ISSN 1392-3110 (Print)
ISSN 2351-6712 (Online)
Socialiniai tyrimai / Social Research. 2015. Nr. 2 (38), 21–32

Empowerment – a Double Edged Sword?

Ieva Daniela Beinarovičа[1], Druvis Kleins[2]

University of Latvia, Faculty of Social Sciences
Lomonosova str. 1a, LV-1090 Riga, Latvia
E-mail: [1]i.beijnarowitz@gmail.com; [2]druviskleins@gmail.com

The article has been reviewed.
Received on 7 September 2015, accepted on 9 November 2015

Abstract

The concept of empowerment is a democratic tool and a logical next step in the evolution of public administration. In this article we explore the possibility of this concept to be used as a tool of unconventional warfare under a certain set of conditions. The carried out case study of the recent events in Ukraine, Crimea allows to conclude that empowerment can indeed be used to compromise the territorial integrity of a sovereign country.

Keywords: empowerment, unconventional warfare, Ukraine, Crimea.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 2013crisis in Ukraine there has been much speculation about the degree of Russian government's involvement behind the situation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Some argue the Russian "right" to protect its interests in the region, others refer to international law and order to denounce unconventional warfare of Russia against Ukraine. Despite the popular feeling that Russia is at war with Ukraine so far it has been difficult to find any broadly accepted term to define the way Russia acts internationally. Recently one of the most discussed problems concerns Crimea's annexation. A prominent feature of the Crimean case, of course, is the notorious referendum, where some 97% of voters (Reuters, 2014) were reported to support for seceding from Ukraine and joining Russia. During his visit to Crimea, the President of Russia denounced critics over Crimea's annexation stating that Crimea joined the Russian Federation legitimately, in a democratic referendum, and discussions on annexation are closed (Goble, 2014b). Same argumentation was used by some Center-Right Republican Party politicians of France when they were criticized for their visit to occupied Crimea (Euronews, 2015). So far the referendum in Crimea has been used as some sort of the legal cornerstone of legitimacy of annexation of the peninsula and denouncing any speculations about Russia's military involvement in setting the stages of political actions that led to annexation.

In the light of these events, "a 70-year period of peace, longer than any other in all written history – more than two thousand years" (Price, 2015) seems to be put under threat more and more every day. The conflict of 2005 between Russia and Georgia and even turbulence in Europe regarding refugees serve as grounds for further concerns. We believe that nowadays, when unconventional warfare is seen to pose potential threats, even such benevolent concepts and ideas as "empowerment" can be used by hostile forces to undermine peace in the country and its territorial integrity. Empowerment has gained popularity over the last decades and has been widely applied in various spheres ranging from managing to healthcare. It is seen as a benevolent concept yet the events of the last few years make one think that there is more to it.

The subject of this research is the potential of "empowerment" to be used in non-democratic ways to compromise the territorial integrity of a particular country. Our aims in this article are, firstly, to understand how empowerment of Russian-speaking community in Crimea was used by Russian military to conduct clandestine military operations and to annex a sovereign territory. Secondly, we hope this article will initiate discussions about the dangers hidden in the empowerment concept. We believe that under certain conditions the ideas of empowerment as a democratic tool can be used for achieving non-democratic goals, for example, compromising the territorial integrity of a sovereign country. This article has been written by combining the perspectives of international relations and public administration so that the new dimensions of empowerment can be identified and explored. In

Copyright © 2015 Šiauliai University Press

order to answer the underlying research question – can the concept of empowerment be used as a means of unconventional warfare – we will use the method of case study and compare available information and facts with the indicators further to be defined in the article. In this case the limitations of the research are quite obvious. When it comes to warfare – or any strategic actions for that matter – information usually is classified. As a result we can only build on information available in the media, which probably is only the so called "the tip of the iceberg", since the media publish only permitted information or that given to be published. Additional difficulties are present in the empowerment concept since there is no concrete list of characteristics, policies or steps that can be attributed to empowerment to serve as a solid foundation for analysis.

Theoretical framework: defining the key concepts

Empowerment

The concept of empowerment first became known in 1977 when Rosabeth Moss Kanter published her book *Men and Women of the Corporation* (The Economist, 2008). Since then *empowerment* has spread across a wide variety of disciplines and now almost everyone is being empowered: women, seniors, patients, minorities, local communities and regions, individuals, social workers, etc. "However, empowerment is also a highly elusive theoretical concept – it has no single guru, nor does it define a clear-cut set of policy initiatives" (Lincoln, Travers, Ackers, & Wilkinson, 2002, p. 272). So the first logical step is to briefly define empowerment in the context of this paper.

So far a wide spectrum of topics regarding empowerment have been covered: the way empowerment can increase public sector employees' job satisfaction as well as build their capacity (Coleman, 1996; Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009; Fernandez & Moldogaziev, 2011, 2013; Kim & Fernandez, 2015); the way empowerment can be used to strengthen participation and capabilities of the community (Couto, 1998; Fischer, 2006; Running, Ligon & Miskioglu, 1999); as well as the interaction between the two (Peters & Pierre, 2000; Pallot, 2001; Peters & Pierre, 2000; Thompson & Butler, 2015); empowering regional governments (Amdam, 2001) and empowerment planning and evaluation (Amdam, 2010) are just to name a few. Works focusing on the issues that can be encountered in the context of empowerment were published: probability of a political conflict and alienation when all groups – clients, lower-level officials, senior officials and local communities – get empowered at the same time (Peters & Pierre, 2000); probability that through empowerment, decentralization and regional reforms regional parties could become more radical instead of taking a moderate ideological stance (Massetti & Schakel, 2013); and such issues as possible radicalization of minorities and their call for autonomy (Jenne, Saideman & Lowe, 2007; Jenne et al., 2007; Siroky & Cuffe, 2014). However, so far we have been unsuccessful in finding any work that would tie empowerment together with unconventional warfare. There have been discussions about countries delegating warfare to insurgent forces instead of using their own military (Salehyan, 2010), however, in the first place that calls for a rebel force to exist and no presence of outside agents. Recently cases showed that it is not always needed.

Usually the definitions of the term *empowerment* have in common with the idea of "giving power" to someone be it a person or a socio-economic group who has been deprived of it. However, those types of definitions are quite similar to the definitions of the word *empower* the Oxford English Dictionary has deemed rare and obsolete. These are "to bestow power upon, make powerful" and "to gain power over" (Lincoln et al., 2002, p. 272). It is quite understandable why such a line of reasoning might seem appealing especially in the context of the political science and its sub-disciplines.

