GLOBAL LIFE WORLD

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The essay is designed to disclose one aspect of modern Western civilization that has become the ground for what is known as "globalization." The argument is presented that this civilization is premised on formal systems that are not derivable either from physical or from empirical grounds. Such systems are constructs and their connection with the environment is technical and productive. Thus the selection among the systems to be applied depends on social valuations with respect to their usefulness. The current global systems of internet communication have no physical presence; they are purely "signitive" in the sense that they have no specific space-time location, although can be embodied at any time and any place. Such systems provide an invisible net that can be utilized to access and communicate messages about all events around the globe. The argument that such communication although very fast, takes some time, since the logic of this communication is signitive, a net of meanings that by themselves, as a matter of course define even space and time. It can be stated without a contradiction that the invisible signitive world is a variant of traditional metaphysics, such as Plato's understanding of mathematics, or the world of ideas.

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Introduction

Modern Western civilization presumes human autonomy as the self creating ground of history, science, public norms and even ultimate beings. Yet what it has globalized is a specific technological life world idealized as scientific and objective. We know that throughout the course of the Twentieth Century scientific thought was in a quandary concerning its own basis: science with its theories and methods wanted to be logical, precise and rational; on the other hand, it also wanted to make ontological claims concerning the structure of the world. The world was and is deemed to be physical-empirical. Indeed, the latter is regarded as the sole possessor of the honorable name "reality" and "objectivity" on which everything rests, by which everything must be explained, and from which all other modes of presence are derived. If we recall from previous sections, all else is subjective and to be excluded from scientific considerations. Moreover, science is value free and any valuation belongs to the

subjective realm. It is our contention that the case is not only more complex but science assumes the objectivity of something that is not derivable from any empirical facts. This is to say, the first condition of science – being logical – is not accessible from any empirical position; second, the notion that science, and indeed logic, as value free, is equally mistaken; given that there are various logical and self-consistent systems, the selectivity of one system over another is a matter of valuation and, above all, cultural valuation. Cultural valuation belongs to a life world that consists of intersections and overlappings of events, each pointing one to the other in complex ways, and each bearing various social meanings. (Greimas, 1987) In this context, science is one set of such meanings that must be located in its function in terms of its practical, cultural, and technical significance. This suggests that even technical inventions are not just entities, but comprise a complex system of life world interconnections, such as values, economy, productivity, education, politics, and even ideologies (Mickunas, 1997). This, of course, will have to be shown in a detailed and precise manner.

It is also the case that the current life world is interlaced by multiple scientific and technical discourses and practices. One cannot buy a cereal box without being exposed to multiple languages and quantities of bio-chemical, nutritional, caloric, etc. codes. All this also implicates productive, normative, and even legalistic interconnections as aspects of a life world. This is to say, the scientific and technical discourses and practices do not overlay some primordial life world, but comprise our understanding of the way our world and we are, live and relate. Our mass media are equally replete with reports of scientific "studies" and reports of inventions and progress, and even of protests against some scientific inventions and technical inovations – all being understood as aspects of our life world. No wonder, then, that our technologies are regarded equally as "objective" as trees and cucumbers.

We shall furthermore argue that the scientific practice cannot demonstrate how the constituted logic of a given consistent system translates into empirically constructed system without the assumption of other conditions which may also be logically constituted through modes of praxis that are already technically available. There is an interpretation of the entire environment as accessible to technical management. In this sense, there is a pre-understanding that allows a given population to regard science as "value free." Yet it is precisely the technologically interpreted environment that is imbedded in valuations. In this section, we shall explicate the principles that: first, establish scientific objectivity on the basis of the objectivity of logics; second, how those logics are connected to the resources of the environment; third, how the environment itself is technical and valuative; and fourth, how particular modern value context pervades the technical logical and scientific enterprises (Husserl, 1970).

Logic and Fact

In this section the question of scientific objectivity will be addressed in terms of the understanding of facts as contingent. By the latter is meant that every given factual state of affairs could be otherwise than it is. Such states of affairs have no necessity. Yet science is designed to connect empirical facts by necessary rules. In principle, even if those rules are distributive such that facts are read as statistically probable, the very logic of probability is necessary. This implies that there is an essential difference between scientific rules of calculation of probabilities as necessary and the calculated empirical facts as contingent. The former cannot be derived from the latter. Moreover, any scientist, despite the claim that empirical objectivity is the only source of truth, will also demand respect for scientific formal rules and logic as necessary and objective. This suggests that science accepts logic to be another domain of objectivity without being able to account for it on the grounds of the presumed empirical reality (Husserl, 1973).

