle et comme suscite la conscience par laquelle son être resplendit et, par là meme, apparait” (my translation).
phenomena signify “something from the external world, they represent it, desire it, love it, etc” (Levinas 1973: 39–49). Thus, according to Levinas, being affected by the hyletic stratum the flow of consciousness intends something other than itself; it transcends itself. In function of hyletic data Levinas finds the other which is not modified by consciousness.

One of the questions raised by Levinas in *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology* is how hyletic data are animated by intention and how this intention is then united to constitute an object (Levinas 1973: 126). Is sensation subordinated to transcendental consciousness or not? In *Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger*, Levinas elaborates on the notion of sensation as more complex intentional acts: “The contents of consciousness are not merely animated by a meaning but are meanings. They are therefore inseparable from the essences they mean. … Consciousness and its real content do not ‘weight’ as reality but remain (pure) meaning through intentionality” (Levinas 1974: 31). Here Levinas attacks the primacy of the representational character of consciousness. Husserl’s understanding of intentionality is described as that which correlates meaning with appearances of the object meant. The external appearance of the perceived object is composed from the standpoint of constituting consciousness, where all qualities and aspects are already sketched by the ideal correlate of thought. Levinas claims that “it does not suffice to say that sensation lacks clarity and distinctness, as though it were situated on the plane of representation…sensibility is not theoretical knowledge bound however intimately to affective states” (Levinas 2004: 136).

The crucial problem for Levinas’ own understanding of intentionality lies in taking up the question of unity and disunity of consciousness. If consciousness is affected by hyletic data then the flow of consciousness is already broken, it is no longer transparent to itself, it is passive (since it is affected) and it allows the appearance of the other. In “Intentionality and Sensation” Levinas notes that “consciousness that is consciousness of the object is not nonobjectifying consciousness of itself. It lives itself; it is *Erlebnis*. The intention is *Erlebnis*” (Levinas 1998: 138). Consciousness grasped as Erlebnis already indicates sensations as constitutive of consciousness. The question, then, is about the non-intentional meaning of sensation at the base of accomplished intentionality. What we are faced with is a paradoxical double character of sensation: it is correlational and, at the same time, it is non-constituted.

Levinas takes a remarkable step in asking whether we can find any phenomenon that sanctions us in exceeding objectifying consciousness.

In rethinking intentionality, Levinas attempts to detach sensation from the cognitive aspect of representation. This detachment of sensation from representation accentuates a difference between the Levinasian concept of sensation and the Husserlian one. To put it more exactly, Levinas makes it possible to alter the form of the sensible as constituted to the sensible as self-constituted. In this manner, sensibility is experienced as an event prior to the work of constituting consciousness.
In *Totality and Infinity* Levinas states that “rather than taking sensations to be contents destined to fill apriori forms of objectivity, a transcendental function *sui generis* must be recognized in them (and for each qualitative specificity in its own mode); apriori formal structures of the non-I are not necessarily structures of objectivity. The specificity of each sensation reduced precisely to that ‘quality without support or extension’ the sensualists sought in it designates a structure not necessarily reducible to the schema of an object endowed with qualities. The sense has a sense that is not predetermined as objectification” (Levinas 2004: 188). It underlies Levinas’ account of consciousness: the contact with alterity is not perceived as consciousness of this alterity, rather, it is the very moment of the subjection of the subject to that with which one is in contact. Thus, Levinas upholds the status of sensibility as something constituting my openness to exteriority. According to him, one should not be misled by the fact that sensibility designates an ability thanks to which the sensible is perceived.

I summarize here: in function of hyletic data Levinas finds the presence of radical alterity which is not modified by consciousness, yet affects consciousness, and points on non-intentional aspects of consciousness. In the next part I take up the temporal aspect of the other.

1.3. *[Birth of the other within the temporal structure of consciousness]*

Husserl’s analysis of the inner consciousness of time is the key notion in constructing ethics. For Husserl the analysis of time is brought into question first of all as a ground for the phenomenonology of egological transcendental consciousness which constitutes objects and authorises their epistemological argumentation. In this part I argue that the Husserl’s analysis of the inner consciousness of time serves as the core for the appearance of the other.

