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Discursive Power

(Diskursyvioji galia)

Santrauka. Šiame straipsnyje glaustai nagrinėjami galios sampratos formavimosi ypatumai modernioje Vakarų mokslo kultūroje. Teigiama, kad kitų tradicijų įtraukimas į intelektualinę diskusiją suteikia pagrindą platesniam ir gilesniam požiūriui į diskursyviosios galios raišką ir politinės retorikos kilmę.

Galios samprata neatsiejama nuo modernųjų mokslų ir jų metodų kritikos, kuri baigiasi racionalumo krize. Todėl čia vadovaujamasi dviem intencionalumo kryptimis – vertikalia ir horizontalia, parodant, kad modernusis mokslinis racionalumas įtvirtina principus, kurie atmeta vertikalumą. Teigiama, kad mokslinė matematinio metodo koncepcija, kaip būdas konstruoti medžiaginį pasaulį, teikia kalbinių ženklų sistemų suvaržymo pavyzdį. Kad ir nesąmoningai, moderniosios filosofijos ir mokslo formos „išskliaudžia“ kalbinės raiškos formas suteikdamos pirmenybę specifinei kalbai.

Šio straipsnio paskirtis – atskleisti specifinius darinius, kurie lyg ir niekam nepriklauso, tačiau jie sudaro moderniojo supratimo modalumus. Modernioji galios samprata remiasi savita duotybės sandara, pateikiama kaip transcendencija, kuri yra neprieinama tiesioginei intuicijai. Modernusis filosofinis ir mokslinis mąstymas teigia, kad matematika, ar kiekybinės procedūros, yra ne tik metodologinės gairės, bet pagrindžia teorinį mąstymą. Specifinė tokių procedūrų sandara rodo, kad jos apima struktūras ir taisykles, kurios gali būti formuluojamos neatsižvelgiant į santykį su intuicija, t.y. kokybine, tiesioginio suvokimo sritimi.

Kad šios procedūros ir struktūros įgytų pagrįstumą, remiantis šiomis procedūromis, turi būti sukurtas objektyvus pasaulis. Pirma, procedūros turi būti indiferentiškos suvokimo intuicijos atžvilgiu; jos perteikia visus įvykius kaip iš esmės homogeniškus. Antra, pagal šiuos reikalavimus – teoriškai-metodologiškai reikalaujamo homogeniškumo vardu – apibrėžiama intuicijos, tiesiogiai duotos suvokimui, sritis. Moderniojo amžiaus mąstytojai, siekdami rasti vietą formaliai sričiai, išranda „talpyklą“, pavadindami ją protu. Čia tariamai gyvena minėti kiekybiniai ir formalūs komponentai, kurie priklauso subjekto imanencijai.

Postmodernioji semiotika daro prielaidą, kad, viena vertus, nėra „vietų“, kuriose įsikūrusi galia, tačiau, kita vertus, ji visur ir visada įgyvendinama pasitelkiant diskursą. Nors tokia prielaida yra tinkama, vis dėlto svarbu suprasti pagrindžiamuosius galios suvokimo principus. Kaip įrodinėja Edmundas Husserlis, technologizacija numato formalias operacijas, visiškai nepaisydama gyvenamojo pasaulio prasmės struktūrų. Toks formalizmas, suporuotas su homogeniška ir indiferentiška tikrove, galiausiai baigiasi dviem struktūriniais procesais. Pirma, visiškai nepaisoma konkrečių gyvenamojo pasaulio prasmių ir jų horizontų, o antra, formalūs ir technologiniai principai atsiejami nuo konkrečių intencionalumo formų, kurios susieja subjektą su gyvenamojo pasaulio morfologijomis.