To avoid other confusions, we add other variations of the difference between logic and fact. Psychologists argued that since empirical-physical-

facts are the only reliable sources of knowledge, everything else is subjective and psychological. In this sense, the theory was proposed and is still maintained that since logic is not an empirical objective fact then it must be a subjective fact. In turn, since psychology claims to be the science of subjective facts, it also claims that logic can be understood psychologically. This is to say, logical formulations of science can be derived from psychological facts. Obviously, this is a contradiction since every psychological fact, as empirical, is radically contingent and it cannot imply any necessary rules or laws. Moreover, if psychology were the basis of logic, it would then be the basis of all sciences. In this sense, even logically framed laws of physics would be derivable from psychological facts (Seebohm, 1962). We are certain that no physicist will grant such an absurd theory.

Other sciences, such as sociology, have made claims that all theories, including logically framed theories, are social constructs. They can be explained by social interests, whether such interests are economic or power, and therefore the analysis of social conditions would imply scientific theories and their logic. This is a variant of the psychological theory; instead of deriving science from individual psychological facts, we presume to derive science from collective social facts. This is to say, we simply postpone the issue without resolving it. Moreover, a description of social facts such as collective activities and interests would not imply the logic of social sciences. The latter, as a science, will already presume to be able to arrange social facts in the framework of scientific rules. Such rules will not respect the differences between social facts, psychological facts, or physical facts. They will be regarded as universal and necessary, so well testified even by sociology in its effort to become "scientific".

Another thesis that is currently in vogue is one of evolutionism. This thesis assumes various forms, such as historicism, pedagogy, cumulative affect, and all claiming that while our current scientific knowledge is vast it was slowly accumulated through historical learning transmission, and ultimately through the pressures and needs of life. In one sense, what we know now, we have learned from our predecessors, and in turn added our own empirical experience, thus providing a continuing process and evolution of knowledge. We do not doubt that there is cumulative empirical experience from generation to generation providing subsequent generations with a more complex understanding of themselves and their environment. But such an accumulation is equally contingent and does not imply the logic of sciences. The point is that empirical experiences, no matter how vast, can go on in their accumulation without ever leading to formulation of logical rules. We would even argue that the notion of cumulative empirical experience is contingent, and threatens the very notion of accumulation. After all, contingent experiences of contingent facts cannot lead to necessary accumulation. The environment changes and we change. What was relevant yesterday, may be no longer relevant or true today. In this sense, the constitution of scientific logic plays its role at another level and requires another mode of accessing besides the empirical. This implies that the constitution of logical domain does not in any way suggest a connection to the presumed empirical facts. There is no resemblance between these two domains. Contingent empirical facts cannot be an imitation of necessary logical rules (Mickunas, 1997).

Given the problematic of current explanations of logic from psychology through accumulation of factual experience, we can argue that there is a difference between two main domains of objectivity, such that every explanation will presuppose these two domains. In this sense, we propose that the scientific domain that becomes translated into technology is one of pure signification with its own rules of implication that in many cases defy our own abilities to master such rules. At least for modern age, this means that sciences of all types are subject to this signitive domain. If one were simply to consider the constitution of various formalized geometries, one would be convinced that the psycho-physiological beings that we are could not access such geometries. This requires another epistemic layer that is correlated to formalized

systems whose parameters are vectors of significations (Husserl, 1932).

Signitive World

There are theoretical notions that something is either given as a fact or a proposition that is derived from a number of facts – a general proposition. Assuming that the move from facts to general propositions is even possible, such a move will not account for our disregard of the meaning of general propositions and their use in a context of formal demonstrations. This is to say that general propositions will turn out to be inadequate to demonstrate formal conditions. Hence, there is no connection between generalization and formalization. Formal operations employ rules that need not respect the truth or falsity of general propositions. In this sense, formalization is a signitive process that correlates to rules such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division in arithmetic; or rules of implication, inference, deduction in logic, which do not reflect anything that is available in generalized propositions. Thus we can operate by excluding both empirical facts and the general propositions derived from them, and construct in turn empirical facts based on formal requirements. In brief, we can formulate mathematical rules and use any empirical fact to instantiate such rules. Moreover, using such rules, we can transform empirical facts by our practical activities in a way that the facts will be directly constructed on the basis of the formal rules. This is one level at which material technology arises.