To explain the problem of perceiving time, Husserl uses the examples of a melody or sequence of tones (Husserl 1991: 11–14). The question put by Husserl is as follows: in regard to what productivity of consciousness is it that we perceive a melody and not a mere sequence of individual tones? This change cannot be explained only by the existence of sensory acoustic experiences. Husserl suggests another explanation: just as one tone has sounded we begin to experience the second one and so on. A sequence of tones is perceived as a melody when there is a connection between the current sound and one that has finished. This connection is a result of the work of consciousness which Husserl explains while analyzing the perception of time.

For the analysis of time Husserl uses the following three concepts: *pra-impression* (*Urimpression, proto-impression*), *retention* and *protention*. The pra-impression is the first sensory experience, the ability of the mind to discern a melodic tone from other background noises. The pra-impression corresponds to the experience of the present moment, of “now”. One pra-impression is followed by another. According to Hus-
serl, there arises a certain connection in the row of pra-impressions: the first tone has already disappeared but still exists in consciousness. With each new tone of a melody, the previous tone is still retentionally perceived (Husserl 1991: 37). Thus, a certain retentional sequence appears that, with every new tone, moves ever further from the pra-impression. Husserl notes that a pra-impression flows into empty retentional consciousness (Husserl 1991: 38–39). Through this flow of a sequence of tones, a melody is grasped as certain integrity of content. However, in the process of perception consciousness continues to expect new tones until an impression arises that the melody has been completed. Retentional consciousness makes possible the prospect of expectation which Husserl denotes as protention. A temporal row appears as an on-going combination of the now-moment, retention, and protention. It is important to mention that, as Held emphasizes, a relation to the I and to personal identity are already rooted in the terms of retention (Held 2003: 32–62). This designates the transition from the primordial impersonal present to the past. On this account Patocka asserts that “the present does not merely sink away but rather escapes me and I retain it” (Patocka 1996: 114). Indeed, we could say that the I keep the presence alive only by bestowing upon it something of my own identical I.

In the essay “Intentionality & sensation”, Levinas focuses on the significance of experience in the constitution of temporality. While Husserl sees experiences as elements within Erlebnis, or as non-intentional contents which are not in themselves intentional acts and have no active role in constituting meaning (and require a different approach through the passivity of experience), for Levinas experiences and non-intentional contents are the very central point that determines a new interpretation of intentionality. Despite the fact that Husserl admits hyletic data at the foundation of intentionality, he underestimates the constituting role of the passivity of experience. Within the limits of static analysis, however, the passivity of experience remains concealed, inasmuch as static analysis always establishes similarity, or analogy, between experiences and objective qualities. It means that even despite Husserl’s admittance of the non-intentional status of experiences, the static method of analysis fails to match up to the task of preserving this non-intentionality. The non-intentionality of primary experiences requires a genetic account of consciousness impressed. Here, the notion of time – arising in Levinas’ analysis of consciousness impressed – allows for discussing the alterity of a primal feeling in terms of the radical and irreducible.

It is the temporal analysis of experience that enables Levinas to clarify non-intentional contents outlined at the foundation of intentionality. Husserl, in comparison, bases his model of experience on the experience of an arising external object. In such cases experiences are given as ideally though at the same time in a certain “reduced form”. J. Drabinski in Sensibility and Singularity: The problem of phenomenology in Levinas, while considering the problems of temporality, notices two types of relations between consciousness and its object: the constitutive, or correlative, and the contrasting (Drabinski 2001: 141). The constitutive
relation, where the object is a pure experience, defines the experience as intertwined with the ideality and hence the experience manifests itself as ideality burdened with aspects of subjectivity. Meanwhile, in the contrasting relation there appears a discrepancy between the ideality and the materiality of experience. This irreducibility is asserted because of the source of the experience – the impression.

