

## Barriers to the Development of Collaborative Governance in Croatia

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### Abstract

This paper aims to establish whether collaborative governance may be a useful concept in Croatian local government and what barriers might prevent Croatian ULGs from developing such models. Recent research has shown that some ULGs in Croatia are more successful than others in terms of financial management and resource allocation, which may be due to better quality of civil servants working in local government and increased participation of citizens in public policy making but also to some form of collaborative governance. The second case also offers a possibility of achieving higher level of citizen satisfaction with local government on the basis of results, although this satisfaction is not necessarily linked to achieving proclaimed policy objectives or transparency and openness. In the case of e-governance we also assess the technological development of ULGs as a precondition for dynamic communication needed for collaboration. We find that in some cases the achievement of public good and community goals are due to better leadership and creating trust and in some others due to better participation in policies and involvement of citizens in common problems, such as unemployment. Barriers are detected by studying the most and least successful ULGs.

**Keywords:** collaborative governance, local management, budget execution, e-governance.

### I. Introduction

Collaborative governance is a new mode of governance that brings together multiple stakeholders with public agencies (Ansell, Gash, 2007). It has developed over the past two decades and is based on consensus oriented decision-making, which is especially useful in challenging situations and developing countries when dealing with health (Beran et al., 2016) and environmental problems (Gambert, 2010), urban planning (Douay, 2010) or even organised crime (Cayli, 2011). Despite a growing interest empirical research continues to be limited by

conceptual and methodological challenges although attempts to measure the productivity of collaborative governance regimes have been made (Emerson, Nabatchi, 2015). The integrative framework defines collaborative governance broadly as “the processes and structures of public policy decision-making and management that engage people ... across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson et al., 2011). Such a framework allows for the separation of the process and productivity performance and distinguishing outputs from outcomes when measuring performance of new institutional arrangements such as cross-boundary collaboratives (Emerson, Natatchi, 2015). Having a similar framework in mind, we propose that some form of collaborative governance, or new institutional arrangements, may be contributing to a successful execution of budget and resource allocation at local level in Croatia, where functional decentralisation is still a prerequisite for better functioning of units of local government – ULGs (Koprić, Đulabić, 2017). Namely a significant number of smaller ULGs (communities and smaller cities) are heavily dependent on central government for their financing. However, a smaller number of ULGs have considerable own proceeds from tourism, and some have been able to pull out of difficult situations without the help of central government. We attempt to demonstrate that such successful examples of Croatian ULGs may exist due to their application of collaborative governance elements through the analysis of their performance and leadership. In order to determine whether collaborative governance is really the key driver of success in budget allocation, we propose that the structure

of the employees and the main partners of ULGs should be considered as the most important factor. Namely, if the structure is not significantly changed and there are stable partners in the community, under this hypothesis it indicates that success was achieved with the resources that were already present in the community, but by a reorganisation and mobilisation of those resources in a way that may indicate collaborative efforts. This type of change could be visible in increased investments in infrastructure, technology and projects contributing to public good and the quality of life in a the local community. In addition to this, satisfaction of citizens may be accounted for by the number of citizens remaining in the area (which indicates that they all profit from the local conditions), which would relatively decrease sufficient per citizen in comparison with total. As a consequence of development of information society, defined by Castells as society in which all activities and economic production happen within a technological paradigm based on information and communication (Homburg, 2008), it is also to include e-governance and e-government and to determine its importance for a successful budget execution clearly distinguishing between e-participation, such as in e-budgeting, which may also be collaborative and not just participative. Collaboration, which is defined as *consensus oriented decision-making*, implies more than just e-governance, or citizen participation, transparency and openness of government as it brings private and non-governmental organisations with government agencies in common projects that are based on common values and goals, where agencies “act as ‘facilitators’ engaged in ‘value chains’, working through markets” (O’Flynn, Wanna, 2008). The evolution of management has influenced public administration just as a technological evolution as well as the evolution of governance in the sense of change of relations between the government and society (Brown, 2005). E-government signifies usage of ICT in public administrations in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness in public service provision and functioning internal processes, on one hand, and increasing transparency and accountability of public administration on the other (Musa, 2016). E-government includes every provision of information and services to stakeholders (citizens, private sector, civil society) or other public sector instances by fast, simple and user-friendly way, 24 hours a day, seven days per week (Norris and Moon, 2005), including the transformation of relationships between administration and stakeholders and creation of value added, including increased trust between the government and citizens (Homburg, 2008) and technical standards of ICT and software codes tend towards acquiring a regulatory role,