Technology is, at this level, in principle a transformation of the environmental factors into signitive life world. This suggests that the very factual objectivity, transformed in this way, is a system of formal signitive relationships. Given that the modern conception of the environment is regarded to be the sum of material parts that are qualitatively and essentially indifferent, then such materiality can be used as a condition for any possible reconstruction on the grounds of formal systems. This state of affairs implies that our technical life world is more basically a system of signitive interconnections (Mickunas, 1983). But in principle the formal systems already have a subtext: they themselves are technologies of reconstruction of the material environment. Thus despite scientific claims to be based on empirical facts, the practice of science that assumes the objectivity of formal systems as a condition for doing science is a process of application that treats the formal sciences as techniques requiring the reconstruction of the environment, in ways that the formal techniques imply (Schabert, 1978).

While we granted the technical side of formal systems, which has been also granted by modern sciences, we have not yet shown the connections between these formal systems and the material facts. Science takes this connection for granted without explicating how formal systems that science uses and the facts from which the formal systems cannot be derived are connected. One constantly talks about applying sciences to reality in order to test whether the application is warranted or not. In a superficial way, this is known as testing of hypotheses. Obviously, testing the hypothesis does not simply mean opening your eyes and looking, but using highly sophisticated technical means. The latter are already constructed on the basis of formal requirements as a mediation between the so-called physical material world and the logic of science. In this sense, the very testing of hypothesis presupposes the background of formal systems that are imbedded in material techniques. Regardless how far we extend the notion of scientific testing, we should have to include the technological background as a condition both for the testing of hypotheses and as a scientific praxis that must translate every formal requirement into material conditions. Perhaps to our surprise, although it may not be at all surprising, there emerge phenomena that are **self-generating** and are beyond anyone's control: 1) formal systems that have no cause and no empirical base and disregard any empirical generalization, and, therefore, can be used at will; 2) the empirical environment reduced to indifferent material substance that does not imply any qualitative differences; 3) any

qualitative generalizations do not imply the formal systems; and 4) the view of the formal systems as hypotheses to be tested in the factual world implies that the factual world will have to be drawn into the signitive process of the formal systems. But as we said before this is technology – the formal systems are reified into sundry instrumentalities which, as mentioned above, compose the modern Western life world.

This logic of "self-generating" formal systems that get directly translated into material implements implies that even the material facts are co-extensive with the signitive domain of formal constructions (Jonas, 1981). The latter, having no empirical ground and, therefore, not being caused by any psychological, social, evolutionary, or metaphysical components, may be regarded as a self-constituted and, thus, autonomous processes. After all, what is causally explained will have to have one to one correlation: given a specific cause, a specific effect will follow. But in signitive processes a specific formal condition will imply its consequences irrespective of causal requirements. This is to say that varying causal conditions will not correspond to the variation of formal conditions, and conversely. Formal-signitive implications are not of the same order as causal connections.

The transformation of materiality into signitive conditions implies that the social environment is a life world structure, consisting of a system of multiple implications. To speak in a limited traditional sense, all social factual phenomena are not merely factual, but already signitive. In this sense, the world we live in is social, historical, scientific, and technical world of multiple signitive vectors, all comprising a modern life world. At this juncture, we no longer have to be worried about the mind-body problem where signification is somehow subjective, and what is not signitive is objective. The very practice of science has abolished this dichotomy, despite scientific metaphysics. Our argument so far grants that signification as meaning and/or sense making is already available at the formal level that is understood by anyone engaged in scientific venture and engaged in applying this venture to environmental material conditions. Once those conditions are "realized" and, therefore, science is verified, we acquire a construct that purports to be explanatory and self-explanatory.