A seemingly good way to summarize – in layman's terms – what politics and the political science is about, is the title of the book by American political scientist Harold D. Laswell of 1936 *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. No matter how one looks at it politics is always about getting something – money, rights, opportunities, freedom, more power, etc. And it must be done in a way that is acknowledged as legitimate. But not everyone has the knowledge and means – or one might call it "power" – to enter the arena where the distribution and negotiations take place. Taking that into regard one should stop connecting "empowerment to power *per se* and address instead its more indirect end, as in the Oxford English Dictionary's more common usage that is the acknowledgement of power to achieve an end rather than an end in itself" (Lincoln et al., 2002, p. 273).

In the context of this paper, we have chosen to look at empowerment trough the above mentioned prism – as the process of providing means to achieve a goal. As a result the working definition of empowerment for this paper will be the one provided by *The World Bank*: "empowerment" is the

"the process of increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes" (The World Bank, 2011). The "process of increasing the capacity of individuals" will be understood as the provision of material or non-material resources, for example, knowledge, expertise or money, to an individual or individuals in order to achieve a goal – be it made known publicly or not. Friedman (1992), as quoted by Amdam, explains empowerment form just this perspective: "empowerment thus implies a gathering of power in a dynamic way over a period of time in a combination of external support and internal mobilization" (Amdam, 2010, p. 1806).

As it has been mentioned in the introduction, we believe that there is a potential for danger embedded in the concept of empowerment. Our reasoning is a follows: even in small countries, for example in Latvia, differences amongst various regions can be spotted. They can range from such small things as local place names to representing an entirely different culture altogether. These differences can serve as a "way in" for a hostile power. Under the right set of circumstances and using the means of empowerment – under pretence of democracy or defence of human rights – we believe that a hostile power can cause threat to or even actually compromise the territorial integrity of the country. Recent events serve as a basis for our concern: what started with the military conflict between Georgia and the regions of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia which were supported (we might even say empowered) by Russia, is continuing now in Ukraine in the regions of Crimea and Donbas. Even in Latvia we periodically hear a call for a need of autonomy for Latgale region.

Regional empowerment

The concept of empowerment *per se* is definitely a next logical step in the evolution of public administration. Public administration practices have evolved from highly centralized and hierarchical governments to the concepts of the new public management and good, SMART, governance. They have gone from giving and following orders from higher levels of government to empowering the lower levels of governments to take more control over their present, future issues and successes. Yet we believe that there is a potential for a hidden danger. We are concerned that under the right set of circumstances an outside power can use the ideas of empowerment as the means of unconventional warfare.

As we have defined in the previous section, empowerment is about increasing the capabilities of a given group. That encompasses such intangible things as realization of one's power to make a difference and influence the policy process and the quality of one's life and raising the self-confidence of a given group and such tangible things as, for example, granting money or building a new facility. We can distinguish three major groups empowerment is usually directed to in the context of public administration: "the clients and citizens, the employees of the public sector and sub-national governments" (Peters & Pierre, 2000, pp. 10-13). "Dynamic regions are often characterized by people participating in both professional and local communities, and by the integration of local horizontal and global vertical relationships" (Amdam, 2001, p. 169). What Amdam is saying is that regional empowerment can be characterized as a mix of all three: the community (or the clients/ citizens), the public sector or local government employees and regional governments *per se* must all be empowered so that the region succeed in achieving its goals.

Why do we need to empower regions? "The fundamental idea is the same (as devolution of power), and decentralization simply empowers decision makers of local or regional governments to make decisions that better match their own needs and capabilities, perhaps within a broad, national framework" (Peters & Pierre, 2000, p. 14). Even if public administration holds expertise in a wide array of issues and has access to various information, the higher levels of government do not have time and energy to deal with every issue every municipality or region encounters. They also do not have the particular knowledge needed to resolve issues in a way that is truly in the best interests of local citizens. So a rational decision is to entrust regions to solve their issues themselves by "steering" instead "rowing". As a result the needs and wishes of local residents can be met more efficiently thus raising satisfaction with and trust in local government institutions.

Regional empowerment thus can be summarized as helping regions to help themselves. In order to fulfil their duties and obligations new regional political institutions can be established if they are needed or non-existing, or in the first place reorganized, or given more discretion. Irrespective of the situation "regional political institutions need a political process to make them legitimate political actors" (Amdam, 2001, p. 170). Amdam (2001) uses Habermas's work on discursive will formation or the legitimization process which encompasses four elements: "1) juridical discourse – the rules of juridical consistency; 2) moral discourse –conflicts

of norms and fundamental choices of values; 3) ethical-political discourse – conflicts of interests; and 4) pragmatic discourse – discussion about facts and data" (Amdam, 2001, pp. 171-172). The combination of these four discourses "legitimate the region as a political actor" (Amdam, 2001, p. 172). And becoming a legitimate actor might make a region interested in more freedom – autonomy or even complete self-determination.

The potential dangers of empowerment

So far the idea of empowering regions has been presented as having quite some benefits – better delivery of services, higher involvement of citizens, improvement of the democratic process, competitiveness stimulation among regions, etc. However, regions are not simply geographic entities. Just like people they have their own characteristics that make them what they are – identity.

"Regions are seen as results and expressions of social relations that may have their origin in complex institutional contexts that can locate in the regions but also outside, and respectively be 'local', 'regional', 'national' and 'global'" (Paasi, 2011, p. 10). A region has its own history and sometimes even a different culture, traditions and language if minority population has settled there. Those factors are important to be taken into account because they are important to people. Taking pride in something that one has gained because of a coincidence might seem irrational to some, however, people tend to take pride in, for example, being residents of a certain city or region. It can be often seen that presuming a person comes from a wrong region is regarded as an insult.

This is an important factor because we believe that this specific regional identity and people taking pride in it can be used as a means in conducting unconventional warfare. And it is especially important in situations where the majority of the region's population is minority in the context of the country. West (1990) in his book *Authenticity and Empowerment*, as cited by Lincoln (Lincoln et al., 2002, pp. 273-274), presents a very important thought for our line of reasoning:

> "According to theories of rationality, people are both individuals and social beings and that the culture within which an individual lives must be seen as "authentic"; that is, consistent with their beliefs and values. If the culture fails to meet these needs, an alternative culture which holds greater authenticity will be sought and through this "dissident" culture individuals will seek collective goals of their members in the face of indifference from a wider society."