replacing or complementing traditional legal norms and regulation (Contini, Lanzara, 2009) leading to better government citizen relations. Collaborative governance, on one hand, represents developments in public administration that are rooted in New Public Management and cooperation between the public and private sectors and, on the other hand, incorporates new developments in the direction of good governance and participation of citizens in policy making. However, the transformational aspect of collaborative governance has not yet been thoroughly studied in Croatia, especially at local level and coupled with a study on e-government and e-governance, which significantly contributes to the scientific interest of this work. In the absence of previous studies on collaborative governance, we can only attempt to determine whether there are any barriers to the development of collaborative governance coupled with e-governance at local level, which may be technological, or organisational in nature, or perhaps the consequence of poor leadership.

## II. Methodology

In order to link the superiority of local government units to the role of collaborative governance in that success, we must exclude any other endogenous or exogenous factor that may also be contributing to success. Therefore we limit ourselves to comparing ordinary ULGs with ULGs that have been through difficult situations and pulled out of them due to superior leadership. Although the number of such ULGs may be limited, it is so far the best method for attempting to prove the existence and efficiency of collaborative governance at local level in Croatia, as the concept is largely unknown and unrecognised by decision-makers. We use quantitative and qualitative methods on the basis of secondary data including surplus, the number of citizens and surplus per citizen in order to select the most successful local units in terms of budget execution and resource allocation and then we attempt to evaluate the role of collaborative government in that success by the method of a case study of particular local governments based on their web pages, potentially also including interviews with the leaders of those local government units and collect data on site, although in this particular paper we were not able to achieve this goal, which remains to be achieved by some future effort. Therefore we are based only on secondary data and, in order to check the efficiency of resource allocation, we compare amounts spent on employees to budget surplus and budget surplus per citizen considering that with fewer amounts spent on employees surplus must be coming from some intrinsic value of governance in a ULG.

Firstly, we proceed the evaluation of communities, cities and counties (districts) in Croatia in order to determine which of them are the most and least successful in terms of budget execution and creation of surplus, including also surplus per capita, which may be indicative of whether local citizens stay in the community as employees (which may not be true for some Dalmatian tourist destinations, which are inhabited on a seasonal basis) and then we check the allocation of this surplus on the basis of audit reports of the Government Audit Office for the last year available. In this we evaluate better investments in infrastructure and public good than investments in employment as the first indicates a higher level of collaboration and integrity in a community and is positively linked to financial stability, while the latter is indicative of division between the government and citizens and sometimes also of corruption, poor budget execution and resource allocation and problems with financial stability. Then we also check the technological level of a government unit as one of the signs of development and a precondition for better participation of citizens. Finally, the most successful local government units are analysed by case studies of their functioning as examples of best practice. In evaluating success we particularly see the role of collaborative government in those units, which have achieved significant breakthroughs from being unsuccessful or bankrupt to success in balancing their accounts as this kind of achievement is usually impossible without excellent leadership,

collaboration of all stakeholders or some other special exogenous reason (e.g. massive investments). In order to account for these exogenous variables we also check the level of transparency in the local government unit, excluding those with the lowest level of transparency (0). Finally we check the difference between best and worst local government units to determine the barriers to success.

### III. Case studies of croatian ULGs

It has been suggested that the best territorial division of Croatia may be just five regions (Koprić, 2015) instead of current 22 counties called “županija”, in Croatian, or local government units with the head called “župan”, who are elected in local government elections. Besides the capital, Zagreb, the other regions would be central Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Istria. In all those regions it is possible to find a local community that has been able to outperform the region in general, including the natural capitals of those regions (Rijeka, Osijek, Split, Varaždin). Such local communities may have been able to achieve better collaborative governance than the rest of their regions thus enabling them to achieve better financial and management results at local level. According to a recently (2015) published study of all communities, cities and districts, some have achieved superior performance in budget execution, which may be determined by budget surplus.

