

I. DISKURSO IR NARATYVO TYRIMAI / BADANIA NAD DYSKURSEM I NARRACJĄ

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THE PRIMACY OF INDEX IN NAMING PARADIGMS. PART II

This analysis highlights the semiotic naming differences between the pronouns, nouns, and verbs. It capitalizes on the role of Peirce's Object in assigning names and the special character of pronouns and verbs to hasten notice of Objects. It showcases Peirce's indexical sign as an individuating instrument, by arguing that nouns do not name the Object uniquely. The invoking notice of shifting places via pronouns/verbs is paramount.

Naming begins with the most pure Indexes (pronouns), then nouns (which draw upon similar features); afterward, verbs emerge to name the dynamic event profile, illustrating the indispensability of the index. The advances in deictic individuation establish and reinforce the joint attentional ventures: co-signers are compelled not merely to attend to the same Object but to recognize distinctive participant roles in events as well.

KEY WORDS: index, naming, verbs, pronouns, Peirce.

The Power of Peirce's Object:

The distinction between "object" in common parlance and Charles Sanders Peirce's use of the "Object" as a referent of a Sign is pivotal. Peirce's use of "Object" includes: tangibles (whether present or absent), linguistic entities (such as words), intangibles (including invisible constructs: God, angels, monsters, phantasms, imaginary friends, and the like), or mental constructs such as propositions. Further arguments will be proffered as to how pronouns and proper names serve as individuals versus singulars, as measured by the issues of the relative power of Objects to affect the signs. To this end, it must be noted that it is the Object which monitors semiosis, namely,

the Object forms the basis for assigning the novel Interpretants (West 2013b); the Immediate Object determines its kind (mental representations which are fundamentally analogic in nature). The Object can predict the kind of sign which issues (Index, Icon, or Symbol). Finally, it is the Object which establishes the need for concurrent sign use, when the supplementation of a second sign is warranted to clarify the intended referent. In short, within the Object lies the impetus to call up the stored conceptual representations (signs or Interpretants) in the form of semantic memories to enhance the meaning construal. Such power resides within the Object, as in cases of the Index in spatial contiguity with the location of the Object.

Objects of Peirce's individual type elicit signs, which can best showcase their discreteness and not their commonalities with other entities. As such, they select "pure" Indexes to highlight their location and identity. They are not as likely to select Symbols, especially at the early stages of development when the global percepts predominate and when the vocabulary items are less enriched by the differentiated real world experience. Accordingly, although individuals (pronouns, the first instances of proper names) do not constitute names in the strict, classic sense of naming, in that their lack of obvious physical and functional attributes militates against comparing them with an exemplar and ultimately determining into which class of objects they best fit. Pronouns and the first instances of the proper name do qualify as names and names of a rather perfect vintage for Peirce. If nouns are "imperfect" specimens of individuating, because they "do what the pronoun does at once" (1893: 2.287 fn1), their naming function is actually superior and not inferior, given its natural way of naming Objects with attentional signs.

In fact, Objects of individuals (especially demonstratives) strip their signs of the means to subsist as the best exemplars of a class when they are used instead of the singulars. The choice of "that" (compelled by non-concept-driven Objects) for whatever noun (whether observable or not) equalizes and perhaps reduces all the objects to an identical Object (those which are noticed), which is wiped clean of any kind of semantic affiliation. This process of "wiping clean", the noun actually appears to represent the starting point or zero point of naming, namely, transforming the speaker's single focus to a joint attentional venture. This happens because without this

attentional paradigm the naming is likely to be stripped of its very character, i.e., to direct or force attention on an Object. It is well-documented that infants will not apply novel names to Objects without joint attentional success, absent capture of another's attention via gaze and pointing (to the other, then to the Object) and after securing the other's focus thereon (Tomasello 1999: 62). In view of the Object's need for the joint attentional Indexical signs in this early enterprise and in the light of the overall primacy of demonstrative pronouns in ontogeny, their preeminence in the naming process is unquestionable.

Peirce supports this line of reasoning that the pronouns are preeminent in the naming process, when he asserts that nouns derive from pronouns, not the reverse (as many have been assumed).