For Levinas, as for Husserl, an essential point is the dual nature of experience. On the one hand, the primary feeling arises thanks to the presence of the other. It is the other that impresses:

The unforeseeable novelty of contents that arise in the source of all consciousness and being is original creation (Urzeugung), a passage from nothingness to being (to being that will be modified in being-for-consciousness, but will never be lost), a creation that deserves the name of absolute activity, of \textit{genesis spontanea}. But it is at the same time fulfilled beyond all conjecture, all expectation, all germination, and all continuity, and consequently is wholly passivity, receptivity of an “other” penetrating the “same”, life and not “thought” (Levinas 1998: 144).

Here Levinas goes directly from Husserl:

The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced; it does not arise as something produced, but through \textit{genesis spontanea}; it is primal generation. It does not spring from anything (it has no seed); it is primal creation. (Husserl 1991: 106).

On the other hand, the impression belongs to the Ego, or that which is affected by the impression of an experience. When a structured experience has been modified into a pra-impression, an impression has two characteristic moments: one when the impression appears in the realm of experience, and another in respect to which the pra-impression is “no ideality”. “Every distinction between perception and perceived, every idealizing intention rests on time, on the dephasing between the aiming and the aimed at. The proto-impression alone is pure of all ideality. <…> the proto-impression is nonideality par excellence.” (Levinas 1998: 144). Again, the constituting relation is that of an identification between ideality and experience, despite the seemingly original phenomenological difference. The significant difference, i.e., that which signifies beyond the range of any possible coincidences, is articulated only in the contrasting relation originating from the primary experience that produces an impression. This is where, for Levinas, another meaning of intentionality comes forth, which demonstrates another structure of relations between an experience and an intention that has occurred. Time is “not only the form that houses sensations and lures them into a becoming, it is the sensing of sensation, which is not a simple coincidence of sensing with the sensed, but an intentionality and consequently a minimal distance between the sensing and the sensed – temporal distance”. Thus perceived, intentionality opens a fundamental difference between “intentionality that intends identifiable idealities” and “impressed consciousness” (Levinas 1998: 144). Within this difference there lies what Levinas denotes as connection (lien) and shift (ecart). Shift means “already not”, but also “still here” and “presence for”. The connection
means (separate) consciousness targeting an impression yet while not being an awareness of the impression. The idea of shift makes it possible for Levinas to accentuate the significance of a past moment that belongs to primary experience. “The already past’, the ‘just passed’ are the very divergence of a proto-impression…the divergence of the Uriimpression is the event, in itself primary, of the divergence of dephasing, which is not ascertained in relation to another time but in relation to another proto-impression that is itself ‘in on it’” (Levinas 1998: 142). The connection and the gap present in intentionality constitute a diachronic relation within which Levinas finds it possible to describe an ethical relation towards alterity (Levinas 1998: 159–178).

The combination of impression and ideality (articulated by Levinas with what at first sight appears as paradoxical notions of gap and connection) is only possible within the contrasting relation. Thus, in intentionality itself Levinas notices the presence of a temporal distance explicated as diachrony (Levinas 1996: 151). This is a kind of diachrony that signifies a gap between the intentional consciousness as it occurs in intention that targets the ideal, and the impressed consciousness structured according to the primary experience. Intentionality as such does not reveal the diachrony, it is rather that the diachrony is asserted in relation to the problem of the temporality of consciousness (Levinas 1996: 157). Neither does the fact that it is a gap between two moments of consciousness mean that the diachronic in intentionality signifies some absolute division. It is exactly because the diachrony is present exclusively in the origins of intentionality, that is, where impressed consciousness and the intention are intertwined.

According to Husserl, pra-impression is the “original creation” of consciousness that is later modified into retention in the stream of absolute subjectivity. In its turn, retention, despite its modified structure, is connected with the primary experience, i.e., pra-impression. Levinas points out that pra-impression precedes retention and makes it possible, which means that primary experience is not completely modified:

The “already past” and the “just past” are the very divergence of a proto-impression modifying itself in relation to a completely new proto-impression, Event and consciousness are on the same level. The divergence of the Uriimpression is the event, in itself primary, of the divergence of dephasing, which is not ascertained in relation to another time but a relation to another proto-impression that is itself “in on it” (Levinas 1998: 143).