Table 1

#### Best communities in Croatia by budget execution, 2014

Community	Surplus (millions HRK)	Citizens	Surplus per capita (000 HRK)
Barilović	4,7	2990	1566
Baška	3,3	1764	1950
Bol	2,4	1630	1464
Cestica	3,4	5806	583
Drenovci	4	5174	773
Dugopolje	3,3	3469	940
Gornji Kneginec	3,7	5349	649
Medulin	8,7	6481	1336
Plitvička jezera	11,1	4373	1540
Primošten	3	2828	1059
Tisno	16,3	3094	5057
Vir	17	3000	5659
Ž. Dubrovačka	7,7	932	8331
<b>Negative examples</b>			
Dubrovačko pr.	-4,6	2170	-2134
Funtana	-6,1	907	-6735
Viškovo	-14	14445	-970
Ližnjan	-6,7	3965	-1684
Konavle	-8	8557	-930

Source: Budget execution of communities, cities and counties, 2015 (surplus – in millions of kuna)

The case of Vir, Bol, Baška, Tisno, Plitvička jezera, Župa Dubrovačka and Matulji is clear, as they are among the best known tourist destinations in Croatia. Particularly interesting cases are Primošten (also a community with well developed tourism but with a difficult history), Barilović, Drenovci, Cestica and Gornji Kneginec (Table 1, above). In the case of cities, there are the best by budget execution, such

as Crikvenica, Sv. Nedelja, Poreč, Rijeka, Rovinj, Samobor, Senj, Slavonski Brod, Split, Supetar, Virovitica, Vukovar, Zadar and Zaprešić, and the worst Belišće, Dubrovnik, Jastrebarsko, Karlovac, Koprivnica, Šibenik, Velika Gorica and Zagreb, the best among the counties – Istarska, Primorsko-goranska and Varaždinska, and the worst – Sisačko-moslavačka, Karlovačka and Međimurska.

Table 2

**Best and worst cities by budget execution, 2014**

City	Surplus (millions)	Citizens	Surplus per capita (000)
Crikvenica	20	11122	1771
Sv. Nedelja	24	18059	1341
Poreč	14	16696	2471
Rijeka	40	128624	312
Rovinj	28	14294	1960
Samobor	20	37633	533
Senj	13	7182	1830
Slavonski Brod	22	59141	375
Split	19	172102	105
Supetar	10	4074	2430
Virovitica	13	21291	600
Vukovar	36	27683	1316
Zadar	11	75062	142
Zaprešić	13	25223	513
<b>Negative examples</b>			
Belišće	-15	10825	-1401
Dubrovnik	-330	42615	-14
Jastrebarsko	-12	15866	-771
Karlovac	-15	55705	-277
Koprivnica	-20	30854	-636
Šibenik	-14	46332	-310
Vel. Gorica	-18	63517	-282
Zagreb	-983	790017	-1244

Source: Budget execution of communities, cities and counties, 2015.

Table 3

**Best counties by budget execution, 2014**

County	Surplus (mil.)	Citizens	Surplus per capita (000)
Istarska	21	208055	102
Primorsko-goranska	17	296195	57
Varaždinska	22	175951	126
Vukovarsko-srijemska	12	179521	64
Zadarska	10	170017	62
<b>Negative examples</b>			
Brodsko-posavska	1	158575	4
Karlovačka	-1	128899	-9
Krapinsko-zagorska	1	132892	4
Međimurska	-1	113804	-6
Sisačko-moslavačka	-9	172439	-49
Šibensko-kninska	1	109375	8

Source: Budget execution of communities, cities and counties, 2015.

In this sense, the achievements of the local communities in the counties of Varaždin (Cestica, Gornji Kneginec), Istria (Rovinj, Poreč, Supetar), Primorsko-goranska (Rijeka), Vukovarsko-srijemska (Vukovar) and even Zadar are more expected than surprising but the achievement of the local communities in the county of Šibensko-kninska, as in the case of Primošten or Barilović in Karlovačka county, is an entirely different example, which may point in the right direction of being more collaborative than others.