Kultūra gali stiprinti savo šeiminkavimą ir praktinę kontrolę plėsdama formaliosios diferenciacijos žymenis ir technologinį aplinkos suvaržymą, stiprindama materialiuųjų išteklių vartojimo efektyvumą. Tačiau tai – krizės pagrindas, nes mokslas įtraukiamas į žmonių gyvenimą remiantis technologiniu materialiuųjų išteklių „vartojimu“, įgyvendinant tas pačias operacijas, kaip ir gamtos pasaulio atžvilgiu.

The phenomenon of power is implicit in numerous critiques of modern sciences and their methods, resulting in the crisis of rationality. Our analyses will follow two intentionalities, the vertical and the horizontal, showing that the modern scientific rationality assumes principles which exclude the vertical. By “intentionality” we mean a way of experiencing the world at the exclusion of other ways. Thus, intentionality is not a private affair but can be carried from generation to generations. For example, scientists invariably will say “let us look at the world mathematically,” proposing a quantitative mode of perception over poetic, ritualistic, etc. The latter, while equally intentional, will be discarded by science.

Thus the scientific conception of mathematical method, as a way of mastering the material world, intimates also a restriction of linguistic sign systems and uses to specific modes, mathematical discourse, at the expense and exclusion of other discursive forms. If not deliberate, there is a specific “bracketing” that was performed by the philosophies and sciences of the modern age that allotted the primacy of all understanding to language, and indeed to a specific language. The result of this development is manifested in the current claims by the semiotics and the deconstructionists that language or discourse is the primary power in all domains of human experience and praxis. While at first sight outlandish, this claim is well justified on the basis of most concrete analyses of modernity, with its ontology and scientific method.

Our approach will trace out this “bracketing” and show what phenomena become discarded and what phenomena remain in order to be constitutive of power. It is hoped that the result of this investigation will reveal specific formations which belong to no one, are nowhere, and yet comprise the very modalities of our modern awareness. What is meant here by

awareness consists of specific noetic practices ruled by, and expressive of, a set of intentionalities. In addition, the noetic practices constitutive of power are also ruled by a specific form of transcendence lending such practices their autonomy. The latter is expressed in numerous ways across various socio-political, economic and scientific formations, aims, and imageries. It lends an appearance of a total transcendental arbitrariness to the noetic practices at all levels. The phrase “noetic practices” encompasses what the human actually does in relationship to the world of objects of whatever type and at whatever level of posited objectivity.

The given

The emergence of modern understanding of power rests on a specific constitution of the given seen as transcendence and inaccessible to direct intuition. The configuration of the given requires a precise deformation of qualitative awareness, its bracketing and hence its reduction to the immanence of the subject. This immanence is subsequently designated in terms of psychology and physiology (Dennet 2004).

This form of bracketing can be called the *Cartesian skepsis*. As is well known, the modern revolution deems reality to be a material extension of atomic parts that are not accessible to experience, although manageable by a method of mathematical manipulation. Following this, the entire modern view claims that what is beyond skepsis is a constitution of a precise reflective method offering univocal and indifferent approach to a specifically constituted objectivity.

This is to say, the endless totality consists of an univocal rationality correlative to the precise requirements of methodology. There is a need to show the ways in which both, the methodology, and the objectivity are constituted and correlated. Invariably, modern philosophical and scientific thinking grants that mathematics or

quantitative procedures are not only as methodological, but founding for all theoretical thought. The specific composition of such procedures suggests that no intuitive content is correlated to them. They contain structures and rules which can be formulated without any relation to the intuitive, i.e. qualitative and categorically articulated domain of direct awareness. Moreover, any meaning such structures acquire is not dictated by these structures. This is to say, the meaning is a matter of will, but in such a way that the will is not compelled by such structures; they have no causal force. The implications of such non-necessary connections will be seen subsequently.

In order for these procedures and structures to gain validity, the objective world must be constituted in accordance with these procedures. First, the procedures are indifferent with respect to perceptual intuition; they treat all events as if they were essentially homogeneous. Second, the perceptual domain of intuition, directly present to live awareness, is transcended in favor of theoretically-methodologically required homogeneity, i.e. posited in accordance with such requirements.