According to Levinas, however, primary experience is always absent because of the time element between it and occurred intention. Instead, Levinas defines primary experience as the beginning of every consciousness and every being. A thought (as intention) appears from a sensory source in pra-impression (Levinas 1998: 144). Levinas designates this source as the presence of alterity. He discovers alterity as constituting the aspect of temporality in Husserl’s concept of inner consciousness: “The absolute alterity of the other instant cannot be in the subject, which is the self. Such alterity comes from the other” (Levinas 1978: 93). The time is constructed by my relationship with the other, it is exterior to my instant, it is not the object of contemplation. This
sensory source undergoes modification in the process of transforming a feeling into retention. For Levinas, retention is not a constituted content in the sense that it is not constituted by occurred intention. The only constituting point of retention is the state of pra-impression that in itself only goes through the absolute passivity of a sensory experience. Despite its modified structure, retention bears a trace of the pra-impression’s primary impression. The temporal interpretation of experiences as pra-impression, modified in the form of retentions, is presented as a non-intentional content inside intentionality itself.

Time is implied in experience inasmuch as structural components of experience (inevitably) entail a temporal articulation. Levinas draws attention to the fact that time denotes and describes the gap and distance that characterizes experience as originally pre-given (Levinas 1998: 143). On the other hand, experience also structures the transition from the non-intentional to the intentional. Experience makes it possible for time to appear, it facilitates the moment of the living present and is the basis for the birth of absolute subjectivity. The point here is that the non-intentional experience of time indicates the fundamental indiscernibility of two moments, each of which conditions the other: experience as a temporal gap, and time as the transition of absence to presence via experience — that of alterity. Also this thesis can be illustrated by the well-known example of a sounding melody. The harmony of a melody is broken by a false note. The intervention of a false tone does not comply with Husserl’s concept of temporality. For Husserl, the moment of a false tone does not break the retention-protention structure but is a mere judgment. For Levinas, however, the very presence of a false tone is the event of the birth of subjectivity, self-awareness: “Consciousness is a constituting event and not merely, as in idealism, a constituting thought” (Levinas 1998: 143).

Thus, I argue that Levinas imparts a new dimension to Husserl’s temporality by articulating the aspect of alterity through the notion of experience: “proto-impression is wholly receptivity of an “other” penetrating the “same“ (Levinas 1998: 144). That which Levinas puts as the arcane of intentionality consists for him in the latter being based on non-intentional contents which become the source of the intentional consciousness. Levinas makes a point that speculations about the temporality of consciousness do not lead to the factual realisation that consciousness is the consciousness of time. On the very contrary, Levinas’ most important accomplishment is the thesis that “consciousness of time is not a reflection upon time, but temporalization itself; the after-the-fact of realization is the after of time itself” (Levinas 1998: 143). The time of the source of experience, not included in the time of the living present (transcendental consciousness), has always been passed by the moment whereby the experience, as a content given to consciousness, is retentionally modified. For Levinas, consciousness is not the now moment but a moment in the past, always late in respect to itself: the primary time of the source of experience always remains in the past and does not coincide with the moment of the living present.

At this point I would like to summarize the following: in function of hyletic data
one might find the otherness that has not yet been modified by cognitive power of consciousness; this other has its root in temporal flow, i.e., in pra-impression (Levinas 1981: 31). As I have discussed above the experience of pra-impression as an experience of the other which then initiates the appearance of the radical Other: “the Other (l’autrui) takes place of the other (l’autre)” (Levinas 1985: 94) Thus, the analysis of hyletic data and temporality is needed for opening up subjectivity towards the Other as other human being. Evidently Levinas wants to legitimate structures which model the subjectivity as going “beyond itself” and as striped from outside. This going “beyond itself” signifies concretion of intentionality, which allows transcendence to appear not as a relation of correlation, but as a relation of the subject to a “fundamental disorder” (Levinas 1985: 89). To be “beyond itself” means beyond what might be rendered as present.