In the case of Primošten it becomes clear from the Government Audit Report that success was achieved by reducing the total sum spent on the employees. While in some of the best local governments in terms of financial stability and performance (Mali Lošinj, Pula, Pazin) which are mostly located in the area of Istria and Croatian Primorje and have also been using participative budgeting (as well as the city of Karlovac) expenditure on the employees was no lower than 25%, and in some of the worst LGUs they surpassed 30% and even reached 40%, which was indicative of poor cooperation and internal corruption and nepotism, in Primošten those expenditures were only 10% of the budget. In fact, only 7 employees were basically in charge of all city functions and they performed this function as volunteers in order to pull the community out from bankruptcy. It is clear that this kind of success did not depend only on a sudden increase of the efficiency of city employees but also on leadership and better governance, which can be regarded as a basis for collaborative governance. The mayor built wide cooperation with citizens and private firms, including those specialising in EU fund management, and started a new round of investment in public infrastructure and other useful projects. In the case of Barilović, its small and poverty stricken community managed to organise itself to solve problems with acquiring textbooks for school children and unemployment also by clearly identifying those problems and collaborating with all stakeholders, so it became one of the most successful small communities in the county that is generally relatively unsuccessful. In major cities such behaviour is not yet present, especially in the capital of Zagreb, where only Rijeka and perhaps Zadar can serve as positive examples of building community spirit and unleashing the potential of collaborative governance. In this respect, Rijeka is also technologically superior to all other cities, both Rijeka and Zadar have universities, what indicates that education may also be an important factor in acquiring this superiority and better collaboration. The city of Split, although having a deficit, can

hardly be taken as a positive example of collaborative governance, as it exemplifies similar problems as the city of Zagreb and the city of Osijek, which also harbours a university and some successful and innovative projects have been harmed by political factors and the conflict between some political actors opposing the central government in Zagreb, which also produced some positive results diminishing aid from the central government and forcing the city and the whole region to turn to EU funds.

#### **IV. Collaborative governance models in Croatia**

The key problem preventing economic development in Croatia is corruption, connected to major political parties in the country, namely the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Social-democrat Party (SDP), the Croatian People's Party (HNS) and others. There are numerous examples, which show that being a member of political parties or 'well connected' acts as an effective umbrella against criminal proceedings and enables partners of political actors to enrich themselves at the expense of public good and ordinary citizens. In this process, public good is usually neglected, which accounts for quite the opposite development to collaborative governance. Therefore, a new administrative paradigm is needed, which would be based neither on painful cuts nor on incremental changes (Koprić, 2016), which could also be based on some form of collaboration. However, the development of collaborative governance, which is usually quite useful solving urgent problems of ordinary citizens, is slowed down or prevented by the resistance of political structures that are more interested in their own gains than in satisfaction of the citizens. In one part this can be blamed to electoral law and the fact that the political structures were able to spread corruption through a large portion of the citizens that participate in it even for smaller gains, such as employment in public services or other types of privileges. However, the problems that are used as a means to spread corruption and strengthen the grip of political structures on Croatian society could also be used as a means to positive development through the introduction of collaborative governance models. One of the most urgent problems in Croatia is unemployment. It involves all sectors of society, the way of dealing with this problem is very complex and not straightforward. Another similar problem that Croatia faces is that of (public) education. Local communities can do a lot to help solve those problems with the assistance of private partners, EU funds and other sources, but the collaboration of all partners is essential for success. On the basis of case studies we

could propose two basic collaborative governance models in Croatia. One model is predominantly based in the region of Dalmatia, which thrives on tourism as a prosperous economic sector in Croatia, and it is mostly geared for better allocation of resources through superior leadership and investments in infrastructure. A similar model may be also found in Krapinsko-zagorska county (e.g. Oroslavje, although not with tourism but instead EU funds and entrepreneurship as a motor for development), and its main goal is also the reduction of unemployment and cutting costs while increasing the efficiency of local employees. The other model is predominantly based in poorer regions, Slavonia and Karlovac, and its main problem is unemployment and maintenance of basic functioning.