The reason for this self-explanation is the valuation which is in a background that grants certain formal systems the practical value to transform the environment in favor of the so-called "human needs". Once again, what is theoretically at issue is that human needs as empirical, be they psychological, sociological, or economic, do not imply formal-signitive systems. Therefore, the latter will have to be constructed and selected as values to correspond to those needs. We must note that the selection of the formal systems as valuable to fulfill the needs has no direct connection with such needs. The latter are psychological, biological. social, economic, while the former are signitive. In other words, one is premised on empirical generalizations as various needs, the other is formal systems that must be connected to such needs by way of technical implementation. Therefore, the selection of the formal systems that would be relevant will have a criterion that has to be translated into formal systems. This means that the criterion will be some valuative principle that will facilitate the decision as to which formal system will be adequate to apply for the fulfillment of which needs. In this sense, there is again a way of saying that the formal systems have to become techniques to fulfill the criteria of empirical needs. Yet the process is still more complex: the needs themselves are also selected in terms of their significance in a given life world, and hence are not a mere observation and generalization of empirical phenomena. In principle formal systems as signitive are valuative to the extent that they can fulfill the desires that are equally articulated in terms of socially, psychologically, and economically signified needs. In other words, the very needs are significant by social and not by empirical definition. Not every psychological wish, biological drive will be regarded as socially significant. In this sense only the significant needs will be granted value. What emerges here is a question of multiple valuations. What kind of

valuations there are, and what kind of formal systems must be constituted to translate the material environment in order to fulfill the valuation of needs depends on the complex intersignification of a given life world.

The signitive logics that pervade the life world, with the latter's valuative selectivities, is also at the background of cybernetic revolution. This is to say, while the cybernetic revolution brought in computer science, it has at the same time included as a background of the self-generating process of formal systems that are translated and reified into the technical environment. The computerized logic as formal has no regard to anything that is environmentally, qualitatively differentiated. Its own logic does not need to respect the so called "natural-qualitative" differentiations. Any living, working, suffering being in this logic of indifference that transcends such a being, can regard all events in terms of mutually replaceable variants. Social, economic, pedagogical, cultic, cultural givens are, in this logic, equivalences in normative exchanges. Whether something is labor power, art work, mysticism must subject itself to the requirements of formal rules of quantification. The latter, the quantification, must become the information to be transmitted globally. While previously tele-visual globalization was available and this globalization depended on valuative selectivity of large media organizations, the computerized globalization offers any arbitrary access to any selectivity. This means that rhetorical propositions as translatable into practices will be equivalent to other propositions. No external judgment is possible apart from an appeal to other computerized information whose credibility is simply the appearance in the global network. Computerization opens up a domain of any space and any time accessed without history, without places and without times. It is a synchronic instrument premised on signification that is everywhere and yet not localizable. The age of the computer is a world of signification where there is no place and time and, conversely, where all places and all times are equivalently accessible. Our task is therefore to explore the domain of all places and all times.

Signitive Space and Time

As we already saw, regardless of the arguments given by positivist historians and anthropologists, the simple access to the past is not read as empirical, but conversely every empirical discovered datum is read as a text that means. This is to say that what we call the past is not accessed empirically, since in principle we cannot be there empirically (for example we cannot be at the battle of Waterloo), but we access those events by reading texts, monuments, not as empirical data but as various systems. This is to say that time and space wherein we locate empirical events is accessible only as a signitive framework of sense making to which everyone has access. Given that we have no time machines to go from now into the future or the past, the only access we have to both of those temporal components is the immediacy of meaning and sense making awareness. In this sense, the globalizing process of cybernetic revolution is based on our ability to communicate irrespective of place and time on the globe, because we know or understand what the others mean. This suggests that dealing with the computer technology we are presented with immediate access to the entire world, not because of our capacity to be empirically everywhere, but because of the technical capacity to make present signitively constituted events no matter how far or near in the so-called real space and time.

We are not suggesting that signification is something eternal given beyond space and time; rather it is contingent to the extent that sense making systems are embodied in and maintained through the various technical means as carriers of such systems. When we speak of systems, we are in the same domain as logical or mathematical systems, assumed as given by any modern science. In this sense, when someone reads the computer messages, that someone does not question the presence of such messages, despite the empirical fact that those messages originated ten thousand miles away. In this sense, one reads signification as temporally and spatially indifferent. In brief, prior to the question of where and when, there is an awareness what the message means and what sense does it make.

