This study critically assesses the 2018 Western Balkans Enlargement Strategy, arguing that its failure to accelerate democratic reforms in Serbia and Montenegro was structural. Using a comparative case analysis grounded in the External Incentives Model (EIM), Complex Interdependence theory, and stabilitocracy frameworks, we analyze why EU conditionality proved insufficient against entrenched local elites. The analysis supports three key propositions that explain this stagnation: 1) Reform outcomes negatively correlated with the presence of rival external actors (Russia/China) in key sectors; 2) The strategy’s exclusive engagement with incumbent politicians reinforced the logic of the stabilitocracy model and enabled democratic backsliding; and 3) The failure to link the EU’s high structural leverage to credible enforcement mechanisms left insufficient pressure for costly rule-of-law reforms. The paper concludes that the strategy was fundamentally flawed. It requires urgent recalibration: inclusive, better-resourced, and attuned to geopolitical realities.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.