In his essay ‘Diachrony and Representation’ he links the thesis that the subject is always belated and that consciousness is always late to itself, or in the past with the notion of responsibility, temporality taking the shape of a certain kind of ‘from me to the Other’ (Levinas 1998: 140, 149). Should we assign unconditional priority to that concrete and theoretical grasping and the order that is its noematic correlation, the order of presence, being as being and objectivity? Does a meaning appear here? Is cognition altogether capable of asking itself about itself and its own ground for existence?

Husserl describes a flow of consciousness, the rhythm of which is organized in such a way that one intentional act is replaced by another, i.e., the first act has already been in the past when the second act arises (Husserl 1991: 45). The new coming act is bound with the previous one. It is present in the form of an anticipation of the future before the moment when it is realized in the present. In this duration of temporal acts, each moment represents an awareness of the present that refers to the awareness of the past and the future. This explains why consciousness is a flow and not a collection of consecutive or separated moments. According to Husserl, even if time is connected with objects, it indeed characterizes transcendental consciousness as being one⁹. Thus, Husserlian transcendental subject is a sort of unceasing movement of its own temporalization. For Levinas, the process of temporalization is articulated in consciousness by another type of presence, that is, the other, as Levinas puts it “the other is in me in the midst of my very identification” (Levinas 1981: 125). I will show how this happens more concretely.

Having affirmed the temporal character of intentional consciousness, Husserl continues his investigations in two ways. First, he wonders how the temporality of intentional consciousness constitutes the temporal determination of objects, or, in other words, how the objective time of the world as a horizon where empirical objects manifest themselves is bound up with intentional consciousness. Without answering this question, we can still say why the encounter of the other has a temporal

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⁹ In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, especially when Husserl discusses function of memory and recollection, paragraphs 18–20.
dimension for my consciousness. This task touches upon the question of understanding how in the unceasing movement of intention a temporal unity is constituted in which objects and events have their fixed place. The key notion for answering this thesis is the representation. Husserl’s second line of investigation, then, is to clarify the structure of absolute consciousness, for which and in which the temporal flow becomes evident (Husserl 1991: Appendix XIII). This absolute consciousness can be described as ‘inner’ consciousness that accompanies the temporal accomplishment of an intentional act. The flowing temporality of the intentional acts of constituting consciousness appears in a way that is fundamentally different from the way in which the fixed temporal features of constituted objects appear. The appearance of the flowing temporality of intentional acts is no longer a matter of re-memoration and a synthesis of recognition, it is a matter of sensibility towards the intimacy of an immediate ‘feeling’ that is an auto-affection of consciousness by itself. It should also be mentioned that when the flux of absolute acts appears, it at the same time appears to itself in the form of retentitional auto-affection (Husserl 1991: paragraph 17).

Levinas criticizes Husserl in that he limits his description of time to phenomenological investigations of what time is, but does not consider time as a possibility of accomplishing transcendence. However, Husserl concentrates his efforts on temporality only as an object of theoretical knowledge. This purely theoretical approach to time is also caused by Husserl’s interest in the pure phenomenon of the present and in the way objects are presented in consciousness. Levinas tries to show how by revealing temporality it is possible to reach a new understanding of being. Even before he raised ethics to the level of first rank philosophy, Levinas had already exhibited particular attention in relation to the question of alterity in his first writing on time. At the heart of temporality Levinas discovers otherness, which then changes the temporality of the subject. The temporal presence of alterity entails a different interpretation: for Levinas, the temporality of the subject and intentionality is structured in accordance with the otherness which consciousness aims at (Levinas 1981: 33).

Before analyzing the temporal structure of the encounter with the other, let me consider Levinas’ objection to Husserl’s analysis of temporality (Levinas 1981: 32). The Husserlian concept of temporality is that he does not consider the role of the other or alterity in constructing temporality. In Husserl’s philosophy, memory provides the continuity between the present and the past (Levinas 1998: 143). The true essence of the past is defined by my lived experiences. Since all these experiences are retained in my consciousness, they can be made present again at any moment in the form of memory. Within the idea of otherness such a definition of the past is not productive.