In our argument, we note that the reading of a message is prior to and pervades the empirical means that transmit the message. Computer, as technological means, is a spacio-temporal entity, but it is designed to carry the presence of significations that have no specific space-time positions. This would be analogous to the construction of the non-Euclidean space. The latter has no empirically given intuitive component. It is a pure system of formal constructs that does not point to any material, mental, or other "realistic factors." Yet non-Euclidean geometry is regarded as an important way of articulating (if not actually constructing) other dimensions capable of transforming life world environment (Stroeker, 1965). This kind of non-positional objectivity is a condition for computerized communication to the extent that it does not require either the senders or the receivers of messages to have the same mental-physical experience. As we suggested above, there is a variation between the empirical and the signitive such that it is possible to have different empirical factors making the same sense and one empirical factor having diverse senses. Since the major level of computer signification is logic, then there is a constructive connection between this logic and various life world facts, and in turn such facts can be articulated and reconstructed by different computer logics.

Given the computer non-positional logics, and given that they can be carried by appropriate technologies, then in principle it is possible to select and to transmit the sense of any event as if it were immediately present to anyone. What is at issue is the process of selectivity that is not implied by the constructed logics and by the empirical events such logics frame. Here we encounter the question of selectivity as valuation. Among numerous events signified in a life world, some are regarded as important and valuable. At this level, valuation does not have any rules that could be derived from either domain, the formal-logical or the technically constructed events of the life world. What is required by our analysis are the value conditions that connect signification and such events. The point we have reached is the previously mentioned requirement of connecting logic with fact, mathematics with data, and sense making with events. Since the systems of signification are constitutable at will, they themselves do not imply which of them are relevant to the social, economic, pedagogical, cultural aspacts of a life world. Resultantly, the very constitution of signitive systems requires a value criteria which would say: 1) what formal systems among all possibilities should be applied to what aspects and events; and, 2) the criteria for the constitution of specific formal systems must be part of a society, a political society, political economy, political economical ideology, that would provide a clue concerning what is relevant among possible formal systems. In fact, we would argue that the very construction of computer technology based on logical signification is a technology that embodies valuation. This is to say we elect to build this instead of other technology. This is simply to remind us that technology embodies valuative conditions and therefore it cannot be regarded as a mere empirical fact.

What is appropriate to the theme of space and time is that the technical means that embody the formal logic and its valuative subtext can be produced and set up anywhere and any time around the world. Yet it is to be noted that such a set up carries with it the social-cultural, economic, and technical life world. Thus, first world imports and transfers the latest technologies to the third world in order to help "develop" the local populations, to make them aware of the rest of the world, in brief in order for them to be signitively accessible and accessing events no matter where and when. This globalizing transference of technology brings with it non-positional space-time to all who can afford the technological means. We must remind ourselves that those very global means are not mere empirical data or facts, but carry with them valuative conditions. For modern Western understanding, values are deemed to be subjective, in contrast to the objectivity of the empirical, and as we have argued, to the logical-signitive domain. Yet the very selectivity of certain logics over others, and of their connection to the events is valuative. Exporting

computer (and other) technologies also includes the export of values imbedded in technologies.

Valuative Nexus

The ideology of science has maintained all along that there is a difference between value and fact, and that science is value free. We have argued that the required connection between logic and fact introduces a third component which at base is valuative. This is to say that the very understanding of application of logically framed theories or hypotheses introduces selectivity among various hypotheses and a selectivity what domains in the environment are relevant for application and hence techno-logical reconstruction. The reconstruction is an activity premised on human purposes and resultantly on various levels of valuation interpreted in various ways, such as sociological, psychological, economic, ideological, and even mythological. Since scientifically speaking values do not belong to objectivity, then they are part of the world either of subjective or intersubjective proposals. We are not contending that such proposals are totally arbitrary, based on individualistic desires, but we are contending that even when they are interpreted socially, they still are primarily values. Even if we quantify values and claim to have gained objective data, we have not, therefore, abolished their value function (Luhmann, 1981).