It is impossible to express what an assertion refers to except by means of an Index. A pronoun is an Index. A noun, on the other hand, does not indicate the object it denotes; and when a noun is used to show what one is talking about, the experience of the hearer is relied upon to make up for the incapacity of the noun for doing what the pronoun does at once. Thus, a noun is an imperfect substitute for a pronoun. Nouns also serve to help out verbs (1893: 2.287 fn1).

Peirce is adamant that it is the pronoun which has greater means to individuate. Thus, nouns (when they replace pronouns) are an "imperfect substitute." Because of the exclusive focus on their Object's uniqueness and the legisign's vague, all-encompassing nature, pronouns point in a universal way, such that they are relatively free from semantic wrapping. This compulsive dependence on the pronoun liberates the signer from casting about for the most suitable singular sign: a noun which classifies the Object. Instead, signers can

plug in a demonstrative pronoun and need not access stored semantic knowledge. Employing “that” in lieu of a noun is quite automatic and requires far less on-line deliberation. It allows signers to forego the process of settling upon a fitting conventional singular sign, which depends upon increased conscious control, which is often unavailable (given less developed working memory skills).

“That” represents an easy default or a concerted effort to individuate the Object via selection of an individual rather than a singular to represent the interest of the signer in describing the Object’s effect upon consciousness. Although the noun individuates its Object, such is not as effectual to celebrate the Object’s differentness, when compared to the riveting effect of pronouns.

Proper Names as Names:

Because proper nouns virtually always individuate, they, likewise, constitute names. In fact, they ordinarily individuate in a manner which trumps that of common nouns, given the proper noun’s heavy dependence on the pragmatic factors for interpretation and relatively semantic-free contributions from the code. The importance of pragmatic factors to interpret proper names makes necessary the presence of index (visual gestures) to disambiguate the referent, because, unlike common nouns, the NP does not inherently connect the referent to other similar referents.

Although definiteness is useful in determining lexemes suitable for the naming process, it does not distinguish between names, which refer distinctly to those which require semantic, hence, classificatory knowledge. Definiteness does not distinguish between referents, which are unique and those which are “one of a kind”; cf.: “The car is

in the driveway” with “The Prius is in the driveway.”

Despite their differences, proper and common nouns bear some similarity. The use of proper names, as a species of a noun, is apprehended rather early in the development (perhaps prior to apprehending common nouns as names), before 0;7 (Tincoff, Jusczyk 1999: 174); but they are recognized primarily with reference to familiar persons, especially family relations, e.g., Mommy or child’s own name. The former does not qualify definitively as a proper name; in linguistic genres, “vocative” characterizes their use (Clark 2009: 315–316). Vocative refers to terms used to secure another’s attention as in “gimme dat, Mommy.” Given the nature of early proper name use as vocatives, they are most often existentially connected with their referents: compelling the intervention of index to determine the referent. This is a characteristic which they share with the initial uses of pronouns and proper names in non-peripheral uses (exophoric), especially operational in the case of demonstratives (cf. West 2013b for further foundation). Proper names share several other features with pronouns, chief among them is their reference to individuals. While pronouns refer using the semantic meaning; in point of fact, they are in some sense less individual than are the proper names in nearly every instance of use. For example, “this is my favorite meal, not ‘that’ one,” categorizes “this” as a near object from the speaker’s perspective and “that” as a far object, but this spatially contrastive demonstrative use contains semantic meaning in its establishment of the speaker as Origo and in its demarcation of near and far distance from Origo’s location. In contrast, “Sally is my favorite person, not Julia,” hints a little, if any, universal semantic commonalities

or differences in the meaning, apart from the referent-based meaning affiliations. Essentially, proper names properly refer to individuals independent of their existential relationship to their referent, typically persons.

The consensus in the discipline of Linguistics for the last fifty years is that both pronouns and proper names exude the grammatical characteristic of definiteness for several reasons: both typically reject definite determiners in the same noun phrase, neither is ordinarily pluralizable (particularly in English), nor is either ever a mass noun. Often when the denotative function operates the name (proper or otherwise) has a less designative function. Proper names do not merely behave similarly to plural generic nouns, at least syntactically, in that they do not permit a definite determiner, although generics can appear bare or can take definite/indefinite determiners, e.g., “dogs (bare generic), a dog/the dog.” The following sentences illustrate these possibilities: “Dogs are man’s best friend,” “A dog is a good friend” and “The dog is man’s best friend.” Accordingly, the following construction (using proper names in the same way) is rather curious, approximating an anomaly: “a Paul is a good thing,” but one might produce: “a Gibson is a good thing.” The latter is possible, given its more generic character, i.e., either referring to the significant contribution of J. J. and Eleanor Gibson to the field of Psychology or referring to the brand of guitar. In short, both generics and proper names often refer to ensembles, not merely to single individuals (Lyons 1999: 195). In fact, in some cases, the generics and proper names behave indistinguishably when they indicate a class, e.g., “My dad has a Prius” or “I like Hershey’s not Nestlé’s.” In this use, they both refer to a