Based on this, we further reason that in a situation where people, who identify themselves with a certain regional identity, are not satisfied with the overall national conduct, they can be used to compromise the territorial integrity of the given country since "the constitutive powers of regions may originate both from the region and from the outside, from distant power houses" (Paasi, 2011, p. 12). A hostile power using propaganda, false pretences and means of empowerment can persuade people to accept the culture which will satisfy their "authenticity" needs better than the country to whose culture they belong at the moment. Radcliffe and Westwood (1996), as cited by Paasi, note that "Whether or not regional affiliations mobilize people into conflict with their respective state, their belonging to a region calls upon a sense of community and identity which often questions and nuances national feelings in subtle and distinctive ways" (Paasi, 2011, p. 9). It means that the more persuasive and skilled the hostile power is, the greater are the chances of actual success. In this case success varies – from an outbreak of internal turmoil in the given country to even compromising its territorial integrity and adding the region in question to its own territory.

With "means of empowerment" in this context, we regard actions and resources, that a hostile power might offer the region in question to gain their compliance. As it has been mentioned before, empowerment is usually seen as a positive instrument for all-around community involvement. However, the case of Crimea, which will be analysed below, shows that it can be used to manipulate the said community and compromise the territorial integrity of a country. The resources used in achieving that might include such things as information – no matter how true – about the benefits the community would gain if they were to pledge their allegiance, for example, better living standards; information about how they are being mistreated or oppressed, money, citizenship, help in organizing and persuading the masses and even official or unofficial military assistance. As soon as enough people have been persuaded that they will receive all the promised things, further actions can be undertaken. For example, people will be informed how to "gain" their independence from their "oppressors" – the state – and/or how to join their benefactor – the hostile power – through actions of civil participation, e.g., referendum, or through military actions.

Although empowerment is not equal to revolution, "it appears that empowerment has revolutionary connotations, that it is a process by which the oppressed may become free. In the process, they enjoy a liberating and enabling experience"

(Lincoln et al., 2002, p. 284). However, "oppression" can be quite relative – what one claims as being oppressed another sees as a normal situation. This allows the "feeling of oppression" to be artificially created through skilfully constructed rhetoric and the means of propaganda. As soon as it has been done, the opportunity to infuse in the "oppressed" minority an idea of liberation be it greater autonomy or complete self-determination. "Where there is an intermixture of self-identifying and territorially compact national groups, independence of a particular group could create new demands for self-determination" (MacFarlane & Sabanadze, 2013, pp. 614-615).

"It is widely accepted that violations of human rights on their own do not offer decisive moral grounds for coercive intervention by outsiders, rather they provide outside agents with merely *pro tanto* reasons for various modes of action" (Levitov, 2015, p. 292). The country to which the minority in question has a connection – we shall call it "Motherland" – might use the claims of oppression and violation of human rights as grounds for action. It is not unusual for the Motherland to use empowerment with minority communities in other countries through promotion of their arts, culture, language, traditions, etc. Compromising a state's territorial integrity is usually not among those activities. However, if the Motherland has hostile intentions, empowerment and its revolutionary connotations can be used for just that purpose as it will be shown below.

Self-determination and proclamation of national states or autonomous territories have always been controversial acts as virtually no constitution of modern states foresees legal procedure for secession of part of its territory for any reason. Preserving a state's territorial integrity is a basic task. "If states have final jurisdiction within their territories and if the principle of territorial integrity is accepted, then it follows that a minority within a larger state does not have the right to challenge that jurisdiction or to seek change in the territorial boundaries of the state through secession" (MacFarlane & Sabanadze, 2013, p. 611). However, in history we have seen territories split to become independent countries, for example, Yugoslavia, Bangladesh and/or the Bengalese of East Pakistan.

Events in Crimea: brief summary

In 2009, as the result of signing a declaration at the Prague summit, the Eastern Partnership was established with the goal to improve the relations between the European Union and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (The European Commission, 2013). What the EU offered was "cooperation, free trade and financial contributions in exchange for democratic reforms" (SPIEGEL staff, 2013). Four years later, in November 2013, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers announced its "decision to suspend preparations to sign the Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius" (Service, 2015). There were rumours about this being the result of a secret meeting between President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych (SPIEGEL staff, 2013).

After the announcement was made public, peaceful protests start – people want to demonstrate their discontent with the aforementioned decision. Soon the situation turns violent as "more than 100 people reportedly died in 48 hours as protesters and police clash in Kiev, with government snipers opening fire" (The Telegraph's foreign staff, 2015). By 24 February 2014 "pro-Russian gunmen seize government buildings in Simferopol" (The Telegraph's foreign staff, 2015). Soon after, on March 1, "Russia's parliament approves President Vladimir Putin's request to use force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests" (BBC News, 2014a), which however gets cancelled a couple of months later. In the span of less than 2 months Crimea organizes referendum that results in secession from Ukraine (The Telegraph's foreign staff, 2015). The situation still remains turbulent as Ukrainian armed forces clash with pro-Russian rebels. By 7 April "protesters seize government buildings in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine and by 11 May The Donetsk and Luhansk "People's Republics" declare independence after referendums" (The Telegraph's foreign staff, 2015). The crash of the Malaysian airplane in eastern Ukraine only serves to heighten the tension between Russia and the West (BBC News, 2014a). Now, almost 2 years since these events set into motion, opinion polls show that the majority of people living in Crimea believe that secession from Ukraine was the right thing to do (Rapoza, 2015) despite the ever worsening humanitarian crisis as "the number of Ukrainians in need of assistance has now reached a total of five million people" (United Nations News Service, 2015).

In his speech on 18 March 2014, two days after referendum, V. Putin referred to Crimea as a "cow they had milked". He described the current authorities in Kiev "fascists, neo-Nazis and anti-Semites" (Kelly, 2014). He kept lamenting the collapse of the Soviet Union and referring to Crimea as the "Russian land": "When Crimea ended up in a different state, Russia realized that not only Russia was robbed but Russia was robbed in broad daylight" (Kelly, 2014). V. Putin had also

made promises to "rehabilitate the ethnic Tartars, a minority Muslim that makes up about 12% of the Crimeans today" (Kelly, 2014). In addition to that, already in December 2013, just after the protests had begun, "it was announced that Russia would buy $15 billion worth bonds from the Ukrainian government. The cost of Russian gas supplied to Ukraine was slashed from more than $400 per 1 000 cubic metres to $268.5" (BBC news, 2013). In addition to that, Russia has also sent, and seems inclined to keep on sending, more than 30 humanitarian aid convoys that bring food and non-food items, including educational materials for children, to Ukraine (SPUTNIK News, 2015).