A typical example of success of the first model is the community of Primošten, which was able to pull out of near bankruptcy and reestablish itself as one of the best local communities in Croatia in terms of budget surplus and cost reduction, and of the second model there is Barilović in the county of Karlovac. The cases of larger cities, such as Split in Splitsko-dalmatinska county and Slavonski brod in Brodsko-posavska county, are more complex and controversial. According to the interviews with employees of Primošten community, the process of creating collaborative governance started with the appearance of a new mayor of the community of Primošten, who started changing the old ways of corruption and at first was met with a considerable resistance of citizens unwilling to change. However, as the government was able to create surpluses and investments in infrastructure and public good became visible, the majority of citizens changed their opinion and voted in favour of such government by a majority of 80% in local elections. Thus, success was achieved in small steps, by creating trust and progressively involving all stakeholders in a common project of development. For some analysts, this model of leadership was similar to sort of 'local sheriff' dictatorship in some other local government units, albeit results were quite different; while the others suffered losses in their budgets due to untransparent collusions of the government with private partners and investors, in the community of Primošten surplus was created and used to develop the community to the benefit of the citizens, what ensured their cooperation and satisfaction. Certainly, criticism of such models is possible, from the position of government transparency and openness, or decentralisation of decision-making that could be greater, although in some communities the results of that practice of openness and transparency were not better or more straightforward than in

the community of Primošten. The fact that the community of Primošten is heavily dependent on proceeds from tourism, which can be regarded as a natural resource, can open again a controversial debate whether natural resources are beneficial or detrimental to development. In some African corrupt countries it may even be detrimental, and in some other countries as Norway they are beneficial. Political culture and a lack of political corruption may be the key issue in determining such questions, and the example of Primošten may show that such trends need not be fixed as they may be overturned in cases of emergency if a competent government and leadership is able to seize that opportunity.

## **V. Theoretical models of and barriers to collaborative governance in Croatia**

Collaborative governance as a new mode of governance in comparison to managerial and adversarial modes that are based on internal conflict rather than cooperation with stakeholders in collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision-making. Critical variables that influence whether collaborative governance will or will not produce successful collaboration include a prior history of conflict or cooperation, incentives for stakeholders to participate, power and resources imbalances, leadership and institutional design. Factors influencing collaborative process are: face-to-face dialogue, trust building, development of commitment and shared understanding. A collaborative process enters into a virtuous cycle when it focuses on small wins, deepening trust, commitment and shared understanding (Koomson, Asuboteng, 2013). From this perspective, there are some barriers to both collaborative governance models that we have described, which can be evaluated on the basis of the most and least successful local government units in terms of budget execution and resource allocation. It would appear that the main barrier to collaborative governance is a lack of strategy and leadership at local level. Most Croatian ULGs are heavily dependent on the central government and government politics which uses them in an inefficient and intransparent manner just to create political influence and prosper in elections. The whole system of Croatian local government and decentralisation is dysfunctional, with fragmented units and a lack of cooperation at local level (Koprić, 2011), which hampers even the process of EU fund disbursement and absorption. Instead of about 418 communities and 69 cities and communities, perhaps only about 100 such units should exist in order to be viable, with no more than 10 urban centers and 5 regions (instead of current 20 counties). This lack

of cooperation at local level and dependence on the central government due to insufficient and inadequate decentralisation in turn creates a divide between the government and citizens, preventing the virtuous cycle of collaboration, which depends on trust building and commitment of all stakeholders, not just a privileged minority. A typical example is the capital, Zagreb, with the worst score of all (an outlier), where the mayor has surrounded himself with his business aides and partners, excluding the majority of citizens from the city's profits and resources. Independently, he is able to dispose of large sums of money and create projects that serve only his own needs for self-promotion and self-indulgence, such as the project of "Zagreb fountains".