This leads us to the understanding of computer rationality as purposive, value laden, and, therefore, premised on individual or social purposes. We shall argue that the computer rationality consist of layers of value systems and in final analysis valuations that both promote autonomous selectivity and invention, and in turn place demands on individuals and groups. To engage in continuous proliferation of increasing efficiency and circular creativity requires that any logic that is translated into material implements becomes, in turn, the means to create more novel, encompassing, and efficient computer logics. This is the subjecting process wherein one is compelled to constantly engage in research that is not designed only to discover new facts, but to invent new ways to establish logics that would become factually efficient. This is a magic circle. The more we constitute new logics that are translated into material implements, such as computers, the more we are capable to use the same computers to open up new logics for their own material implementation. But the point of this magic circle is an increase in possibilities of valuative selectivity. The latest computer machines can perform calculations that previous logics were incapable of performing. In this sense, the very latest machines can instruct us about the possibilities of new logics (Jonas, 1981).

There is an available dogma that computer science is objective and has no need for any values; after all, anyone can learn the latest computer programs and the required use of this technology. No doubt. Whether in China or Guatemala, the computer will be regarded as means to process and transmit information. Thus, the view is that computers are purely technical and indifferent menas, usable by anyone, and therefore its only value is what particular groups or individuals want to give them. It is like saying that there are trees and whatever people want to make of them will give those tress their value. But this is a wrong analogy, because the computer systems are themselves information, and indeed selected information. First, the imbedded information is a particular logic of the computer (the software); second, its specific material design (the hardware); third, its economic system of values and the modes of production; and finally, the options that it suggests. In this sense, the objectivity of the computer embodies various levels of valuations. Those who acquire the latest machinery do not acquire means of processing and transmitting messages but also the messages of computer logic, embodiment, economy, and basically an entire life world and its social systems. Moreover, the logic of the programs is designed to process information in specific ways. While the user is told that he or she is free to access information, the information is mediated by the logic of the program, the economy of affordability by specific group, in a specific part of the world, and its

purposive rationality that would dictate the programs and the messages that the given population will access. In brief, the objective claim that computer rationality is merely a means for anyone dealing with messages is to restrictive to what computer logic is all about.

The point of our concern is this: first, the objectivity of computer logic is selective; second, the selectivity is imbedded in the production of the software; third, the software is restrictive to the extent that it prescribes and, we suggest, interprets the messages to be received; fourth, it constructs socio-economic parameters for the useability and affordability of this so-called value free instrument; fifth, the logic of the latest software demands the reproduction of hardware, leading to a constant rush for the latest technology. Otherwise the latest software will be in the hands only of those who can afford the latest hardware. In this sense, vast populations of the world may be able to afford the outdated hardware, and those so-called objective systems are split into the populations that can match the latest hardware with the latest software, and those who depend on the outdated hardware, and therefore cannot engage in receiving, producing, or processing the messages provided by the latest software. This is the paradox: as we have mentioned before, one requires a constant subjection to the efficiency and reconstruction both of the logics and the hardware that imply socio-economic valuation and the capacity, therefore, to acquire what would become, or for some has become, the latest.

The implication is obvious: vast populations of the world would be called upon equally to engage in valuation. Do we want the latest hardware to match the latest software? Or, do we want to protect the environment, to educate next generations, to afford decent housing or medical care? It is the case that all things cannot be accomplished at once, and to buy latest hardware may have to be postponed in favor of other human purposes and, therefore, to forego the receiving of messages that are deemed to be objectively accessible for everyone. We are suggesting that the introduction of the computerized systems around the globe is not an innocent presence of means to acquire information, but valuational requirements of peoples and their governments to deal with what is of greater value in a given society. In short, we are not rejecting the computer logic and its objectivity, yet we wish to show that it belongs in various value contexts. At the center of this valuative complexity, there is also the understanding that currently the valuations are computer mediated. They are systems of significations that are accessible to anyone and anywhere. Valuation here is part of the global selectivity, and the question is what type of value significations are currently prevailing?