Empowerment – weaponized?

It has been noted that there is no "magic" recipe for empowerment (Lincoln et al., 2002) – no single set of steps to be taken or a set of policies to be implemented guarantee that the intended group or area will be empowered. The basic rule – help people help themselves. However, based on what has been written before, attempts can be made to compile a list of actions that can be undertaken in order to empower, in this case the region and its community (Amdam, 2001, 2006; Lincoln et al., 2002): 1) to create and, if needed, to legitimize / recognize regional institutions (and regions) as equal political players; 2) to provide information about rights, opportunities for actions and resources available; 3) to provide these resources when a certain set of conditions has been met; 4) to get a civic society involved in planning and other processes that determine the further development of the region, for example, through public consultations or local referendums; 5) to create opportunities for socially disenfranchised groups to voice their needs and opinions; 6) to involve elected representatives at a higher degree, for example, through consultations with the public, meeting with the residents on a regular basis or developing mechanisms that allow them to voice the concerns and needs of their constituents at national level; 7) to encourage evaluation of and learning from the past actions and experiences, own and foreign. Of course, that is not a complete or absolute list. That is just an attempt to put forth some guiding clues for further analysis.

So, what clues can we identify in the case of the Ukrainian crisis? Firstly, we must take into account the ethnic composition of Crimea. It played an important role in the way the events unfolded. Almost 60% of the population of Crimea are ethnic Russians (BBC News, 2014b). In addition to that, "Russia has been the dominant power in Crimea … since it annexed the region in 1783. But it was transferred by Moscow to Ukraine, then part of the Soviet Union, in 1954. Some ethnic Russians see that as a historical wrong" (BBC News, 2014b). That alone provides a strategic advantage for Russia. Secondly, there was a need to "stir the pot". The rumoured secret meeting, which was followed by the announcement of signing the Association Agreement being postponed, served perfectly for this purpose. The European Union is still seen by many as a symbol of "a very good life" – travelling, movement of labour and capital, grants, high standard of living, etc. – despite the fact that in reality it is not so simple, Greece being a perfect example. And who does not want to lead good and affluent life? Peaceful protests turning violent was the "last drop" – the culture failed to be seen as "authentic" as the West would put it. And exactly that was what Russia needed to make its entrance and present itself as an alternative culture to lean on: it offered assistance fixing the damage done by protests, the price for gas was lowered quite significantly, there was a promise to buy Ukrainian government bonds to save it from bankruptcy and (at the beginning of March) the declaration to protect its citizens. In short, Russia demonstrated that it has resources and is willing to provide them. The Ukrainian Parliament voting to "ban Russian as the second official language caused a wave of anger in Russian-speaking regions; the vote later was overturned" (BBC News, 2014a). However, it only served to make Russia "more attractive".

Thirdly, seizure of strategically important objects, government buildings and airports (BBC News, 2014a). And that was done not by civilian protesters as it was in Kiev but by armed gunmen in unmarked uniforms (BBC News, 2014a; Oliphant, Blair & Walters, 2014) That happened a couple of days before the Russian Parliament officially approved V. Putin's aforementioned request to use force to protect Russians. However, it served its purpose to show that Russia has enough resources to take care of the interests of its citizens. Fourthly, empowerment of people by giving them a choice – referendum – whether to join the Russian Federation or not. That not only made people believe that they have power to make influence on the future development of their lives and region but also made it seem legitimate from the democratic point of view: we were not occupied or annexed, we chose that. Moreover, that also legitimated the region as an equal political player that can take responsibility for its future development. Fifthly, providing information before referendum. In that case – propaganda that put Russia in an even more favourable light. That was done by silencing the media that were not under Russian control, "fanning" the fear of fascism, a bright example is billboards showing two outlines

of Crimean territory: one painted with the Nazi flag, the other – in the colours of the flag of the Russian Federation; using the aforementioned (latter abolished) law to cancel Russian as the official language as the means of showing that Russian people are not treated justly; using vague statements and presenting its troops as mere self-defence or rebel groups (Yuhas & Jalabi, 2014). The acts of financial help and lowering the gas prices were additional acts to show that Russia is the better alternative with a promise of better life.

To summarize, Russia put on a very intricate act. It used the results of historical events, its material and financial superiority and poorly worked out actions by the Ukrainian government to its advantage. It used propaganda and the means of empowerment – gave people a choice and an opportunity to affect their future, provided information and resources and presented its military actions as grass-root level initiatives – and achieved favourable results of the Crimean referendum. It also used learning as the means of empowerment – less than a month later there were calls for referendum in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, which directed accusations at Russia for "attempting to repeat the "Crimea scenario" in eastern Ukraine" (Oliphant & McElroy, 2014). Had the Crimean events and referendum not turned out successful, one might speculate that these two regions would not have called for independence. People saw that it is possible, and that empowered them enough to make a choice - to secede from Kiev. To sum up, all that shows that there is a potential threat in the concept of empowerment. Under a favourable set of circumstances it can be weaponized and used to effectively compromise territorial integrity of a sovereign country.

Is this Russia's new generation warfare?

The events in Ukraine evoked some academic debates on how to label the Russian style of unconventional warfare. One of the most common publicly used terms is *hybrid warfare*. Despite the fact that the term has been adopted by NATO and EU officials, it is unclear whether they refer to already known terms of unconventional warfare or this term will be developed as something new. That poses some challenge when we are attempting to build our analysis on scientific foundation as we have done in other, more developed, academic discourses.

Despite many speculations about "fourth generation warfare" referring to Lind's idea that warfare has generational evolution (Lind, 2004) or the concepts describing "Russia's new generation warfare" (Bērziņš, 2015) we tend to agree with arguments that Russian warfare still fits in the internationally agreed framework of spectrum of conflict and which by its nature belongs to the family of unconventional military operations. We can still admit that the way Russia implements the age-old concept of unconventional warfare is new and indeed can be regarded as a novelty in the art of war. Nevertheless, some authors argue that it is a methodological mistake to try to fit Russian "new generation warfare" in Western concepts, as theory developed independently by Russian military must be fundamentally different because it reflects another way of thinking and strategic understanding of the way of conducting warfare (Bērziņš, 2015). However, evidence suggests that this type of warfare is not so new and previously unseen (Bowdish, 2013). To understand a broader nesting of the concept in this article we use for reference conceptual definitions found in US Army publications and manuals.