collective. Hence, despite their definiteness, they are not strictly individuals when they express an ensemble. Still, both are definite in that they refer to a familiar, identifiable and somewhat specific collective whose form is impermeable. Nonetheless, they are distinguishable from one another syntactically in that the primary uses of proper names resist modification by determiners, whereas generics welcome their presence in the same NP.

The primary distinction between generics and proper names, on the one hand, and common nouns, on the other hand, is the degree to which the name can refuse to coalesce from a referent with discrete form into one for which form becomes eroded (Macnamara 1982: 139–140). While generics (inclusive of proper names) refuse to coalesce, common nouns may not altogether refuse to do so. For example, whereas dogs (as generics) do not coalesce, a pebble (common noun) can coalesce into gravel (Macnamara 1982: 138–140). If, however, “Sally” (proper name) were to coalesce into “a crowd/group,” “Sally” would lose her proper name status. Proper names, as in *Alice in Wonderland*, are incapable of coalescing, disbursing with discrete form. In sum, the similarity between generics and proper names demonstrates the existence of blurry demarcations, lending some evidence to the claim that proper names belong to the category of generics (Lyons 1999: 199).

The onset of proper names, with respect to: generics, common nouns, and pronouns (especially of the personal kind), materializes early on (Clark 2009). This fact confirms the existence of spatial primitives and Index ontologically. The vocative use of proper names typically appears rather earlier, within children’s initial fifty words (even prior to two word utterances), ordi-

narily between 1;6 and 2;4 (Lust 2006: 194; West 1988: 152–153). The vocative use of proper names demonstrates a real presence of the Index in the attentional purpose of vocatives, calling the name or role designator of the caregiver to commandeer joint enterprises. It appears that, although vocative use can refer to a collective/ensemble (e.g., Mommy), children's initial uses do not reflect this. Instead, their referents are likely to be individual, attending to a single individual and not to the familial role. It is not until personal pronouns are used in the same manner, to refer to general speaker-listener roles (cf. West 2013a), that vocatives have a role, that of a caregiver. "Mommy" and "daddy" refer to perhaps the primary/only caregiver whom children know and filling the subject slot with a proper name conforms to what children consider the standard, since all sentences appear to include explicit subjects on the surface level. Rather than leaving an imperative without an overt subject, they fill the slot with a vocative, e.g., "Mommy, come here" rather than "come here." Proper names there are the substitutes for non-overt addressee pronouns. In this substitution, children do not need to classify addressee role.

Similarly, prior to and concurrently with the use of speaker pronouns, proper names are employed in lieu of the speaker's pronouns (West 1986: 131–132; West 1989: 40–41; Bloom *et al.* 1974: 67). Although this practice appears to be universal, it materializes far more often in certain disordered/sensory-impaired populations (West 1986: 131–132; West 1989: 40–41). Blind children without any concomitant abnormalities were still employing this proper name substitution for their role as speaker in the discourse, even at 3;10 (West 1986: 130–134). These blind children

likewise substituted third person pronouns for speaker self between 2;4 and 3;8 (West 1989: 40–43), perhaps demonstrating some failure to recognize conversational roles. In view of blind children's decreased likelihood to be included in conversational exchanges, they may be less practiced in the pronoun use, especially of the speaker vantage and consequently more reliant on referring to the persons independent of that role, especially themselves, which proper name substitution accomplishes. Autistic children with reasonable linguistic facility perform similarly to the blind children in Donna E. West's study, perhaps for similar reasons: they are not as actively sought out as conversational partners (Loveland 1993: 245; Sigman, Capps 1997: 29). Since both third person pronouns and proper names refer to collectives/ensembles, neither population lacks the classificatory skills altogether. What appears to be missing is the deictic skill to index a participant role, not to index an individual.