Obviously, the transcendence in this context is minimally double: first, it is the transcendence to consciousness of the qualitative sphere, and second, the transcendence of the posited homogeneous world subtending the qualitative. In this sense, awareness has no access to the second transcendence apart from the theoretical and methodological positing of reality. This is the source of the Husserlian conception of mathematically idealized nature whereby nature becomes a homogeneous mathematical manifold (Husserl 1962, 21–32).

We should not be misled by the concept of homogeneity. The latter might seem to have geometric associations, and hence capable of being given in perceptual intuition; the problem lies in the practice of substituting geomet-

ric formations, the translation of the forms into a mathematical set of signs which do not offer any semblance or intuitive comparison to the geometric domain (Ströker 1960).

The geometric understanding would still offer a field posited as matter, yet with mathematization of geometry, and if one were to take a next step toward formalization of mathematics, one would be able to regard the geometric as quanta, as numerical points, sums, and divisions, arranged in accordance with formal structures. Irrespective of the levels of quantitative-formal constitution, there is posited only one fundamental-transcendent reality. The problems of the constitutive processes both of the theoretical-methodological domain, and the transcendent domain, lead to a particular contradiction which cannot be solved within the parameters of the theoretical-methodological form.

The method is proclaimed to be universal, all-inclusive, and thus able to subsume all phenomena objectively. In this sense, the subject who calculates, and formalizes must be either subsumed under the method, or be the condition for the constitution of the method. If the former thesis is accepted, then the method must assume a position of supremacy over the subject, i.e. be objective; yet this very method permits only one kind of reality: homogeneous matter. The method is not “matter” but “ideality” and indeed a necessary ideality. And yet, if the latter is taken for granted, i.e. that the subject too is to be submitted under the method, then the ideality of the method has no place in the subject, since the subject must be contingent and thus cannot be a basis for the methodological mathematical and formal necessities. In either case, the theoretical-methodological composition is something other than the posited transcendent reality, and the latter is not something given. In fact, the morphologically constituted and directly given world, a world of shapes, path-

ways, axes for practical activity, multi-leveled interconnections, is regarded as complex phenomena that are not identical with the strict homogeneous reality. This non-identity precludes the possibility of deriving the theoretical-methodological formations from the phenomenal-morphological composition of what Husserl called the lived world (Husserl 1962 114ff).

As a result, the former are neither correlative to the intuited world of morphologically composed things and their interconnections, inclusive of the “real” subject, nor are they abstractable from the posited homogeneous world. On these terms, the transcendent world, the world of theoretical objectivity, is not given and cannot be a source of theoretical-methodological compositions. The morphological world is GIVEN, and yet it too is not a source for the understanding of the transcendent world, and neither can account for the theory and method of the modern sciences and the positing of the world of transcendent and perceptually inaccessible homogeneous world. And yet, the theoretical-methodological composition is regarded as GIVEN, and indeed with full evidential necessity.

What kind of necessity? Purely quantitative and formal structures having their own rules and procedures, where the morphological or the material side is completely contingent and arbitrary. With respect to the rules of the formal domain, the morphological and intuitive side, such as sounds or marks, is arbitrarily selectable and changeable. This is one of the more fundamental and initial designations of the formal as necessary and the material as arbitrary. This suggests that the connection between them is not direct, not immediate or GIVEN, but must be INTENDED by an entirely different act. While there are many acts which can comprise the connection, modern thought requires a specific act that is constitutive of power. Such an act has to

be deciphered in its own right. Here we are concerned with the conjunction between the domains which are radically distinct: the theoretical-methodological and the transcendent. To repeat, the former is regarded as necessary and GIVEN, while the latter is regarded as transcendent, contingent and NOT GIVEN.

Formal Region

As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed otherwise, the quantitative-formal, are not within the domains of the contingent world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly intuited morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as different from these domains. Not having any other locus for the formal, the thinkers of the modern age invented a container called “mind” in which these quantitative and formal components reside. They belong to the immanence of the subject.