In Idea II Husserl states that “the word ‘impression is appropriate only to original sensation; the word expresses well what is “there” of itself, and indeed originally; namely, what is pregiven to the Ego, presenting itself to the Ego in the manner of something affecting it as foreign <…> This non-derived impression <…> breaks down
into primal sensibility and into Ego-action and Ego-affections” (Husserl 1983: Ideas II, 348). Levinas claim is that my encounter with the other, since it is an event of something new and unexpected, presupposes a distance and interruption in consciousness. While Husserl’s concept of time does not really deny the difference between the present and the past, the notion of retention and re-memorative representation is nevertheless an effort to recuperate the past by establishing continuity within the flow of intentional consciousness. In other words, if consciousness is a flow of temporality, then the connection between the past and the present is needed. In contrast, for Levinas the past is irreducible and irrecoverable alterity.

In the work Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence Levinas states: “A subject would then be a power for representation in the quasi-active sense of the word: it would draw up the temporal disparity into a present, into simultaneousness” (Levinas 1981: 133). The moment of the present always has the meaning of something new and unforeseen. This is a gift that gives the possibility of change and renewal to the life of the subject. Here, Levinas follows Husserl’s notion of pra-impression which is revealed as an attempt to hold the ‘freshness’ of the future. The future, from Levinas’ point of view, is still mine and is always new for me, but the origin of its appearance is rooted in the other. I can hardly anticipate it. I should make clear at this point that through a transformation of Husserl’s concept of temporality the ethical content becomes apparent. In substituting the time of passivity for the time of intentional representation, or the time of hetero-affection to the time of auto-affection, Levinas transforms the egological transcendental subject into an ethical subject:

Both being and the vision of being refer to a subject that has risen earlier than being and cognition, earlier than and on this side of them, in an immemorial time which a reminiscence could not recuperate as an a priori. The “birth” of being in the questioning where the cognitive subject stand would thus refer to a before the questioning, to the anarchy of responsibility, as it were on this side of all birth (Levinas 1981: 26).

The peculiar features of this newborn ethical subject are not spontaneity and free will, but the responsibility for the Other. This responsibility occurs to a subject that is marked, at a very deep level of its existence, by its sensibility born by the fact of being affected with the other. This specific sensibility of the subject is, thus, an affectivity that is always already inhabited by the Other and is provoked by the Other. In a way, such sensibility of intentional consciousness was already present in Husserl’s analysis of temporality. According to Husserl, the temporality of intentional acts is partly constituted by absolute consciousness (Husserl 1983: 193–194). This absolute consciousness is temporalized by the experience of lived intentional acts. In other words, it is a kind of inner sense that temporalizes itself by living through intentional lived experience.

This specific kind of temporalization is bound with hetero-affection. Consciousness is affected by the moment of the present which appears to consciousness
from outside\textsuperscript{10}. The present occurs for consciousness as a new and unpredictable moment. Thanks to its unpredictability, the present presupposes a discontinuous flow of temporality that precedes the moment of the present and appears for consciousness as something unpredictable. Thus, in its character the pra-impression is hetero-affective, since it is supposed to account for alterity as novelty. In Levinas’ terms this pra-impression, coming to consciousness from outside, implies rupture and lapse in the flow of intentionality. It should be pointed out that temporality is disclosed as a diachronical process in which the notions of the future and the past do not belong to the subjectivity but come from outside.

I suggest that despite Levinas’s negative interpretation of Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity, it entails a temporal dimension and can be fruitful in considering a temporal interpretation of the face-to-face situation. Yet, before considering temporal intersubjectivity as it appears within Husserl’s phenomenology, we should consider how perception of an object takes place. The notion of perception is revealed through Husserl’s interpretation of intuition. Intuition for Husserl means having something present, where ‘presenting’ is distinguished from the many possibilities of re-presenting, such as, for example, memory and imagination. The perception of a thing shows itself to me in the presence of the here and now. In such an intuited having-present of perception, however, it becomes clear that the thing in view is in no way present in every respect. The intuition is a universal essential attitude to the world and is, at the same time, an initial givenness of an object, i.e., something which can be perceived. What is interesting in each observation is that a thing, for example this desk, presents its front side to me, but presently its back side and other aspects remain hidden from me. In spite of this, the thing is known to me.