Other, still less conventional uses of proper names materialize as substitutes for the children's own name. Rather than employing first or second person pronouns to refer to ego within conversational exchanges, children universally use their own names (West 1986: 131–132; West 1989: 40–41). In doing so, they need not to name their role(s) as one partner or the other in the conversation. Their uses are designative, referring to self and other without classifying speaker/listener roles. In other words, when children name themselves within the conversational exchange (until 2;10), they do not alter individuating self as ego from self as a contributor to the speech event. This phenomenon demonstrates that although children encode themselves as participants in the event being reported (the narrated

event), they are hard pressed to designate their role in the speech event (as “I”); they can indicate themselves as doing X (“Sally drinks juice”, but not yet as a speaker does X (“I drink juice.”) In short, early on the children’s use of proper name instead of the speaker pronoun short-circuits reference to their role as reporter of their own participation in an event.

More mainstream uses of the proper names reveal an extension of their Interpretants from the individual (referring to a single person only) to a generic-based use in which apprehension of the name to the other persons is viable. This process is likely to begin with a recognition that “mommy” is used to refer to maternal figures of any child. As such, proper names can be determined to refer to a host of individuals who have been accorded that name and even to types of inanimates (those which resemble animates, e.g., cars and guitars). Inanimates are more a subject to proper name association after an intimate relationship with them has been developed. In fact, it is likely that the productive use of generic terms is relatively concurrent with that of more adult-like proper name uses. What is riveting is the fact that children employ count nouns (at 1;8) such as “a dog” or “an apple”, which have an object-based individuating function (Nelson *et al.* 1993). Although the individuating function is naturally operational, given the children’s propensity to use the Index for investigating spatial primitives; nonetheless, their facility to individuate is enhanced by the count noun naming. When an object was named, children were more likely to individuate a similar object in an array, but when a demonstrative pronoun was employed, rather than the common count noun, any object was individuated from the array including the dissimilar

objects. For example, similar objects were selected after the prompt: “find another dax,” than upon: “see this, find another one.” Hence, the name in the form of a count noun appears to further harness children’s propensity to individuate. Nevertheless, proper names constitute a quintessential/basic means to individuate. Unlike count nouns, proper names are never employed with determiners, nor their individuating function is syntactically obvious; nonetheless, this function has been operational at the earlier ages as well. In fact, no need exists to explicitly individuate other than by employing the proper name only, since proper names encode without a determiner what common nouns need a determiner to accomplish. Despite their status as types of generics (hence, potentially possessing some denotative value), proper names implicitly single out a whole object, typically a person. Then the proper names encode two factors (working in concert) which qualify them as early, effective individuator: their discreteness without the presence of modifiers and their pragmatic function of familiarity with the referent. These defining features account for the fact that proper names surface so early in the naming process: they do not rely on a syntactic facilitator (a determiner) to individuate further; the individuating function is intrinsic to their status as proper names.

The orientation toward/recognition of the import of individuating as a direct outgrowth of early indexical use via gesture provides the foundation for discerning single objects/events from an array of its undifferentiated, global features. The propensity to perceive whole objects as contributors to an outcome places proper names in a unique position to encode pre-linguistic quantification-based competencies, discerning “sortal

objects"/numerosity. At 0;2.5, infants apprehend that an object cannot exist in two locations simultaneously (Baillargeon, DeVos 1991), suggesting not merely a place to object connection but the representation of an object as individuated from the others. The numerosity skills develop later indicating recognition of more than one object. The existence of numerosity competencies (sensitivity to object separateness) are present at 0;7 (Bloom 2001: 166–167), providing convincing evidence that individuation underlies naming. According to Prentice Starkey et al. (1990), this skill entails counting a minimum of three individuals (linear dots, photos of household objects, and actions) demonstrating an early propensity to notice individuals. Numerosity extends to other modalities—infants (at 1;6), even count auditory separations, e.g., matching different sounds to the objects (Starkey *et al.* 1990: 122–124).

Afterwards, the more generic uses of proper names and other generic nouns come into surface. Because generics often take the form of plural nominals, as in “dogs” or “apples,” their reference to ensembles is grammaticalized with the plural “-s.” Singular forms can likewise qualify as generics, as in “the dog.” These singular forms, however, more implicitly refer to a set of collective objects (Lyons 1999: 197). The absence of an explicit grammatical marker to express a whole object set warrants their later acquisition. Although generics individuate, such applies to the sets of objects, not to the singular items. If they refer to individuals at all, their referent pool extends to kinds of objects, founded upon higher level of analogical reasoning skills.