The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet it is factually a contingent, material substance. This contingency is expressed by Cartesianism in two ways: first, the formal composition, with respect to a posited absolute being, cannot be regarded as necessary. This is to say, the absolute being can will different formal systems; this is an analogical expression of a conception which offers an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of the formal. Second, the formal is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the formal domain swings in the ambiguity between necessity and will, rules and choice.

The importance of this “indecision” consists precisely in the option to either regard the formal as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of na-

ture as created in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one expression. Coupled with the notion that even the mathematical-formal is decidable by an absolute will, the result is obvious: the stress is on the primacy of construction of the formal systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regarded as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the transcendent world. Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and proliferating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the perceptual, intuitive content.

A brief analysis of this disregard will clarify the constructive intentionality, necessary for the understanding of the composition of power in the modern age at the level of signs. To note, while the conception of homogeneity of the transcendent reality can be described by geometrical structures, corresponding to the morphological and perceptually intuited world, the shift from the geometrical signification to the mathematical and formal abandons any kind of intuitive correspondence between the shapes of geometry and the morphological compositions of the lived world.

Hence, any theory of representative correspondence, copy of the world in the "mind" substance, has to be abandoned. The signitive symbolism of quantitative and formal compositions do not offer any intuitive counterpart in the perceptual world apart from the sounds or marks, selected arbitrarily. But these marks, while part of the morphological world, in no wise resemble the theoretical-methodological composition; they simply provide the arbitrary means for perceptual expression. Although there are many complexities in the constitution of the quantitative-formal modes of theoretical-methodological thought, in principle this

thought does not offer any possibility of correspondence between theoretical- methodological compositions and the perceptual world of shapes and structures.

The operations with signified symbolism - the perceptual side of the quantitative-formal - offer themselves in a precise order: they must be arranged sequentially and uni-directionally. They must follow a temporal sequence and must be constructed as sequential. The perceptual intuition into the morphological side of such signitive processes offers an awareness of "progression" from a starting point to a finish. The problem of the finish is not to be taken in a finite sense: the formal procedures lend themselves to indefinite progression and articulation; hence what could be regarded as finish is a decision to stop the formal articulation of theoretical-methodological composition. As noted above, the quantitative and formal processes can be continued indefinitely; any cessation in our operations with them, as was already noted at the dawn of the modern age, is a matter of choice.

Phenomenologically speaking, there appears a specific "lack" on the basis of the transformation from the morphological lived world, present to perceptual awareness, to the formal signitive symbolisms, expressed serially by arbitrary selected marks. The intentional direction toward the perceptual world, capturing the morphological constitution of the lived world, can be designated as VERTICAL. The maintenance of the vertical intentionality requires the presence and continuity of the directly intuited morphology; this intuition can be unfolded horizontally, and if need be in a horizontal performances composed of grammatically structured marks or sounds.

Thus the morphological awareness of a particular object can offer a possibility of eidetic variation to yield a pure geometric figure, whereby the morphological awareness becomes

an intuitive exemplification of a corresponding eidetic structure. Each morphological variant has a representing capacity, i.e. it can give an intuitive similarity to the eidetic structure, held by vertical intentionality. Yet the constitution of the mathematical-formal need no longer signify the object present to vertical intentionality. It becomes free from any morphological moorings and vertical intentionality and can be articulated on the basis of its own formal procedures. This is to say, it can “progress” uni-directionally, i.e. HORIZONTALLY in a process of either increased formally analytic differentiations or an indefinite repetition of functions.