Within Husserl’s phenomenology, the openness to the Other is caused by the temporal structure of my consciousness, i.e., the intersubjectivity of my consciousness is founded on the protention of the lived present. Penetrating into consciousness, protention discloses a sphere of my own and my openness which is not mine any more but is a space of the ‘inter’. This temporal explanation of intersubjectivity was probably not of very much interest to Husserl, but it is a conceptual ground for investigating temporality in ethics in Levinas’ works. Husserl states: “The other is co-present in me. Absolute ego, as living-, streaming-, existing-, concrete present, has the other present as co-present, as appresentatively itself as itself in me, but also manifesting the other (ego) itself as itself in me – (me) constituted in the “co-present” of its (the other’s) living present”\textsuperscript{11}. This statement confirms that the temporal structure of my consciousness in the cause of the intersubjectivity which is present in consciousness.

\textsuperscript{10} Levinas makes an interesting observation: “the star is anterior to the gaze that contemplates it because of the speed of light and the subject’s reaction time” in (Levinas 1998: 144).

\textsuperscript{11} Husserl 1950, 44B: “Der Andere ist in mir mitgegenwärtig. Ich absolvi, als lebendig strömend seienende konkrete Gegenwart hat Seine Gegenwart als Mitgegenwart, als appräsentativ sich al ser selbst bekundend in mir, aber auch ihm selbst bekundet als mich in Selbstbekundung haben in ihm, in seiner lebendigen Gegenwart konstituiert in der Weise der Mitgegenwart”.
It also allows the immediate appresentation of another consciousness. Intersubjectivity is considered a part of my temporal consciousness, it leads consciousness beyond itself and beyond its everyday experience: “My primordial co-present, as first horizon: primordial world, my alien-subjectively mediated, intersubjective co-present. The existence of the other egoic subjects with their primordial worlds – as horizonally co-valid for me”12. Intersubjectivity brings me out of my presence in original horizon, since this horizon is torn by the presence of the Other. It is no longer a horizon which is mine and for me. In it we find grounds for an ethical transformation of the subject.

The existence with other human beings is correlated with my temporal extension of protention which, in its turn, takes my consciousness out of my own present moment. According to the Fifth Meditation, the intersubjective experience reveals my existence as the present temporally lived (i.e., the present of appresentation) in the same way as retention and protention open for me the meaning of any event. This can be explained with a very simple example: we understand our self better and we acquire the idea of our identity when we meet other men. However, even this construction of intersubjective relation leads us to the reduction of the other. Consciousness reduces the other subject to its own temporal ego and I discover a certain connection between my consciousness and the sense which is in the content of intention. Thus, intersubjectivity is also put into brackets with the entire world. In Husserl’s interpretation, the subject and intersubjectivity can be founded by each other, but it seems impossible to consider them as a basis for each other. The temporal subject still is the source for itself and its intuitions. It can only have an origin of itself in itself. Despite these consequences of the intersubjective relation, Husserl’s analysis of temporality shows that my personal intuitions depend on the intersubjective structure of consciousness. Intersubjectivity as such is based upon my experience of the (intersubjective) world. It means that before I meet another human being I have already recognized it as an absolutely other consciousness.

It would seem that Husserl, at the most fundamental level of time consciousness, could have “surmounted” the objectifying consciousness in the constituting/constituted living present. That is to say, Husserl has opened the way to the other with the model of the empirical, sensorial impression-surpassing subject at the core of all perception and all consciousness. As we have seen and as Levinas is quick to point out, the living present becomes itself thematizable in time. However, Husserl interrupts any possibility of diachronic interruption. In fact – and Levinas presents this as a criticism of Husserl – “nothing incognito enters into the same to interrupt the flow of time and interrupt the consciousness that is produced in the form of this flow” (Levinas 1981: 43). It is at this point, of course, that Levinas introduces his most radical sug-

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gestion that the summons of the other is the condition for the constitution of time.