As Paul Bloom (2001: 166–167) asserts, children’s early notion of individuation is broader than their notion of the whole

objects. Although some truth resides in his claim, he misconstrues the essence of “object,” restricting it to tangible/observable entities, delegitimizing less observable/abstract objects: “shadows,” “jokes,” “holes,” and “songs.” The semiotic models that are using Peirce’s categories as their standard ascribe Object status to all the referents, independent of their degree of observability. Accordingly, Bloom fails to recognize the profound influence of indexical semiosis to frame conceptual/linguistic advances. Index, the prime catalyst from the sensorimotor individuation to social and logical individuations, must not be overlooked.

Beyond Nominals:

The “whole object” constraint likewise short-circuits investigation of other forms of naming: verbs and locatives. While nominals individuate objects (emphasizing a static goal), verbs often express non-static source, path, and goal constituencies. Verbs are names for events, states, and actions. The naming of events showcases index’s influence in development; in that action, verbs typically select two or three arguments (semantically and syntactically). These transitive or ditransitive constructions express a source (often agent), a path (within the verb/verb particle), and a receiver and object to be received.

The verb naming constitutes more than the individuation of events; it illustrates advanced forms of index, movement along the paths to goals. Here, the arguments are integrated into a spatial and temporal episodic frame of reference. The unfolding of the index is not an unexpected or sudden phenomenon, but it materializes consequent to the existence of early spatial primitives. The theories of naming and testing need to be founded upon the fact that spatial

primitives underlie the process of applying names to things and the way how verbs and locatives characterize events must be incorporated. Ignoring frequent reference to locations, participants' orientations within spatial fields creates an incomplete picture. Spatial boundaries and relations to them are unrepresented.

The names for events and their overextensions are equally, if not more, revealing linguistic and cognitive competencies, since they express relations, especially spatial ones, an endeavor which nouns as names are hard-pressed to encode. Motion verbs and verbs referring to resultative states of affairs have been sorely under-investigated. The over-emphasis on nominals as names (as opposed to verbs, prepositions or other locatives) ignores the existence of spatial primitives and undermines the power of indexical signs to refer to basic event relations. This is so, particularly given the very nature of prepositions as event situators, spatially/temporally.

Nonetheless, some investigators (Tomasello, Merriman 1995; Naigles *et al.* 2009) document the productive emergence of verb use from 1;6 to 2;0. In fact, the transitive and intransitive verbs were equally likely to be employed, and subjects were significantly more likely to be omitted than were the objects: 65 vs. 55 percent (Naigles, *et al.* 2009: 34). The confounding factor here appears to be that the 55 percent object omission includes instances in which objects were appropriately omitted (such that they were implicit) and those for which objects were inappropriately omitted. The upshot of these findings to issues of naming is that even before relations are expressed via adjective-noun combinations, they materialize as names for events (verbs). As such, verbs account for naming not merely as a referential process, but as a

relation-based process as well. Merely accounting for reference in the case of nouns (matching possible existent object to label) is incomplete for verb naming: vital to naming actions/states is their sense (their constituents).

Relations (linguistic and extra linguistic) pregnant in verb use are diverse: one participant to a host of event participants (“fall” / “see” / “push” / “bring”), event location(s) with respect to participants (“come” vs. “go”), internal event causation (“feed” vs. “eat”), internal event resultativeness (“wash” vs. “clean”), event directionality (“move” vs. “descend”), and internal event process/iterativity (“fixing” vs. “hammering”). Acquiring names for events is especially challenging, because they encode the participant, directional, and locational structure necessary to specify in the lexicon how the respective event is to be implemented. Although not all of the specifications are explicit (e.g., “I jumped” implying “onto a surface”), the diverse relations (implicit or explicit) illustrate the richness of verb naming, as opposed to naming with nouns. Despite its complexity, verb naming begins within a few months of the onset of noun naming (Tomasello, Brandt 2009). Their conceptual and syntactic complexity is obviated by the fact that participants omitted arguments (noun arguments, especially subjects), while maintaining the verb in the utterance (Naigle *et al.* 2009). The nominal relations subject to omission include agents, receivers, experiencers, and instruments. These semantic roles are operational in verb selection, in that independent of whether they are present, they are nonetheless being implicit. For example, the selection of “give” implies the presence of an agent, a receiver, and an object, notwithstanding whether they are made explicit. In the event

that the entity being pushed is established in the discourse, one partner might appropriately implore the other to “push faster”, the entity (perhaps a carriage) is implicit.