As recent research by the US Army Irregular Warfare Centre states, warfare can be regarded as one of the oldest trades of human kind:

> "As nature of humans never changes, also nature of warfare does not change over time. It is character of warfare that changes constantly. These changes are based on the evolving context of the environment and the new technologies that enable new approaches to war and warfare" (USJFCOM Joint Irregular Warfare Centre, 2011, p. 4).

If we analyze Russian operations from the theoretical point of view, the actions in Crimea still fit in the existing theoretical framework of Conflict Studies. The basic framework of all Russian military actions did not significantly differ from any other military operations. It still had all elements of the phases listed by any modern military doctrine, i.e. strategic build-up, massing troops and pooling resources; declaration of war or engaging in warfare by surprise attack; use of military units to defeat manpower, firepower; ensuring control over the territory, etc. [1]

As some researchers put it:

> "Russia's method of warfare against Ukraine is not new, despite the claims of many analysts. War was rarely ever a purely military affair. It

[1] Most academic analysis so far have been based on the assumption that the Russian Federation has been an active participant in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine from the very beginning of political turmoil in Kiev. In case of Crimea, Russian administration implicitly acknowledged involvement of its military only after annexation of Crimea. However, many other indicators, like reports from independent media sources, NATO satellite imagery, information from Western intelligence agencies, captured Russian soldiers in Ukrainian territory, types of equipment filmed, captured or destroyed, proved Russian military involvement and excluded option that political manifestations in Crimea should be considered as kind of internationally recognizable, democratic self-determination effort of local community.

> may be more accurate to conclude that Western analysts generally did not expect Russia to be able and willing to launch war against Ukraine using such a comprehensive approach while denying its involvement. This leads us to turn to Russia's non-acknowledged war" (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2015, p. 44).

How is war in Ukraine labelled?

Western military thought describes the range of military operations as a fundamental construct that provides a context for all military activities. Military operations vary in scope, purpose and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns (US Army, 2014).

The continuum of operations frames application of land power. It includes the spectrum of conflict and operational themes. The spectrum of conflict is an ascending scale of violence ranging from stable peace to general war with unconventional warfare somewhere in the low intensity spectrum of combat.

The same spectrum of military operations has existed for many decades. Similarities based on the same doctrine and tactics can be found by reviewing Russian military operations in the Baltic Sea region during the last century. Some researchers discovered that the same political rhetoric was used in 1939 when Russia engaged in Winter War with Finland (Шама, 2014). Back then, the Russian government used similar arguments and almost the same propaganda and some of tactics as it is using against Ukraine now (Goble, 2014c). What really has changed over 75 years is the use of information technology that enables to turn information into weapon of subversion. The so called *Gerasimov* doctrine states that:

> "modern strategy and tactics is more like progressive erosion of the distinctions between war and peace and between uniformed personnel and covert operatives. Wars are "not declared but simply begin", so that "a completely well-off and stable country" could be transformed into "an arena of the most intense armed conflict in a matter of months or even days" (Jones, 2014).

"New information technologies permit a significant reduction in the spatial, temporal and information gap between the forces and organs of administration" (Goble, 2014a).

The main difference between unconventional warfare and conventional operations is that this type of warfare is waged among and within the people. Actors wage the conflict not for military supremacy but for political power. Unconventional warfare always is waged against an adversary state. As stated in the White paper *Counter-Unconventional Warfare Among State Actors and on the very Frontiers of NATO* produced by United States Army Special Operations Command, Russia's actions in Ukraine correspond to tenets of modern unconventional warfare. "Russia currently employs special operations forces, intelligence agents, political provocateurs and media representatives as well as transnational criminal elements in eastern and southern Ukraine" (United States Army Special Operations Command, 2014, p. 4).

"Mr. Gerasimov quoted Soviet military theoretician Georgii Isserson: "mobilisation does not occur after a war is declared, but "unnoticed, proceeds long before that" (Jones, 2014). The speed and scale of Russian military operation in Crimea suggests that preparations for such well-coordinated, full scale unconventional military operation had been going on unnoticed for a significant period of time. Apparently, unfolding political events in Kiev had been planned as contingencies for triggering military response to once again protect Russian security interests next to its borders. Russian special forces units and regular army in Crimea were well staged. Russian propaganda suggests that overnight the allied Ukrainian nation became the adversary, and peaceful Russian "minority" in Crimea became so endangered that a sense of genocide triggered highly effective political mobilization of already empowered local community. Thus, as Russia's official government stated, the loose, untrained and uncoordinated movement practically in numbered hours acquired cutting edge Russian military uniforms and sophisticated weaponry, neutralized local security forces, seized the key infrastructure and produced a temporary government. Of course, after such showdown following referendum held in support of separatism had little credibility and was taken not seriously internationally.

Despite the official politics of non-acknowledgement, evidence suggests that, despite Russia's denial and visual features of democratic nature of the secession process, there was a strong presence of foreign military force throughout all of the stages of the self-determination processes in Crimea that eventually led to proclamation of independence, referendum for secession and annexation of the peninsula (Czuperski, Herbst, Higgins, Polyakova & Wilson, 2015; Sutyagin, 2015). If foreign military force is used to set preconditions for the desired outcome, the democratic nature of self-determination and subsequent secession are questioned, and the process itself must be categorized as clandestine military operation or subversion to replace local governance and gain control over the territory.

András Rácz, who has conducted so far one of the most comprehensive studies of the concept of hybrid warfare based on the events that took place in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, mapped out the functioning of hybrid warfare. He concluded that hybrid warfare, just like conventional warfare, is composed of three main phases: preparatory, attack and stabilization (Rácz, 2015). As he concludes:

> „Hybrid warfare is built on capitalizing on the weaknesses of a country, on flaws in its political system, administration, economy and society. If an adversary cannot detect sufficient weaknesses, then no full-scale attack can be launched, meaning that hybrid warfare never reaches the second, attack phase. Hence, the best defence against hybrid warfare is good governance" (Rácz, 2015, p. 92).

However, even such benevolent ideas of good governance as the concept of empowerment can be turned to work in favour of hostile force as it has been shown above.