Signitive Power

So far so good. But a question remains: why the rush for the newest computer logics, newest and fastest materialization of such logics, and the very transformation of the materials into previously unheard of combinations: chips, conductive systems, miniaturizations, and massification that lead to increasing compacting of functions? Certainly not for the sake of scientific discovery of "objectivity," since the interests and valuations do not aim at objectivity but at its transformation. The more plausible conclusion is this: the entire process of metaphysical signitive constructions, that are directly shifted to application and productivity, imply – strange as it may seem – signitive power. To understand the latter, we want to argue against the notion of causal power of classical tradition: all events in nature have their specific causes. Yet for modern understanding, signification, comprising at one level logical and quantitative interconnections, has no causal power. The logical connection "If P then Q" (if it rains then the ground will be wet) cannot cause rain, since it is an empty formulation that can be applied to anything. Yet what modern understanding of constructing of logic implies is this: if we want rain, what logico-mathematical formulations must we invent and how such an invention can signify the production of the material conditions for rain. In this sense, valuation implies a selection of logics that are materially signitive and

hence are "empowered" to transform the environment. Signitive power, in this sense, becomes the metaphysically preeminent regard toward the world. It appears in socio-economic currency as "power of ideas," or "clash of views," or "progress comes from ideas," or "we need people with creative ideas," etc. In the classical regard, creative ideas belonged to poetry, theater, and rhetoric, but currently, they are the very power to elicit transformation of the environment, including the human as an aspect of the environment (e.g. genetic reconstruction of the human). Indeed, the battle for signitive power has intensified to such an extent that even some main stream journals are talking about "who owns your ideas?" In short, signification has to be adjudicated socio-economically and even legally (Mann, 1998). Once again, one is no longer concerned with "pure metaphysics," but with metaphysics as power.

Here our argument becomes quite obvious; computer systems are embodied metaphysics of signification and hence have the power to increase the complexity and efficiency both of signitive creations and also of their applications for transformation of the so-called physical environment. Thus the talk of the new generation of "more powerful computers" is not an idle speculation, but must be taken literally. As signitive constructs, they are in a position to rearticulate and, through application, to transform events in a given life world, and, in many cases, to rearticulate the life world itself. Indeed, they are part of the events that they transform to the extent that they are interconnected laterally with all other events, from economic, through political to cultural. They are the very fabric of current "culture of information," and information is in principle signification.

The very formulation of logic as purposive and applicable implies that this logic is the basis of power. What we are suggesting is that the ground of various current theories, advocating the primacy of discursive power, are premised on the notion of application. Discourse as discourse would have no power unless its significations not only define but also prescribe the rules of transformation of events in a life world. What is at issue here is the radical arbitrariness and contingency of the notion of logic. While initially logic was regarded as the bearer of necessary rules, capable of deciphering the rational structure of nature, now it is seen as a construct that follows unfounded purposes. In this sense, there can be many logics wherein each is designed to perform a task and hence to be the source of power. As we mention above, the age of information, or what some people call postindustrial society, is totally premised on transmission, appropriation, creation, and combination of signitive processes. Even the traditional notion of capitalism as producing and selling of material values has become redundant. What the material values embody is a level of information that is more important than the material value. In this sense, the information imbedded in computer logic is more valuable than the material production of the computer. This value is of course extended to all social domains. As Braudillard has pointed out, the social positioning of persons is not economical, but signitive (Boudrillard, 1981). People buy signs of importance, even if such signs are simulacra. I am not rich, but I post signs of wealth. This phenomenon of signitive importance is paraded in mass media when peoples of the so-called third world exhibit their computer knowledge and indeed a possession of the latest hardware, despite the fact that the primary needs such as shelter, clothing, food are quite inadequate. In short, we are up to date, and therefore we are significant.

The computer logic is at the same time the logic of contemporary political economy and social self-understanding. In principle, the instrumentalization of logic on the basis of valuative requirements is also instrumentalization of all signitive domains that are deemed to be of value because of the power that signification opens. Computers are coextensive with the fabric of the globalizing processes that are engaged in transmission of information about and through everything. It is of note that even the previously exempt areas of imaginatory signification, such as film and video production, have now become a prerrogative of computer information. This is to say, there is a digital translation of material products such as tapes into

pure signitive processes that can be access through computer logic everywhere, anytime, without any need to transport things materially. All one needs is a logic to deal with any materiality, and therefore, translate any materiality into signitive power.