After attentional schemes become joint and reciprocal, verbs surface in the lexicon. In fact, when the joint attentional indexical schemes are in place and when children have begun to associate speaker’s name with the speaker’s referential intentions, verb naming emerges and becomes productive. Concurrently with the onset of verb relations surfaces children’s means to effectively employ referential cues such as a gaze toward an object, to connect the intention (of another) to the object being named (Baldwin *et al.* 1996: 3151–3153). In short, the verbs as names for actions/states rests upon higher level reasoning skills than do the nouns and emerge at slightly older ages (1;1 – nouns, 1;6 – verbs). More particularly, the reasoning that underlies verbs considers not merely idiosyncratic determinations, but the more objective reasoning whose tenets rely on others’ reactions and orientations. More importantly, the fact that verbs are employed productively by about 2;0 (Naigles *et al.* 2009: 52–61) illustrates children’s early reliance on higher level inferencing skills as a necessary competence. This appears to be so, given that the verb selection is a direct result of children’s basic knowledge of the arguments inherent to particular verbs—event participants, event locations/directionality, and event orientation. In short, the relational character of verbs places them at the crossroads for solidifying primitive spatial-relational schemas and for establishing novel ones: paths, sources, and goals. The direct relevance of these relational issues to the Index is obvious: place primitives and the signs which represent them are relational by nature (a

single landmark must be related to another point of reference to be interpreted).

Index is the single most influential vehicle to establish and maintain verb-based relational valences inherent to event structure. Within event structures, the deictic names emerge from inside, such that the verb lexicon itself selects the nominal and locative constituencies with which it is likely to appear, e.g., selecting “pull” determines the existence of a minimum of two nominal constituencies: an agent and the involved object. “Push” preempts (however implicitly) the additional existence of a starting point, a path, and an end point, and the presence of an instrument which orchestrates the pushing is implied. The index has a substantive presence here, since the agent to patient illustrates a deictic trajectory (agent to patient and reverse), as does the vector from location A (the beginning point) to location B (the end point). Spatial and sequential awareness of the canonical event and establishing permutations of the event’s trajectory indicate the influence of the Index in verb naming. The productivity in the use of indexical valences is vital to early construal not merely of cause and effect relations, but to the issue of who is initiating what to whom. Verb construct competencies underscore the degree to which indexical signs facilitate the recognition of event contours. Spatial primitives: source, containment, motion, attachment to surfaces, blocked surfaces, path, and goal, reassert their influence so that the verbs have a distinctive argument trajectory: inclusive of envisioning paths, Origos, and goals. These spatial primitives are actualized via Index, which (when instantiated as a gesture) fixes attention on and orients participants, establishes Origos, and individuates spatial frames.

Conclusion:

As more advanced tracers of episodes, verbs measure and name the event trajectories establishing slots for the orientational shifts incumbent to different participants which inhabit agent/patient and other roles. In this way, Index attends to Objects in increasingly more differentiated spaces by recognizing more precise divisions of geometric and conversational boundedness. In specifying which objects/persons are included within particular boundaries of different spaces and event participant slots, Index (first, by means of pronouns and proper names, then, via nouns and verbs) separates the existence of the Peircean Object (recognizing its context while ascribing more singular, more objective meaning: emphasizing its being and classifying its qualities /properties).

Although nouns like pronouns individuate, Peirce insists that they do not do that naturally. Instead, nouns draw upon commonalities across similar Object categories/classifications. As names, nouns are used to show what is being talked about in the light of the features of other Objects, not where or when. As such, nouns require additional competencies, the means to consolidate two or more distinct instantiations of an Object. The producer and hearer of the noun must integrate knowledge and expectations about Objects' function. Verbs, as naming paradigms, express a still more advanced form of Index, an informational event scheme drawing upon earlier pronoun and noun competencies. In this capacity, verb use entails packing noun-based concepts into action structures ultimately highlighting shifts in participant roles and path trajectories.

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