Conclusion

Some might have got the idea that we are trying to label empowerment as something bad or dangerous, however, that is not our intention or goal. We believe that the concept of empowerment is a democratic tool that helps foster a more democratic and engaged society, higher trust between society and various levels of government as well as promotes efficiency. As the article shows, the principles of empowerment can be used by hostile force to compromise territorial integrity of a sovereign country under certain circumstances. Behind the pretence of defending human rights of their citizens the Motherland can use empowerment as a weapon. It is possible because hybrid warfare takes the old saying "all is fair in love and war" quite literally – everything imaginable can and will be used in order to achieve one's goals as it has been discussed above. The government of the country facing these threats has to be very careful in the actions taken and decisions made otherwise they can be used to fuel the propaganda train. In the times when the fight for human rights has been used more than once to invade and put territorial integrity of a sovereign country under threat no one is safe since, as it has been noted above, the feelings of oppression and abuse are quite subjective and relative.

In the case of Ukraine and Crimea, Russia used historical events to its advantage – the feelings of Crimea being unjustly added to Ukraine by nearly 2/3 of its population. Russia also used trauma caused by the Nazi regime as part of its propaganda to fuel the existing fear. The decisions made by the Ukrainian government –postponing signing of the Eastern Partnership Agreement, the anti-protest laws, the law stripping Russian of the status of an official language and the sniper incident – were used to rile up society. In addition to that, by helping Ukraine financially Russia presented itself as a better alternative, and neutralization of the independent media only helped to foster this image. Referendum gave people the feeling of empowerment and democratic choice. To sum up, in the situation where: 1) a large minority makes up the majority of the population of the given region; 2) the feelings of historic injustice and/or trauma exist; 3) there is a large scale discontent with the country's political course; 4) many troops of the Motherland are stationed (the Black Sea fleet in this case) in a rather close proximity to or in the given region; and 5) hasty, not well thought out, government decisions can help a hostile power to weaponize the ideas of empowerment and turn it from the "tool of democracy" into the "tool of unconventional warfare".

That, however, raises a whole set of new questions from the perspective of public administration. We need to start asking ourselves questions like: what other benevolent concepts can be weaponized or what are, or should be, the limitations of good governance – how "far" can it be taken? What are the conditions under which empowerment can be safely used and when should the government intervene? Of course, that encompasses a risk that countries, which presently are only starting to implement the principles and ideas of good governance, might stop or even revert back to outdated practices.

We also need to look at the cooperation mechanisms and channels between the community, secret service/intelligence agencies, the sub-national and national governments and military to avoid potential "Crimean scenarios". The fact that several thousands of enemy troops can invade the whole region in just a matter of days and with no resistance is very disturbing. That only serves to show that there are dangerous gaps in communication and planning that need to be identified and corrected. That also includes a need to review the way minority socialization and inclusion policies are carried out. Even though it is only human nature to have sentiments towards ones country of origin, family roots, etc., there must be something wrong when minority is ready to disregard the laws of the country they live in favour of those sentiments. That needs to be explored in order to mitigate future risks and vulnerabilities.

The good news is that the situation has not been left to unfold by itself. "In fact, in Brussels, at the NATO HQ, the emerging consensus is that the Alliance should work together with the EU to

combine military tools with civilian ones in order to project an integrated civil-military response" (Defence Matters editorial, 2015). However, the bad news is that there is still a lot we do not know. And every uncertainty holds in itself a potential for bigger or smaller threats to security and sovereignty. We hope that this article will inspire discussions and further explorations of known concepts from new points of view through both perspectives, of public administration and international relations.

References

1. Amdam, R. (2001). Empowering New Regional Political Institutions: A Norwegian Case. *Planning Theory & Practice*, *2*(2), 169–185. doi: 10.1080/14649350120068786.
2. Amdam, R. (2006). Empowerment planning: A communicative planning. Retrieved 29 August 2015 from http://www.hivolda.no/neted/upload/attachment/site/group1/notat14_06.pdf.
3. Amdam, R. (2010). Empowerment Planning in Regional Development. *European Planning Studies*, *18*(11), 1805–1819. doi: 10.1080/09654313.2010.512165.
4. BBC news. (2013). Russia offers Ukraine major economic assistance. Retrieved 31 August 2015 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25411118.
5. BBC news. (2014a). Ukraine crisis: Timeline. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
6. BBC news. (2014b). Why Crimea is so dangerous. Retrieved 1 September 2015 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26367786.
7. Bērziņš, J. (2015). Russian New Generation Warfare is not Hybrid Warfare. In A. Pabriks & A. Kudors (Eds.), The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe (pp. 5–182). Riga: The Centre for East European Policy Studies University of Latvia Press. Available at: http://appc.lv/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/War_in_Ukraine.pdf.
8. Bowdish, R. G. (2013). Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts. The Faculty of The Graduate College. Available at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=poliscitheses.
9. Brinkerhoff, D. W., Johnson, R. W. (2009). Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, *75*(4), pp. 585-607.
10. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. (2015). Russia and the West: The Consequences of Renewed Rivalry. Canada. Available at: https://www.scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/wrldwtch/2015/RUSSIA_AND_THE_WEST-ENG.PDF.
11. Coleman, H. J. (1996). Why employee empowerment is not just a fad. *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, 17(4), pp. 29-36. doi: 10.1108/01437739610120574.
12. Couto, R. a. (1998). Community Coalitions and Grassroots Policies of Empowerment. *Administration & Society*, *30*(5), pp. 569-594. doi: 10.1177/0095399798305004.
13. Czuperski, M., Herbst, J., Higgins, E., Polyakova, A., & Wilson, D. (2015). Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin's War in Ukraine. Retrieved 4 September 2015 from https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201503_BP_Russian_Forces_in_Ukraine_FINAL.pdf.
14. Defence matters editorial. (2015). What's next for NATO in Afghanistan? Retrieved 4 September 2015 from http://www.defencematters.org/index.php?page=article&art_id=53.
15. Economist, T. (2008). Rosabeth Moss Kanter | The Economist. Retrieved 5 August 2015 from http://www.economist.com/node/12492049.
16. Euronews. (2015). French MPs defend controversial visit to Crimea. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://www.euronews.com/2015/07/23/french-mps-defend-controversial-visit-to-crimea/.
17. Fernandez, S., Moldogaziev, T. (2011). Empowering Public Sector Employees to Improve Performance: Does It Work? *The American Review of Public Administration*, *41*(1), pp. 23-47. doi: 10.1177/0275074009355943.
18. Fernandez, S., Moldogaziev, T. (2013). Employee Empowerment and Job Satisfaction in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 0275074013507478–. doi: 10.1177/0275074013507478.
19. Fischer, F. (2006). Participatory Governance as Deliberative Empowerment: The Cultural Politics of Discursive Space. *American Review Of Public Administration*, (1992), pp. 19-40. doi: 10.1177/0275074005282582.
20. Goble, P. (2014a). Putin's Actions in Ukraine Following Script by Russian General Staff a Year Ago. Retrieved 4 September 2015 from http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-actions-in-ukraine-following-script-by-russian-general-staff-a-year-ago/.
21. Goble, P. (2014b). Putin's Visit Seeks to Legitimate Russia's Illegal Occupation of Crimea. Retrieved 6 September 2015 from http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-visit-seeks-to-legitimate-russias-illegal-occupation-of-crimea/.
22. Goble, P. (2014c). Window on Eurasia: 75 Years On Russia Again Engaged in a Winter War. Retrieved 4 September 2015 from http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/11/window-on-eurasia-75-years-on-russia.html.
23. Jenne, E. K., Saideman, S. M., Lowe, W. (2007). Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization. *Journal of Peace Research*, *44*(5), pp. 539-558. doi: 10.1177/0022343307080853.
24. Jones, S. (2014). Ukraine: Russia's new art of war. Retrieved 4 September 2015 from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ki4XWCqN.
25. Kelly, M. B. (2014). PUTIN: CRIMEA IS PART OF RUSSIA. Retrieved 31 August 2015 from http://www.businessinsider.com/live-putin-speaks-about-crimea-2014-3.
26. Kim, S. Y., & Fernandez, S. (2015). Employee Empowerment and Turnover Intention in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy. *The American Review of Public Administration*. doi: 10.1177/0275074015583712.