In “Intentionality and Sensation” Levinas’ interpretation of pra-impression is also quite innovative in relation to the phenomenological notion of temporality. The original impression is considered to be a knot in the interpretation of the present which is unpredictable and new. As was shown earlier, the radical passivity of consciousness is established in pra-impression. Consciousness is passive since it is affected by the newness of the present event. In the present, as Levinas affirms, consciousness is confronted by alterity (Levinas 1981: 57). The source of the passivity of consciousness and of the activity of present moment is the other. It is implied that consciousness by means of the pra-impression, experiences the newness and alterity of a new moment that comes to it from outside. This activity of the pra-impression is a result of the fact that the pra-impression appears in consciousness as an other and as different from the flow of consciousness. The pra-impression also sets a lapse between that which precedes it and that which follows it. The pra-impression points at the present but this present does not have any subjective characteristics or any subjective understanding. A sensitive impression instead gives a feeling of present moment and it foreruns the intentional apperception of an object.

We are lead to the conclusion that for Levinas the pra-impression reveals temporal flow as discontinuity and passivity; it is shown to be an example of the presence of alterity. Due to the Husserlian tie-up of three components (retention, protention and pra-impression) consciousness is considered to be aware of the present understood as continuity, and as a prolongation of the past or of the future. In “Intentionality and sensation“, Levinas affirms the impossibility of distinguishing between retention and protention because of the newness of pra-impression. The unity of the present and the past in one moment bears conceptual meaning for all philosophical structure: the awareness of the present and the past as something new sets consciousness at a distance to itself. Consciousness finds itself in a sort of rupture with itself and is not a continuous flow anymore, “the oneself cannot form itself” (Levinas 1981: 104). Levinas describes this state of consciousness as being which is ‘no longer’ (Levinas 1998: 143). This is consciousness which is being ‘after-the-fact’ and is a displacement from its ordinary state as an intentional flow. It is discovered as being late to itself in its awareness of the present moment: “consciousness is delayed in relation to itself – a way of lingering over a past” (Levinas 1998: 144). This fact of being late to itself indicates, according to Levinas, the true birth of the temporalization of consciousness and the source of the other. This is a difference between Husserl’s notion of temporality and Levinas’ interpretation of temporality, and we can conclude the following: the essence of temporality is not constituted by immanence but by transcendence of the other.

Conclusion

I tried to show that Levinas’ original view of sensation as the sensation of alterity issues from the Husserlian account of hyletic data and affection. Affection is thought to be a specific concept which questions intentiona-
lity and indicates a break in the intentional flow of consciousness.

Of special interest in this article is the notion of pra-impression which points at the newness and otherness of each coming moment. Temporality is not a structure of continuity but of diachrony, a notion that destroys the Husserlian unity of the temporal flow. Pra-impression does not belong to consciousness itself. It comes from outside and forms the present, the future and the past not as prolonged present but as ruptured temporal moment. The source of this rupture lies in the otherness of pra-impression.

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NUO HUSSERLIO PRIE LEVINO: HILETINIŲ DUOMENŲ, PRIERAIŠUMO, JUSLUMO IR KITO VAIDMUO LAIKIŠKUME

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S a n t r a u k a

Straipsnyje Kito išankstinės duotybės bei pasikeitimo klausimas keliaamas analizuojant ir lyginant sąmonės laikiškumą bei prierašumo ir juslumo vaidmenį Husserlio ir Levino filosofijoje. Autorė teigia, kad intencionaliame sąmonės sraute galima įžvelgti ne-intencionalias struktūras, t. y. prierašumą ir hiletinius duomenis – abu pastarieji dalykai žymi sąmonės pasyvumą, nutraukia intencionalaus akto tolydumą ir sveikina kitą. Aptariant laikinę sąmonės struktūrą specialus dėmesys skiriamas diskusijai apie pirminius įspūdžius.

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Husserlis, Levinas, sąmonės laikiškumas, intencionalumas, prierašumas, hiletiniai duomenys, juslumas.

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