What appears here as a conclusion of Western modern modernity with its metaphysics and ontology is, at one level, a reversal of explanation: the usual ploy was that we can explain everything materially, in terms of cause and effect. But our argument had already suggested that the primacy should be placed on the metaphysical side. In this sense, at another level, the current digitalization of signification and proliferation of information systems reveals that modern science and technology are basically metaphysical, that is signitive. To speak with historical hermeneutics, we can claim that the truth of modern sciences as metaphysical, appears in the globalized computer logic under the guide of the age of information. In other words, the truth of a particular position, even if not recognized by those who proposed this position may appear centuries later. Our argument can be supported by the following consideration: the transportation of material things that may depend on cause and effect is being replaced by processes that defy any kind of space time continuum. The metaphysical signitive processes are non-temporal and non-spacial since their meaning is transmitted directly. Yet this process is also immediately translated into materialization and realization of how to change material events in any part of the world, and therefore, to acquire material power. Not to be comical, nonetheless, we would suggest that this is Plato gone mad. At any rate, our argument that modernity consist of specific metaphysics and its correlate ontology is born out by the current phenomena of signitive logics at all levels, although centered in the computer logic, that have become global preoccupation of peoples who had never heard about western political and scientific enlightenments.

Postscript

While current literatures are still talking about economic and material interests, psychological securities and insecurities, and desires of populations to become part of modern history, we contend that these designations are surface appearances of the Western modernization with is metaphysical and ontological grounds that have been unrecognized so far. While we are not the first ones to suggest that formal and mathematical processes are involved in articulating the world, our claim is that there has not been a recognition that the formal-quantitative procedures are at base metaphysical and therefore free from the constrains of space and time, and that they have assumed priority over the material. We contend that the conditions for the possibility of globalization are not economic, psychological, even ideological, but signitive. The reason for this claim is that before a particular people in global economy will acquire the economic conditions to better their lives they have been already informed signitivelly of what is the better life. And the better life is the possession of modern technology, specifically information technology such as computers and their logic, and above all the value preferances imbedded in this logic. This logic, in turn, is the end of temporality, end of history; it is all encompassing logic that can transmit its values to any village with promises of the production of anything that the logic signifies in global economy. Of course, the villages would be able to access the information once they have accepted the latest computer – to access this information. The latter is laden with value offers, specifically with images of the "good life" that will require the materialization of this signitive power. We see the images, then we buy into the global economy to materialize those images in the forms of beauty, sun glasses, jeans, kellogs cereal, and sundry overproduced and overpriced cheap commodities. Computer is the metaphysical logic that has the power to accomplish this task. Of course, we shall not make a judgment whether this accomplishment destroys or saves the multiple ways people have lived or want to continue to live. This is to say, will they be absorbed into the metaphysics of transformation of their environments in order to join the global nexus? Or will they be able to

maintain by virtue of the mass means provided by the acquisition of computers and their logic to maintain their own difference? This subtends the entire discussion of multiculturism, environmental protection, and even the rights of peoples to self-determination.

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GLOBALUS GYVENAMASIS PASAULIS

Algis Mickunas

Santrauka

Straipsnyje atskleidžiamas Vakarų civilizacijos aspektas, tapęs vadinamosios „globalizacijos“ pamatu. Pateikiamas argumentas, kad ši civilizacija remiasi formaliomis sistemomis, kurios neredukuojamos iš fizinių ar empirinių duomenų. Tokios sistemos yra techniškai ir produktyviai su aplinka susieti konstruktai. Todėl sistemų atranka priklauso nuo nauda pagrįsto socialinio jų vertinimo. Dabartinės internetinės komunikacijos sistemos fiziškai neegzistuoja; jos yra grynai signityvios, nes negali būti lokalizuotos jokiuose konkrečiuose erdvėlaikio taškuose, nors gali būti įkūnytos bet kada ir bet kur. Tokios sistemos sukuria nematomą tinklą, kuriuo galima gauti ir siųsti žinias apie visus planetos įvykius. Straipsnyje argumentuojama, kad ši komunikacija, nors ir labai sparti, vis dėlto užima laiko, nes jos logika yra signityvi, tinklas prasmių, kurios pačios savaime ilgainiui apibrėžia erdvę ir laiką. Galima be jokio prieštaravimo tvirtinti, kad nematomas signityvusis pasaulis yra tradicinės metafizikos variantas, kaip ir Platono matematikos samprata ar idėjų pasaulis.

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: globalumas, mokslas, logika, signifikacija, vertė, technologija, erdvėlaikis.

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