The specificity of this horizontal process consists of the fact that the criteria of articulation, differentiation, and analyses are intrinsic to the formal discourses. This is quite fitting, since the criteria of the experienced world, the given morphological structures are no longer signified by the formal processes. After all, what the formal process signifies is its own arbitrary selection of means of expression. The formal can be still regarded as necessary and the selected expressive “material” as contingent (although with the previously mentioned ambiguity), yet what leads the process is the possibility of increased formalization of propositions, resulting in the concept of formal systems which can be differentiated into formal sub-systems and of splitting up of systems into distinct formal systems. Disregarding the morphological composition of the lived world, this process pretends to subsume under itself all domains of the world not on the basis of any intuitive content but on the basis of formal designations and differentiations.

Contingency

The previously indicated problematic of the transcendent world emerges here in a new guise. The excluded morphological lived world yields, in accordance with formal systems, no visible

necessity. The posited homogeneous world, transcending all perceptual and intuitive access does not offer any viable view which would make its necessity present. This is to say, it too must be regarded as contingent. Being inaccessible, it must be posited in accordance with the formal definitions and procedures whose necessity would provide a MODEL of explanation not for the perceptual components, but of POSSIBLE PROCESSES DESIGNATED AS MATERIAL.

The contingent is so designated because its necessity comes from another, and in two senses. First, from the formal articulations comprising the theoretical-methodological domain presumed to be correlative to the posited transcendent reality, and second, from a presumed act of an absolute creation (Galileo) such that the theoretical-methodological composition is the very way in which reality is created (Schabert 1978;193ff). This is the symbolic support designated to necessitate the functioning of this reality and to guarantee that our theoretical-methodological forms constitute adequate descriptions of reality. Thus the Galilean exclamation of our greatness (ibid 141ff).

Analogous symbolic ploy was used by Descartes to guarantee the necessity of the objective phenomena. This persistent insistence on securing symbolic assurances for necessity of the processes of the transcendent reality indicates a fundamental realization that left to itself such a reality is contingent, unless it acquires its necessity from elsewhere. This is to say that an appeal to an absolute geometrician is not an attempt to placate the ecclesiastics, but a symbolic effort to legitimate the necessity of an otherwise contingently construed reality and the correlative necessity of the presumed objective theory and method.

If we were to exclude such a symbolism, we would be left with a contingent reality whose necessity would come from another and this is

to say from the theoretical-methodology. Contingency excludes, at the same time essentiality, i.e. the possibility for a vertical intentionality to maintain something permanent with necessary characteristics, accessible to perception, or in case of induction, essentiality with universal validity in the sphere of ontology. The abolition of essentiality (the Greek notion of essential composition of something real) opens the door to the notion of an access to this reality in terms of POSSIBILITY. This is to say, since what IS cannot be perceived, and since its being posited as transcendent reality does not offer any necessity for its composition, then it can be accessed and dealt with in accordance with theoretical-methodological formal possibilities. This is precisely the juncture at which it becomes "necessary" to regard this transcendent reality in accordance with what it can possibly be. Before continuing this line of constitution, it is advisable to interject the first moment which offers itself through the awareness delimited until now.

Power

The problems of power have been discussed from ancient Far East all the way to modern political thought and even post modern semiotics. The last has admitted that power is not to be located anywhere, although its exercise is present everywhere through discourse. Such an admission is well taken, but without a proper grounding in awareness. The task at hand is to indicate what grounds power in awareness and why it cannot be located. To recall the previous discussion and its basic composition: the lived world of morphologically constituted and intuitively accessible events and objects is bracketed under scientific skepticism; the posited transcendent and homogeneous reality is inaccessible to perception.

The constitution of the theoretical-methodological formalisms have no intuitive counter-

part, i.e. no vertical hold. They can be articulated horizontally in a serial, unilinear progression in accordance with their own intrinsic rules. The homogeneous transcendent reality is contingent and hence open to POSSIBILITY. As a result, there is no necessary connection between the theoretical-methodological formalisms, or their signitive functions, and the transcendent reality. The connection is arbitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality which is not necessitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the formal signitive factors to the posited reality.