27. Levitov, a. (2015). Human rights, self-determination, and external legitimacy. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, 14(3), pp. 291-315. doi: 10.1177/1470594X14544285.
28. Lincoln, N. D., Travers, C., Ackers, P., Wilkinson, A. (2002). The meaning of empowerment: the interdisciplinary etymology of a new management concept. *International Journal of Management Reviews*, 4(3), pp. 271–290. doi: 10.1111/1468-2370.00087.
29. Lind, W. S. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=1702.
30. MacFarlane, N., Sabanadze, N. (2013). Sovereignty and self-determination: Where are we? *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, *68*(4), pp. 609-627. doi: 10.1177/0020702013511184.
31. Massetti, E., Schakel, A. (2013). Between autonomy and secession. Decentralization and regionalist party ideological radicalism. *Party Politics*, 47–48. doi:10.1177/1354068813511380.
32. Oliphant, R., Blair, D., Walters, J. (2014). Ukraine: Russia launches "armed invasion" as Obama warns Moscow of "costs" of intervention. Retrieved 1 September 2015 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10669475/Ukraine-Russia-launches-armed-invasion-as-Obama-warns-Moscow-of-costs-of-intervention.html.
33. Oliphant, R., McElroy, D. (2014). Eastern Ukraine protesters push for Russian rule. Retrieved 1 September, 2015 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10749701/Eastern-Ukraine-protesters-push-for-Russian-rule.html.
34. Paasi, A. (2011). The region, identity, and power. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 14, pp. 9-16. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.03.011.
35. Pallot, J. (2001). Transparency in local government: antipodean initiatives. *European Accounting Review*, 10(3), pp. 645-660. doi:10.1080/09638180126794.
36. Peters, B. G., Pierre, J. (2000). Citizens Versus the New Public Manager: The Problem of Mutual Empowerment. *Administration & Society*, 32 (1), pp. 9-28. doi:10.1177/00953990022019335.
37. Price, D. H. (2015, May 8). How did Europe construct its longest peacetime ever? *The Brussels Times*. Brussels. Available at: http://brusselstimes.com/opinion/2974/how-did-the-europe-construct-its-longest-peacetime-ever.
38. Rácz, A. (2015). *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist*. Available at: www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIAReport43.pdf
39. Rapoza, K. (2015). One Year After Russia Annexed Crimea, Locals Prefer Moscow To Kiev // Forbes. Retrieved 31 August 2015 from http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/03/20/one-year-after-russia-annexed-crimea-locals-prefer-moscow-to-kiev/.
40. Reuters. (2014). Crimea referendum: 96.8% vote to join Russia – video. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/mar/17/crimea-referendum-96-8-percent-vote-russia-video.
41. Running, D. M., Ligon, J. B.,Miskioglu, I. (1999). Local Government-Sponsored Community Development: Exploring Relationships Between Perceptions of Empowerment and Community Impact. *Journal of Composite Materials*, 33(10), pp. 928-940. doi: 0803973233.
42. Salehyan, I. (2010). The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(3), pp. 493–515. doi:10.1177/0022002709357890.
43. Service, E. E. A. (2015). Fact Sheet: EU-Ukraine relations. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140514_02_en.pdf.
44. Siroky, D. S., Cuffe, J. (2014). Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism. *Comparative Political Studies*, *48*(1), pp. 3-34. doi:10.1177/0010414013516927.
45. SPIEGEL staff. (2013). How the EU Lost to Russia in Negotiations Over Ukraine Trade Deal. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eu-lost-to-russia-in-negotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html.
46. SPUTNIK news. (2015). Russia Preparing 37th Humanitarian Aid Convoy for Donbass. Retrieved 31 August 2015 from http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150824/1026110035/russia-humanitarian-convoy-donbass.html.
47. Sutyagin, I. (2015). *Russian Forces in Ukraine*. Available at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201503_BP_Russian_Forces_in_Ukraine_FINAL.pdf.
48. The European Commission. (2013). Eastern Partnership. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/index_en.htm.
49. The Telegraph's foreign staff. (2015). Ukraine crisis: timeline of major events. Retrieved 30 August 2015 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11449122/Ukraine-crisis-timeline-of-major-events.html.
50. The World Bank. (2011). Empowerment. Retrieved 1 September 2015 from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTEMPOWERMENT/0,,contentMDK:20245753~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:486411,00.html.
51. Thompson, L. S., Butler, G. (2015). Empowering Communities to Influence Public Policy: Healthy Damilies Maryland - A Case Study // *Policy, Politics & Nursing Practice*, *2*(2), pp. 167-172. doi:10.1177/152715440100200214.
52. United Nations News Service. (2015). As Ukraine fighting continues, UN warns of worsening humanitarian crisis. Available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51380#.VeQfDvbtmkp.
53. United States army Special operations command. (2014). Counter-Unconventional Warfare. Public Inteligence. Available at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/USASOC-CounterUnconventionalWarfare.pdf.
54. US Army. (2014). Joint Publication 3-05: Special operations. *Defense Technical Information Center*. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf.
55. USJFCOM Joint Irregular Warfare Centre. (2011). *Irregular Adversaries and Hybrid Threats: an assesment 2011*. Available at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/USJFCOM-IrregularThreats.pdf.