Collaborative governance depends on dynamic communication that can be summarised in a cycle of seeing, understanding, integrating and tracking. A typical approach to collaborative governance is building a network of stakeholders and formalizing a procedure for collaboration, such as in action planning cycle that includes four stages which are then divided into: 1) defining problems, 2) mapping stakeholders, 3) gathering evidence, 4) defining resources, 5) defining expected results, 6) generating ideas, 7) defining actions, assessment/evaluation, which uses both a consultation and/or coproduction process, and a results framework that may start with a problem tree and use other tools, such as a stakeholder ecosystem map and influence/importance matrix, self-assessment tools for ULGs and an evidence grid, asset mapping and OPERA for generating ideas. Another useful approach is a "social innovation policy framework" developed by the OECD, which depends on social innovation ecosystem coordination, where "social innovation can act as a catalyst for systemic transformation because it changes the way civil society achieves impact, governments work, and business behaves". As they have discovered, coordinated action is the key to real impact on society, as "systemic social innovation happens when a number of social innovations occur in parallel and are interconnected, impacting on a given social challenge". The main barrier to the development of social innovation ecosystem, which, according to the OECD, should be based on a quadruple helix model, is poor interaction of sectors (academia, government, business and civil sector), which is crippled by a strictly hierarchical organisation of society, which correlates with high levels of corruption and lower levels of innovation. Such interaction may be achieved on a limited, local scale in some local projects, and likewise in smaller local communities, which have been able to break the barriers between sectors and pull actors from

their silos. A catalyst for this process in Croatia seems to be a political change or a shift of power from major parties to smaller and independent local actors that are able to promote change by better leadership and financial performance in their communities. This approach actually solves the problem of political corruption that permeates all major parties and prevents economic development. Solutions to corruption may be increased either by through transparency, openness and participation of citizens, or by collaborative governance directed at solving certain problems; the first way is usually connected to higher level decentralisation in decision-making and technological development enabling e-governance, usually in better developed and larger units of local government, such as cities and large cities, and the second appears in smaller, less technologically developed communities which have particularly urgent problems they have to solve, either facing bankruptcy, large deficits or debts, or even meeting basic needs of their citizens. It can be shown that level of transparency in ULGs does not correspond to effectiveness of budget execution or collaborative governance, although a minimum of transparency is a necessary requirement for dynamic communication as a precondition for collaborative governance. Ideally, according to theory, both ways of combating corruption should somehow merge at some point in the future by embedding transparency and openness in collaborative governance, thus creating collaborative e-governance through dynamic communication.

A particular barrier to the development of collaborative e-governance is that cities with most resources and largest budgets usually lack political will for collaborative governance as such, and social dynamics in such ULGs points in a different direction of development. On the other hand, in smaller communities are able to find a route towards collaborative governance and distancing themselves from party politics, the central government and even regional (county) governments that are largely tied to the first two lack resources and expertise and even technological means to develop collaborative e-governance. Technological development may be measured by the evolutionary eGovernment maturity model, by which the maturity of towns' web sites was measured (Sinjeri et al., 2015). Other methods for measuring e-government efficiency may be used as well (Puron-Cid, 2014). This vicious cycle of technological inactivity rooted in problems with governance, however, is bound to change through the advance of new projects, such as e-participative budgeting in ULGs in Pazin, Mali Lošinj, Pula and Karlovac with more transparent budgeting as a new

type of standard. This may serve as a catalyst for the development of collaborative governance and e-governance on one side, while on the other already existing examples of collaborative governance may become catalysts for the development of participation in ULGs that have more resources and higher level of technological development.

## VI. Limitations of the study

The limitations of the study lie in the fact that it is based almost entirely on secondary data, which are predominantly of financial nature and may hide various endogenous and exogenous factors that may not be apparent at first sight. In order to reduce this problem, we have excluded those communities that have been rated lowest in transparency, but there also may be some limitations of the study due to transparency of local units. It should be noted that the role of exterior investments may be important for success but also the independence of the largest political structures in Croatia, which are the main political parties – the CDU and the SDP. However, the role of this influence on success is difficult to evaluate, although it is a common knowledge that the main parties use local units as a means to maximize profits of people connected to them, which is in direct conflict with the idea of collaborative governance and even public good. In order to achieve better results, structured interviews and surveys may be used but the scope of this paper prevented such a study.