The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the "application" of theory to "praxis," the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is a reshaping of the environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts to "humanize" nature and the "human animal," the aims at improving nature, the fascinating pronouncements that if god is dead, then everything is permitted, the exclamations that something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own precepts, etc. In principle, the intentional connection between the formally constituted domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it need not respect any prescription and qualitative composition of the lived world. And yet it is a required nexus between the theoretical and the real. After all, the signitive formal compositions do not point to anything that would be intuitively similar to such compositions. Arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the real.

While this might seem obvious, there appears an unnoticed requirement for this correlation: concrete activity. The formal compositions, not having any similarity to anything intuitively present to perception, cannot be cor-

related to anything perceptual; hence by excluding the perceptual, the correlation requires an active intervention and construction of the posited homogeneous world in accordance with the formal requirements. In this sense, the formal requirements comprise POSSIBILIZING arrangements which direct the construction of the real in accordance with formal requirements. This is to say the intention to control the environment under whatever guise is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness in the connection between theory and “reality.”

Arbitrariness, as a ground for power, might run counter to the usual notions that only set restrictions comprise power, e.g. discursive practices of a tradition. Indeed, it is possible to extend the argument that the classical conceptions of human nature and essence, and indeed an essence of everything else, submitted nature to power under the guise of limits, restrictions and impositions; yet such restrictions were not external but comprised the very way of being without violation. It could be argued that a continuous or at least somewhat stable framework restricts activities and disallows violations “without notice.” Yet arbitrariness lends itself to an emergence of power without reason, or at best from psychological whim, enhanced, prompted, and fed by unlimited possibilities of formal and as a result material constructions.

The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the real swings between two possibilizing structures: the formal possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, reach a point of realization that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed and hence can be reconstructed at will, purely empty significations without any immediate fulfillment in perceptual intuition. These formally designed possibilities are also in a position to align the transcendent reality toward intuitive fulfillment

by human intervention into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter toward material possibilities in accord with the formal designs.

This shaping comprises the source of both, the labor theory of value and life - the primacy of homo laborans – and technology, inclusive of the appearance of political technocracies which promise to redesign the environment and the human in line with the theoretical-methodological requirements: a world produced by science. Some scholars in fact suggest that the modern world has two intentional histories: one, a completely unstructured world of completely autonomous individuals, and two, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with the formal designs we ourselves posit. Yet in either case arbitrariness is assumed and the intentionality that swings between the formal and the transcendent is the decisive arbitrator.

This intentionality is not identical with Kantian autonomous will and with Nietzsche’s will to power. Its engagement is with possibilizing constituents both at the formal and at the material levels. The possibilizing allows for formal variations and differentiations of processes into systems and sub-systems, until the sub-systems can become “distinct” sciences, carving out their fields and accessing the environment in accordance with their formal requirements. This simply means an increased refinement of “application” and fulfillment of the formal sphere in the material sphere. This is the technological process.

As Husserl argues, technologization posits formal operations, with a total disregard or indifference to the meaning and truth of nature in the lived world. Such formalism, coupled with the presumed homogeneous and indifferent reality, results in two structural processes when introduced in the lived world. First, a complete

disregard to the concrete meanings and their horizons, including their enactments in the lived world thus leading to increased contingency, and second, formal and technological detachment from the concrete intentionalities which tie the subject to the morphologies of the lived world.

These two components constitute the problematics of the relationship between contingency, detachment, and nature. Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent material nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential distinctions with indifference.

As already suggested, the formal indifferent and disconnected constitution lends itself to a horizontal process of increased formalization of all propositions in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentiations of formal systems. While leading to more complex formal connections, it also includes increased differentiations. In this sense, the material reality can be increasingly differentiated and constructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the material. The increase of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material processes, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. As Jonas suggests, every refined and produced material process offers possibilities for further formal refinements and material rearrangements (Jonas 1981; 73–96).