56. Yuhas, A., & Jalabi, R. (2014). Russian propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: how does it work? Retrieved 1 September 2015 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media.

57. Шама, О. (2014). Принудительно-освободительная. Ровно 75 лет назад СССР развязал войну против Финляндии. Retrieved 4 September 2015 from http://nv.ua/publications/prinuditelno-osvoboditelnaya-75-let-nazad-sssr-razvyazal-voynu-protiv-finlyandii-22338.html.

Beinarovič a, I. D., Kleins, D.

Ermächtigung - ein zweischneidiges Schwert?

Zusammenfassung

Das Konzept der regionalen Ermächtigung fördert die Stärkung der horizontalen Strukturen der Macht, d.h. es fördert das gesellschaftliche Engagement, die Entwicklung der lokalen Wirtschaft und die Wahl von eigenen örtlichen Vertretern. Die Grundidee des Konzeptes ist es, den Regionen einen Anreiz zu geben, mehr Verantwortung zu übernehmen und so die Abhängigkeit von nationaler Regierung zu verringern. Die Regionen werden autarker und sind in der Lage ihre eigenen Probleme ohne die Beteiligung von höheren Ebenen der Macht zu lösen. Obwohl das Konzept der Ermächtigung *per se* auf jeden Fall ein logischer nächster Schritt in der Entwicklung der öffentlichen Verwaltung ist, sind wir der Meinung, dass es die potenzielle versteckte Gefahr darin besteht. Wir glauben, dass durch die autarke Entwicklung der Regionen dem Staat unkonventionelle Hybrid-Kriegsführung drohen kann.

In unserem Artikel wird dieses Problem unter Berücksichtigung des Falls der ukrainischen Krise behandelt. Man muss darauf hinweisen, dass das Konzept der Ermächtigung in diesem Artikel als Zwecksmittel zur Selbstverantwortlichkeit und Selbstbestimmtheit einer Bevölkerung oder einer Region und nicht als Verleihen der Macht verstanden wird. Das heißt, man ermächtigt Leute oder Regionen, den Zweck zu erreichen – die Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe.

In der wissenschaftlichen Literatur wird das Konzept der Ermächtigung nicht eindeutig formuliert. Deshalb wird als erster Schritt die Analyse der wissenschaftlichen Literatur durchgeführt, um eine Liste von Kriterien, die den Begriff Ermächtigung definieren, festzustellen.

Aus der Analyse der wissenschaftlichen Literatur lassen sich 7 Kriterien des Konzeptes Ermächtigung feststellen: a) die Erstellung - wenn es nötig ist - und die Legitimierung vs. die Anerkennung von regionalen Institutionen (und Regionen) als gleichberechtigter politischer Akteure; 2) die Bereitstellung von Informationen über die Rechte, Handlungsmöglichkeiten und Ressourcen, die zur Verfügung stehen; 3) die Bereitstellung von Ressourcen, wenn bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt worden sind; 4) die Teilnahme der Zivilgesellschaft an der Planung und an den anderen Prozessen, die die weitere Entwicklung der Regionen bestimmen, z.B.: durch öffentliche Beratungen oder lokale Volksabstimmungen; 5) die Schaffung von Möglichkeiten für sozial entrechteten Gruppen, damit sie ihre Bedürfnisse und Meinungen äußern können; 6) die stärkere Einbeziehung der gewählten Vertreter, z.B. durch ihre Teilnahme an öffentlichen Konsultationen und durch ihr regelmäßiges Treffen mit den Bewohnern. Es sollten Mechanismen entwickelt werden, die den Vertretern erlauben, die Interessen und Bedürfnisse ihrer Wähler auf nationaler Ebene zu vertreten; 7) die Förderung der Auswertung und das Lernen durch vergangene Handlungen und Erlebnisse: eigene und fremde.

Im Weiteren wird eine von uns zusammengestellte Zeitleiste von den Ereignissen in der Krim vorbereitet, um die Analyse durchzuführen. Unter Berücksichtigung der Krim-Situation lassen sich mehrere Kriterien des Konzeptes Ermächtigung identifizieren: die regionalen Institutionen werden als gleichberechtigte politische Akteure behandelt; die Informationen über Ressourcen werden verliehen, z. B.:, durch den Ankauf von Staatsanleihen und die Senkung der Gaspreise; um die Ressourcen zu bekommen, wird eine „Liste“ von Bedingungen aufgeführt, z.B.: man muss sich nur an Russland anschließen; das Engagement der Zivilgesellschaft: in knapp zwei Monaten wird das Krim-Referendum über den Anschluss von Krim an Russland durchgeführt; die Militärtruppen treten als einheimische Rebellen vor; in knapp einem Monat werden in Regionen Luhansk und Donetsk zwei Unabhängigkeitsreferenden durchgeführt.

Zum Schluss lässt sich feststellen, dass die Ermächtigung unter bestimmten Bedingungen tatsächlich als eine zusätzliche Waffe der unkonventionellen Kriegsführung verwendet werden kann: 1) es gibt eine große Minderheit, die die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in einer Region bildet; 2) es gibt Gefühle von historischer Ungerechtigkeit, in diesem Fall der Anschluss von Krim an die Ukraine; 3) es gibt eine große Unzufriedenheit mit der Politik des Staates; 4) es gibt eine große Präsenz der Militärtruppen eines Fremdstaates (z.B.: Schwarzmeer-Flotte) in der Nähe oder in der betreffenden Region; 5) geeilte, nicht durchdachte Entscheidungen der Regierung können einer feindlichen Macht helfen, die Ideen von Ermächtigung von einem „Werkzeug der Demokratie“ ins „Werkzeug der unkonventionellen Kriegsführung“ zu verwandeln.

Daraus folgen die Fragen, welche wohlwollende Konzepte der öffentlichen Verwaltung könnte man als Waffen der unkonventionellen Kriegsführung verwenden; wie weit kann man die Ermächtigung einführen und wo man sie stoppen sollte.

Schlüsselwörter: Ermächtigung, unkonventionelle Kriegsführung, Ukraine, Krim.