## VII. Conclusion

Collaborative governance models in Croatia differ depending on administrative culture. Some depend on superior leadership and collaborative practice of their elected representatives, and some on better participation in policy making. In both cases it is possible to achieve better financial performance in terms of budget surplus and stability, as well as better satisfaction of citizens. We have identified two basic models in Croatia on the basis of data on budget execution in ULGs and case studies. One model is focused on greater collaboration due to insufficient resources, and the other – on collaboration in order to achieve better allocation of already existing resources, especially in terms of reducing expenditures on employees but increasing investments in projects and infrastructure serving public good. The main barriers to the achievement of the first model appear to be a lack of leadership skills of local elected officials, and in the second model – problems with local administrative culture that may not be directed towards public good or a lack of commitment towards achieving common goals. In both cases, a lack of technological development

enabling better e-governance and other models allowing for better integration of communities and improved leadership may be an effective barrier to the development of collaborative e-governance and creating online fora for collaboration. It may be concluded that in the majority of cases (except some notable exceptions, such as the city of Rijeka) ULGs with most resources, such as larger cities, are those that are least prone to the use of collaborative governance as a model for solving common problems, creating trust and commitment, and those with least resources are usually technologically less developed, what prevents effective development of collaborative e-governance as a model, indeed e-governance and e-government as such. However, the development of collaborative governance is certainly possible in all ULGs regardless of their economic status and development level which may be demonstrated by positive examples of the community of Primošten and Barilović, or on a larger scale with mixed results in the city of Vukovar or even Slavonski Brod where local governments have shown increased efforts to solve common unemployment or education problems by building trust and creating commitment while maintaining stable budget execution and even creating surplus. In all those cases, success came after a period of serious threats, including even bankruptcy, which lead to the demise of the local political elite and positive changes. Those achievements surpass the overall achievements of their respective counties, what clearly indicates superior achievement of local governance and leadership. Such a development may also be shown perhaps to exist in some better developed communities of Krapinsko-zagorska county, where the integration level of local communities is higher, and some of local government units are even highly developed in terms of the quality of life and standard of living, while others have just successfully pulled out of bankruptcy and stabilised their finances. Further research is needed to determine social dynamics leading to real examples of collaborative governance and e-collaborative governance, research should be extended to the collection of first hand data in the communities that are being studied, including the method of structured interviews and surveys.

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## Les barrières au développement de la gouvernance collaborative électronique en Croatie

### Sommaire

L'intérêt scientifique de l'oeuvre présent est de rechercher les effets et modèles possibles de la gouvernance collaborative dans le gouvernement local en Croatie, tout en soulignant les barrières au développement d'un tel modèle de gouvernance pour qu'on puisse en profiter au niveau local. Les recherches sur la gestion locale et la réalisation budgétaire ont montré que certaines unités d'autogestion locale (AUL) ou du gouvernement local en Croatie ont réussi à réaliser ses objectifs budgétaires mieux que les autres, ce qui peut être expliqué d'un côté par la meilleure qualité des fonctionnaires élus ou les institutions dans le gouvernement local ou par la participation augmentée des citoyens dans la création des politiques publiques. Dans le premier cas, il est aussi

possible d'atteindre un degré plus haut de satisfaction des citoyens avec le gouvernement local, bien que cette satisfaction ne soit pas liée toujours aux objectifs des politiques publiques ou la transparence du gouvernement. Cette satisfaction se produit par la méthode des petits pas et la création de la confiance en coopération avec différents partenaires privés et non-gouvernementaux, ce qui est un cas typique pour la gouvernance collaborative. Quant à la gouvernance électronique, il est aussi nécessaire de se rendre compte de l'importance du développement technologique des unités d'autogestion locale, où le bien public et les objectifs communs sont réalisés par les qualités de leader des fonctionnaires locaux et son capacité de améliorer la confiance des citoyens.