The horizontal differentiation of formal systems and their correlative material structuration, provide a basis for disciplinary differentiations, each having its own formal approaches and each capable of possible construction of material fulfillment. While this process maintains its basic principles of formal and ma-

terial detachments, it “progresses” toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, both “natural” and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated world where semi-independent spheres call for semi-independent functions and “work.” What is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in which the formal constructs divide the human “material:” the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological, psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated “behaviors,” each semi independent of the others.

It would be redundant to analyze the obvious: the “power” of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of expertise. Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary connection with other spheres. Hence the results of “research” in a specific domain, can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning the intentionalities which would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics for possible application. The lateral differentiation decentralizes responsibility, thus increasing the contingency and arbitrariness, and the latter is increasingly unchained from any constraints.

Every formal rule, and every material result made to fulfill the formal design, become totally arbitrary, offering possibilizing formal and material combinations without end. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, each an expert in its own sphere, need not relate to any other sphere; each can claim that there is no such thing as conclusive evidence precisely because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are,

insofar as they make, and with the making they assume reality and hence increment power and “prove” their momentary success.

It would be redundant to speak of inherent needs since the latter are part and parcel of the possibilizing procedures and become at the same time needs and fulfillment. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we wanted therefore we can make it. What this suggests is that the process of increased contingency and arbitrariness as eidos of power, comprises a self-referential domain. This means that there are no restrictions for the “search for truth.” After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object.

Even in social understanding, the relationship between the formal and material processes are determined by science, i.e. the very self articulation and production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check this process. And each domain has no built in reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease making more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic growth, no biological reasons to stop remodeling of the living processes along new combinations, etc. Any limitation would be regarded as an infringement on the autonomy of research. Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above.

Progress

Given the key intentionality which swings without any essential necessitation between the theoretical-methodological and the transcendent homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is permanent: PROGRESS. It must be without regression, without death, and all formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into calculatively remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent

structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no “subject” that would progress. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and improvements without, of course, attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilizing and hence improvement. In this sense one could say semiotically, and yet on Husserlian basis, that the signifier and the signified, the meaning and the meant, are one.

The question that arises in this kind of progress, and as pointed out, its proliferation of increasing arbitrariness with respect to all phenomena, is the appearance of crisis. What is immediately notable is the disproportion between the sub-system called science and the rest of the culture. The efforts by the theoretically-methodologically designed systems to master the material nature has become exponential. Let us be clear about this: there can be only one domain of progress, and this is the coded and formalized transmission of practices, techniques, or strategies. A culture can increase its mastery and practical control through the increase of formal differentiations and physical interventions in the environment, yet it cannot increase what the environment as a whole has to offer.

There is no progress in nature. We cannot increase material resources, but only the efficiency of their uses. Only the latter can progress. And this is precisely the point of crisis: the sciences are entering human life on the basis of this “use” i.e. making humans function in accordance with the very prescripts that are imposed on the presumed physical world. Thus the question: is this a progress for human life, or is this the arbitrary treatment of the human and hence the subsumption of the human under arbitrariness and its opening up of power over the human?

Obviously, the use and interference is inherent in the processes of modern science, requiring the intentionality which can connect the formal and the material. The human then is submitted to and subsumed under an arbitrariness which includes his own operations. That is, the human also functions in this modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e. violently. Arbitrariness is a “power” which opens an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided within the context of modern understanding of theory and method and their “application.”

The brief discussion of the emergence of power in the modern tradition resulted in sign systems as all encompassing EIDOS of power.

Other traditions should be deciphered and variations performed in order to discover the complete noetic-noematic correlation constituting power. One notion seems to be warranted in the context of our discussion: it is not the discursive limits which exercise power – after all, Greeks were capable of linguistic “dance” within a well designed form – but an arbitrariness which proclaims a homogeneity of a method and the material world which then can disregard not only the limits of qualitatively understood objects, but also the uniqueness of any individual. Arbitrary violation of limits is what will yield modern power. This now can open our understanding to political rhetoric and its power to make, and a broader grasp of the basis of discursive power.

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