Les barrières pour le développement sont soulignées par la comparaison des mieux et pires UAL dans l'achèvement des objectifs communs, et réalisation des budgets tout en balance, ou bien la création des déficits budgétaires, ce qui est plus important en cas qu'elles soient exposées aux dangers imminents et sérieux. Afin de relier la supériorité des UAL au rôle de la gouvernance collaborative dans cette réussite, on utilise des méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives, sur la base des données secondaires, et ensuite on sélectionne les meilleures unités par le critère de la réalisation du budget. On évalue ainsi de la manière qualitative le rôle de la gouvernance collaborative dans cette réussite financière, en appliquant la méthode des études de cas, et des interviews avec les fonctionnaires de certaines unités d'autogestion locale. D'abord, on s'applique à l'évaluation des communes, villes et départements en Croatie, afin de préciser les meilleurs et pires UAL par la réalisation budgétaire et la création des déficits, ainsi que déficit per capita, ce qui puisse indiquer si les citoyens restent dans la commune comme travailleurs. Puis, on continue l'évaluation avec l'allocation de ce déficit sur la base des rapports - audits faits par l'Office d'Audit de Gouvernement, pour la dernière année applicable et des autres s'ils existent. Par cette méthode on évalue les investissements dans l'infrastructure et les biens publics, d'un côté, et les investissements dans les fonctionnaires publics; le premier type d'investissement, s'il produit le déficit budgétaire, peut indiquer un plus haut degré de la collaboration et intégrité dans une UAL ce qui a pour conséquence une plus grande stabilité financière, et l'autre type peut résulter de la division entre le gouvernement et les citoyens et la corruption politique, si la réalisation budgétaire et allocation des ressources sont inadéquates, ce qui toujours a pour conséquence l'instabilité financière. D'ailleurs, on évalue le niveau du développement technologique des UAL, ce qui est nécessaire pour la communication dynamique dans une gouvernance collaborative électronique.

Finalement, on emploie la méthode des études de cas pour analyser les meilleures UAL et tirer les conclusions. Les modèles de la gouvernance collaborative dépendent surtout de la culture administrative et les institutions. Un type dépend de la gestion supérieure des fonctionnaires et leur qualité de leader, et d'autres sur la participation des citoyens dans la préparation des

politiques publiques qui est plus facile d'institutionnaliser. Le premier modèle de la prise des décisions est plus centralisé, et l'autre décentralisé, tandis que l'un et l'autre font partie du spectre de la gouvernance collaborative, ce qui inclut la participation du secteur privé dans la réalisation des projets communs. Dans les deux cas il est également possible de réaliser l'amélioration de la réalisation financière rendue manifeste par un déficit budgétaire et la stabilité des finances, ainsi que par la satisfaction des citoyens. Quand-même, les processus menant vers la réalisation des deux modèles sont différents, en tant que le premier commence avec un 'big bang', ou un problème de grande échelle, qui demande changement de gestion dans les communautés qu'on peut nommer riches, et l'autre par un développement graduel jusqu'au moment où le gouvernement se sent libre de permettre une plus profonde participation des citoyens dans ses politiques publiques, dans les régions plutôt pauvres.

Le second emploie la collaboration à cause de l'insuffisance des ressources, et l'autre pour réaliser l'allocation meilleure des ressources abondantes. ce qui signifie l'augmentation des investissements en projets servant le bien public. Les barrières pour la réalisation du premier modèle sont surtout le manque de leaders et des institutions permanentes permettant l'institutionnalisation, et dans l'autre cas, la culture administrative qui n'est pas dirigée vers le bien commun et les objectifs communs. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, le manque du développement technologique peut agir comme une barrière pour le développement de la gouvernance collaborative électronique, et la communication dynamique – par exemple par la création des forums locaux pour collaboration. Il semble évident sur la base de la majorité des cas étudiés (excepté la ville de Rijeka), que les UAL avec les ressources abondantes, comme les villes larges, ne montrent pas l'intérêt suffisant pour la gouvernance collaborative en tant que modèle pour la résolution des problèmes communs, création de la confiance et motivation, et ceux avec les moindres ressources sont d'habitude moins développés du point de vue technique, ce qui ne permet pas le développement de la gouvernance électronique.

**Mots clés:** gouvernance collaborative, gestion locale, exécution du budget, gouvernance électronique.